The article intends to demonstrate that, when building his science, Claude Lévi- Strauss abandons the categories used by the traditional studies of the myth and creates singular epistemological tools, suggested by the music, by the natural science and by the plastic arts. These tools, which we can denominate aesthetic operators, light up, in an exemplary way, the dissolution process that suffers the mythical matter when transforming in the time and in the space. When establishing that new form of (...) thinking, the myth, that reconciles the sensitive experience with the intelligible, Lévi-Strauss proposes to overcome the permanent dichotomy between knowing archaic and modern, between magical and scientific thought, between magic and Science. (shrink)

Při výběru z teorií, které bychom mohli aplikovat na problém, jímž se zabýváme, je pro nás účinnost jejich použití jedním z nejdůležitějších kritérií. Jinými slovy, naše hodnocení teorií se odvíjí o jejich schopnosti řešit problémy. V tomto eseji nejprve ukáži, jaké druhy problémů jsou pro sociální vědy klíčové, a s pomocí strukturalistické kritiky funkcionalismu nabídnu ilustrace těchto problémů. Budu přitom tvrdit, že Lévi-Straussovy přísliby spojené s jeho metodou nebyly nikdy naplněny a že je strukturální antropologie neuspokojivá.

We cannot simply observe that Emile Durkheim, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Pierre Bourdieu all received philosophical training and subsequently asserted, in surprisingly similar terms, that escaping from philosophy or breaking away from philosophical modes of thought was a necessary condition for any research in the human and social sciences, without considering whether there might be a direct relationship between the sociological ethos and a particular attitude towards philosophy. The "rupture" with philosophyis never complete: the sociologists' conception of sociology is, (...) on the contrary, heavily influenced by the negative image they have of philosophy, which they always invoke as something to be avoided or a specter that must be exorcised. The sociological perception of philosophy thus constitutes a system of oppositions, a set of likes and dislikes deeply ingrained in the minds of practitioners in the human and social sciences, and which, so to speak, form the very foundation of the discipline and its definition of its identity. By reconstructing it, this article proposes a sociological analysis of the genesis, structure, and function of the sociological unconscious. (shrink)

This essay centers on the notion of the symbolic and its impact as developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. I examine Lévi-Strauss’ formulation of the “floating signifier” and its influence in French thought, particularly in the work of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. In doing so, I argue that Lévi-Strauss’ notion may be a misreading of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure that has important implications for contemporary political (...) issues on the left in both theory and practice. (shrink)

O termo “cogito” designa de modo genérico e impreciso um argumento que Descartes propõe em diversos momentos de sua obra. De um modo geral, os comentadores, tal como o fizeram os interlocutores contemporâneos ao autor, consideram que a expressão “penso, logo existo” (cogito ergo sum), ausente das Meditações Metafísicas, resume adequadamente este argumento único e procuram esclarecê-lo ou criticá-lo, nem sempre levando em consideração as diferentes formulações que recebe e os diferentes contextos em que ocorre. Meu objetivo neste texto é (...) simplesmente analisar o quarto parágrafo da Segunda Meditação (AT VII, 24-25; IX-1,19), no qual ele supostamente apresenta este mesmo argumento sem empregar a famosa expressão. Das muitas, diversas e relevantes questões filosóficas que este argumento suscita, gostaria de me concentrar em investigar se ele pode ser reconstruído sem que seja necessário introduzir – como uma premissa não justificada – a concepção do pensamento como sendo essencialmente consciência de si e, portanto, como envolvendo - por definição, a auto-referência imediata e incorrigível do sujeito a si mesmo. Gostaria de poder mostrar que o argumento não apenas independe dessa concepção como, além disso, conduz a essa concepção; todavia, somente o primeiro passo em direção a esta interpretação será dado neste artigo. Quanto à expressão “penso, logo existo”, minha hipótese é que, embora ausente do texto, ela, de fato, resume o sentido geral da posição cartesiana. Sua ausência explica-se pelo fato de que Descartes pretende apresentar nas Meditações a versão mais completa de seu argumento e a passagem que será aqui analisada constitui, na realidade, apenas uma primeira etapa dessa versão. A análise e a reconstrução que serão propostas supõe que o argumento apresentado no parágrafo 4 deva ser compreendido, como propõe H. G. Frankfurt, como composto de quatro etapas, cujo sentido depende do contexto argumentativo mais amplo no qual estão inseridas, como observou Jean-Claude Pariente, em seu artigo sobre o cogito nas Meditações Metafísicas. Nesse sentido, a estrutura do presente artigo seguirá essas etapas. (shrink)

Based on a discussion of the theoretical contributions of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Pierre Clastres, this article explores social relationships as more than a human dimension. Though strongly analysed by both anthropologists, these relationships appear to involve indigenous societies’ whole ecological and cosmological system. In this sense, reciprocity, social cohesion, and exchange can be understood as material and immaterial interrelationships between entities of a more than a corporeal world. I argue, then, that to go beyond the mere anthropocentric conceptualisation (...) of sociality in a nature good to think, we need to holistically conceive the interconnected levels of trophic, socio-structural and socio-cosmic relationships and exchanges between human and non-human beings in the ecosystem. (shrink)

Al tratar de disolver la neta separación entre una mente racional y la materia inerte abogada por el dualismo Cartesiano, el monismo lucha por reunificar estas distintas realidades ontológicas. Tal como para Claude Lévi-Strauss y Baruch Spinoza, esa dicha unificación no puede prescindir de la trascendencia de la mente humana como locus del pensamiento y conocimiento de la naturaleza externa. A través de una discusión entre las abstracciones de la etnología Amerindia (animismo-perspectivismo), las teorizaciones del estructuralismo y las (...) relaciones que estos tienen con algunas especulaciones filosóficas occidentales, este artículo trata de analizar las intricadas interacciones humano-naturaleza entre los Shuar de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana. De esta forma, se argumenta que las realidades metafísicas de las experiencias oníricas y visionarias están ontológicamente determinadas por el grado de intensidad de contacto que los humanos establecen con las subjetividades materiales del ecosistema. (shrink)

narrativity and a soft anhropology of the mind, between tabu and social liberation.

O presente artigo investiga a filosofia de Butler no que concerne os problemas da performance e abandono das noções essencialistas e cientificizantes de gênero e sexualidade, especialmente a partir de dois referenciais teóricos lá presentes: Nietzsche e Lévi-Strauss. Partir-se-á, então, das contribuições nietzschianas para se pensar a crise da metafísica (mais pontualmente com a noção de Verdade) e da discussão estruturalista lévi-straussiana, situando os mecanismos de análise do mito para a dissolução da essência do sujeito. Para a mediação de (...) ambos os autores, Foucault aparecerá como o fio condutor do texto e dobradiça de articulação que abrirá caminho para uma leitura mais aprofundada de Gender Trouble (1996). Buscar-se-á, então, o deslocamento da inscrição da identidade como essência para a sexualidade enquanto tecnologia de poder e narrativa, marcando as aproximações e estranhamentos metodológicos e epistemológicos entre os autores supracitados. (shrink)

The term “deep history” refers to historical accounts framed temporally not by the advent of a written record but by evolutionary events (Smail 2008; Shryock and Smail 2011). The presumption of deep history is that the events of today have a history that traces back beyond written history to events in the evolutionary past. For human kinship, though, even forming a history of kinship, let alone a deep history, remains problematic, given limited, relevant data (Trautman et al. 2011). With regard (...) to a deep history, one conjecture is that human kinship evolved from primate social systems in a gradual, more-or-less continuous manner (see Chapais 2008); another conjecture is that kinship, in accordance with the incest account of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969) or the fanciful, tetradic account of Nicholas J. Allen (1986), “comes into existence with a leap” (Trautman et al. 2011: 176); and yet another, the account to be developed in this paper, is that kinship, as it is understood and lived by culture bearers today, is the consequence of a profound and qualitative evolutionary transformation going from an ancestral primate-like social system predicated on extensive face-to-face interaction to the relation-based social systems that characterize human societies (Read 2012). (shrink)

In this article, the notion of entropology introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss is applied and developed in the context of Georges Bataille’s anthropological philosophy: Bataille’s project is defined as entropological. Four philosophical vectors are chosen for this: the theory of general economy, the concept of decay, the idea of extinction and the notion of inhumanism. The theory of general economy allows us to understand the immanent terrestrial nature of humanity and the negative – entropic – side of the capitalist (...) economy. The concept of decay gives access to the thought of bodily disintegration and decomposition, which is temporality and mortality that split the subject. The idea of extinction speculates on the consequences of humanity’s destructiveness, libidinally charged inertia, and the extreme perspective of entropy’s impact on the planet. The notion of inhumanism suggests a radical rethinking of the human relationship with alienation and exteriority: Bataille’s philosophy is reinterpreted as inhumanist. I conclude that the Lévi-Strauss’s neologism – entropology – can be productively articulated and actualised within the framework of Bataille’s philosophy. (shrink)

Este ensaio parte de um movimento de transmutação das noções ocidentais-modernas de Natureza e Cultura. Utilizando-se de uma base nietzscheana como fio condutor, primeiramente, introduzir-se-á a transformação da noção de Natureza dentro do estruturalismo de Lévi-Strauss, assim como suas variações. Após isto, será mostrado dois exemplos contemporâneos que completarão a crítica ao pensamento moderno europeu ao mostrar: as teorias de Philippe Descola, especialmente suas ideias sobre as diversas ontologias, e Viveiros de Castro, no concerne à questão do perspectivismo ameríndio.

Η μοντέρνα φιλοσοφία στράφηκε απευθείας στη φύση (Francis Bacon), στράφηκε απευθείας στο νου (René Descartes), στράφηκε απευθείας στην εμπειρία (Thomas Hobbes). Από αυτή τη βασική διαφωνία ως προς τις πηγές της φιλοσοφικής γνώσης προέκυψε η «διαμάχη των αρχαίων με τους σύγχρονους». -/- Η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία αποστασιοποιήθηκε από το παγιωμένο γνωσιολογικό παρελθόν και ενστερνίστηκε την αρχή ότι η γνώση προοδεύει ιστορικά και κατατείνει στη διεύρυνση της ανθρώπινης κατανόησης μέσω της λογικής μεθόδου ή μέσω της εμπειρίας. Στη διαμάχη μεταξύ των ηπειρωτικών ορθολογιστών (...) φιλοσόφων (Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz και Benedict de Spinoza) και των Βρετανών εμπειριστών (Hobbes, John Locke και David Hume) στο τέλος του Διαφωτισμού του δέκατου όγδοου αιώνα, ο Immanuel Kant επιχείρησε να συμφιλιώσει τις αντιθέσεις και να διατυπώσει μια νέα κριτική φιλοσοφία. Ο Immanuel Kant συγκέντρωσε στην «κριτική» του φιλοσοφία τις δεσμεύσεις για την αναλυτική άσκηση του νου, από τη μια, και την εμπειρική πρόσληψη μέσω των αισθήσεων, από την άλλη. Με τον Καντ, η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία συνδύασε την «υπερβατική ενότητα της αντίληψης» με την «πολλαπλότητα της εμπειρίας». Η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία δεν βασιζόταν πλέον σε μια θεωρία αναπαράστασης -αναπαράσταση του νου μέσω της λογικής ή αναπαράσταση του νου μέσω της εμπειρίας- αλλά στη σύνδεση της υπερβατικής υποκειμενικότητας και της εμπειρικής αντικειμενικότητας. Αυτό το «διπλό», όπως το ονόμασε ο Michel Foucault, αντιπροσώπευε έναν εντελώς νέο τρόπο φιλοσοφίας. Ο μοντερνισμός διακρίνεται από τη σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία στο ότι συνδέεται με ορισμένα κινήματα στην τέχνη και τη λογοτεχνία που ξεκίνησαν κάπου γύρω στα τέλη του δέκατου ένατου αιώνα. Ενώ βασιζόταν σε κάποια παρόμοια χαρακτηριστικά της «μοντέρνας φιλοσοφίας», ο μοντερνισμός στην τέχνη, τη λογοτεχνία και τη φιλοσοφία περιλάμβανε καινοτομία, ρήξη με την παράδοση, πρόοδο, συνεχή ανάπτυξη, γνώση που προέρχεται είτε από τη θέση του υποκειμένου είτε από αξιώσεις για αντικειμενικότητα, και ταυτόχρονα κρίση στη γνώση που παράγεται από αυτήν ακριβώς τη διχοτόμηση. Ως εκ τούτου, στον μοντερνισμό, την ίδια στιγμή που ορισμένες θεωρίες βασίζονταν στη γνώση σε μια επικεντρωμένη, υπερβατική, ερμηνευτική υποκειμενικότητα και άλλες βασίζονταν στη γνώση σε βέβαιη, ατομικιστική, αναλυτική, εμπειρική αντικειμενικότητα, η κρίση στη γνώση δημιούργησε μια αίσθηση αβεβαιότητας, παραδοξότητας, ατέλειας, ανεπάρκειας, κενό. Ο μοντερνισμός στην τέχνη και τη λογοτεχνία περιλάμβανε μια μετατόπιση από τις διχοτομίες του ρομαντισμού και του ρεαλισμού στο ρεύμα της συνείδησης, της βιωμένης και εσωτερικής συνείδησης του χρόνου, της υπερβατικής υποκειμενικότητας, της αφηγηματικής ανάμνησης και επίγνωσης, της απεικονιζόμενης ταχύτητας, των μηχανισμών, των αντικειμένων και των αφαιρέσεων. Το λανθάνον περιεχόμενο αφέθηκε να διεισδύσει μέσα από τις επιφάνειες εμφανούς περιεχομένου. Η κατανόηση θα έπρεπε να εμβαθύνει περισσότερο από τις επιφάνειες και τις απλές εμφανίσεις. Θα χρειαζόταν μια φαινομενολογία για την απογραφή του περιεχομένου της συνείδησης (Edmund Husserl) ή μια ψυχανάλυση για να διερευνήσει τα βάθη του τι σκεφτόταν πραγματικά ο νους (Sigmund Freud), ή ένας λογικός θετικισμός θα έπαιρνε την εναλλακτική οδό, αποκλείοντας κάθε γνώση που δεν μπορεί να επαληθευτεί λογικά και εμπειρικά (Bertrand Russell, πρώιμος Ludwig Wittgenstein, A. J. Ayer). Ο μοντερνισμός στη φιλοσοφία περιλάμβανε σε κάθε στάδιο τον καντιανό συνδυασμό του εμπειρικού και του υπερβατικού, του αντικειμενικού και του υποκειμενικού, του υλικού και του διανοητικού—αλλά κάθε φορά στη διπλή αυτή θεωρητική σύλληψη υπερίσχυε αξιακά και γνωσιολογικά ένας πόλος. -/- Η αποσύνθεση του μοντερνισμού στη φιλοσοφία ήταν εσωτερική. Οι ριζοσπαστικοί ισχυρισμοί του λογικού θετικισμού απέκλειαν ό,τι είχε αξία: τη μεταφυσική, την αισθητική, την αξιολογία. Η αυστηρή επιστήμη της υπερβατικής φαινομενολογίας απέκλεισε την ίδια την ύπαρξη αυτού που ερευνούσε. Ο δυϊσμός του δημιουργικού εξελικτισμού άφησε μια ανεπανόρθωτη διχοτόμηση μεταξύ βιωμένης εμπειρίας και αντικειμενικής γνώσης. Ο πραγματισμός του ριζοσπαστικού εμπειρισμού απέτυχε να προσφέρει έναν τρόπο ερμηνείας των νοημάτων της εμπειρίας. Το κέντρο του μοντερνισμού στη φιλοσοφία δεν μπορούσε να κρατήσει γιατί τα ίδια τα θεμέλιά του ήταν υπό αμφισβήτηση. Αλλά οι προσπάθειες να το ανακτήσει κανείς από τον εαυτό του με τη στροφή προς τη γλώσσα - καθημερινή γλώσσα, αναλυτικές φιλοσοφίες της γλώσσας, ερμηνευτική της γλώσσας, σημειολογίες της γλώσσαςδεν μπόρεσαν να λύσουν τα διλήμματα της ανθρώπινης ύπαρξης. Ο μοντερνισμός στη φιλοσοφία αντιμετώπισε το παράλογο, το διφορούμενο και το διαλεκτικό και εξώθησε αυτές τις θεωρίες στα όριά τους. Στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1960, η φιλοσοφία άρχισε να εξετάζει τους γνωσιολογικούς της, οι ανακρίσεις του Maurice Merleau-Ponty αναδιατυπώθηκαν στην αρχαιολογία της γνώσης του Foucault. Οι ανθρωπιστικές επιστήμες έθεσαν υπό αμφισβήτηση τις αισιοδοξίες της σύγχρονης φιλοσοφίας παρακάμπτοντας τη θεωρία του «ανθρώπου». Οι σχηματισμοί γνώσης αρθρώθηκαν με όρους πολλαπλών χώρων παραγωγής γνώσης και όχι πλέον σύμφωνα με μια κεντρική πηγή ή θέση, ή εγώ, ή εαυτός, ή υποκείμενο, ούτε σύμφωνα με μια πληθώρα αισθητηριακών δεδομένων, αντικειμενικών κριτηρίων, υλικών στοιχείων ή συμπεριφορών . Οι σχηματισμοί γνώσης διέσχιζαν τους κλάδους και λειτούργησαν σε πολλαπλούς χώρους όπου τα ερωτήματα της δομής, του πλαισίου, του περιθωρίου, του ορίου, της άκρης, του ορίου κ.λπ. θα σημάδευαν οποιαδήποτε πρακτική λόγου. Με άλλα λόγια, η γνώση δεν παράγεται πλέον από ένα κέντρο, θεμέλιο, έδαφος, βάση, ταυτότητα, εξουσία ή υπερβατική ικανότητα. Η γνώση ήταν διάσπαρτη, πολλαπλή, κατακερματισμένη και θεωρητικά ποικίλη. Η γνώση δεν βασιζόταν πλέον στη συνέχεια, την ενότητα, την ολότητα, την πληρότητα και τη συνέπεια. Η γνώση άρχισε να γίνεται κατανοητή με όρους ασυνέχειας, διαφοράς, διάδοσης και διαφορετικών. Στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1970, ο μεταμοντερνισμός - ένας όρος που χρησιμοποίησε ο Daniel Bell σε σχέση με τη μεταβιομηχανική κοινωνία τη δεκαετία του 1950, τον οποίο έκαναν έκκληση οι αρχιτέκτονες στη δεκαετία του 1960 και που οι ιστορικοί της τέχνης και της λογοτεχνίας επικαλέστηκαν τη δεκαετία του 1970 - δεν είχε ακόμη επικαλεστεί σε σχέση με τη φιλοσοφία. -/- Η γραμματολογία και η θεωρία της «διαφοράς» του Ζακ Ντεριντά το 1967 (με βάση την αφήγηση του Μάρτιν Χάιντεγκερ για το «τέλος της φιλοσοφίας και το έργο της σκέψης») μετατράπηκαν σε πλήρη αποδόμηση τη δεκαετία του 1970. Η έννοια του Gilles Deleuze και του Felix Guattari για τη ριζωματική σκέψη (σε αντίθεση με την ιεραρχική, εξουσιοδοτημένη δενδρώδη σκέψη) σηματοδότησε μια κίνηση ενάντια στις ψυχαναλυτικές θεωρίες που βασίζονται στην Οιδιπόδεια αυθεντία και την πατρική επιμονή. Η ιδέα τους για τον νομαδισμό έδωσε έμφαση στη γνώση, την εμπειρία και τις σχέσεις που δεν ήταν οργανωμένες γύρω από μια κεντρική έννοια. Η αφήγηση του J. Kristeva για την επανάσταση στην ποιητική γλώσσα σηματοδότησε τη διάκριση μεταξύ του σημειωτικού και του συμβολικού. Όπου η συμβολική —επιστημονική, θεωρητική, φαλλική, πατρική— σκέψη είχε διαποτίσει τη φιλοσοφία και την επιστήμη, η Kristeva επικαλέστηκε τη σημειωτική ως την ποιητική, ρευστή, σαν υποδοχέα, μητρική σκέψη που έχει κρυφτεί στη σύγχρονη σκέψη. Ωστόσο, το μεταμοντέρνο δεν ήταν σχεδόν ο όρος που χρησιμοποιήθηκε για να περιγράψει αυτό το είδος φιλοσοφίας. Αντίστοιχα, η πιο περιορισμένη μελέτη της φαινομενολογίας και του υπαρξισμού στη φιλοσοφία έδωσε τη θέση της στις πιο πολλαπλές και ποικιλόμορφες θεωρίες που υπονοούνται στην ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία: αποδόμηση, αρχαιολογία της γνώσης, σημασιολογική ανάλυση, σχιζανάλυση, φεμινιστική θεωρία κ.λπ. Ωστόσο, ενώ ο μεταστρουκτουραλισμός (σε σχέση με τους Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Kristeva, et al.) χαιρετίστηκε ως ο διάδοχος του στρουκτουραλισμού (Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser) και της υπαρξιακής φαινομενολογίας (Heidegger, Jean -Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir), ο μεταμοντερνισμός δεν ήταν ακόμα μια σχετική κατηγορία στη φιλοσοφία μέχρι και τη δεκαετία του 1980. Καθώς περνούσε ο καιρός, ο μεταμοντερνισμός και η μεταμοντέρνα σκέψη άρχισαν να υπερισχύουν του μεταστρουκτουραλισμού ως η κυρίαρχη θεωρητική διατύπωση. -/- . (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I -/- A SOCIOLOGIA BRASILEIRA -/- HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I -/- THE BRAZILIAN SOCIOLOGY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- PREMISSA -/- Como na França de Émile Durkheim, os primeiros passos da Sociologia no Brasil, em termos institucionais, ocorreram a partir de iniciativas para a inclusão dessa disciplina no ensino secundário (hoje, ensino médio). A primeira tentativa ocorreu (...) em 1890, logo após a proclamação da República, com a reforma educacional de Benjamin Constant, que defendia o ensino laico em todos os níveis. O ensino secundário tinha por objetivo a formação intelectual dos jovens fora do contexto religioso, então predominante. Mas, sem nunca ter sido de fato incluída nos currículos escolares, a Sociologia foi expurgada pela Reforma Epitácio Pessoa, em 1901. Somente em 1925 a Sociologia retornou ao currículo do ensino secundário por meio da Reforma de Rocha Vaz, que tinha os mesmos objetivos da de Benjamin Constant. Em decorrência dessa reforma, o Colégio Pedro II, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, implantou a Sociologia regularmente no seu currículo. Em 1928, a disciplina foi introduzida nas escolas de vários estados brasileiros, notadamente em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Pernambuco. -/- Desde 1925, podem-se destacar alguns intelectuais que contribuíram para o ensino de Sociologia no ensino secundário, lecionando e escrevendo manuais para esse nível: Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987), Carneiro Leão (1887-1966) e Delgado de Carvalho (1884-1980), em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Recife. Eles tinham por objetivo preparar intelectualmente os jovens das elites dirigentes, elevando o conhecimento daqueles que chegavam às escolas médias. Esses autores, em sua maioria, foram influenciados pela Sociologia desenvolvida na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. -/- Em 1931, a reforma de Francisco Campos, no governo de Getúlio Vargas, introduziu a Sociologia nos cursos preparatórios ao ensino superior nas faculdades de Direito, Ciências Médicas, Engenharia e Arquitetura, além de mantê-la nos cursos normais (de formação de professores). -/- No final do Estado Novo, em 1942, o governo de Getúlio Vargas, através de seu ministro da Educação, Gustavo Capanema, implantou a Reforma Capanema, que excluiu a Sociologia do ensino secundário brasileiro. Assim, a Sociologia fez parte do currículo do ensino secundário por 18 anos (1925-1942). Ela, contudo, permaneceu como matéria obrigatória do currículo das Escolas Normais, de nível secundário, destinadas à formação de professores do antigo ensino primário (o que corresponderia aos atuais 2º a 5º anos). -/- 1. A SOCIOLOGIA NO ENSINO SUPERIOR: INÍCIO DO SÉCULO XX -/- Nas primeiras décadas do século XX, a Sociologia no ensino superior estava presente de forma embrionária em vários estados brasileiros (Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) e principalmente nos cursos de Direito. Desenvolveu-se de forma mais consistente, contudo, nos estados que passavam por um processo de industrialização e urbanização crescente desde o final da década de 1910. -/- Essas transformações da estrutura econômica e social repercutiram nas esferas culturais e educacionais, propiciando um crescente interesse pelos estudos científicos da realidade social da época. -/- Em decorrência disso, foram publicados importantes trabalhos que contribuíram para o desenvolvimento das ciências sociais no Brasil. Uma das preocupações dos pensadores daquele período era a busca do entendimento do Brasil por meio de seus componentes históricos, tendo por base as muitas vertentes europeias e estadunidenses das ciências humanas. -/- Esses pensadores defendiam a ideia de que havia uma ligação entre o passado colonial e a configuração social em que viviam. Para eles, esse condicionamento do passado deveria ser superado para que o país saísse do atraso. As preocupações desses pensadores giravam em torno do futuro do Brasil e das possibilidades de mudança social e das resistências a elas. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna (1883 -1951), Caio da Silva Prado Júnior (1907-1990), Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1902-1982), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987) e Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974). -/- Pode-se afirmar que foi entre as décadas de 1920 e 1940 que a Sociologia fincou alicerces no Brasil. Nesse período, procuraram-se definir mais claramente as fronteiras entre a Sociologia e as áreas do conhecimento afins, como a Literatura, a História e a Geografia, e institucionalizou-se o curso de Sociologia e/ou Ciências Sociais em faculdades e universidades. Foram fundadas a Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política (ELSP) em São Paulo, em 1933, e as Universidades de São Paulo (USP) e do Distrito Federal (UDF), esta no Rio de Janeiro, respectivamente em 1934 e 1935, nas quais foram instituídos cursos de Ciências Sociais. -/- Vários professores estrangeiros vieram ao Brasil para trabalhar nessas universidades e contribuíram de modo significativo para o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no Brasil. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Donald Pierson (1900-1995), Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), Claude Lévi -Strauss (1908-2009), Georges Gurvitch (1894-1965), Roger Bastide (1898-1974), Charles Morazé (1913-2003) e Paul-Arbousse Bastide (1901-1985). -/- A revista Sociologia, da Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política, foi um exemplo da produção sociológica da época. Criada em 1939 e publicada até 1981, em São Paulo, constituiu um verdadeiro marco de estudo, pesquisa e divulgação das Ciências Sociais no Brasil. -/- 1.1 De 1940 a 1960: disseminação da Sociologia na universidade -/- A partir do final da Segunda Guerra Mundial até meados da década de 1960, disseminaram-se as Faculdades de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras no Brasil, em universidades ou fora delas, e a Sociologia passou a fazer parte do currículo dos cursos de Ciências Sociais ou a apresentar-se como disciplina obrigatória em outros cursos. -/- Uma nova geração de cientistas sociais passou a ter presença marcante no Brasil. Entre eles, podem ser citados: Florestan Fernandes (1920-1995), Antonio Candido (1918-2017), Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz (1918-2018), Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes (1925-2011), Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1915-1982), Luiz Aguiar da Costa Pinto (1920-2002) e Hélio Jaguaribe (1923-2018), que influenciaram muitos cientistas sociais em todo o território nacional. -/- Os principais temas de pesquisas, análises e discussões nesse período foram: imigração e colonização, estudos de comunidades, educação, folclore, questão rural e urbana, teoria e método das Ciências Sociais, estratificação e mobilidade sociais e sociologia da arte e da literatura. Cabe um destaque para o tema das relações étnico-raciais envolvendo a questão do negro no Brasil, graças a um projeto de pesquisa financiado pela Unesco. -/- Nesse período, a Sociologia tornou-se disciplina hegemônica no quadro das Ciências Sociais no Brasil, e a primeira a formar uma “escola” ou uma “tradição” em São Paulo, tendo em Florestan Fernandes um dos seus mentores. -/- 1.2 De 1960 a 1980: consolidação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- Mesmo sob a ditadura civil-militar no Brasil, a partir de 1964, a Sociologia começou a se expandir, principalmente nos grandes centros urbanos, e a se relacionar com outros campos das ciências humanas. As discussões sobre o processo de industrialização crescente no país foram o centro das atenções. -/- Um dos temas de discussão era o desenvolvimento, incluindo as teorias da dependência e da modernização. Outros temas de debates e pesquisas da época foram o trabalho industrial e o sindicalismo, a formação da classe trabalhadora, a urbanização crescente e as transformações no campo, os problemas da marginalidade social, a presença do capital estrangeiro e a indústria nacional. A questão educacional também esteve presente, pois de alguma forma os problemas sociais estavam vinculados à precariedade do setor. Foram bastante debatidos, ainda, o autoritarismo, principalmente depois do golpe militar de 1964, e o planejamento, criando-se uma interface com a ciência política. Além disso, destacaram-se, nesse momento, os estudos sobre a América Latina. -/- Em razão desses debates, foram incluídas nas universidades disciplinas como: Sociologia do Desenvolvimento, Sociologia Urbana, Sociologia Rural, Sociologia Industrial e do Trabalho (incluindo a questão sindical), Sociologia do Planejamento, Sociologia da Educação e da Juventude e Sociologia da Arte e Literatura. -/- Muitos foram os estudiosos que, em diferentes áreas do pensamento sociológico, desenvolveram pesquisas nessas décadas. Alguns dos que formaram a segunda geração de sociólogos no Brasil são: Octavio Ianni (1926-2004), Marialice M. Foracchi (1929-1971), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1931-), Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (1934-), Heleieth Saffioti (1934-2010), Maurício Tragtenberg (1929-1998), Francisco de Oliveira (1933-), Luiz Pereira (1933-1985), Luiz Eduardo W. Wanderley (1935-), José de Souza Martins (1938-), Gabriel Cohn (1938-), Roberto Schwarz (1938-), Elide Rugai Bastos, Luiz Werneck Vianna (1938-) e Simon Schwartzman (1939-). -/- 1.3 Diversificação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- A partir da década de 1980, ampliam-se os cursos de graduação e pós-graduação (mestrado e doutorado) em Ciências Sociais e, em particular, de Sociologia em todo o território nacional, elevando o nível, em número e em qualidade, das pesquisas e do ensino da área. Os estudos sociológicos passaram a ser mais específicos, ocorrendo uma fragmentação dos temas/objetos, como: violência, gênero e sexualidade, corpo e saúde, religião, cotidiano, comunicação e informação, indústria cultural, representações sociais, consumo, cidadania, direitos humanos, questão ambiental, globalização, ciência e tecnologia, urbanização, juventude, família, trabalho, classes e mobilidade social, questões étnico-raciais, Estado e sociedade civil. -/- Novas gerações de sociólogos se formam nas universidades em quase todos os estados da federação, e há centros de ensino e pesquisa na maioria das universidades, disseminando-se assim a formação de sociólogos, sob diversas influências teóricas. A formação em Sociologia, que havia se estabelecido a partir de São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, na década de 1930, expandiu-se para todo o território nacional em pouco mais de 50 anos. -/- 1.4 O retorno da Sociologia ao ensino médio -/- Oficialmente extinta do currículo do ensino médio em 1942, a Sociologia voltou a marcar presença em um ou outro estado da federação, de modo intermitente, a partir da década de 1980, com os primeiros ensaios de democratização da sociedade brasileira, conforme diz o sociólogo brasileiro Amaury C. Moraes, na esteira de mudanças na legislação educacional realizadas pelo governo ditatorial pós-1964. A Lei n° 7.044/82 flexibilizou o ensino médio (então 2º grau) e profissionalizante, abrindo espaço para a presença da Sociologia, não em caráter obrigatório, mas por escolha das escolas. Nesse sentido, ela começou a ter uma presença crescente nos currículos escolares. -/- Aqui cabe citar as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio, (p. 104-105). -/- Há uma interpretação corrente que (...) deve ser bem avaliada criticamente; ela afirma que a presença ou a ausência da Sociologia no currículo está vinculada a contextos democráticos ou autoritários, respectivamente. No entanto, se se observar bem, pelo menos em dois períodos isso não se confirma, ou se teria de rever o caráter do ensino de Sociologia para entender sua presença ou ausência. Entre 1931 e 1942, especialmente após 1937, a Sociologia está presente e é obrigatória no currículo em um período que abrange um governo que começa com esperanças democratizantes e logo se tinge de autoritarismo, assumindo sua vocação ditatorial mais adiante. Em outro momento, em plena democracia, o sentido do veto do Presidente da República (2001) à inclusão da Sociologia como disciplina obrigatória traz uma certa dificuldade para essa hipótese. O que se entende é que nem sempre a Sociologia teve um caráter crítico e transformador, funcionando muitas vezes como um discurso conservador, integrador e até cívico – como aparece nos primeiros manuais da disciplina. Não se pode esquecer que a Sociologia chegou ao Brasil de mãos dadas com o positivismo. No caso recente, deve-se entender que a ausência da disciplina se prende mais a tensões ou escaramuças pedagógico-administrativas que propriamente a algum conteúdo ideológico mais explícito (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- Paralelamente, algumas associações de sociólogos, em diferentes estados brasileiros – mas principalmente em São Paulo –, iniciaram um movimento pela volta da Sociologia ao ensino médio, almejando a ampliação de espaço de trabalho para os formandos dos cursos de Ciências Sociais. Apesar de não haver a obrigatoriedade da disciplina, os cursos de Ciências Sociais continuavam a formar professores de Sociologia. Em alguns estados brasileiros, ao longo dos anos, foram abertos concursos para professores de Sociologia. -/- Com a Constituição de 1988 e a consequente formulação das constituições estaduais, sociólogos em todo o país passaram a reivindicar a presença da Sociologia no ensino médio. Assim, leis estaduais de alguns estados e as constituições estaduais do Rio de Janeiro e de Minas Gerais tornaram a Sociologia obrigatória no ensino médio. -/- A partir do ano 2000, organizações representativas de sociólogos (sindicatos e associações de sociólogos e de cientistas sociais) de várias tendências, assim como pequenos grupos nas universidades do país, começaram a desenvolver um movimento em defesa da obrigatoriedade do ensino da Sociologia no nível médio, considerando que os conteúdos dessa disciplina contribuíam para melhor formação do jovem estudante. -/- O movimento estendeu-se ao início do século XXI, conquistando o apoio de instituições de ensino, associações científicas, intelectuais, sindicatos e associações de categorias profissionais. Finalmente, pela Lei n° 11.684, de 2 de junho de 2008, que alterou a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, a Sociologia retornou oficial e obrigatoriamente ao currículo do ensino médio brasileiro. -/- A título de conclusão, e ainda refletindo sobre a Sociologia e sua contribuição para a formação dos estudantes, é importante destacar o que as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio afirmam com muita clareza: -/- A presença da Sociologia no currículo do ensino médio tem provocado muita discussão. Além dessa justificativa que se tornou slogan ou clichê – “formar o cidadão crítico” –, entende-se que haja outras mais objetivas decorrentes da concretude com que a Sociologia pode contribuir para a formação do jovem brasileiro, quer aproximando esse jovem de uma linguagem especial que a Sociologia oferece, quer sistematizando os debates em torno de temas de importância dados pela tradição ou pela contemporaneidade. A Sociologia, como espaço de realização das Ciências Sociais na escola média, pode oferecer ao aluno, além de informações próprias do campo dessas ciências, resultados das pesquisas as mais diversas, que acabam modificando as concepções de mundo, a economia, a sociedade e o outro, isto é, o diferente – de outra cultura, “tribo”, país etc. Traz também modos de pensar (...) ou a reconstrução e desconstrução de modos de pensar. É possível, observando as teorias sociológicas, compreender os elementos da argumentação – lógicos e empíricos – que justificam um modo de ser de uma sociedade, classe, grupo social e mesmo com unidade. Isso em termos sincrônicos ou diacrônicos, de hoje ou de ontem. -/- Um papel central que o pensamento sociológico realiza é a desnaturalização das concepções ou explicações dos fenômenos sociais. Há uma tendência sempre recorrente a se explicarem as relações sociais, as instituições, os modos de vida, as ações humanas, coletivas ou individuais, a estrutura social, a organização política etc. com argumentos naturalizadores. Primeiro, perde -se de vista a historicidade desses fenômenos, isto é, que nem sempre foram assim; segundo, que certas mudanças ou continuidades históricas decorrem de decisões, e essas, de interesses, ou seja, de razões objetivas e humanas, não sendo fruto de tendências naturais (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- BRASIL. Secretaria de Educação Básica. Orientações curriculares para o ensino médio: ciências humanas e suas tecnologias. Brasília: Ministério da Educação/Secretaria de Educação Básica, 2006. -/- FILHO, E. D. L. A sociologia no Brasil: história, teorias e desafios. Sociologias , Porto Alegre, n. 14, p. 376-437, dezembro de 2005. -/- MARTINS, C. B.; MICELI, S. (Org.). Sociologia brasileira hoje. São Paulo: ateliê editorial, 2017. -/- SILVA, A. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- ©2019 - Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit werden die Hauptbegriffe der Strukturalen Anthropologie von Lévi-Strauss analysiert: Struktur, Zeichen, Symbol und Mythos. Es wird die Frage aufgeworfen, ob ein vereintes Objekt der Anthropologie jenseits der verschiedenen Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften möglich ist. Die Trennung zwischen Ethnologie und Geschichte wird uns für die Fragestellung über ein allgemeines “menschliches Wesen” dienen. Dem Gegensatz zwischen Natur und Kultur gemäβ werden wir nach der positiven Rolle von Symbolen und Mythen als Gelenk zwischen diesen Extremen forschen. Letztlich werden wir die (...) Grenze der vermuteten Kontinuität zwischen Natur und Kultur durch die Rolle der Schrift erklären. Dazu dienen uns neben dem Werk von Lévi-Strauss auch die Werke der Autoren Cassirer, Rousseau, Eugeunio Trías, Gustavo Bueno und Derrida. (shrink)

In this essay, I follow the lead of recent scholarship in Saussure linguistics and critically examine the Saussurean doctrine associated with the Course in General Linguistics, which later became a hallmark of structuralism. Specifically, I reconstruct the history of the concluding sentence in the Course which establishes the priority of la langue over everything deemed external to it. This line assumed the status of an oft-cited ‘famous formula’ and became a structuralist motto. The ‘famous formula’ was, however, freely inserted by (...) the editors of the Course who effectively ghostwrote the book after Saussure’s death, and authored a series of early book-reviews of the same text in dedicated scholarly venues. I argue that the editorial success turning their vision of Saussure’s teaching into official doctrine was enabled in part by the dominant social structures regulating twentieth-century European academia. (shrink)

the young generation seeking for a better future.

Rodney Needham bipolarity in a small context.

Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have attracted extensive attention in meta-ethics, as they pose an important challenge to moral realism. Mogensen (2015) suggests that EDAs contain a fallacy, by confusing two distinct forms of biological explanation – ultimate and proximate. If correct, the point is of considerable importance: evolutionary genealogies of human morality are simply irrelevant for debunking. But we argue that the actual situation is subtler: while ultimate claims do not strictly entail proximate ones, there are important evidential connections between (...) the two. Attending to these connections clears ground for a new and improved EDA. However, it also brings into view some possible problems with EDAs that have been largely neglected so far. (shrink)

How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on “non-final valuing”—i.e. valuing_ (...) x_ for the sake of something else—I argue that it involves adopting certain reasons on account of a desire for _x_ to contribute to other things. I then show how this contrasts final valuing. The result, I argue, is a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. This is helpful because it develops a popular methodology used to explore the value of a wide range of things, including natural entities, family heirlooms, and artworks, as well as, more broadly, entities that might have “extrinsic final value.”. (shrink)

Este breve ensaio busca, por meio da análise estruturalista e distanciada indicada por Lévi-Strauss, aproximar o conjunto de funções literárias das relações presentes entre os personagens principais do mito de Orphéus e Eurydíkē, fundadores dos mistérios órficos da Antiguidade Clássica, e de Lot e sua esposa, apresentados no Livro de Gênesis. Os pontos correlacionados são: o ponto de partida da jornada de ambos os casais, a figura mítico-mágica que anuncia a saída, o olhar para trás da figura feminina e (...) a punição sobre elas exercida. (shrink)

This paper explores some consequences of Lewis’s (Australas J Philos 74(4):549–567, 1996) understanding of how knowledge is compartmentalized. It argues, first, that he underestimates how badly it impacts his view. When knowledge is compartmentalized, it lacks at least one of two essential features of Lewis’s account: (a) Elusiveness—familiar skeptical possibilities, when relevant, are incompatible with everyday knowledge. (b) Knowledge is a modality—when a thinker knows that p, there is no relevant possibility where p is false. Lewis proposes compartmentalized knowledge to (...) keep treating knowledge as a modality while mitigating one of its unrealistic epistemological implications: In normal modal epistemic logic (and standard possible world semantics), a thinker always counts as knowing the strongest proposition that follows from the set of all the individual propositions that this thinker knows. Lewis’s compartmentalization proposal is that thinkers merely know the conjunctions of propositions that are known in each of, but not across, their compartments. The irony is that in avoiding overblown knowledge the view now allows for thinkers to attend to skeptical error possibilities and yet knowledge is present. The account avoids inflation of knowledge in one sense only to acquire another type of knowledge the view denies subjects can have. This problem motivates an inspection of knowledge accounts whose intra-compartment closure principles are weaker than those that are valid in normal modal-logic. The conclusion is that some formulations of closure can avoid the challenge Lewis’s view faces. Nevertheless, even these closure principles pose a barrier—perhaps an implausible barrier—for knowledge of ignorance. Even when the reasoning supporting the lack of knowledge is sound, a subject cannot always know she doesn’t know. Interestingly, this obstacle is one that knowledge of knowledge doesn’t seem to face. (shrink)

The external world sceptic tells some familiar narratives involving massive deception. Perhaps we are brains in vats. Perhaps we are the victim of a deceitful demon. You know the drill. The sceptic proceeds by observing first that victims of such deceptions know nothing about their external environment and that second, since we cannot rule out being a victim of such deceptions our- selves, our own external world beliefs fail to attain the status of knowledge. Discussions of global external world scepticism (...) tend to focus on the second step, where a number of well-known lines of resistance have been offered. But there has been little attention to the first, seemingly innocuous step. That will be the focus of this paper. Part one – sections 1, 2, and 3 – will explain why these standard narratives are not convincing examples of cases where there is no knowledge of the external world. In part two – section 4 – we shall undertake a useful case study. David Lewis’s ‘Elusive Knowledge’ is often thought of as presenting an epistemological vision that is somewhat friendly to external world scepticism: as Lewis himself presents things, there are contexts where external world knowledge ascriptions are uniformly false, and where true knowledge ascriptions are limited to either axiomatic truths or truths about our inner life. We examine his discussion in the light of the preceding reflections and show that the framework he presents is not so concessionary to global external world scepticism after all. (shrink)

This study analyzed the monitoring and evaluation of HIV/AIDS prevention programs in Southern Senatorial District of Cross River State, Nigeria. The study considered different levels of care/support and tested for locational variations in the monitoring/evaluation of HIV/AIDs prevention programs. A descriptive survey research design was utilized. This study covered 596 public health employees (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and laboratory employees) in the study area. A sample of 239 respondents was chosen using the proportional stratified random sampling procedure. Data was collected using (...) a questionnaire constructed by the researchers and validated by specialists. Data gathered were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Results indicated that HIV/AIDs programs have been successfully monitored/evaluated to a high extent. High rates of success in the monitoring/evaluation of HIV/AIDs prevention programs are attributable to high rates of care/support provided to people living with HIV/AIDs. There was a significant variation in the monitoring/evaluation of HIV/AIDs prevention programs based on the location of health facilities, with higher rates recorded for urban areas. Based on the findings, it was concluded that the monitoring/evaluation of HIV/AIDs prevention programs in the Southern Senatorial District of Cross River State had recorded a significant level of success. The study recommended, among others, that there should be even distribution of medical facilities, resources and personnel to both urban and rural areas to promote equity and access to materials needed to contain or mitigate the spread of the pandemic across all locations. (shrink)

The principle of epistemic closure is the claim that what is known to follow from knowledge is known to be true. This intuitively plausible idea is endorsed by a vast majority of knowledge theorists. There are significant problems, however, that have to be addressed if epistemic closure – closed knowledge – is endorsed. The present essay locates the problem for closed knowledge in the separation it imposes between knowledge and evidence. Although it might appear that all that stands between knowing (...) the truth of the premises of a valid inference and knowledge of its conclusion is inferring it from the premises, the evidence for each of the premises may jointly count against the conclusion. The intuitive view regarding inferred knowledge says one thing, the evidence says another. One epistemological framework that seems to have the resources to resolve this tension endorses the view that knowledge always requires conclusive evidence. A second framework resolves the tension by limiting the scope of the closure principle. Only inferences drawn directly from propositions contained in the scope of a single knowledge operator are considered closed. The aim of the present essay is to revive the unpopular third option, the idea that knowledge is open. The essay proceeds by arguing that in different ways the two former frameworks only succeed in relocating the problem, not in resolving it. The first framework, the infallibilist view, relocates the problem to a sharp separation between knowledge of the occurrences of events from knowledge of their chance of occurring, a separation leading to several significant additional problems. The fallibilist view, the second framework, in endorsing closure neglects to take into full account the ways in which evidence fails to be transitive. For instance, evidence can count in favor of a conjunction while counting against each of its conjuncts. This fact, which is argued for in the essay on probabilistic as well as non-probabilistic grounds, is used as the foundation of an argument against closed knowledge that can be used as a way to understand several of the most fundamental challenges of epistemology. Not only can an open knowledge view that is based on open evidence resolve all these problems in a simple and natural way, it can also respond to formidable challenges that significantly hinder other open knowledge views. There are good reasons, then, to view both knowledge and evidence as open. (shrink)

Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessaryfor free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) thatmy being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary forfree will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimateself-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USCLibertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, nometaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception ofultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivatingthe USC Libertarian is ultimately (...) impossible to fulfill. (shrink)

I defend an interpretation of the first Critique’s category of totality based on Kant’s analysis of totality in the third Critique’s Analytic of the mathematical sublime. I show, firstly, that in the latter Kant delineates the category of totality — however general it may be — in relation to the essentially singular standpoint of the subject. Despite the fact that sublime and categorial totality have a significantly different scope and function, they do share such a singular baseline. Secondly, I argue (...) that Kant’s note (in the first Critique’s metaphysical deduction) that deriving the category of totality requires a special act of the understanding can be seen as a ‘mark’ of that singular baseline. This way, my aesthetical ‘detour’ has the potential of revealing how the subjective aspects of object-constitution might be accounted for in the very system of the categories (of quantity) itself. (shrink)

Available reports provide an account of academic staff’s poor job performance in higher education institutions and universities in particular. Consequently, a growing body of research has been attracted to this area, including those seeking ways to understand the problem and others aimed at proffering solutions. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the influence of occupational stress on the job performance of academic staff in universities. Three null hypotheses directed the study in line with the quantitative ex-post facto research (...) design. A sample of 150 respondents was obtained using the systematic random sampling technique from a population of 400 lecturers in the Faculty of Education from two public universities in Nigeria. A 31-item questionnaire was used for data collection. The null hypotheses were tested at the .05 alpha level using simple linear regression analysis. It was revealed that remuneration is a significant positive predictor of academic staff job performance. The prediction of workload was negatively non-significant on the job performance of academics. The provision of institutional amenities has a positive but non-significant prediction on academic staff job performance in the two public universities. It was concluded that occupational stress significantly influences the job performance of lecturers in universities. The study recommended that the government constantly pay lecturers’ salaries as and when due. Institutional managers should reward lecturers with outstanding performance to boost their morale for effective service delivery. (shrink)

The law views with suspicion statistical evidence, even evidence that is probabilistically on a par with direct, individual evidence that the law is in no way suspicious of. But it has proved remarkably hard to either justify this suspicion, or to debunk it. In this paper, we connect the discussion of statistical evidence to broader epistemological discussions of similar phenomena. We highlight Sensitivity – the requirement that a belief be counterfactually sensitive to the truth in a specific way – as (...) a way of epistemically explaining the legal suspicion towards statistical evidence. Still, we do not think of this as a satisfactory vindication of the reluctance to rely on statistical evidence. Knowledge – and Sensitivity, and indeed epistemology in general – are of little, if any, legal value. Instead, we tell an incentive-based story vindicating the suspicion towards statistical evidence. We conclude by showing that the epistemological story and the incentive-based story are closely and interestingly related, and by offering initial thoughts about the role of statistical evidence in morality. (shrink)

In the wake of the spectacular success of Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice, philosophers have paid a great deal of attention to testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when recipients of testimony discount it in virtue of its source: usually, their social identity. The remedy for epistemic injustice is almost always listening better and giving greater weight to the testimony we hear, on most philosophers' implicit or explicit view. But Fricker identifies another kind of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical injustice. This kind of injustice (...) occurs when someone can't articulate their own experience or understand their situation for lack of the hermeneutical tools. There is a possible tension between these kinds of injustice, we suggest: sincere testimony may be misleading (may fail to identify significant harms the testfier is subject, or may fail to register its magnitude, or to categorize it as the kind of harm it is) in virtue of a lack of hermeneutical resources. This tension raises the possibility that there are situations in which experts - those who possess hermeneutical tools - may be able to correct the testimony of those who experience harms in virtue of their identity. In this paper, we identify possible cases in which epistemic injustice might be reduced through such correction: in which an increase in testimonial injustice might serve to decrease it in the longer run, for example. We also suggest how the obvious dangers of a too great readiness to see testimony as in need of expert correction might be mitigated, and how the expert might suggest corrections without ceasing to listen. (shrink)

Despite the changes in human behaviour and interactions occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, many institutions are yet to adapt to the new normal fully. While some educational institutions switched entirely to e-learning to promote teaching and learning, others could not offer education due to physical and social restrictions. Previous studies in Africa have identified reasons for the poor ICT adoption for educational purposes. However, the degree to which these factors affect ICT utilisation is barely analysed. Using a quantitative approach, this (...) study assessed ICT deployment for teaching in the COVID-19 era by focusing on their availability and challenges. A sample of 344 respondents from a population of 2,867 academic staff at two Nigerian public universities participated in the study. After receiving face validity from experts, a structured questionnaire was used for data collection. Cronbach alpha reliability indices of the questionnaire ranged from 0.72 to 0.94. Descriptive statistics (simple percentages, mean, and standard deviation) and inferential statistics (one-way ANOVA) were used for data analysis. Findings generally revealed a moderate extent in the availability of ICT resources in public universities. The cost of data, computer literacy, and electricity supply are challenges that significantly affected ICT deployment in the COVID-19 era. Based on this finding, it was concluded that personal and institutional challenges affect how ICT resources are deployed in public universities. It was recommended, among other things, that the management of each tertiary institution should apportion proceeds from internally generated revenue to procure ICT resources specific to the need of the school. The study provides the ground for further research into students’ use of ICT for educational purposes. (shrink)

Background We investigated the personal philosophies of eight persons with a tetraplegic condition (four male, four female), all living in Sweden with a chronic spinal cord injury (SCI) and all reporting a good life. Our purpose was to discover if there is a philosophical mindset that may play a role in living a good life with a traumatic SCI. Methods Two rounds of in-depth qualitative interviews were performed by the same interviewer, a philosophical practitioner by training (de Miranda). The second (...) round systematically covered the following elements: bodily sense, sense of self, sense of belonging, sense of the possible, sense of purpose and philosophical sense. This six-step method developed by de Miranda is called SMILE_PH, an acronym for Sense-Making Interviews Looking at Elements of Philosophical Health. Results All the interviewees, as a consequence of their trauma, reported having gone through a reinvention of themselves which implied questioning the meaning and purpose of their life in particular and life in general. A philosophical rather than realistic sense of the possible was abstracted toward teleological growth. All interviewees developed a sense of purpose based on self-interested altruism and solidarity with disabled peers. Conclusions To reinvent a good life with SCI, in addition to physical training and willpower, one needs to consider philosophical questions about the self and life, what Kant called the cosmic interests of reason: What may I hope? What must I do? What can I know? Our results indicate that we should, in the future, explore what the philosophical health approach may bring to rehabilitation processes in the months or years that follow the trauma. (shrink)

-/- INTRODUCTION: Many higher education students indulge in risky eating behaviours which tend to affect their physical, psychological and academic health. Previous studies have tried to understand the trend in students’ eating patterns without paying adequate attention to contributing factors. -/- PURPOSE: This study evaluated the influence of selected psychological variables on the consumption of balanced diets among students in two public universities in Calabar Metropolis, Nigeria. -/- METHODOLOGY: A research question was posed, and a formulated hypothesis to guide the (...) study. The study adopted the descriptive survey research design. A total of 12,530 faculty of education students spread across two public universities in Calabar Metropolis constituted the population of this study. A sample of 125 students was randomly selected through the stratified technique. A four-point questionnaire was used for data collection after validation by experts. Descriptive statistical measures such as mean, standard deviation, and percentages answered the research question. The null hypothesis was tested at the .05 level of significance using the one-sample t-test analysis. -/- RESULTS: Findings revealed that the influence of psychological variables (such as stress, emotions, and mental state) on students’ consumption of balanced diets is not significantly low. -/- RECOMMENDATIONS/CLASSROOM IMPLICATIONS: Based on the findings of this study, it was recommended that students cultivate the habit of always eating quality meals rich in nutrients, irrespective of their psychological state, to maintain a healthy life. (shrink)

People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has started to discuss it under the heading of doxastic wrongdoing. In this paper we argue that despite the strength of such initial intuitions, at the end of the day they have to be rejected. If (...) it can be ever truthfully asserted that beliefs wrong, this is always derivative – beliefs wrong only in virtue of other things (like evidence-gathering actions) wronging. We distinguish between modest and ambitious doxastic wrongdoing theories (the former deny, while the latter accept, the possibility of a morally wrong yet epistemically permissible belief); we argue that each of these options faces insurmountable problems; and we offer partly debunking explanations of the intuitions purportedly supporting doxastic wrongdoing. (shrink)

Statistical evidence—say, that 95% of your co-workers badmouth each other—can never render resenting your colleague appropriate, in the way that other evidence (say, the testimony of a reliable friend) can. The problem of statistical resentment is to explain why. We put the problem of statistical resentment in several wider contexts: The context of the problem of statistical evidence in legal theory; the epistemological context—with problems like the lottery paradox for knowledge, epistemic impurism and doxastic wrongdoing; and the context of a (...) wider set of examples of responses and attitudes that seem not to be appropriately groundable in statistical evidence. Regrettably, we do not come up with a fully general, fully adequate, fully unified account of all the phenomena discussed. But we give reasons to believe that no such account is forthcoming, and we sketch a somewhat messier account that may be the best that can be had here. (shrink)

It is well known that the nature of consciousness is elusive, and that attempts to understand it generate problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience. Less appreciated are the important – even if still elusive – connections between consciousness and issues in ethics. In this chapter we consider three such connections. First, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status. Second, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action. (...) Third, we consider the relevance of consciousness for the acquisition of moral knowledge. (shrink)

There is disagreement among physicians and medical ethicists on the precise goals of Hospice and Palliative Medicine (HPM). Some think that HPM's goals should differ from those of other branches of medicine and aim primarily at lessening pain, discomfort, and confusion; while others think that HPM's practices should, like all other branches of medicine, aim at promoting health. I take the latter position: using the ars moriendi to set a standard for what it means to die well, I argue that (...) if HPM's practices were to aim at mitigating suffering with little regard to promoting health, some patients would die worse deaths than if HPM's practices were to aim at health. According to the ars moriendi, flourishing at the end of one's life requires that one exercise her agency and pursue the goods most important to her. On this view, HPM's practices should promote patients’ health to enable them to pursue these goods. (shrink)

Many scientists and philosophers of science think that beauty should play a role in theory selection. Physicists like Paul Dirac and Steven Weinberg explicitly claim that the ultimate explanations of the physical world must be beautiful. And philosophers of science like Peter Lipton say that we should expect the loveliest theory to also be the most likely. In this paper, I contend that these arguments from loveliness bear a striking similarity to Thomas Aquinas’ arguments from fittingness; both seem to presume (...) that the most beautiful theory is also the most probable. To do this, I first explain the explanatory virtues that are commonly thought to be constitutive of a lovely theory. Second, I elucidate Aquinas’ arguments from fittingness and show how they work in light of his account of beauty. Lastly, I connect the two kinds of aesthetic arguments and show the extent to which they overlap. (shrink)

This project has been supported by the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council (project number CS170100008); the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science; and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. ACOLA collaborates with the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences and the New Zealand Royal Society Te Apārangi to deliver the interdisciplinary Horizon Scanning reports to government. The aims of the project which produced this report are: 1. Examine the transformative role that artificial intelligence may play in (...) different sectors of the economy, including the opportunities, risks and challenges that advancement presents. 2. Examine the ethical, legal and social considerations and frameworks required to enable and support broad development and uptake of artificial intelligence. 3. Assess the future education, skills and infrastructure requirements to manage workforce transition and support thriving and internationally competitive artificial intelligence industries. (shrink)

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a (...) disjunction. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value here, and (...) we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy. (shrink)

This article begins the task of assessing polygamy as a moral ideal. The structure of traditional polygamy, in which only one central spouse may marry multiple partners, necessarily yields two inequalities. The central spouse has greater rights and expectations within each marriage and greater control over the wider family. However, two alternative structures for polygamy can remove these inequalities. In polyfidelity, each spouse marries every other spouse in the family. In “molecular” polygamy, any spouses may marry a new spouse outside (...) the family. These new models of polygamy face additional difficulties, but they can be egalitarian in principle. (shrink)

The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of (...) evidential support is not closed under known entailment. Therefore the evidence-for relation is deductively open regardless of whether evidence is probabilistic or not. Given even a weak dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, we argue that empirical knowledge is also open. On this basis, we also respond to the strongest argument in support of knowledge closure. Finally, we present a number of significant benefits of our position, namely, offering a unified explanation for a range of epistemological puzzles. (shrink)

We present a minimal pragmatic restriction on the interpretation of the weights in the “Equal Weight View” regarding peer disagreement and show that the view cannot respect it. Based on this result we argue against the view. The restriction is the following one: if an agent, $$\hbox {i}$$ i, assigns an equal or higher weight to another agent, $$\hbox {j}$$ j,, he must be willing—in exchange for a positive and certain payment—to accept an offer to let a completely rational and (...) sympathetic $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him whether to accept a bet with positive expected utility. If $$\hbox {i}$$ i assigns a lower weight to $$\hbox {j}$$ j than to himself, he must not be willing to pay any positive price for letting $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him. Respecting the constraint entails, we show, that the impact of disagreement on one’s degree of belief is not independent of what the disagreement is discovered to be. (shrink)

The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...) known premises. The first strategy, while effective, retains little of the original idea—conclusions even of modus ponens inferences from known premises are not always known. We then look at the second strategy, inspecting the most elaborate and promising attempt to secure the epistemic role of basic inferences, namely Timothy Williamson’s safety theory of knowledge. We argue that while it indeed has the merit of allowing basic inferences such as modus ponens to extend knowledge, Williamson’s theory faces formidable difficulties. These difficulties, moreover, arise from the very feature responsible for its virtue- the infallibilism of knowledge. (shrink)

We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.

There is a tension for those who want to simultaneously hold that Abraham’s disposition to sacrifice Isaac is epistemically justified and yet hold that a contemporary father would not be justified in believing that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. While some commentators have correctly pointed out that one must take Abraham’s long relationship with God into account when considering Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, they do not entertain the possibility (...) that his hearing this commandment is evidence against the hypothesis that Abraham is speaking to God. I grant this possibility. But I argue that when God commands Abraham to do the unthinkable, Abraham’s previously acquired evidence could still be sufficient to justify his belief that he is speaking with God. And in making this argument, I attempt to show what differentiates Abraham from the contemporary father who thinks that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. (shrink)

Before the semester begins, a teacher tells his students: “There will be exactly one exam this semester. It will not take place on a day that is an immediate-successor of a day that you are currently in a position to know is not the exam-day”. Both the students and the teacher know – it is common knowledge – that no exam can be given on the first day of the semester. Since the teacher is truthful and reliable, it seems that (...) the students can know that what he says is true. However, in that case, assuming the students can know that they know whatever it is they know (KK) and assuming their knowledge is closed under entailment (closure), the students can reason from what they know to the conclusion that no exam will take place during the semester. This conclusion contradicts what they supposedly know: that there will be an exam. This puzzle, we argue, gives rise to a new consideration for the rejection of KK. We discuss unique features of the argument, especially in comparison to Timothy Williamson's rejection of KK in light of other versions of the surprise exam paradox. (shrink)