During the last ten years of his life, Antonin Artaud shows more and more intensively a multi-faceted and caustic refusal for traditional literature and the ordinary practice of writing. But above all, he shows a stylistic impatience for the alphabetic use of the word and the language. By the intention of creating an inhuman language, which could be understood also by the illiterate people, Artaud wants to undermine the significant use of the word, so that he can (...) achieve a non-representative language, a language that could make real. In this perspective, the aim of our work consists in an inquiry of the expressive forms through which Artaud’s last literary production shows the refusal of canonical literature: especially, we attempt to work about the use of glossolalias, drawings and pictograms included in several Cahiers which Artaud draws up during his confinement in the Rodez’s madhouse, as well as in some of the letters that he writes since 1943. (shrink)

Edvard Munch (Løten, 1863 — Ekely, 1944), Antonin Artaud (Marseille 1896–Paris 1948): deux artistes bouleversés par des conditions de santé fragile et par des crises nerveuses. Une relation s’instaure entre eux. Chacun, de manière particulière, invite le spectateur à réviser son rapport avec la mort, la mélancolie et les forces de la nature. Tantôt cette relation s’exprime dans les écrits personnels d’Artaud ; tantôt elle apparaît dans le rapprochement que nous pouvons faire entre les oeuvres graphiques d’ (...) class='Hi'>Artaud, qui mettent en exergue l’influence qui a exercé le peintre norvégien dans sa démarche artistique. Plus tard, l’approximation d’Artaud à la peinture devient plus évidente. Lui-même, non seulement poète et homme de théâtre, est aussi dessinateur et, comme témoigne nombre de ses documents écrits, porte une grande appréciation par l’art d’El Greco, Bosch, Lucas de Leyde, Bruegel et Goya. Cette étude comparative vise analyser le processus d’intertextualité qui accompagne Artaud tout au long de sa vie et qui commence précocement, quand il observe et traduit les références recueillies d’après d’autres artistes. Avec ceux-ci, il est possible de tracer une correspondance, non seulement artistique, mais aussi biographique avec Artaud. Ce projet présente des contributions pour la critique littéraire d'Antonin Artaud. Même si d'autres études ont fait le rapport entre son œuvre et la peinture, et celle d’Edward Munch, il y n’existe aucune étude plus détaillé autour du sujet. (shrink)

Beyond the eras a dialogue seems to have been established between Bruegel the Elder (1525-1569) and Antonin Artaud (1896-1948). The poet’s wonder at the « painting of the North », both realistic and emblematic, reveals his deepest ideal as an artist : painting, a « magical » operation, deploys a power of expression based on signs and no longer on words, which the theatre is also called upon to seize. The juxtaposition of Bruegel’s Triumph of Death and a (...) famous drawing by Artaud, Le Théâtre de la cruauté [The Theatre of Cruelty], highlights the striking convergences between the two artists. Through their pictorial works, both of them renew over the centuries the funerary and mythical symbolism of death, inherited from the macabre scenes of medieval paintings, but also from ancient times. Studying the references to theatrical iconography in Bruegel’s painting, where carnival and crudity of death reinforce each other, allows us to deepen the meaning of these resonances. For the two artists, form and poetic momentum meet so that representation, as a structure common to painting and theatre, fixes a moment of the world, while animating that moment to infinity, thanks to signs conceived as « true hieroglyphs » (Artaud), a problem that Michel Foucault associated with the strongest truth that the experience of madness carries. (shrink)

This chapter examines the ways in which French philosopher Gilles Deleuze offers conceptual resources for an enactive account of language, in particular his extensive consideration of language in The Logic of Sense. Specifically, Deleuze’s distinction between the nonsense of Lewis Carroll’s portmanteau creations and that of Antonin Artaud’s “transla- tion” of Carroll’s Jabberwocky highlights the need for an enactive, rather than merely embodied, approach to sense-making, particularly with regard to the general category of what Jakobson and Halle (1956) (...) call “sound symbolism”. (shrink)

What is the concept of sense developed by Deleuze in his 1969 Logic of Sense? This paper attempts to answer this question analysing the three dimensions of language that Deleuze isolates: the primary order of noises and intensities ; the secondary order of sense ; and the tertiary organisation of propositions. What renders language possible is that which separates sounds from bodies and organises them into propositions, freeing them for the expressive function. Deleuze argues that it is the dimension of (...) sense that brings about this genesis of language, and he analyses in detail the three syntheses that bring about the production of this surface of sense. Yet Deleuze also distinguishes between two types of non-sense: the nonsense of Lewis Carroll's portmanteau words, which remain ensconced in the dimension of sense, and the more profound nonsense of Antonin Artaud's psychotic scream-breaths, which penetrate the almost unbearable world of the primary order of noise and intensities. In the end, the focus of Logic of Sense is less the surface domain of sense than the primary depth of corporeal intensities. What Deleuze calls a ‘minor’ use of language is nothing other than an intensive use of language that constitutes a principle of metamorphosis. (shrink)

‘The Image of Thought’ could be considered to be the most important piece of writing in the entire Deleuzian corpus. This is the chapter of Difference and Repetition that several decades later, Deleuze claims is the ‘most necessary and the most concrete’ (Deleuze 1994: xvii) section of the book, and the one that provides a basis for his later work with Guattari. Here, Deleuze engages with two basic issues. First, he separates out his conception of thinking, and with it, philosophy, (...) from prior philosophical approaches, explaining why the difference of his philosophy from prior systems itself differs from the traditional relationship between philosophical positions. Second, he raises the question of how one should begin to philosophise. As we will see, philosophy often operates by the recognition of implicit presuppositions in prior thinkers, and their refutation. Descartes, for instance, criticises Aristotle for presupposing the transparency of categories such as rational and animal. Kant, in turn, criticises Descartes for presupposing the determinability of his own foundational moment, the cogito. If we see the development of philosophy as the unmasking and critique of presuppositions of prior systems, then the endpoint of philosophy will be a system entirely without presuppositions. This is the goal Hegel aims at with his system of absolute idealism. Deleuze’s claim is that such a model of the progress of philosophy itself operates within one overarching assumption: the good will of thinking. In this essay, I want to relate these questions of thinking and beginnings to the work of one of Deleuze’s predecessors. Deleuze writes of Ludwig Feuerbach that ‘Feuerbach is among those who have pursued farthest the problem of where to begin.’ (Deleuze 1994: 319) As we shall see, prefiguring Deleuze, Feuerbach accuses Hegel of operating within ‘an image of Reason’. While Feuerbach is famous as a precursor of Marx, and for his critique of traditional accounts of religion, I want to here focus on an early piece by Feuerbach, his Critique of Hegelian Philosophy. Here Feuerbach sets out the limitations of traditional philosophical accounts, and provides the groundwork for his own later materialism. Deleuze discovered Feuerbach through his friend Althusser’s translation of his work, published in 1960. While many of the intuitions behind Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought can be found within a broader pantheon of thinkers, including Nietzsche, Bergson, and Foucault, the specific mechanics of Deleuze’s criticism bear a striking resemblance to the formulation of the critique of philosophy in Feuerbach’s earlier thought. I want to explore this connection, first by looking at the dialectical interrelation of two thinkers, Descartes and Hegel, to get a sense for how criticism in philosophy typically operates. I then want to move on to look at Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and philosophy more generally, drawing out several aspects that will be taken up by Deleuze himself. I will then look at some of the ways in which Deleuze goes beyond Feuerbach by recognising some of the limitations that persist in Feuerbach’s own analysis. I will conclude by showing how Deleuze’s desire to think the two common acceptations of aesthetics together (the artistic and the sensible) bring Feuerbach into relation with an unexpected figure: the playwright and poet, Antonin Artaud. (shrink)

This essay explores how contemporary works of critical theory and deconstruction can challenge preconceptions of the body and embodiments and interrogate their limits, particularly in relation to intertwined foldings of desire, gender, race and sexuality. It aims to suggest that Jacques Derrida’s acute concern for the question of translation might help challenge and re-configure the conventional dichotomy between understandings of the body either as physical/material or as socio-culturally constructed. The authors then analyse the questions of translation and untranslatability in relation (...) to interculturality, and explore their implications for thinking the corporeal and the material. (shrink)

The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward an alternative approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from (...) the heterogeneity problem has led to an interesting discussion about the essence of pleasure, it has usually endorsed an introspectionist methodology and other problematic assumptions that have led to doubtful results. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research. (shrink)

One of the main objections against effective altruism is the so-called institutional critique, according to which the EA movement neglects interventions that affect large-scale institutions. Alexander Dietz has recently put forward an interesting version of this critique, based on a theoretical problem affecting act-utilitarianism, which he deems as potentially conclusive against effective altruism. In this article I argue that his critique is not as promising as it seems. I then go on to propose another version of the institutional critique. In (...) contrast to Dietz's version, it targets not the core principles of effective altruism but rather some important methodological assumptions made in EA research, namely diminishing marginal returns and low-hanging fruits. One key conclusion is that it may be time for critics of effective altruism to shift their attention from the theoretical core principles of effective altruism towards the methodological tools actually employed in practice by the EA movement. (shrink)

Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by (...) what their relata are. I argue that, under some plausible additional premises, no account of what grounds these relations in the essence of their relata is consistent with Revelation, at least if we take common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties. (shrink)

L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. (...) — dont on pourrait argumenter la valeur finale.While axiological hedonism has a long history in philosophy, it also has a bad reputation, which has led to it being discarded without proper examination of its plausibility. In this article, I defend axiological hedonism by presenting the main arguments in its favour as well as the criticisms and confusions to which it has been subjected. I pay special attention to the arguments that hint at the specificity of pleasure and displeasure in comparison with other things — friendship, knowledge, justice, etc. — that might be argued to have final value. (shrink)

Philosophy in the City (or PinC, as it came to be known) is an outreach programme led by student volunteers from the University of Sheffield's Department of Philosophy. It aims to bring philosophy out of the university and into the wider urban community, stimulating young and older minds through events and activities organised with local partners, including schools, charities, and a homeless shelter. Since its inception in 2006, the project has seen hundreds of student volunteers from the university engage in (...) philosophical conversations with thousands of local residents from a wide variety of backgrounds. Sixteen years on, what can we learn from the achievements and shortfalls of this initiative? The present paper is not a systematic review of the project’s history, but a retrospective dialogue between the two authors who both participated in its foundation and its early development: Alexis Artaud de la Ferrière was the project’s first President and Joshua Forstenzer its third. In the course of this dialogue, they revisit the initial motivations and ambitions undergirding the project, discuss the obstacles faced throughout their respective tenures of leadership, and analyse the evolving mission of the project against the backdrop of historic changes in English higher education which occurred during this period. (shrink)

Quand nous lisons un livre passionnant, quand nous passons une bonne soirée avec des amis ou quand nous dégustons des mets raffinés, nous nous trouvons parfois dans un état de plaisir. La notion de plaisir traverse de nombreux champs de recherche en philosophie. Une question centrale reste sans doute celle de sa nature : qu’est-ce donc que le plaisir ? Pour y répondre, une comparaison avec d'autres entités mentales plus familières se révèle fructueuse, et permet de mettre à jour ses (...) spécificités propres. La définition du plaisir doit rendre compte de sa diversité, puisque le plaisir semble toujours se présenter sous des formes multiples : qu'y a-t-il de commun parmi toutes les instances de plaisir ? Par ailleurs, le plaisir semble souvent avoir un objet, ce qui soulève une série de questions : Quel type de chose peut être un objet du plaisir ? Dans quelle mesure l'objet du plaisir constitue-t-il le plaisir lui-même ? Plus généralement, quelle est la nature du lien entre le plaisir et son objet ? Ces questions seront abordées dans la Section 1. Au-delà de ces questions définitionnelles, des questions plus spécifiques se posent concernant la manière dont on peut rendre compte du plaisir dans une optique naturaliste : dans quelle mesure le plaisir est-il une entité qui s’intègre dans une image unifiée du monde dans lequel on vit ? Puisqu'il est généralement entendu que la science manifeste cette ambition unificatrice, comment peut-on rendre compte du plaisir de manière scientifique ? La Section 2 est dédiée à ces questions. Une des principales difficultés rencontrées est que le plaisir ne semble pas neutre. Il paraît plutôt avoir une valeur affective positive, dans un sens qui reste bien sûr à éclaircir. Cette valeur se manifeste d'abord dans le fait que le plaisir est susceptible d'orienter nos actions et réactions : nous sommes typiquement attirés par le plaisir, de la même manière que nous cherchons à éviter la souffrance. C'est l'aspect motivationnel du plaisir. La valeur affective du plaisir semble cependant aller au-delà de son rôle motivationnel, pour donner lieu à des caractéristiques normatives. Non seulement le plaisir motive certaines actions, mais il les justifierait aussi, en fournissant des raisons d'agir qui semblent valides. Plus encore, le plaisir semble bon pour nous, ou nous faire du bien. Il semble donc avoir une valeur prudentielle, en ce qu'il contribuerait à rendre notre vie meilleure. Cela pourrait alors justifier son intégration dans le domaine de la morale. Ces considérations seront l’objet de la Section 3. (shrink)

We study the performance of ChatGPT interpreting prompts that require legal expertise to answer. Our inputs are very close adaptations from the "Contextual Canons" section of Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner's Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson West: 2012). We report our experiments and findings for the entire section (comprising 14 canons) of the book. We conclude that as a legal reasoner ChatGPT is exceptionally successful in taking the contextual canons into account.

To support my Phd theses and results of my grant research in 1999, I asked 1) prominent chemist Antonín Holý, author of substances to treat hepatitis and HIV, about the indivisibility of the art and science (published in Slovak Narodna Obroda and Czech blisty,cz), 2) the distinguished economist William Baumol about the alternative activities (published in Slovak Nove Slovo, Czech Respekt and blisty.cz), 3) Nobel Laureate Clive Granger about the significance of the economics (published in 2004 in Czech weekly Tyden). (...) The interviews were exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, The Ice House between 18. Oct - 3. Nov. 2013. (shrink)

Les pensées de la différence selon Gilles Deleuze et Jacques Derrida se touchent dans leur sujet même, le Sujet qui « fait des histoires et des scènes » construisant le même système différentiel, le monde. C’est ce qui assure une sorte de continuité entre les deux philosophies. Concernant les « thèses » il n’y a aucune différence entre Deleuze et Derrida. Et pourtant, ils ne se laissent pas unir dans une seule et même philosophie de la différence. Les deux histoires (...) ne se laissent pas identifier dans un seul et même discours, elles exigent deux discours différents. Leur Sujet se raconte de deux façons, se joue sur deux scènes parallèlement, alternativement – cela relève d’une différence minime, différence de genre, de style, de geste, qui pourtant change tout. Penser pour Deleuze consiste à entrer dans le jeu, dans l’acte de la différence, à « faire la différence » – pour Derrida c’est comprendre la différence. Une philosophie comme celle de Derrida suspend les philosophies comme celle de Deleuze – une philosophie comme celle de Deleuze ne prend pas au sérieux une philosophie comme celle de Derrida. Leurs pensées s’excluent réciproquement tout en faisant signe l’une vers l’autre - comme le dirait Derrida : selon un certain graphique de la supplémentarité. Renverser le platonisme : changer son ontologie « en hauteur » pour une ontologie « en profondeur » , c’est un jeu immanent de l’ontologie. Le renversement deleuzien du platonisme est de se déplacer insidieusement en lui, mais aussi de se décaler légèrement par rapport à lui, lui ouvrir la porte, y instaurer une autre série de pensée divergente, constituer un para-platonisme, en d’autres mots : le déconstruire. L’effet en sera, selon Foucault, un « Theatrum Philosophicum » de fantasmes, de simulacres, d’événements, d’effets corporels où Freud et Artaud entrent en résonance même en s’ignorant. Derrida joue un tout petit peu différemment, du dehors, ou plutôt à la limite de son dehors. Si on se sert de l’allégorie de Rodolphe Gasché : Derrida s’installe au bord de la réflexion, dans le tain du miroir – on peut dire alors que Deleuze se déplace dans le miroitement, entre les images reflétées. Ils tiennent tous les deux, chacun à leur manière, à la limite de la réflexion, limites internes et externes. L’exemplarité de la relation Deleuze/Derrida réside en ceci : c’est une image de la doublure en soi de la pensée qui tente ses limites. Elle « illustre » la doublure inévitable de la pensée – doublure qui, par ailleurs, appelle à la déconstruction et à son mimétisme. (shrink)

In his Bipartitum in morali philosophia, the Scottish philosopher William of Manderston, a pupil of John Mair, and an Ockhamist philosopher, is quoting a text of Antonin of Padua who distinguishes the factum opened to a juridical qualification from the inner belief, known by God alone. Quoting the same text, the authors of the Malleus maleficarum try hard to distinguish three distinct fields, the inner beliefs which belongs to God, the exterior acts, the facts, which are relevant for the (...) judges, and the third field, which establishes a relation between the fact and the beliefs. This third field is proper to the inquisitors. Against this ethics of imputability, Manderston, relying on Ockham’s ethics, advocates an intentionalist ethics which depends on a sharp separation between interiority and exteriority. The soteriological dimension of the question entirely belongs to the inner life, whereas the exteriority is strictly disciplinary. By his radicality, Manderston appears as a paradigm of the modern dichotomy between conscience and law, Paolo Prodi once pointed out as a cornerstone of the religious modernity. (shrink)

Современность, подарившая человеку свободу от диктата традиций, лишила его возможности определять цели внутри себя. В ХХ-ХХI вв. целью «Я» стало узнавание субъекта-во-мне исключительно в ложном объекте-во-мне, что загнало личность в порочный круг погони дурно сыгранного «Я» за дурно сыгранным «Я». Возникла острая необходимость в возврате к театральности в различных областях искусства, эстетике и обыденности в противопоставление театра одного Я. Вопрос лишь в том, как превратить театральность в практику души.