The purpose of this article is to introduce an innovative approach to the theoretical debate of the last two centuries on how to appropriately conceptualize modern democracy. The main argument that is being put forward by the analysis is that the common reliance on the assumption of pre-modern political philosophy, that democracy is a certain type of political regime or at least a form of rule, has become insufficient to cover the influence and scope of its modern meaning (...) and practical use. Political theory faces the risk of becoming misguided and prejudiced, if the problem of re-conceptualizing democracy is not taken seriously into account. The article tends to offer new insights on the ongoing democratic debate by focusing on one simple question: can modern democracy be understood in terms of a political regime or should it be viewed as a distinct entity? The field of study relevant to our analysis of democracy ranges from Enlightenment thinkers, such as J. J. Rousseau and Voltaire, to XIX–XX century political philosophers (like A. de Tocqueville and C. Schmitt) and some contemporary theorists, like P. Manent. The article starts with explanations, why it is important to look deeper into the conceptual difficulties of modern democracy and why political philosophy and its theories on political regimes are crucial for such a task. Parts 3–5 of the analysis tend to prove that the only way to appropriately understand modern democracy is to identify and question its basic assumptions: the sovereignty of the people and social equality. The final part of the article – part 6 – offers a critique of understanding modern democracy as a political regime. The critique identifies three main theoretical problems, inherent to the discussion on modern democracy, which make it difficult to avoid contradictions when applying the name “democratic” to various political regimes. The article concludes that: First, democracy is not a political regime in a pre-modern sense of the term, which is an assumption still widely taken for granted in political theory. Democracy should be seen as a universal principle of legitimization of power, which can be applied by various regimes. Second, political philosophy faces the danger of adopting an oversimplified understanding of democracy as merely an institutional form of rule (a view perpetuated by social sciences); as well as the danger of conceptualizing democracy as a substance-free and abstract ideal, applicable to all forms of government. Both of these concepts fail to acknowledge the scope of democracy and thus should not be seen as satisfactory. Third, theoretical discussions on democracy suffer from three conceptual shortcomings, which make it impossible to speak about democracy as a political regime. The three problems are: 1. a tendency to see democracy as an ideal concept with no need of practical grounding; 2. making democracy a formal concept with no need of references to its normative nor positive substance; 3. making democracy a pseudo-religious entity by imitating structural elements of Christian religion: faith in a universal nature of humans, an all-powerful sovereign (the people), messianic mission. Lastly, the article generalizes that political philosophy has an obligation to demystify the concept of democracy in order to re-emerge discussions about the substance of different political regimes. For this purpose the concept of loyalty should be taken into account. If we want to prove that a certain state corresponds to a certain political regime, we must try to understand why its subjects maintain loyalty to a specific form of rule. Only unprejudiced political philosophy is capable of such a task, that’s why it should avoid taking the concept of democracy for granted. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to suggest a theoretical approach to modern democracy and its implicit contradiction between the idea of public sovereignty and the model of political representation. The apparent practical problem arising from this contradiction is the lack of legitimacy in democratically elected officials and parliament in general. The article argues that the issue with democratic representation cannot be explained sociologically, but must include a theoretical analysis of the normative contradiction between the egalitarian principle of sovereignty (...) of the people and the hierarchical model of political representation. -/- The article develops its argument from the conceptual framework laid down in the political theory of Montesquieu. Montesquieu’s thoughts on political regimes offer important insights about modern representative democracy, highlighting the structural relationship between what he called the “nature of democracy” (the rule of the people) and the “generating principle of democracy” (love for equality). Three contemporary interpretations of Montesquieu’s theory (by Fred Dallmayr, Michael Mosher and Sharon Krause) are introduced and critically evaluated. -/- The article concludes that: -/- Representative democracy suffers from a structural tension between the democratic idea of the rule of the people and its practical implementation through the model of representation, which was inherited from predemocratic monarchic regimes. The problem is not sociological but structural. -/- Montesquieu’s theory offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the inner tension of representative democracy between the ideas of egalitarianism and political hierarchy. Contemporary authors suggest different interpretations of Montesquieu’s thought and offer several strategies for the possible improvement of democratic rule, such as (1) redrawing the notion of representation, (2) creating a more empowered civic society and (3) introducing a meritocratic educational system for individuals. Yet, they all miss the original idea posed by the Enlightenment philosopher regarding the balance between the democratic principle (passion for equality) and its natural claim to represent the people with “intermediary institutions” that mitigate the adverse tendencies of the democratic form of government. -/- Philosophical discussions about democratic legitimacy should consider one Montesquieu’s statement that is rarely theoretically acknowledged: that democratic political representation needs non-egalitarian social ideas. This means that democracy must tolerate certain non-democratic social ideas (such as honor) for its own benefit, because they provide the necessary balancing institutions. Such an idea would benefit the ongoing debates about democracy by providing a more structural outlook on the fundamental source of the problem (which is a structural collision of contradictory ideas: “equality” vs. “hierarchy”) than those offered by the sociological strategies of democratization or civic empowerment. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is one of the most controversial philosophers and political theorists of the Enlightenment. He has often been accused of laying the ideological foundation for many repressive and radical movements and regimes, from the reign of terror of the French Revolution to the right-wing and left-wing totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Especially his idea of the general will has been criticised by scholars as an abstract Platonism that establishes the dictatorship of the state and rejects basic (...) human rights. Some authors even believe that all of Rousseau’s authoritarian passages are merely a paraphrase of arguments found in French absolutist thought. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s novelty lay in his denial of identifying authority with only one person. Instead, sovereignty was based on the will of all those people who made up the political body. Accordingly, the theory of absolute monarchy was transformed into an alternative democratic version of absolute popular sovereignty. Rousseau is also considered one of the classics of the contractual tradition. He argued that mankind without a govern- ment would live in what he called a “state of nature” where there would be no law and order. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is to compare Rousseau’s ideas about the principles of political authority in two of his works: “The Social Contract” and “Considerations on the Government of Poland”. In the first part of the paper we will briefly review the main concepts developed in The Social Contract, such as the general will, the social contract, sovereignty and direct democracy. In the second part, we will focus on the main ideas put forward in Considerations on the Government of Poland. Then, at the end, we will try to identify the reasons for the conceptual changes in some of Rousseau’s views. (shrink)

The increasing number of residents and citizens with non-Western cultural backgrounds in the European Union (EU) has prompted the question of whether EU member states (and other Western democracies) can accommodate the newcomers and maintain their free polities (‘liberal democracies’). The answer depends on how important – if at all – cultural groundings are to democratic polities. The analysis of a fascinating Habermas-Ratzinger debate on the ‘pre-political moral foundations of the free-state’ suggests that while legitimacy originates on the will (...) of the citizens that conform the political community, liberal democracies might not be completely free from moral principles implicit in their political culture. This possibility has normative implications for the political future of the EU - and of the West in general - particularly regarding immigration, integration and citizenship policies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A new ‘political philosophy’ is indispensable to the ‘post-Corona world,’ and this paper tries to analyze the future of ‘liberal democracy’ in it. It shows that ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that has begun before, but the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic,’ as a setback for it, strongly encourages that crisis. ‘Liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed by ‘political philosophers’ to go together, are now becoming decoupled, and the ‘liberal values’ of ‘democracy’ are eroding. To find (...) why and how, this paper analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ and the evils and propensities of ‘democracy’ that bring about further erosions of ‘liberal values.’ There may be difficult trade-offs to be made between ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ ‘values’ - and, after the experience of ‘Coronavirus,’ this paper shows the ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy’ may become stronger. -/- KEYWORDS: democracy, liberalism, liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, the novel Coronavirus pandemic, Covid-19, authoritarianism, totalitarianism. -/- EXTENDED ABSTRACT For almost a century in West, ‘democracy’ has meant ‘liberal democracy’-a political system marked not only by ‘free and fair elections,’ but also by ‘liberal values.’ ‘Liberalism’ applied to the problem of the limits of the criminal law would require commitment to the presumption in favor of ‘liberty.’ If the word ‘liberal’ is to have any utility in this context, it should refer to one who has so powerful a commitment to ‘liberty’ that she is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-limiting or coercion-legitimizing principles as narrowly as possible. So, she only believes in ‘harm-principle’ as the morally relevant reason for criminal prohibitions. ‘Offense principle’ and ‘paternalistic’ and ‘moralistic’ considerations, when introduced as support for penal legislation, have no weight at all. So, it means ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-regarding vs. other-regarding actions distinction’ based on which the human is the owner of her mind and body and everything consenting adults do is beyond the realm of morality and law. It leads to ‘individual’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties’ of ‘speech,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘property’ and ‘collective’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties of assembly,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘political pluralism,’ ‘democratic institutions,’ and ‘non-governmental organizations.’ ‘Liberalism’ also believes in ‘equality of conditions, ‘equal and free participatory rights in political decision making,’ and ‘collective self-governance.’ It also believes in the ‘rule of law,’ a ‘separation of powers,’ and ‘checks and balances.’ However, even under fair and free elections, the elected leaders can be ‘populists,’ ‘ultra-nationalists,’ ‘racists,’ ‘fascists,’ and ‘authoritarians’ who do not respect ‘inviolable basic rights and liberties,’ and suppress ‘minorities.’ Democratically elected leaders can routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of ‘basic rights and liberties.’ The two strands of ‘liberal democracy’ have been coming apart in the world, and the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ have been fraying and eroding even before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ Even before the Coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of ‘liberal democracy.’ In particular, there has been a debate about whether ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled. This paper shows ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that had begun before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ It also analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ ‘liberalism,’ and ‘democracy’ and shows that Covid-19 is a setback for ‘liberal democracy.’ What is striking about the current moment is that many of the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ are so far holding up under immense pressure. ‘Illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many countries. This model of ‘illiberal democracy,’ in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights and liberties are curtailed, may emerge stronger from this new crisis. In that sense, the ‘pandemic’ may become a challenge not only to ‘democracy’ as such but also to ‘liberal democracy’ in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. ‘Authoritarian’ procedures may succeed in mitigating the spread of the ‘Coronavirus,’ but the world now faces another problem: that when the virus recedes, many ‘liberal democracies’ will be far less ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ than they were before. In times of crisis, ‘liberal values’ have been ignored temporarily in the name of executive power. However, the ‘temporary’ can become ‘permanent.’ In addition, if citizens lose their faith in the legitimacy of ‘liberal democracy’ as the best form of government, and think ‘liberal democracy’ cannot function effectively during a crisis, and ‘authoritarian regimes’ manage the crisis more decisively, the world will slide towards ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy,’ and many ‘liberal democracies’ will be at grave risk of failure. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security - and, after the experience of Covid-19, many citizens may choose security. (shrink)

Alternative Solutions to a Failed Democratic System Due to Ignorant Voters and Black Propaganda Politics -/- Introduction -/- Democracy is often considered the best form of government because it allows people to choose their leaders and influence policies. However, democracy is only as strong as the knowledge and wisdom of its citizens. When voters are ignorant and easily manipulated by black propaganda, democracy fails to serve its true purpose. Corrupt politicians take advantage of misinformation, and elections become a contest of (...) deceit rather than competence. In such cases, it becomes necessary to explore alternative governance systems that align with the universal law of balance in nature, ensuring societal stability and progress. This essay explores five potential solutions: meritocratic democracy, hybrid governance, decentralized governance with AI oversight, temporary educational dictatorship, and whole-process democracy with reforms. -/- 1. Meritocratic Democracy: A Government of the Competent -/- One of the main weaknesses of democracy is that it allows uninformed individuals to vote, often leading to the election of incompetent or corrupt leaders. Meritocratic democracy solves this by introducing a system where voters and candidates must meet certain educational or competency requirements. -/- In this system: -/- Voters must pass a basic competency test on political, economic, and social issues before they can vote. -/- Candidates must demonstrate expertise in governance, ethics, and leadership before being allowed to run for office. -/- Decision-making is guided by knowledge and logic, rather than emotional manipulation or populism. -/- By ensuring that only informed citizens and competent leaders participate in the electoral process, a meritocratic democracy prevents the spread of ignorance and manipulation, making governance more stable and effective. -/- 2. Hybrid Governance Model: Balancing Democracy and Technocracy -/- A pure democratic system, when controlled by an uninformed majority, can lead to poor decision-making. A hybrid governance model combines democratic participation with expert-driven decision-making. -/- This system includes: -/- Direct democracy for issues that require public participation, ensuring people still have a voice. -/- Technocratic leadership for areas that require expertise, such as economic planning, environmental policies, and legal reforms. -/- AI-assisted decision-making, where policies are analyzed based on logic, data, and the universal law of balance in nature. -/- By integrating democracy with technocracy, this model ensures that governance is based on both public engagement and expert knowledge, reducing the influence of ignorance and propaganda. -/- 3. Decentralized Governance with AI Oversight -/- Corruption and manipulation thrive in centralized political systems where power is concentrated in a few individuals. A decentralized governance model distributes power across local communities while maintaining oversight through artificial general intelligence (AGI) programmed with the universal formula to ensure balance and ethical governance. -/- This system includes: -/- Local decision-making councils that handle community affairs, reducing dependence on central authorities. -/- AI oversight to prevent misinformation, corruption, and propaganda in governance. -/- Policy-making based on natural balance, ensuring that human actions align with long-term sustainability and fairness. -/- By decentralizing power and using AI to monitor governance, this system prevents political elites from manipulating the public while ensuring that all decisions follow rational and ethical principles. -/- 4. Temporary Educational Dictatorship: A Path to Enlightened Democracy -/- If a democratic system is completely destroyed by ignorance and propaganda, a temporary educational dictatorship may be necessary to restore order. This approach involves: -/- A temporary leadership regime that enforces strict educational reforms before returning power to a well-informed electorate. -/- A governance structure that prioritizes truth, logic, and natural laws in policymaking. -/- A mandatory educational system focusing on critical thinking, ethics, and scientific reasoning to eliminate ignorance from the voting population. -/- This dictatorship would not be based on oppression but on restoring the intellectual foundation necessary for democracy to function properly. Once society reaches a stable level of awareness, democratic processes can be reinstated. -/- 5. Whole-Process People’s Democracy with Reforms -/- China’s whole-process people’s democracy is a system that allows both public participation and centralized decision-making. However, for it to be truly effective, it must integrate the universal law of balance in nature and eliminate ideological biases. -/- To reform whole-process democracy: -/- Education and critical thinking must be central to governance, ensuring the population is not easily misled. -/- Leaders must be selected based on knowledge and competence, not political loyalty. -/- Policies must align with natural balance, ensuring long-term societal stability. -/- By modifying this system with scientific and ethical principles, it can serve as a stable alternative to failing democracies. -/- Conclusion -/- Democracy is valuable, but when ignorant voters and black propaganda politics take control, it leads to instability and poor governance. To correct this failure, alternative systems must be considered. Meritocratic democracy ensures only informed citizens and competent leaders participate in elections. Hybrid governance balances democratic participation with expert decision-making. Decentralized governance with AI oversight prevents corruption and misinformation. A temporary educational dictatorship restores knowledge before returning to democracy. Whole-process democracy, when modified with the universal law of balance, can also serve as a viable alternative. -/- The best solution depends on the specific problems of a country, but the core principle remains the same: governance must follow the universal law of balance in nature, ensuring stability, truth, and progress. Only through such reforms can society escape the cycle of ignorance and manipulation, creating a future where human decisions align with natural laws and rational thought. -/- . (shrink)

The Role of Power Transitions in Government Collapse: Historical Lessons and Solutions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. When power is transferred smoothly, institutions remain strong, and societies continue to function. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or poorly structured, they often lead to political instability, civil wars, or the complete breakdown of government structures. This essay explores the importance of power transitions in maintaining political (...) stability by examining historical examples where such transitions led to the collapse of governments. Additionally, it proposes solutions to prevent such collapses in the future. -/- The Critical Nature of Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. Several factors determine whether a transition is successful or leads to instability: -/- 1. Legitimacy of Succession – If the public and political elites accept the process of succession, transitions occur peacefully. However, when legitimacy is questioned, power struggles emerge. -/- 2. Institutional Strength – Strong political institutions ensure smooth power transitions, while weak institutions make governments dependent on individual rulers. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – When ruling elites agree on a transition, it is more likely to be peaceful. Divisions among elites can result in coups or civil wars. -/- 4. Public Support and Social Stability – If the population supports the transition, the government remains stable. Mass protests or revolts can destabilize regimes. -/- 5. Military and Security Forces’ Role – A neutral or loyal military ensures a peaceful transition, but if the military intervenes, coups or armed conflicts may occur. -/- 6. Economic Conditions – Economic crises can accelerate government collapse during power transitions by weakening public trust. -/- 7. External Influences – Foreign intervention, diplomatic pressure, or economic sanctions can shape whether a transition succeeds or leads to chaos. -/- Historical Examples of Power Transitions Leading to Collapse -/- 1. The Fall of the Roman Republic (1st Century BCE) -/- The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE triggered a power vacuum and civil war. The Republic collapsed as Augustus (Octavian) seized power and established the Roman Empire. The failure to create a smooth transition from the Republic to an alternative stable government structure led to one-man rule. -/- 2. The French Revolution (1789-1799) -/- The monarchy collapsed due to economic crises and public discontent. The power vacuum led to the Reign of Terror and multiple regime changes before Napoleon took control. The lack of a stable transition plan from monarchy to democracy resulted in violent political struggles. -/- 3. The Russian Revolution (1917) -/- Czar Nicholas II abdicated amid economic and military crises. The weak Provisional Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, leading to decades of political purges. The failure to establish a strong democratic system allowed radical elements to seize power. -/- 4. The Weimar Republic and Hitler’s Rise (1933) -/- Germany’s economic crisis and political instability enabled Adolf Hitler to rise to power legally, leading to the collapse of democracy and the Nazi dictatorship. The failure of democratic institutions to resist authoritarian takeovers contributed to this transition failure. -/- 5. The Iranian Revolution (1979) -/- The Shah of Iran lost legitimacy due to repression and economic struggles. His departure created a power vacuum, allowing the Islamic Revolution to establish a theocratic regime. The lack of a democratic transition framework led to a total political shift. -/- 6. The Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) -/- Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms weakened the centralized government, leading to nationalist movements and economic collapse, resulting in the dissolution of the USSR. The sudden transition from communism to multiple independent states was mismanaged, leading to political chaos. -/- 7. The Arab Spring (2010-2012) -/- Mass protests led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. However, weak institutions and power vacuums resulted in ongoing instability and civil wars. The absence of structured political succession made these transitions chaotic. -/- 8. The Fall of the Afghan Government (2021) -/- The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the rapid collapse of the Afghan government, allowing the Taliban to take power without resistance. The lack of a well-planned transition left a power vacuum that extremist groups exploited. -/- Solutions for Preventing Government Collapse During Power Transitions -/- 1. Establishing Strong Political Institutions -/- Governments should build independent institutions that can function regardless of leadership changes. -/- A clear legal framework for succession should be established, ensuring stability. -/- Example: United States Presidential Transition – Despite political disagreements, strong institutions ensure smooth transitions of power every four years. -/- 2. Promoting a Culture of Democratic Succession -/- Political education should emphasize peaceful transitions of power. -/- Leaders should prepare successors and ensure a stable transition process. -/- Example: South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid (1994) – Nelson Mandela ensured a peaceful transfer of power through negotiations, preventing civil war. -/- 3. Ensuring Economic Stability -/- Economic policies should focus on long-term growth and stability to prevent crises that weaken governments. -/- Governments should maintain financial reserves to manage economic downturns during transitions. -/- Example: China’s Economic Reforms (1978-Present) – Transition from Maoist policies to a market economy was gradual, preventing instability. -/- 4. Strengthening Public Trust in Government -/- Transparency and accountability should be prioritized to gain public confidence. -/- Civic engagement and public participation in governance should be encouraged. -/- Example: Post-World War II Japan – Japan rebuilt trust in democratic institutions, leading to long-term political stability. -/- 5. Avoiding Military Interventions in Politics -/- The military should remain neutral in political transitions and serve as a stabilizing force, not a political actor. -/- Civilian oversight of the military should be strengthened to prevent coups. -/- Example: Turkey’s Democratic Reforms – Despite past military coups, recent reforms have reduced military interference in politics. -/- 6. International Mediation and Support -/- International organizations (e.g., the UN) should assist in ensuring peaceful transitions in unstable regions. -/- Diplomatic pressure can prevent violent takeovers and encourage legitimate transitions. -/- Example: East Timor’s Independence (2002) – The UN helped facilitate a peaceful transition to democracy after Indonesian rule. -/- 7. Managing Internal and External Political Conflicts -/- Governments should ensure national unity by addressing ethnic and political divisions. -/- Foreign influence should be managed to prevent external powers from exploiting transitions. -/- Example: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Rebuilding – After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda implemented reconciliation policies to prevent future power struggles. -/- Conclusion -/- The transition of power is one of the most critical and dangerous moments for any government. If managed well, it can lead to stable governance and progress. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or forced, they can result in political collapse, violence, and societal breakdown. -/- The historical examples discussed demonstrate the importance of legitimacy, institutional strength, elite consensus, public support, and military neutrality in ensuring successful power transitions. By implementing solutions such as strong institutions, economic stability, democratic culture, and international mediation, governments can prevent collapse and ensure smooth transitions of power. -/- The fate of nations often depends not only on who rules, but on how power is transferred from one leader or system to the next. Learning from history and implementing practical solutions can help safeguard governments from the chaos of failed transitions. -/- . (shrink)

In contemporary democracies, global capitalism exerts a significant influence over how state power is exercised, raising questions about where political power resides in global politics. This question is important, since our specific considerations about justifiability of political power, i.e. political legitimacy, depend on how we characterize political power at the global level. As a partial answer to this question, I argue that our notion of global political legitimacy should be reoriented to include the structural power (...) of the Transnational Capitalist Class as its subject matter. Structural power is a social relation in which the institutional context makes some agents comply with others’ preferences regardless of actors’ intentional efforts to bring about such outcomes. Even when global business elites do not intentionally exercise power to obtain political control of global governance, their structural power has recognizable effects that partly enforce the world order. To advance my claim, I utilize the radical realists’ argument that the notion of legitimacy is applicable to a broader range of social practices that are beyond dyadic power relations, i.e. rulers intentionally exercising power over subjects. (shrink)

This dissertation addresses a debate about the proper relationship between democratic theory and institutions. The debate has been waged between two rival approaches: on the one side is an aggregative and economic theory of democracy, known as constitutional economics, and on the other side is deliberative democracy. The two sides endorse starkly different positions on the issue of what makes a democracy legitimate and stable within an institutional setting. Constitutional economists model political agents in the same way that neoclassical (...) economists model economic agents, that is, as self-regarding, rational maximizers; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and stability depend on the extent to which the design of institutional rules and practices maximize individual utility by promoting efficient schemes of collective choice. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, understand political agents as communicative reason-giving subjects who justify their preferences and positions on issues that jointly affect them in a process of consensus-directed discourse, or deliberation; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and order depend on the degree to which institutional norms and practices promote deliberation and draw upon deliberated public judgment. I argue that despite the numerous incompatibilities between constitutional economics and deliberative democracy—which amount to a 'deep divide'—an opportunity to produce a genuine synthesis of the two approaches arises inasmuch as it is possible to overcome several points of opposition in their separate research programmes. The central thesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to construct a bridge spanning the divide between constitutional economists and deliberative democrats, and that Dewey and Bentley's transactional view can facilitate this bridge-building project. Pursuant to this end, the points of opposition between the v research programmes are mediated by way of five concepts which, on balance, favor deliberative democracy and its feasible institutionalization. (shrink)

Public justification-based accounts of liberal legitimacy rely on the idea that a polity’s basic structure should, in some sense, be acceptable to its citizens. In this paper I discuss the prospects of that approach through the lens of Gerald Gaus’ critique of John Rawls’ paradigmatic account of democratic public justification. I argue that Gaus does succeed in pointing out some significant problems for Rawls’ political liberalism; yet his alternative, justificatory liberalism, is not voluntaristic enough to satisfy the desiderata of (...) a genuinely democratic theory of public justification. So I contend that—pace Gaus, but also Rawls—rather than simply amending political liberalism, the claims of justificatory liberalism bring out fatal tensions between the desiderata of any theory of liberal-democratic legitimacy through public justification. (shrink)

In this work, a general framework for the analysis of governance of artificial intelligence is presented. A dashboard developed for this analysis comes from the perspective of political theory. This dashboard allows eventual comparisons between democratic and non democratic regimes, useful for countries in the global south and western countries. The dashboard allows us to assess the key features that determine the governance model for artificial intelligence at the national level, for local governments and for other participant actors. The (...) dashboard allows us to appraise aims of AI strategy and aims left aside in alternative strategies. The work shows the theoretical framework could be of use to advance case studies globally, and comparative endeavors. Applying the theoretical dashboard, the case study on China is undertaken. These are the main points the study tackles in the final discussion, conclusion and further recommendations: 1) the complex reality of AI command and control 2) uncertainties about future society and the polity against AI development and 3) particular cultural values enshrined in countries' AI development. (shrink)

Campaigns highlighting the alleged incompatibility of the Islamic polity with principles of democratic self-governance are longstanding. The basic assumption of the incompatibalist proposition runs as follows: Political legitimacy in Muslim polities can be reduced to a principle of conformity with a set of divinely given rules and norms, the Sharīʿa, occasionally supplemented, and interpreted, by Islamic legal scholars and practitioners. In short, political Islam recognizes the Sharīʿa and Usūl al-fiqh (or, for the purposes of this essay, fiqh, for (...) short) as the Islamic polity’s foundations––those are deemed incompatible with democratic participation. In response, Mohammad Fadel (2018) has argued that the legal instrument of maṣlaḥa, which Fadel summarizes as considerations of the “public good” or “general interest,” can establish the democratic accountability mechanism that critics see missing in political authorities of Sharīʿa–grounded polities. Fadel supports this normative view with reference to some select classical Sunni jurisprudence, particularly the Usūl al-fiqh. I contest this view in two ways: Firstly, on a conceptual level, most thorough analyses of democracy acknowledge responsiveness and active involvement as fundamental components of democratic self-rule. Fadel’s idea of maṣlaḥa does not entirely align with this notion. Secondly, from a doctrinal standpoint, Fadel’s argument is confined solely within the classical Sunni context. That means, Fadel’s argument is contingent upon a significant departure from numerous (potentially the majority) sources within a comprehensive lineage of maṣlaḥa. (shrink)

This paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit views of judgment. Three claims are advanced. First, the salient opposition among approaches to legitimacy is not between “moralism” and “realism.” Recent realist proposals for rethinking legitimacy share with moralist views a distinctive form, called “normativism”: a quest for knowledge of principles that solve the question of legitimacy. This assumes that judging legitimacy is a matter of applying such principles to (...) a case at hand. Second, neither Rawls nor Habermas is a normativist about political legitimacy. The principles of legitimacy they proffer claim to express rather than adjudicate the legitimacy of a liberal-democratic regime, and thus cannot solve the question of legitimacy at a fundamental level. But perhaps we should question the normativist aspiration to theoretically resolving the problem to begin with. My third claim is that a “pragmatist” approach enables us to rethink political legitimacy more deeply by shifting focus from the articulation of principles to the activity of judging. Implicit in Rawls’s and Habermas’s theories I then find clues towards an alternative account of judgment, in which the question of legitimacy calls not for theoretical resolution but for ongoing practical engagement. (shrink)

Which standards should we employ to evaluate the global order? Should they be standards of justice or standards of legitimacy? In this article, I argue that liberal political theorists need not face this dilemma, because liberal justice and legitimacy are not distinct values. Rather, they indicate what the same value, i.e. equal respect for persons, demands of institutions under different sets of circumstances. I suggest that under real-world circumstances – characterized by conflicts and disagreements – equal respect demands basic-rights (...) protection and democratic participation, which I here call ‘political justice’. I conclude the article by considering three possible configurations of the global order – the ‘democratic world-state’, ‘independent democratic states’, and ‘mixed’ models – and argue that a commitment to political justice speaks in favour of the latter. (shrink)

This essay contributes to developing a new approach to political legitimacy by asking what is involved in judging the legitimacy of a regime from a practical point of view. It is focused on one aspect of this question: the role of identity in such judgment. I examine three ways of understanding the significance of identity for political legitimacy: the foundational, associative, and agonistic picture. Neither view, I claim, persuasively captures the dilemmas of judgment in the face of disagreement (...) and uncertainty about who “I” am and who “we” are. I then propose a composite, pragmatic picture. This view casts the question of political legitimacy as an existential predicament: it is fundamentally a question about who you are—both as a person and as a member of collectives. The pragmatic picture integrates rational, prudential, and ethical qualities of good judgment that were heretofore associated with mutually exclusive ways of theorizing legitimacy. It also implies that the question of legitimacy cannot be resolved philosophically. (shrink)

Among the most persuasive arguments against hate speech bans was made by Ronald Dworkin, who warned of the threat to political legitimacy posed by laws that deny those subject to them adequ...

The purpose of this article is to consider the question of whether democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality with regard to political speech – including extremist political speech, such as hate speech. The starting point of my discussion is Jeremy Waldron’s negative answer to this question. He argues that it is permissible for liberal democracies to ban certain extremist viewpoints – such as vituperative hate speech – because such viewpoint-based restrictions protect the dignity of persons and a social and (...) moral environment of mutual respect. According to Waldron, well-drafted narrow hate speech bans are not democratically illegitimate, and they do not undermine systemic democratic legitimacy – that is, the legitimacy of a democratic political system. In contrast to Waldron, I will argue that democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality to respect persons as thinking agents. I will defend a civil libertarian doctrine of viewpoint neutrality, and this doctrine requires that citizens in liberal democracies ought to have a legal free speech right to do moral wrong – that is, a legal right to express and defend any political viewpoint or idea, even if it is morally wrong to express, or expose others to, such views. It will be argued that any viewpoint-based restriction on public discourse (including narrow hate speech bans) is democratically illegitimate, and that such restrictions undermine systemic democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

Endorsing Bill Readings’ argument that there is an intimate relationship between the dissolution of the nation-State, the undermining of the Humboldtian ideal of the university and economic globalization, this paper defends both the nation-State and the Humboldtian university as core institutions of democracy. However, such an argument only has force, it is suggested, if we can revive an appreciation of the real meaning of democracy. Endorsing Cornelius Castoriadis’ argument that democracy has been betrayed in the modern world but disagreeing with (...) his analysis of modernity, it is argued that the tradition of modern democratic thought can only be properly comprehended in relation to the ‘radical enlightenment’ originating in the Renaissance, efforts to subvert this by the ‘moderate enlightenment’, and the revival and reformulation of the radical enlightenment in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. It is shown that subsequent political thought only becomes fully intelligible in relation to the on-going struggle between the radical and the moderate enlightenments, and that it is necessary to appreciate that the moderate enlightenment, manifesting itself in neo-liberal thought, is profoundly anti-democratic. While the radical enlightenment was developed in the nineteenth century by philosophical idealists, it is suggested that the achievements of the idealists can be successfully defended now only on naturalistic foundations through process metaphysics. Process metaphysics, it is shown, provides the basis for reviving the Humboldtian model of the university, the democratic nation-State, and a vision of the future as ‘communities of communities’ to counter the dissolution of all communities into the global market promoted by neo-liberals. (shrink)

According to the deliberative view of democracy, the legitimacy of democratic politics is closely tied to whether the use of political power is accompanied by a process of rational deliberation among the citizenry and their representatives. Critics have questioned whether this level of deliberative capacity is even possible among modern citizenries--due to limitations of time, energy, and differential backgrounds--which therefore calls into question the very possibility of this type of democracy. In my dissertation, I counter this line of criticism, (...) arguing that deliberative democrats and their critics have both idealized the wrong kind of citizen deliberation. Citizen deliberation should not be concerned with the indeterminate project of "translating" abstract democratic principles and values into everyday cases of political problem-solving. Instead, deliberation should take the form of analogy, just as we already find it in everyday politics and affairs. When ordinary citizens use analogies, they do not derive decisions from general principles or values, but they still reason nonetheless. Seen from this analogical perspective, deliberative democracy is already a practical reality to a large degree. When an election is on the horizon, a campaign season arises in which debates, forums, and "barstool" dialogues exponentially increase the amount of citizen deliberation. In these settings, citizens can readily be seen to be mapping analogous past candidates, elections, issues, and problems onto those currently on the ballot so as to reason about them. Consequently, analogical reasoning allows citizens to treat the majority rule mechanisms that proliferate in real politics as "deliberative outlets," which is to say, as catalysts of deliberation akin to the "creative outlets" that catalyze self-expression in the arts. While citizens may recognize majority rule mechanisms as catalysts of deliberation, many democratic theorists will hesitate to embrace this vision of the practical reality of deliberative politics. Isn't analogical reasoning too low in rigor to be placed at the heart of the deliberative ideal? I develop two arguments to explain the foundational role analogy plays in deliberation and to counter such critics. First, I draw on the explosion of research on analogical reasoning over the past two decades to show that it is far more rigorous and systematic than many suppose. Second, I argue that to the extent that citizen deliberation is concerned with rational planning, rather than just reasoning in general, analogical reasoning is logically superior. When we reason about what to do, we make plans that incorporate predictions about what is likely to ensue when a given course of action is selected. However, as soon as predictions enter into deliberation, its underlying logic changes as well. The reason for this change in logic is that as our probabilistic reasoning expands, the probability of its conclusions degenerates. Therefore, when assessing probabilities, we no longer should seek decisions derived from long, elegant chains of reasoning that connect our various options to generalities like values and principles. Instead, what we need is "short and sweet," or terse, humble lines of reasoning, which are more congruent with this form of deliberation. Thus, to the extent that democratic deliberation is involved in rational planning, it calls not for the elegant, deductive kind of reasoning idealized by proponents and critics of deliberative democracy alike. Instead, democratic deliberation calls for the "short and sweet," analogical kind of decision-making we associate with ordinary citizens already. After all, as research has shown, analogies are a much preferred and rigorous way by which even experts engage in probabilistic reasoning. By focusing on analogical reasoning, I therefore conclude that the practical reality of deliberative democracy should be recognized in ways that might ordinarily be dismissed. (shrink)

The stability of socio-political systems and the risks of destabilisation in the process of political transformation are among the most important issues of social development; the transition to democracy may pose a serious threat to the stability of a respective socio-political system. This article studies the issue of democratisation. It highlights the high economic and social costs of a rapid transition to democracy for countries unprepared for it—democracy resulting from revolutions or similar large-scale events. The authors believe (...) that in a number of cases authoritarian regimes turn out to be more effective in economic and social terms than emerging democracies, especially those of a revolutionary type, which are often incapable of ensuring social order and may have a swing to authoritarianism. Effective authoritarian regimes can also be a suitable form of transition to an efficient and stable democracy. Using historical and contemporary examples, particularly the recent events in Egypt, the article investigates various correlations between revolutionary events and the possibility of establishing democracy in a society. (shrink)

Although there is no more iconic, stalwart, and eloquent defender of liberty and representative democracy than J.S. Mill, he sometimes endorses non-democratic forms of governance. This article explains the reasons behind this seeming aberration and shows that Mill actually has complex and nuanced views of the transition from non-democratic to democratic government, including the comprehensive and parallel material, cultural, institutional, and character reforms that must occur, and the mechanism by which they will be enacted. Namely, an enlightened despot must cultivate (...) democratic virtues such as obedience, industriousness, spirit of nationality, and resistance to tyranny in the population and simultaneously prepare the way for his own demise and secure his own legitimacy by transitioning to the rule of law. This challenges recent scholarship that paints Mill’s non-democratic views as crudely and uncritically imperialist, because it fails to recognize and engage seriously with his sophisticated (if ultimately problematic) theory of individual and institutional development under enlightened colonialism. (shrink)

Is authoritarian power ever legitimate? The contemporary political theory literature—which largely conceptualizes legitimacy in terms of democracy or basic rights—would seem to suggest not. I argue, however, that there exists another, overlooked aspect of legitimacy concerning a government’s ability to ensure safety and security. While, under normal conditions, maintaining democracy and rights is typically compatible with guaranteeing safety, in emergency situations, conflicts between these two aspects of legitimacy can and often do arise. A salient example of this is the (...) COVID-19 pandemic, during which severe limitations on free movement and association have become legitimate techniques of government. Climate change poses an even graver threat to public safety. Consequently, I argue, legitimacy may require a similarly authoritarian approach. While unsettling, this suggests the political importance of climate action. For if we wish to avoid legitimating authoritarian power, we must act to prevent crises from arising that can only be resolved by such means. (shrink)

This essay focuses on recent proposals to confer decisional status upon deliberative minipublics such as citizen juries, Deliberative Polls, citizen’s assemblies, and so forth. Against such proposals, I argue that inserting deliberative minipublics into political decision-making processes would diminish the democratic legitimacy of the political system as a whole. This negative conclusion invites a question: which political uses of minipublics would yield genuinely democratic improvements? Drawing from a participatory conception of deliberative democracy, I propose several uses of (...) minipublics that could enhance the democratic legitimacy of political decision-making in current societies. (shrink)

This paper provides an examination of some problems caused by the concentration of influence in the capital markets of developed countries. In particular, I argue that large asset managers exercise quasi-political power that is not democratically legitimate. In section two, I will examine the economic driver behind the size and power of the big asset managers: the passive investing revolution. I will discuss several respects in which this revolution has fundamentally changed capital markets, most notably by making a large (...) share of investors universal owners. In the third section, I argue for my central analytical conjecture: asset managers exercise quasi-political power. They use their influence to shape the rules of the game in public capital markets in order to implement social and environmental policies that have traditionally been the exclusive purview of states. “Asset manager capitalism” is a recent term coined to refer to the contemporary system of corporate governance that succeeded the Berle and Means corporation with its dispersed ownership; the argument of this section is that asset manager capitalism is also a new political-economic regime. In the fourth section I defend my central normative claim: asset manager capitalism is an untenable and illegitimate political-economic arrangement, for at least two reasons. First, the power of asset managers is not checked by any institutional constraints, and is not rendered legitimate by any democratic process. More fundamental than this procedural critique is an argument that the interests of asset managers could not be aligned with the public interest, given the fact that the distribution of capital is highly unequal. I conclude by discussing several proposals to reform asset manager capitalism. (shrink)

The recent political developments in the Philippines require a reevaluation of the nature of the State under the Rodrigo Duterte regime. Just years ago, scholars illustrated the regime of Duterte to be a populist, illiberal, or authoritarian one. But since then, and especially during the pandemic, a lot of things have changed. In this paper, I will argue that Duterte’s regime is a fascist one. Unlike how Walden Bello characterized Duterte as a fascist original, a characterization laden with theoretical (...) inconsistencies and practical difficulties, I will develop a concept of fascism proper to the neoliberal and semi-colonial conditions of the Philippines. I will likewise trace the rise, development, and stabilization of the regime’s fascism. The discussion will be supported and illuminated by some illustrative examples taken from the experience of the mass movement in Cebu. (shrink)

This paper outlines the methodological and empirical limitations of analysing the potential relationship between complex social phenomena such as democracy and inequality. It shows that the means to assess how they may be related is much more limited than recognised in the existing literature that is laden with contradictory hypotheses and findings. Better understanding our scientific limitations in studying this potential relationship is important for research and policy because many leading economists and other social scientists such as Acemoglu and Robinson (...) mistakenly claim to identify causal linkages between inequality and democracy but at times still inform policy. In contrast to the existing literature, the paper argues that ‘structural’ or ‘causal’ mechanisms that may potentially link the distribution of economic wealth and different political regimes will remain unknown given reasons such as their highly complex and idiosyncratic characteristics, fundamental econometric constraints and analysis at the macro-level. Neither new data sources, different analysed time periods nor new data analysis techniques can resolve this question and provide robust, general conclusions about this potential relationship across countries. Researchers are thus restricted to exploring rough correlations over specific time periods and geographic contexts with imperfect data that are very limited for cross-country comparisons. (shrink)

Steven Pinker's technocratic liberalism has nothing to do with the radical spirit of the Enlightenment: -/- Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now is a manual for liberal self-congratulation. This preening tome professes a pragmatic and quantitative approach to the world’s problems. For Pinker, modern capitalist democracy has basically gotten things right, and activism should at most consist of pushing for minor improvements, mitigating bad symptoms around the edges.

This article brings to bear findings from the debate on the boundary problem in democratic theory on discussions of workplace democracy to argue that workplace democrats’ focus on workers is unjustified and that more constituencies will have to be included in any prospective scheme of workplace democracy. It thereby provides a valuable and underdiscussed perspective on workplace democracy that goes beyond the debate’s usual focus on the clarification and justification of workplace democrats’ core claim. It also goes beyond approaches like (...) stakeholder theory in law and economics that determine decision-making rights without taking into account genuinely democratic considerations. My discussion proceeds by considering three principles for inclusion from democratic theory for the specific case of the corporation. I submit that two of them, the all-coerced and the all-subjected principle, are not appropriate for this specific case, because they cannot capture the distinguishing features of the corporation. The all-affected principle however is appropriate but has a very wide range. I further argue that this is not as big of a problem as it first might seem and that this principle is still the most appropriate for defining the demos of the democratic corporation. The article closes by pointing out the consequences of this result for the workplace democracy debate and for the legitimacy of the market as a coordination mechanism. (shrink)

Does political decision-making require experts or can a democracy be trusted to make correct decisions? This question has a long-standing tradition in political philosophy, going back at least to Plato’s Republic. Critics of democracy tend to argue that democracy cannot be trusted in this way while advocates tend to argue that it can. Both camps agree that it is the epistemic quality of the outcomes of political decision-making processes that underpins the legitimacy of political institutions. In (...) recent political philosophy, epistemic democrats have embraced this instrumentalist way of thinking about democracy. In this chapter, I argue that the attempt to defend democracy on epistemic instrumentalist grounds is self-undermining. I also develop an alternative – procedural – epistemic defence of democracy. I show that there is a prima facie epistemic case for democracy when there is no procedure-independent epistemic authority on the issue to be decided. (shrink)

One of the main problems of Albania since the overthrow of the communist dictatorship and the beginning of the transition in 1991 has been the consolidation of a functional constitutional democracy. Having a functional and applicable constitutional order by all institutions and mechanisms has been a significant challenge for Albania. Political parties are one of these mechanisms or vital elements in maintaining and improving the constitutional order in Albania. In democratic regimes, political parties continue to be the most (...) important bridge between the state and the mass of society. Political parties are the institutions that hold the position of a political leader in society, and democratic states cannot survive if they do not have political parties that fulfill their functions in consolidating, preserving, and improving democracy. The object of this study will be political parties in Albania and their role in the consolidation or not of the constitutional order during the period of democratic transition. In this study, the three main parties in Albania are taken as case studies, namely the Socialist Party of Albania, the Democratic Party of Albania, and the Socialist Movement for Integration. (shrink)

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, (...) however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy. Key Words: legitimacy • deliberative democracy • epistemic democracy • social epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter explores the influence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on digital democracy, focusing on four main areas: citizenship, participation, representation, and the public sphere. It traces the evolution from electronic to virtual and network democracy, underscoring how each stage has broadened democratic engagement through technology. Focusing on digital citizenship, the chapter examines how AI can improve online engagement while posing privacy risks and fostering identity stereotyping. Regarding political participation, it highlights AI's dual role in mobilising civic actions and spreading (...) misinformation. Regarding representation, AI's involvement in electoral processes can enhance voter registration, e-voting, and the efficiency of result tabulation but raises concerns regarding privacy and public trust. Also, AI's predictive capabilities shift the dynamics of political competition, posing ethical questions about manipulation and the legitimacy of democracy. Finally, the chapter examines how integrating AI and digital technologies can facilitate democratic political advocacy and personalised communication. However, this also comes with higher risks of misinformation and targeted propaganda. (shrink)

This short piece draws on political philosophy to show how social media interference operations can be used by hostile states to weaken the apparent legitimacy of democratic governments. Democratic societies are particularly vulnerable to this form of attack because democratic governments depend for their legitimacy on citizens' trust in one another. But when citizen see one another as complicit in the distribution of deceptive content, they lose confidence in the epistemic preconditions for democracy. The piece concludes with policy recommendations (...) for how democratic governments should protect themselves. (shrink)

In the literature on transitional justice, there is disagreement about whether countries like the United States can be characterized as transitional societies. Though it is widely recognized that transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and reparations can be used by Global North nations to address racial injustice, some consider societies to be transitional only when they are undergoing a formal democratic regime change. We conceptualize the political situation of low-income Black communities under the U.S. imprisonment and policing regime (...) in terms of three criteria for identifying transitional contexts: normalized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural inequality, and the failure of the rule of law. That these criteria are met, however, does not necessarily mean that a transition is taking place. Drawing on the American political development and abolition democracy literatures, we discuss what it would mean for the United States to transition out of its present imprisonment and policing regime. A transitional justice perspective shows the importance of not only pushing for truth and reparation, but for an actual transition. (shrink)

Since the development of representative democracy, parties have been a near-universal feature. Yet at the same time, they have been consistently critiqued. Today, they face challenges to their legitimacy as insurgent anti-system parties rise, leading to a return of these old critiques. This article builds on work by Rosenblum and Mouffe, among others, in exploring the political philosophy behind parties and differing perspectives on the purpose of politics. Doing so in tandem with the empirical literature on the contemporary challenges (...) of political parties in Israel and Germany, this article builds a concrete normative and practical justification for the centrality of parties in contemporary politics. The article argues that political parties in partisan conflict are the best tool for creating agonistic politics out of antagonistic conflict; they achieve this by managing conflict rather than ignoring it or letting it remain antagonistic. Further, the article argues that parties are the only practical tool available for governing modern states democratically. Finally, this article challenges contemporary pessimism surrounding political parties by focusing on the historical power of party systems to adapt to changing conditions to win votes and to become more representative and agonistic. Indeed, the rise of new parties, ordinarily considered a sign of decay, should be taken as a sign of the adaptability of party systems. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This debate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may establish a possible (...) rule of the judges (Michelman; Dworkin). It defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them – it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitutionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in democratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? (shrink)

Political scientists' failure to pay careful attention to the content (as opposed to the operationalization) of their chosen definition of 'democracy' can make them liable to draw invalid inferences from their empirical research. With this problem in mind, we argue for the following proposition: if one wishes to conduct empirical research that contributes to an existing conversation about democracy, then one must choose a definition of 'democracy' that picks out the topic of that conversation as opposed to some other (...) (perhaps nearby) topic of conversation. We show that, as a practical matter, one of the most effective methods for preserving "topic continuity" is to choose a definition of `democracy' that concurs with prevailing judgments about how to classify particular regimes, emphasizing the superiority (in this regard) of judgments about stylized hypothetical scenarios as opposed to judgments about the actual regimes we observe in our datasets. (shrink)

This essay examines Giambattista Vico’s philology as a contribution to democratic legitimacy. I outline three steps in Vico’s account of the historical and political development of philological knowledge. First, his merger of philosophy and philology, and the effects of that merge on the relative claims of reason and authority. Second, his use of antiquarian knowledge to supersede historicist accounts of change in time and to position the plebian social class as the true arbiters of language. Third, his understanding of (...) philological knowledge as an instrument of political change, and a foundational element in the establishment of democracy. By treating the philological imagination as a tool for bringing about political change, Vico’s plebian philology is radically democratic, and a crucial instrument in the struggle against the elite, from antiquity to the present. -/- . (shrink)

I argue that a distinction between three autoimmunities is implied in Derrida’s _Rogues_. These are the autoimmunities of democracy as a regime of power, of democracy to come and of sovereignty. I extrapolate the relations between three different autoimmunities using the figure of the internal enemy in order to argue for an agonistic conception of democracy.

The present paper is an attempt at examining the value configuration and the socio-demographical profiles of the local political elites in four countries of East-Central Europe: Romania, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland. The treatment is a comparative one, predominantly descriptive and exploratory, and employs, as a research method, the case-study, being a quite circumscribed endeavor. The cases focus on the members of the Municipal/Local Council in four towns similar in terms of demography and developmental strategies (i.e. small-to-medium sized (...) communities of around 35,000 inhabitants, with economies largely based on food industry and commercial activities): Tecuci (Galați county, Romania), Česká Lípa (Liberec region, Czech Republic), Targovishte (Targovishte province, Bulgaria), and Oleśnica (Lower Silesia province, Poland). Hypothesizing that the local elites of the former Sovietized Erurope tend to differ in outlook, priorities, and value attainment, as compared to their Western counterparts, the paper considers the former’s attitudes and perspectives in regard to seven values: a series of values customarily connected with the concept of ‘democracy’ (i.e. citizen participation, political conflict, gradual change, economic equality), state intervention in economy, decentralization and increased local autonomy, cultural-geographical self-identification. The study uses, as well, five models of value attainment in what concerns the ‘ideal portrait’ of the local councilor (Putnam 1976): ethical, pragmatic, technocratic, political, and gender. According to the results of a study applying a standard written questionnaire among the local councilors of the three communities in the period December 2010-February 2013, the paper distinguishes among three corresponding types of local elites: (1) ‘predominantly elitistic,’ (2) ‘democratic elitist,’ and (3) ‘predominantly democratic,’ following two types of explanation accounting for the differences among the four cases: the legacy of the defunct regime and the degree of administrative decentralization. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, democracy and oligarchy are empirically the most widespread and analytically fundamental ‘constitutions’. I analyse how in different places in his Politics Aristotle ‘positively’ defines and differentiates between democracy and oligarchy. At the same time, I substantiate in detail a new interpretation of Aristotle’s view that significantly differs from the current interpretation. ‘Combining’ the elements, procedures, and principles of democracy and oligarchy gives rise to mixed ‘constitutions’, a special place among which is occupied by the polity or republic, (...) which is the best regime ‘for most states and for most people’. I show the ways in which, according to Aristotle, it is possible to form such a regime. Carl Schmitt and, later somewhat differently, Bernard Manin draw a link between Aristotle’s mixed regime and the representative democracies of today. (shrink)

In this chapter I seek to provide a theoretical defense of workplace democracy that is independent from and outside the lineage of Marxist and communist theory. Common to the council movements, anarcho- syndicalism and many other forms of libertarian socialism was the idea “that workers’ self- management was central.” Yet the idea of workers’ control has not been subject to the same theoretical development as Marx’s theory, not to mention capitalist economic theory. This chapter aims to contribute at a theoretical (...) level by providing a justification and defense of self- managed workplaces that is independent of the particular historical tradition of the council movements. There is a clear and definitive case for workplace democracy based on first principles that descends to modern times through the Reformation and Enlightenment in the abolitionist, democratic and feminist movements. By the twentieth century, the arguments had been scattered and lost – like the bones of some ancient beast scattered in a desert – partly due to misconceptions, mental blocks and misinterpretations embodied in Marxism, liberalism and economic theory. When one has worked through some of these intellectual roadblocks, then one may be better able to reassemble the case for workplace democracy from well- known first principles developed in the abolitionist, democratic and feminist movements. (shrink)

Economic theories of democratic legitimacy (discussed here as minimalist theories) have criticized deliberative accounts of democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they do not represent a practical possibility and that they create conditions that make actual democracies worse. It is not simply that they represent the wrong ideal. Rather, they are too idealistic – failing to show proper regard for the cognitive and moral limitations of persons and the depth of disagreement in democratic society. This article aims to show (1) (...) that the minimalist criterion of democratic legitimacy is self-defeating and (2) that even if there are minimal cognitive, moral, and social requirements for the possibility of practicable deliberative democracy, these limitations do not necessarily impose insuperable barriers for democratic deliberation as the normative basis of democratic legitimacy. Thus, the limiting facts do not dictate the structure of appropriate normative models of democracy in the way minimalists have supposed. (shrink)

The philosophical significance of rhythm in the United States has been undermined from both sides of what Adorno and Horkheimer called the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’. When rhythm has not been falsely exalted, promising a fetishised, racialised ‘return’ to the body, it has been devalued through the tainted associations of rhythmic synchronisation with fascist regimes and the demand for compliance. In this article, I engage these issues as they inflect the politics of musical form. Adorno’s notorious critique of jazz – (...) developed across a wide range of essays spanning three decades (1933-1962) – has been rightly disparaged, but his concept of the politics of metric regularity has not been repudiated. In what follows, I provide an analysis of how metric regularity works for Adorno as a concept – its limitations and presuppositions. Adorno opens up new critical thought about rhythm by taking seriously the problem of the bass drum in jazz and its historical and structural relation to the military march. However, he gets seriously wrong the different implications of marching rhythm for African-American (and therefore American) history, failing to understand its radical difference from the dangers of European fascism for its victims. -/- Transnational rhythmic forms in the black diaspora (including the United States) and the interracial experiences that these forms enable, at least as in-principle possibilities, continually contest the ‘the divisions between life and thought’ that have been taken for granted by majoritarian philosophy in the West. From this perspective, the segregation of intellect from feel (a technical term among musicians to indicate those normatively right aesthetic choices that nevertheless emerge in excess of predetermined rules is not tenable given the polyrhythmic background that must be presupposed in order for any piece of diasporic music, including and especially in the United States, to be intelligible. (shrink)

If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

This paper argues that the current scholarship of radical politics primarily bannered by Christopher Ryan Maboloc is a misappropriation of the postMarxist political project of Mouffe and Laclau. Drawing primarily both on Mouffe’s and Laclau’s work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics and an interview with Chantal Mouffe herself, the paper argues how the post-Marxist radical political project of Mouffe and Laclau fails to theoretically fit to the style of governance and regime of Duterte. Fundamental (...) to the idea of radical democratic politics is the task of radicalizing liberal democracy. However, as discussed in the paper, liberal democracy is a project whose very institutions and processes Duterte and his regime have undermined and attacked. Under Duterte’s regime, radical democracy lost the conditions for its flourishing, rendering its own impossibility. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the advantages of a theory of political representation for a prag- matist theory of (global) democracy. I first outline Dewey’s disregard for political rep- resentation by analyzing the political, epistemological and aesthetic underpinnings of his criticism of the Enlightenment ideal of democracy and its trust in the power of the detached gaze. I then show that a theory of political representation is not only com- patible with a pragmatist Deweyan-pragmatist perspective (...) on democratic politics but also that Dewey’s concept of “publics”, if applied to contemporary circumstances of globalized politics, requires such a theory. I suggest a pragmatic theory of political rep- resentation that combines elements of Dewey’s aesthetics, particularly his own theory of vision, with Michael Saward’s conception of representative claim-making into the notion of aesthetic democratic representation. (shrink)

What, if anything, is problematic about the involvement of celebrities in democratic politics? While a number of theorists have criticized celebrity involvement in politics (Meyer 2002; Mills 1957; Postman 1987) none so far have examined this issue using the tools of social epistemology, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices and institutions on knowledge and belief acquisition. This paper will draw on these resources to investigate the issue of celebrity involvement in politics, specifically as this involvement relates to (...) democratic theory and its implications for democratic practice. We will argue that an important and underexplored form of power, which we will call epistemic power, can explain one important way in which celebrity involvement in politics is problematic. This is because unchecked uses and unwarranted allocations of epistemic power, which celebrities tend to enjoy, threaten the legitimacy of existing democracies and raise important questions regarding core commitments of deliberative, epistemic, and plebiscitary models of democratic theory. We will finish by suggesting directions that democratic theorists could pursue when attempting to address some of these problems. (shrink)

Legitimacy is a concept that has been largely forgotten by the deconstructive discourse on law and politics. This article seeks, on the one hand, to reassess the role of legitimacy in deconstruction and, on the other hand, to bring deconstructive thinking to bear on the concept of legitimacy. By re-reading Derrida’s “Declarations of Independence” through the lenses of his later texts on sovereignty and (counter)signature, it is argued that, rather than being deconstructible, legitimacy is deconstructing any self-founding of law and (...) power. As such, legitimacy functions not as an evaluative concept of law and order but as a constantly insisting demand that facilitates the principles of responsibility and responsiveness. (shrink)