Results for 'DSM'

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  1. DSM-5 and Psychiatry's Second Revolution: Descriptive Vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2015 - In Steeves Demazeux & Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Springer. pp. 43-62.
    A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the (...)DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSMs descriptive diagnostic categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSMs purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSMs purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSMs descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual. (shrink)
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  2. Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder.Robert Hare, S. D. Hart & T. J. Harpur - 1991 - Journal of Abnormal Psychology 100: 391–398.
    The Axis II Work Group of the Task Force on Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) has expressed concern that antisocial personality disorder (APD) (...)criteria are too long and cumbersome and that they focus on antisocial behaviors rather than personality traits central to traditional conceptions of psychopathy and to international criteria. R. D. Hare et al describe an alternative to the approach taken in the DSM-IIIRevised (DSM-IIIR; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), namely, the revised Psychopathy Checklist. The authors also discuss the multisite APD field trials designed to evaluate and compare 4 criteria sets: the DSM-IIIR criteria, a shortened list of these criteria, the criteria for dyssocial personality disorder from the 10th edition of the International Classification of Diseases (World Health Organization, 1990), and a 10-item criteria set for psychopathic personality disorder derived from the revised Psychopathy Checklist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)
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  3. Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification and the History of the DSM.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2016 - History of Psychiatry 27 (4):406-424.
    This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e. (...)g., schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a superior method for classifying natural kinds than the purely descriptive approach adopted by the DSM since DSM-III. My argument suggests that the DSM should classify natural kinds in order to provide predictively useful (i.e., projectable) diagnostic categories and that a causal approach to classification would provide a more promising method for formulating valid diagnostic categories. (shrink)
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  4. Hyponarrativity and Context-Specific Limitations of the DSM-5.Şerife Tekin & Melissa Mosko - 2015 - Public Affairs Quarterly 29 (1).
    his article develops a set of recommendations for the psychiatric and medical community in the treatment of mental disorders in response to the recently published fifth edition (...)
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  5.  86
    Philosophy of Science, Psychiatric Classification, and the DSM.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2019 - In Şerife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 177-196.
    This chapter examines philosophical issues surrounding the classification of mental disorders by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, the chapter focuses on (...)
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  6. The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):446-470.
    Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks (...)
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  7. Saving the DSM-5? Descriptive Conceptions and Theoretical Concepts of Mental Disorders.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2016 - Medicina E Storia 9.
    At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a certain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now (...)
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  8. Saving the DSM-5? Descriptive Conceptions and Theoretical Concepts of Mental Disorders. MEDICINA & STORIA, 109-128.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2016 - Medicina E Storia (9-10):109-129.
    Abstract: At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a cer- tain extent, for diagnosis, is the (...)
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  9.  94
    Diagnosing the DSM: Diagnostic Classification Needs Fundamental Reform.Hyman Steven - 2011 - Cerebrum.
    Editors Note: If all goes as planned, the American Psychiatric Association will release a new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) in May 2013 (...). Since 1980, the DSM has provided a shared diagnostic language to clinicians, patients, scientists, school systems, courts, and pharmaceutical and insurance companies; any changes to the influential manual will have serious ramifications. But, argues Dr. Steven Hyman, the DSM is a poor mirror of clinical and biological realities; a fundamentally new approach to diagnostic classification is needed as researchers uncover novel ways to study and understand mental illness. (shrink)
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  10. The Concept of Mental Disorder and the DSM-V.Massimiliano Aragona - 2009 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 2 (1):1-14.
    In view of the publication of the DSM-V researchers were asked to discuss the theoretical implications of the definition of mental disorders. The reasons for the (...)use, in the DSM-III, of the term disorder instead of disease are considered. The analysis of these reasons clarifies the distinction between the general definition of disorder and its implicit, technical meaning which arises from concrete use in DSM disorders. The characteristics and limits of this technical meaning are discussed and contrasted to alternative definitions, like Wakefields harmful/dysfunction analysis. It is shown that Wakefields analysis faces internal theoretical problems in addition to practical limits for its acceptance in the DSM-V. In particular, it is shown that: a) the term dysfunction is not purely factual but intrinsically normative/evaluative; b) it is difficult to clarify what dysfunctions are in the psychiatric context (the dysfunctional mechanism involved being unknown in most cases and the use of evolutionary theory being even more problematic); c) the use of conceptual analysis and commonsense intuition to define dysfunctions leaves unsatisfied empiricists; d) it is unlikely that the authors of the DSM-V will accept Wakefields suggestion to revise the diagnostic criteria of any single DSM disorder in accordance with his analysis, because this is an excessively extensive change and also because this would probably reduce DSM reliability. In conclusion, it is pointed up in which sense DSM mental disorders have to be conceived as constructs, and that this undermines the realistic search for a clear-cut demarcation criterion between what is disorder and what is not. (shrink)
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  11.  35
    The Notion of Gender in Psychiatry: A Focus on DSM-5.M. Cristina Amoretti - 2020 - Notizie di Politeia 139 (XXXVI):70-82.
    In this paper I review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry, specifically in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental (...)
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  12. Epistemological Reflections About the Crisis of the DSM-5 and the Revolutionary Potential of the RDoC Project.Massimiliano Aragona - 2014 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 7 (1):11-20.
    This paper tests the predictions of an epistemological model that considered the DSM psychiatric classification (in the neopositivist and neo-Kraepelinian shape introduced by the DSM-III) as (...) a scientific paradigm in crisis. As predicted, the DSM-5 did not include revolutionary proposals in its basic structure. In particular, the possibility of a dimensional revolution has not occurred and early proposals of etiopathogenic diagnoses were not implemented due to lack of specific knowledge in that field. However, conceiving the DSM-5 as a bridge between the present phenomenally based operational diagnostic criteria and the neuro-cognitively based RDoC criteria introduces an internal tension into the system. It is expected that a liberalization of the research criteria will occur, the DSM operational criteria being only one possible way to select research subjects. (shrink)
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  13. The Diagnosis of Mental Disorders: the Problem of Reification.Steven Edward Hyman - 2010 - Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 6:155-179.
    A pressing need for interrater reliability in the diagnosis of mental disorders emerged during the mid-twentieth century, prompted in part by the development of diverse new (...)treatments. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), third edition answered this need by introducing operationalized diagnostic criteria that were field-tested for interrater reliability. Unfortunately, the focus on reliability came at a time when the scientific understanding of mental disorders was embryonic and could not yield valid disease definitions. Based on accreting problems with the current DSM-fourth edition (DSM-IV) classification, it is apparent that validity will not be achieved simply by refining criteria for existing disorders or by the addition of new disorders. Yet DSM-IV diagnostic criteria dominate thinking about mental disorders in clinical practice, research, treatment development, and law. As a result, the modernDSMsystem, intended to create a shared language, also creates epistemic blinders that impede progress toward valid diagnoses. Insights that are beginning to emerge from psychology, neuroscience, and genetics suggest possible strategies for moving forward. (shrink)
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  14. The Absent Body in Psychiatric Diagnosis, Treatment, and Research.Catherine Stinson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6).
    Discussions of psychiatric nosology focus on a few popular examples of disorders, and on the validity of diagnostic criteria. Looking at Anorexia Nervosa, an example rarely mentioned (...)
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  15. Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder.Şerife Tekin - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subjects self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and (...) social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subjects self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs written by people diagnosed with mental disorder, the paper concludes that a DSM diagnosis is a double-edged sword for self- concept. On the one hand, it sets the subjects experience in an established classificatory system which can facilitate self-understanding by providing insight into subjects condition and guiding her personal growth, as well as treatment and recovery. In this sense, the DSM diagnosis may have positive repercussions on self-development. On the other hand, however, given the DSMs symptom-based approach and its adoption of the Biomedical Disease model, a diagnosis may force the subject to make sense of her condition divorced from other elements in her life that may be affecting her mental- health. It may lead her frame her experience only as an irreversible imbalance. This form of self-understanding may set limits on the subjects hopes of recovery and may create impediments to her flourishing. (shrink)
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  16. Autism: The Very Idea.Simon Cushing - 2013 - In Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.), The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 17-45.
    If each of the subtypes of autism is defined simply as constituted by a set of symptoms, then the criteria for its observation are straightforward, although, of (...)
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  17. Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychiatric Classification.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2019 - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford, UK: pp. 1016-1030.
    In this chapter, I provide an overview of phenomenological approaches to psychiatric classification. My aim is to encourage and facilitate philosophical debate over the best ways to (...)
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  18. Has Autism Changed?Simon Cushing - 2018 - In Monika dos Santos & Jean-Francois Pelletier (eds.), The Social Constructions and Experiences of Madness. Leiden: Brill. pp. 75-94.
    The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was published in 2013 containing the following changes from the previous edition: gone are (...)
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  19. Review of: Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives[REVIEW]Lane Timothy - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Review 16:1-6.
    If we already had a periodic table of mental illness in hand, there would be less need for a book of this type. Although some psychiatrists do (...)
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  20. Ontologies, Disorders and Prototypes.Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione, Antonio Lieto & Greta Adamo - 2016 - In Proceedings of IACAP 2016.
    As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and (...)
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  21. Ontologies, Mental Disorders and Prototypes.Maria Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione, Antonio Lieto & Greta Adamo - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag. pp. 189-204.
    As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and (...)
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  22. Stabilizing Constructs Through Collaboration Across Different Research Fields as a Way to Foster the Integrative Approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project.Jacqueline A. Sullivan - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (00):00.
    In this article, I explain why stabilizing constructs is important to the success of the Research Domain Criteria Project and identify one measure for facilitating such stability.
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  23.  38
    Interrogating Incoherence and Prospects for a Trans-Positive Psychiatry.Robert A. Wilson - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    Invited commentary on Nicole A. Vincent and Emma A. Jane, “Interrogating Incongruence: Conceptual and Normative Problems with ICD-11s and DSM-5s Diagnostic Categories for Transgender (...)PeopleAustralasian Philosophical Review, in press. -/- The core of Vincent and Janes Interrogating Incongruence is critical of the appeal to the concept of incongruence in DSM-5 and ICD-11 characterisations of trans people, a critique taken to be ground-clearing for more trans-positive, psychiatrically-infused medical interventions. I concur with Vincent and Janes ultimate goals but depart from the view developed in the paper on two fronts. The first is that I remain sceptical about the overall prospects for truly trans-positive psychiatry. Trans should follow homosexuality and other categories of sexual orientation that have been abandoned rather than reformed as constituents of psychiatric diagnosis and categorisation. The second is that I think that the authorscentral criticisms of the appeal to incongruence are misplaced. (shrink)
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  24. Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds.Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2014 - In Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. MIT Press. pp. 1-10.
    In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, asking whether current systems are sufficient for (...)
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  25. Depression as Existential Feeling or de-Situatedness? Distinguishing Structure From Mode in Psychopathology.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):595-612.
    In this paper I offer an alternative phenomenological account of depression as consisting of a degradation of the degree to which one is situated in and attuned (...)
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  26. Foundations for a Realist Ontology of Mental Disease.Werner Ceusters & Barry Smith - 2010 - Journal of Biomedical Semantics 1 (10):1-23.
    While classifications of mental disorders have existed for over one hundred years, it still remains unspecified what terms such as 'mental disorder', 'disease' and 'illness' might actually (...)
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  27. Phenomenology and Dimensional Approaches to Psychiatric Research and Classification.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2019 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (1):65-75.
    Contemporary psychiatry finds itself in the midst of a crisis of classification. The developments begun in the 1980swith the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical (...)Manual of Mental Disorderssuccessfully increased inter-rater reliability. However, these developments have done little to increase the predictive validity of our categories of disorder. A diagnosis based on DSM categories and criteria often fails to accurately anticipate course of illness or treatment response. In addition, there is little evidence that the DSM categories link up with genetic findings, and even less evidence that they... (shrink)
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  28. Do Sensory Substitution Extend the Conscious Mind?Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina - forthcoming - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness". Amsterdam: John Benjamins. John Benjamins.
    Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be «yes » to this question. However, a (...) growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009) a founder and leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesnt allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. (shrink)
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  29. Embodying Autistic Cognition: Towards Reconceiving Certain 'Autism-Related' Behavioral Atypicalities as Functional.Michael D. Doan & Andrew Fenton - 2013 - In Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.), The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Some researchers and autistic activists have recently suggested that because someautism-relatedbehavioural atypicalities have a function or purpose they may be desirable rather than undesirable. (...)Examples of such behavioural atypicalities include hand-flapping, repeatedly ordering objects (e.g., toys) in rows, and profoundly restricted routines. A common view, as represented in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) IV-TR (APA, 2000), is that many of these behaviours lack adaptive function or purpose, interfere with learning, and constitute the non-social behavioural dysfunctions of those disorders making up the Autism Spectrum. As the DSM IV-TR continues to be the reference source of choice for professionals working with individuals with psychiatric difficulties, its characterization of the Autism Spectrum holds significant sway. We will suggest Extended Mind and Enactive Cognition Theories, which theorize that mind (or cognition) is embodied and environmentally embedded, as coherent conceptual and theoretical spaces within which to investigate the possibility that certain repetitive behaviours exhibited by autistics possess functions or purposes that make them desirable. As lenses through which to re-examineautism-relatedbehavioral atypicalities, these theories not only open up explanatory possibilities underdeveloped in the research literature, but also cohere with how some autistics describe their own experience. Our position navigates a middle way between the view of autism as understood in terms of impairment, deficit and dysfunction and one that seeks to de-pathologize the Spectrum. In so doing we seek to contribute to a continuing dialogue between researchers, clinicians and self- or parent advocates. (shrink)
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  30. Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention.Ken Levy - 2011 - San Diego Law Review 48:1299-1395.
    I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopathsindividuals who (...) lack the capacity to feel sympathyhelp to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer from this conclusion that they must also lack criminal responsibility and therefore that our continuing to punish psychopaths for their crimes is unjust. My response is that this inference is entirely fallacious. -/- Criminal responsibility turns out to be quite distinct from moral responsibility. The two kinds of responsibility require very different conditions to be satisfied. In particular, criminal responsibility, unlike moral responsibility, does not require an agent be able to grasp and follow moral reasons; it requires only that the individual be able to grasp and follow criminal laws. Once this point is recognized, it becomes much easier to accept my thesis: while the subset of psychopaths who commit crimes are not morally responsible for their criminal behavior because they cannot understand moral reasons, they are still criminally responsible because they can understand what the consequences will be if they get caught. For this reason, even though I concede that psychopaths are not morally responsible for the crimes that they commit, our practice of punishing them for these crimes is still just. -/- Second, I argue that psychopathy is a mental illness and should be recognized as such. One reason that it should be recognized as a mental illness is simply because it is; it satisfies the main criteria for inclusion in the DSM-IV, thebibleof mental disorders. The other reason is more practical than conceptual. It starts with two facts: the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that the preventive detention of any individual who is not a criminal suspect is not constitutional unless the individual is not only dangerous but also mentally ill; and psychopathy is not currently considered to be a mental illness. So, as things now stand, we cannot preventively commit dangerous psychopathsthat is, psychopaths who have clearly indicated that they will be committing serious crimes. Instead, we must wait for them to commit the crimes before we can lock them up. Unfortunately, this incarceration always comes too late for the victims. It would therefore be better if we could lock them up before they actually inflict any harm. Once again, then, I propose that the legal and psychological communities classify psychopathy as a mental illness. (shrink)
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  31. Reconsidering the Affective Dimension of Depression and Mania: Towards a Phenomenological Dissolution of the Paradox of Mixed States.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2014 - Journal of Psychopathology 20 (4):414-422.
    In this paper, I examine recent phenomenological research on both depressive and manic episodes, with the intention of showing how phenomenologically oriented studies can help us overcome (...)
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  32. An Information Processing Model of Psychopathy.Jeffrey White - 2012 - In Angelo S. Fruili & Luisa D. Veneto (eds.), Moral Psychology. Nova. pp. 1-34.
    Psychopathy is increasingly in the public eye. However, it is yet to be fully and effectively understood. Within the context of the DSM-IV, for example, it (...)is best regarded as a complex family of disorders. The upside is that this family can be tightly related along common dimensions. Characteristic marks of psychopaths include a lack of guilt and remorse for paradigm case immoral actions, leading to the common conception of psychopathy rooted in affective dysfunctions. An adequate portrait of psychopathy is much more complicated, however. Though some neural regions and corresponding functions are commonly indicated, they range across those responsible for action planning and learning, as well as emotional processes. Accordingly, a complete fine-grained map of all neural mechanisms responsible for psychopathy has not been realized, and even if it were, such a map would have limited utility outside of the context of surgical or chemical intervention. The utility of a neural-level understanding of psychopathy is further limited by the fact that it is only applicable in the clinical identification of individual subjects, and the neuro-chemical/biological correction of those subjects after they are positively identified as psychopaths. On the other hand, an information processing model of moral cognition provides for wider-ranging applications. The theoretical and practical implications for such a feasible working model of psychopathic personalities are assessed. Finally, this chapter raises the possibility of directed modification of social-environmental factors discouraging the development of psychopathic personalities in the first place, modifications which are also open to simulation and testing in terms of the same model of moral cognition. (shrink)
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  33. Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science.Bill Fulford, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2014 - World Psychiatry 13 (2):110-117.
    Understood in their historical context, current debates about psychiatric classification, prompted by the publication of the DSM-5, open up new opportunities for improved translational research in (...)psychiatry. In this paper, we draw lessons for translational research from three time slices of 20th century psychiatry. From the first time slice, 1913 and the publication of JaspersGeneral Psychopathology, the lesson is that translational research in psychiatry requires a pluralistic approach encompassing equally the sciences of mind (including the social sciences) and of brain. From the second time slice, 1953 and a conference in New York from which our present symptom-based classifications are derived, the lesson is that, while reliability remains the basis of psychiatry as an observational science, validity too is essential to effective translation. From the third time slice, 1997 and a conference on psychiatric classification in Dallas that brought together patients and carers with researchers and clinicians, the lesson is that we need to build further on collaborative models of research combining expertise-by-training with expertise-by-experience. This is important if we are to meet the specific challenges to translation presented by the complexity of the concept of mental disorder, particularly as reflected in the diversity of desired treatment outcomes. Taken together, these three lessonsa pluralistic approach, reliability and validity, and closer collaborationprovide an emerging framework for more effective translation of research into practice in 21st century psychiatry. (shrink)
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  34.  94
    The Influence of Framing on CliniciansJudgments of the Biological Basis of Behaviors.Nancy S. Kim, Woo-Kyoung Ahn, Samuel G. B. Johnson & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 22 (1):39-47.
    Practicing clinicians frequently think about behaviors both abstractly (i.e., in terms of symptoms, as in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed., DSM5 (...); American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and concretely (i.e., in terms of individual clients, as in DSM5 Clinical Cases; Barnhill, 2013). Does abstract/concrete framing influence clinical judgments about behaviors? Practicing mental health clinicians (N ? 74) were presented with hallmark symptoms of 6 disorders framed abstractly versus concretely, and provided ratings of their biological and psychological bases (Experiment 1) and the likely effectiveness of medication and psychotherapy in alleviating them (Experiment 2). Clinicians perceived behavioral symptoms in the abstract to be more biologically and less psychologically based than when concretely described, and medication was viewed as more effective for abstractly than concretely described symptoms. These findings suggest a possible basis for miscommunication and misalignment of views between primarily research-oriented and primarily practice-oriented clinicians; furthermore, clinicians may accept new neuroscience research more strongly in the abstract than for individual clients. (shrink)
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  35. Theory of Mind and Mentalizing Ability in Antisocial Personality Disorders with and Without Psychopathy.M. Dolan & R. Fullam - 2004 - Psychological Medicine 34:1093–1102.
    Background. The literature on Theory of Mind (ToM) in antisocial samples is limited despite evidence that the neural substrates of theory of mind task involve the same (...)
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  36. Will I Be Pretty, Will I Be Rich?”: The Missing Self in Antidepressant Commercials.Serife Tekin - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (5):19 - 21.
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  37. The Mechanistic Approach to Psychiatric Classification.Elisabetta Sirgiovanni - 2009 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 2 (2):45-49.
    A Kuhnian reformulation of the recent debate in psychiatric nosography suggested that the current psychiatric classification system (the DSM) is in crisis and that a sort of (...)
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  38. Why a Logical-Pragmatic Perspective on Validity in Mental Health is Not Sufficient: Introduction to the Principle of Convergent Trans-Disciplinary Crossvalidity.Drozdstoj St Stoyanov - 2010 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 3 (1):25-26.
    The logical-pragmatic perspective on the psychiatric diagnosis, presented by Rodriguez and Banzato contributes to and develops the existing conventional taxonomic framework. The latter is regarded as (...)grounded on the epistemological prerequisites proponed by Carl Gustav Hempel in the late 1960s, adopted by the DSM task force of R. Spitzer in 1973. (shrink)
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  39.  93
    Present and Future Trajectories Towards a Possible Valid and Useful Diagnosis of ADHD.Piero De Rossi - 2016 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 9 (1):34-35.
    To date, diagnosing Attention Defi cit Hyperactivity Disorder remains indeed one of the most controversial issues in contemporary psychiatry and behavioural sciences. Most of the conceptual problems (...)
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  40. Philosophy of Psychiatry.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against (...)
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  41. Rappresentare i disordini mentali mediante ontologie.Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2016 - Apprendimento, Cognizione E Tecnologia.
    Come emerso dallanalisi filosofica e dalla ricerca nelle scienze cogni- tive, la maggior parte dei concetti, tra cui molti concetti medici, esibisce deglieffetti prototipici (...)e non riesce ad essere definita nei termini di condizioni necessarie e sufficienti. Questo aspetto rappresenta un problema per la pro- gettazione di ontologie in informatica, poiché i formalismi adottati per la rap- presentazione della conoscenza (a partire da OWLWeb Ontology Langua- ge) non sono in grado di rendere conto dei concetti nei termini dei loro tratti prototipici. Nel presente articolo ci concentriamo sulla classe dei disordini mentali facendo riferimento alle descrizioni che ne vengono date nel DSM-5. Lidea quella di proporre un approccio ibrido, in cui i formalismi delle ontologie sono combinati a una rappresentazione geometrica della conoscenza basata sugli spazi concettuali. (shrink)
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  42.  76
    A Metaphysical and Epistemological Critique of Psychiatry.Giuseppe Naimo - forthcoming - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 14. Athens, Greece: Athens Institute for Education and Research. pp. Chapter 12 pp. 129-142..
    Current health care standards, in many countries, Australia included, are regrettably poor. Surprisingly, practitioners and treating teams alike in mental health and disability sectors, in particular, make (...)
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  43. Review of 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus' by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922).Starks Michael - 2016 - In Michael Starks (ed.), Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018. Michael Starks. pp. 246-258.
    TLP is a remarkable document which continues to seduce some the best minds in philosophy, with new books and articles dealing partly or entirely with it appearing (...)
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  44.  67
    Review of 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus' by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 348-363.
    TLP is a remarkable document which continues to seduce some the best minds in philosophy, with new books and articles dealing partly or entirely with it appearing (...)
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  45. Emotional Disturbance, Trauma, and Authenticity: A Phenomenological-Contextualist Psychoanalytic Perspective.Robert D. Stolorow - 2018 - In Kevin Aho (ed.), Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 17-25.
    The psychiatric diagnostic system, as exemplified by the DSM, is a pseudo-scientific framework for diagnosing sick Cartesian isolated minds. As such, it completely overlooks the exquisite (...)context sensitivity and radical context dependence of human emotional life and of all forms of emotional disturbance. In Descartess vision, the mind is athinking thing,” ontologically decontextualized, fundamentally separated from its world. Heideggers existential phenomenology mended this Cartesian subject-object split, unveiling our Being as always already contextualized, a Being-in-the-world. Here I offer a critique of studies inphenomenological psychopathologythat presuppose the validity of the psychiatric diagnostic system and leave it unchallenged. In this vein, I contend that all emotional disturbances are constituted in an indissoluble context of human interrelatedness. Specifically, I claim that all emotional disturbances, including those objectified by the DSM, take form in relational contexts of severe emotional trauma. There are no psychiatric entities, only devastating contexts. Additionally, I show that Heideggers analyses of Angst, world-collapse, uncanniness, and thrownness into Being-toward-death provide extraordinary philosophical tools for grasping the existential significance of such contexts of emotional trauma. Applying Heideggers concept of authenticity, I suggest that emotional health entails an ease of passagei.e., an absence of dissociationbetween the world of trauma and the world of everydayness. (shrink)
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  46.  63
    What is a Way to Overcome Sadness? (Sic).Chatterjee Subhasis Chattopadhyay - 2017 - Https://Www.Quora.Com/Profile/Subhasis-Chattopadhyay-2.
    Philosophy and psychoanalysis should address the problem of sorrow qua melancholia and even, in a popular manner, Major Depressive Disorder. I have tried to take both philosophy (...)
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  47. Language, Prejudice, and the Aims of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Terminological Reflections onMania".Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2016 - Journal of Psychopathology 22 (1):21-29.
    In this paper I examine the ways in which our language and terminology predetermine how we approach, investigate and conceptualise mental illness. I address this issue from (...)
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  48. John S. Wilkins and Malte C. Ebach: The Nature of Classification: Relationships and Kinds in the Natural Sciences: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2014, Pp., Vii + 197, Price £60/$100.00.Catherine Kendig - 2015 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 37 (4):477-479.
    John Wilkins and Malte Ebach respond to the dismissal of classification as something we need not concern ourselves with because it is, as Ernest Rutherford suggested, mere (...)
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  49. Identifying the Explanatory Domain of the Looping Effect: Congruent and Incongruent Feedback Mechanisms of Interactive Kinds.Tuomas Vesterinen - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (2):1-27.
    Winner of the 2020 Essay Competition of the International Social Ontology Society. -/- Ian Hacking uses the looping effect to describe how classificatory practices in the human sciences (...) interact with the classified people. While arguably this interaction renders the affected human kinds unstable and hence different from natural kinds, realists argue that also some prototypical natural kinds are interactive and human kinds in general are stable enough to support explanations and predictions. I defend a more fine-grained realist interpretation of interactive human kinds by arguing for an explanatory domain account of the looping effect. First, I argue that knowledge of the feedback mechanisms that mediate the looping effect can supplement, and help to identify, the applicability domain over which a kind and its property variations are stably explainable. Second, by applying this account to cross-cultural case studies of psychiatric disorders, I distinguish between congruent feedback mechanisms that explain matches between classifications and kinds, and incongruent feedback mecha- nisms that explain mismatches. For example, congruent mechanisms maintain Western auditory experiences in schizophrenia, whereas exporting diagnostic labels inflicts incongruence by influencing local experiences. Knowledge of the mechanisms can strengthen explanatory domains, and thereby facilitate classificatory adjustments and possible interventions on psychiatric disorders. (shrink)
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  50.  74
    Function, Dysfunction, and the Concept of Mental Disorder.Jonathan Y. Tsou - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
    Commentary on Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien, "Dysfunction and the Definition of Mental Disorder in the DSM.".
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