This article explores the potential of Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of subjectivity as objectivity as a grounding for value sensitive design (VSD) and the design turn in applied ethics. The rapid pace of scientific and technological advancement has created a gap between technical abilities and our moral assessments of those abilities, calling for a reflection on the philosophical tools we have for applying ethics. In particular, applied ethics often presents interconnected problems that require a more general framework for ethical reflection. Lonergan’s (...) philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of selfunderstanding and self‐transcendence in achieving objectivity, can provide a valuable perspective on VSD and the design turn in applied ethics. The article examines how Lonergan’s philosophy can be applied to VSD and the design turn, and how scientific knowledge can be integrated into an ethics of science without reducing it to an external reflection. By adopting Lonergan’s perspective, we can address the ethical challenges arising from scientific and technological advancements while promoting a more holistic approach to applied ethics. (shrink)

Regardless of the metaphysics that inspires them, theories of perception invariably end up in the trap of subjectivism. Thus, idealism argues that the world can be nothing more than a representation of the mind. As to dualism and materialism, despite fundamental differences, they share the common assumption that perception is a subjective replica of external objects. Opposed to these theories is common sense with its tenacious belief that an external world exists and that things are perceived where they are and (...) as they are. This paper contends that Bergson’s theory of perception should be approached from the question of what the relationship between matter and mind must be for perception to retain an objective character. It shows that only its emergence from things themselves rather than from the subject can provide objectivity to perception. In thus grounding objectivity in the impersonal character of perception, whose implication is that it precedes the subject, which is then posteriorly formed, Bergson’s theory constitutes, so the paper argues, a radical reversal of the traditional position, including that of phenomenology. (shrink)

Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate. These empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological mental states like beliefs and desires. However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive and social neuroscience to explain the (...) processes through which agents are moved to act on the basis of decisions, including decisions about social and moral norms. I argue that these developments are beginning to cast doubt on the prospect of finding nontrivial physical 'realizers' for the FP states invoked in the Humeanism dispute by posing two distinctive challenges that tend to work against each other: belief-desire directionality and causal relevance. (shrink)

In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s desiderata for a supreme principle of practical reasoning and morality require that the subjective conditions under which some action is thought of as justified via some maxim be sufficient for judging the same action as justified by any agent in those conditions. This describes the kind of universalization conditions now known as moral supervenience. But when he specifies his “formula of universal law” (FUL) Kant replaces this condition with a quite different (...) kind of universality: the judgment that some agent could rationally (i.e., without willing the frustration of his own valued ends) will his adoption of some maxim under the condition that this would cause all agents in his world to adopt it as well. Our wills typically lack this efficacy, so requiring that our wills conform to what would be rational for a hypothetical agent in this situation to will is a heteronomous requirement. Several intuitively wrong maxims pass Kant’s test but fail the test of supervenience, because they generate no contradiction in a world of universal compliance but do so in non-ideal worlds, demonstrating the inadequacy of the FUL and the logical superiority of moral supervenience. -/- Note that in the published version the title of this article incorrectly had the word "become" instead "became.". (shrink)

Harry Eckstein’s long-standing (but ever-changing) hypothesis that a nation’s political stability is a function of “congruence” between the “authority patterns” exhibited by the government and those displayed by nearly every sort of institution under that government’s aegis involved a highly complex politico-psychological theory. As a result, it was quite difficult either to confirm or disconfirm. While there have been a number of suggested revisions that apparently simplify his thesis, they suffer either from vagueness or a failure to take democracy (...) to be a system that requires an actual commitment to majoritarianism. In this paper a revision is offered that utilizes a small number of completely dichotomous variables that are easily subject to empirical tests. This revised theory (of “consonance” rather than congruence) is also explicitly majoritarian, enabling it to shed light on the essential nature of democratic regimes. (shrink)

A review of Michel Henry's Marx (2020) that focuses on the later philosophical-economic body of his works.

A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (for all S knows, p), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions. A surprising theorem about epistemic necessity is proved. A proposition p can be epistemically necessary for a knowing subject S even though p is /a posteriori/ and S does not know p. The identity (...) relation is well-behaved in metaphysically possible worlds but can go rogue in epistemically possible worlds. Whereas it can be epistemically possible that Lewis Carroll is not Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, this is not epistemically possible in the manner that anti-Millianism requires. (shrink)

Many liberal egalitarians argue that workers today are subjected to the authority of their bosses and that justice demands that the employment relationship be reformed. But why? What is unjust is not subjection to authority as such but subjection without adequate justification. In this article, I argue that the justificatory demand raised by subjection to workplace authority has not been well understood, primarily because the nature of the subjection itself has been misunderstood. According to the standard (...) view, workplace subjection consists in the fact that managers issue orders backed by sanctions. I challenge this view by reconstructing the libertarian-economic theory of the firm, which construes managerial authority simply as a division of labor. I propose an alternative account, according to which workplace subjection consists in living under a society-wide arrangement that compels most workers to work under a boss. My argument reorients theorizing about justice at work from a narrow focus on corporate governance towards a broader theory of a just social system, incorporating the role of the state, class, the power of investors, and the social purpose of labor. (shrink)

This collection serves as an introduction to the concept of subjective fact, which plays a central role in some of the author's philosophical writings. The collection contains two book chapters and a paper. The first chapter (Chapter 2 of From Brain to Cosmos) begins with an informal characterization of the concept of subjective fact. Then it fleshes out this concept with examples, gives a more precise characterization, and addresses some potential weaknesses of the concept. This chapter shows how subjective (...) fact is related to key ideas in the philosophy of mind, such as intentionality. The second chapter (Chapter 3) is a detailed study of the concept of “instance of seeming” that was introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 ends with some remarks on the modal logic of subjective facts. The paper, also by the book’s author, answers some potential questions about the ideas in the two included chapters. (shrink)

This document consists primarily of excerpts (chapters 5 and 10-12) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. These excerpts address several traditional problems about the histories of conscious subjects, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. Topics include the persistence of conscious subjects through time, the unity or disunity of the self, and the possibility of splitting conscious subjects. (These excerpts depend heavily upon the author’s concept of subjective fact as (...) developed in From Brain to Cosmos. Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of that book first. See the last page of this document for details on how to obtain those chapters.). (shrink)

This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 6) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. That excerpt presents an analysis of the problem of knowledge of other minds, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. (Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos first. See the last page of this document for details on how to obtain those (...) chapters.). (shrink)

This document consists primarily of excerpts (chapters 5 and 7-9) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. These excerpts address some traditional philosophical problems about temporal flux and identity through time, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. (Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos first. See the last page of this document for details on how to (...) obtain those chapters.). (shrink)

This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 5) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. That excerpt presents an analysis of personal identity through time, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. (Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos first. See the last page of this document for details on how to obtain those chapters.).

Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...) ways an entity can be located in time, emerged. In this article, we provide a precise map of the conceptions at stake, complete the debate by introducing a version of endurantism not yet considered in the debate — we call transcendentism — and show that it allows us to provide an effective interpretation of the relation of trans-world identity and an intuitive solution in the temporal case. (shrink)

Recent theorizing argues that online communication technologies provide powerful, although precarious, means of emotional regulation. We develop this understanding further. Drawing on subjective reports collected during periods of imposed social restrictions under COVID-19, we focus on how this precarity is a source of emo-tional dysregulation. We make our case by organizing responses into five distinct but intersecting dimensions wherein the precarity of this regulation is most relevant: infrastructure, functional use, mindful design (individual and social), and digital tact. Analyzing these reports, (...) along with examples of mediating technologies (i.e., self-view) and common interactive dynamics (e.g., gaze coordination), we tease out how breakdowns along these dimensions are sources of affective dysregulation. We argue that the adequacy of available technological resources and competencies of various kinds matter greatly to the types of emotional experiences one is likely to have online. Further research into online communication technologies as modula-tors of both our individual and collective well-being is urgently needed, especially as the echoes of the digital push that COVID-19 initiated are set to continue rever-berating into the future. (shrink)

People are increasingly subject to algorithmic decisions, and it is generally agreed that end-users should be provided an explanation or rationale for these decisions. There are different purposes that explanations can have, such as increasing user trust in the system or allowing users to contest the decision. One specific purpose that is gaining more traction is algorithmic recourse. We first pro- pose that recourse should be viewed as a recommendation problem, not an explanation problem. Then, we argue that the capability (...) approach provides plausible and fruitful ethical standards for re- course. We illustrate by considering the case of diversity constraints on algorithmic recourse. Finally, we discuss the significance and implications of adopting the capability approach for algorithmic recourse research. (shrink)

We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more (...) frequently than is sometimes supposed. But it also helps us see why this might not be a bad thing. (shrink)

As presented in the early work, 'Revolution in Poetic Language,' Julia Kristeva’s 'subject-in-process' can be interpreted as a semiotic alternative to older conceptions of the philosophical subject.This discussion of Kristeva’s early work will attempt to demonstrate that new interpretations of Fregean logic and Freudian psychoanalysis radically displace the traditional subject. This act of displacement allows Kristeva to employ Hegelian dialectics to introduce a “textual” conception of meaning of experience. As a consequence, the Kristevan semiotexte offers a basis for both understanding (...) and misunderstanding in which language mediates between semiotic meaning and cultural practices. The conclusion of the paper maintains that Kristeva's unique formulation of the semiotexte re-defines human subjectivity in relation to the existing world. (shrink)

Given a subject so imbued with contention and conflicting theoretical stances, it is remarkable that automated instruments ever came to replace the human eye as sensitive arbiters of color specification. Yet, dramatic shifts in assumptions and practice did occur in the first half of the twentieth century. How and why was confidence transferred from careful observers to mechanized devices when the property being measured – color – had become so closely identified with human physiology and psychology? A fertile perspective (...) on the problem is via the history of science and technology, paying particular attention to social groups and disciplinary identity to determine how those factors affected their communities’ cognitive territory. There were both common and discordant threads motivating the various technical groups that took on the problems of measuring light and color from the late nineteenth century onwards, and leading them towards the development of appropriate instruments for themselves. The transition from visual to photoelectric methods could be portrayed as a natural evolution, replacing the eye by an alternative roviding more sensitivity and convenience – indeed, this is the conventional positivist view propounded by technical histories. However, the adoption of new measurement technologies seldom is simple, and frequently has a significant cultural component. Beneath this slide towards automation lay a raft of implicit assumptions about objectivity, the nature of the observer, the role of instruments, and the trade-offs between standardization and descriptive power. While espousing rational arguments for a physical detector of color, its proponents weighted their views with tacit considerations. The reassignment of trust from the eye to automated instruments was influenced as much by the historical context as by intellectual factors. I will argue that several distinct aspects were involved, which include the reductive view of color provided by the trichromatic theory; the impetus provided by its association with photometry; the expanding mood for a quantitative and objective approach to scientific observation; and, the pressures for commercial standardization. As suggested by these factors, there was another shift of authority at play: from one technical specialism to another. The regularization of color involved appropriation of the subject by a particular set of social interests: communities of physicists and engineers espousing a ‘physicalist’ interpretation, rather than psychologists and physiologists for whom color was conceived as a more complex phenomenon. Moreover, the sources for automated color measurement, and instrumentation for measuring color, were primarily from the industrial sphere rather than from academic science. To understand these shifts, then, this chapter explores differing views of the importance of observers, machines and automation. (shrink)

Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account, and the ideal consent account, and argues that none of these (...) strategies succeed. The article then discusses and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a lottery, as opposed to simply picking one of the parties on more subjective grounds or out of pure whim. In addition to the practical consequences of this skeptical view, the article sketches some theoretical implications for debates about saving the greater number and about axiomatic utilitarianism. (shrink)

This is a response to a Symposium on Phenomenology and Scripture. In examining a move from phenomenology to scripture, this symposium does not address all possible readers; it addresses a specific readership, for a specific reason, and within the framework of specific assumptions. By way of response, I want first to identify a few features of what I take to be the symposium’s specific address or context. Then, I will comment on what messages I believe the authors have delivered (...) to this context. The symposium specifically addresses those who participate willy nilly in the transcendental project of modern philosophy and of modern northern Europe. In that project, knowing, as noesis, means intentionality: its subject or agent is ultimately reducible to the unity of apperception; and its object— noema—is the object of the ego’s intentional knowing—the thematized object. It appears, furthermore, that the symposium identifies phenomenology not only with the species of Husserlian philosophy, but also with the broader genus of all efforts, from Descartes to Kant to Hegel to Husserl to Heidegger, to identify philosophy with an effort to frame the a priori conditions for, or the possibility of, knowing what we would know: from self to world to being itself—or to God. (shrink)

Arguments from consciousness to God’s existence (ACs) contend that physicalism is too problematic to explain the mind’s ultimate source. They add that theism probably better explains this source in terms of God making us in his own image (with conscious, unified, rational minds). But ACs are problematic too. First, physicalism has various competitors beside theism. Russellian monism and dual-aspect theory are examples. Second, all these theories, including theism, are seriously flawed. For example, it’s tied to traditional dualism, which has (...) causal issues (according to Murphy, Churchland, and other physicalists). But we argue that this theistic dualism can be refined to avoid its issues—and the issues in all other theories. So, it probably explains the mind’s origin better than other theories. We rely here on Lowe’s dualism, where the mind’s subject exists immaterially yet spatially, and is a unified, simple entity (unlike neural aggregates with their quite separate parts). This turns the tables on Churchland, Murphy, and other advocates for scientism. -/- . (shrink)

The article develops an internalist justification of welfare ethics based on empathy. It takes up Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s internalistic (but not consistently developed) justification approach via empathy, but tries to solve three of their problems: 1. the varying strength of empathy depending on the proximity to the object of empathy, 2. the unclear metaethical foundation, 3. the absence of a quantitative model of empathy strength. 1. As a solution to the first problem, the article proposes to limit the foundation of (...) welfare ethics to certain types of empathy. 2. In response to the second problem, an internalistic metaethical conception of the justification of moral principles is outlined, the result of which is: The moral value of the well-being of persons is identical to the expected extent of (positive and negative) empathy arising from this well-being. 3. The contribution to the solution of the third problem and focus of the article is an empirical model of the (subject’s) expected extent of empathy depending on (an object’s) well-being. According to this model, the extent of empathy is not proportional to the expected empathy, but follows a concave function and is therefore prioritarian. Accordingly, the article provides a sketch of an internalist justification of prioritarianism. (shrink)

Pragmatism has ties to Idealism; it has even been accused of being a form of idealism. I tell a story about the changing nature of idealism that makes sense of its relationship to pragmatism without threatening to collapse the two. My story is a genealogy that begins well before pragmatism shows up. Pragmatism has very little in common with the subjective idealism of Berkeley or the problematic idealism of Descartes; the differences between idealism and pragmatism get blurred only because idealism (...) underwent an evolution transforming it into something primed to influence and maybe bleed into pragmatism. It was, according to my story, the evolved idealism developed in Germany between 1781 and 1831 that contributed to the formation and development of pragmatism. Yet pragmatism is a large evolutionary step away from idealism, however much it retains and utilizes some of the strengths of late idealistic thought. (shrink)

How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying ‘what it is like’ to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Block’s Chinese (...) Nation and Chalmers’ Hard Problem. To defuse such challenges, theorists of artificial consciousness can appeal to empirical methods and models of explanation. Second, I explain why this naturalistic approach produces an epistemological puzzle on the role of biological properties in phenomenal consciousness. Neither behavioural tests nor theoretical inferences seem to settle whether our machines are conscious. Third, I evaluate whether the new challenge can be managed through a more fine-grained taxonomy of conscious states. This strategy is supported by the development of similar taxonomies for biological species and animal consciousness. Although it makes sense of some current models of artificial consciousness, it raises questions about their subjective and moral significance. (shrink)

In a famous debate between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, Popper accused Kuhn and Quine of propagating the “Myth of the Framework”: that some broad set of specific background commitments are required for interlocutors to be able to have a fruitful conversation. The Myth of the Framework could be used to argue for a beneficial version of the canon: that training in these shared background commitments allows for the growth of a robust community of inquiry. Popper argues, however, that the (...) position that truth or inquiry can be framework-dependent is a pernicious form of relativism, and undermines the possibility of rational inquiry. I subject Popper’s view to criticism, showing that it can be used to undermine “orthodoxy” and the canon in some ways, but that it props up the canon in others. In closing, the paper examines the connections between Popper’s position on the community of inquiry and standpoint epistemology, and argues for the claim that Popper’s view, to be persuasive, requires a more robust account of how critical inquiry relies on the evaluative capacities of rational agents within a community. (shrink)

In this paper, we model a relational notion of subjectivity by means of two experiments in subjective computing. The goal is to determine to what extent a cognitive and social robot can be regarded to act subjectively. The system was implemented as a reinforcement learning agent with a coaching function. To analyze the robotic agent we used the method of levels of abstraction in order to analyze the agent at four levels of abstraction. At one level the agent is described (...) in mentalistic or subjective language respectively. By mapping this mentalistic to an algorithmic, functional, and relational level, we can show to what extent the agent behaves subjectively as we make use of a relational concept of subjectivity that draws upon the relations that hold between the agent and its environment. According to a relational notion of subjectivity, an agent is supposed to be subjective if it exhibits autonomous relations to itself and others, i.e. the agent is not fully determined by a given input but is able to operate on its input and decide what to do with it. This theoretical notion is confirmed by the technical implementation of self-referentiality and social interaction in that the agent shows improved behavior compared to agents without the ability of subjective computing. On the one hand, a relational concept of subjectivity is confirmed, whereas on the other hand, the technical framework of subjective computing is being theoretically founded. (shrink)

When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here (...) to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to go some way towards showing that the maintenance of hard and fast dichotomies, like those between mind and body, and the real and the virtual, is untenable, and that technological advance cannot occur with being cognisant of its reciprocal ethical implications. In their place I will present a softer enactivist ontology through which I examine the nature of our engagement with technology in general and with virtual realities in particular. This softer ontology is (...) one to which I will commit Kant, and from which, I will show, certain critical moral and emotional consequences arise. It is my contention that Kant’s logical subject is necessarily embedded in the world and that Kant, himself, would be content with this view as an expression of his inspired response to the ‘‘scandal to philosophy... that the existence of things outside us... must be accepted merely on faith’’ [Bxl]. In keeping with his arguments for the a priori framing of intuition, the a priori structuring of experience through the spontaneous application of the categories, the synthesis of the experiential manifold, and the necessity of a unity of apperception, I will present an enactivist account of agency in the world, and argue that it is our embodied and embedded kinaesthetic engagement in our world which makes possible the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, and which, in turn, make possible the activity of the reproductive or creative imagination. (shrink)

This chapter deals with Thomas Browne’s most famous work, Religio Medici, and especially with his account of Charity. The first paragraph focuses on Browne’s specific account of the relationship between natural and supernatural. This view is inspired by Bacon, Sebunde, and Montaigne, and is crucial to understand the background of Browne’s view about the virtue of Charity. The second paragraph is about Browne’s specific understanding of Charity, which seems to be a middle stage between the traditional, Scholastic doctrine, and the (...) Kantian idea of moral law, independent from the practical law and the desire of the subject. The third paragraph deals with Religio Medici’s reversal of the traditional “order” of Charity, as well as Browne’s accounts of abnegation and friendship as an effective way for a charity to the self which meets many aspects of Foucault’s ἑπιμέλεια έαuτου. The fourth paragraph is about Browne’s analogical understanding of medicine and morality, as well as his use of the meditatio mortis. (shrink)

The purpose of the work is to form the net structure of management of the system of administrative services provision on the basis of implementation of subject-to-subject interactions between state sector and civil society. Methodology. The methodology basis for the investigation is the abstract-logical analysis of theoretical and methodological backgrounds for management of relations and interactions. For the theoretical generalization and formation of net structure, there are used scientific recommendations of Ukrainian scientists regarding the necessity to implement subject-to-subject relations in (...) the system of administrative services provision. Results. The investigations allowed confirming that the hierarchical structure of the state governance system does not give an opportunity to implement equal interaction between a subject of provision and a subject of an appeal as these relations have one – way communication and the feedback channel has a formal character. Moreover, the civil society is not considered by state sector to be a source of methods and ways to develop the system of state governance, in particular, the management system of administrative services provision. Practical meaning. The net structure of management will allow implementing the subject-subject relations in the system, under which the actions of the subject of provision – that means state sector – will be directed to the realization of rights and interests of the subjects of appeal. In their turn, apart from the performance of all legislative responsibilities that they should perform, they can carry out activities directed to the development of management activity in the system of administrative services provision and the whole system of state governance as an integral system of management. Meaning/Distinction. The provided model of the net structure will allow involving citizens in the processes of state governance and increasing the impact of the civil sector during the making of state and management decisions and, as a result, to confirm subject-to-subject positions in the relations. (shrink)

The “saturated phenomenon” is Jean-Luc Marion’s principal hypothesis, by which he tries to ground the source of phenomenality. Against the transcendental phenomenology, Marion finds phenomena that go beyond the constitutional power of intention. The saturated phenomenon is never possessed because the saturated phenomenon withdraws itself and thus it endlessly escapes from us. A problem of intelligibility thus arises. The essential finitude of the subject requires that the subject passively receives what the saturated phenomenon gives. Marion, however, endows the gifted (...) with more than the mere passivity. The subject is invited as a “witness” who actively responds to the call of the phenomenon. Marion posits the interpersonal relationship. The problem of the interpretability of intention is another problem inherent in the infinity of interpretation of the other. In our ordinary lives, we habitually search out the other’s intention, infinitely. Emmanuel Levinas clearly points out that the other is the transcendent source of ethics, a source which is not intelligible to us. The other, for Levinas, does not appear to the subject, but conditions it. Marion, by contrast, neutralizes the other and “the face” imposes “oneself” as the other who is neutrally visible to us. I assume Marion is more interested in the world of objects, rather than the world of persons, and thus misses the peculiarity resident in the personhood of persons. We become passive in the presence of the personality, not because we want to become passive, but because we realize our own power of illustration does not fill in the personality. (shrink)

Amidst the broad divergence in opinion of philosophers and scientists at understanding reality that has lent character to the historical epochs of the Philosophical enterprise, the crucial realization has always been, of the necessity of Epistemology in our entire program of making inquiry into ‘What Is’. This realization seems born out of the erstwhile problem of knowing. Epistemology, which investigates the nature, sources, limitations and validating of knowledge, offers a striking challenge here. Since we have no direct access to our (...) world around us, outside of the subjective experience offered us by our senses, we are handicapped at making comparisons of our beliefs with a concrete world, out there, or with elements of the world. Our statements about the world seem to stand alone, buffeted against the intimidating tide of possible contradicting circumstances. Our putative claims to knowledge, therefore, face the exigency of justification. Ayer, expressing the urgency of resolving this persisting lacuna, provides an alternative criterion of knowing, as ‘having the right to be sure’. Thus, it is this deep-seated concern that has evolved, over time, to become the primary thrust of the project of Epistemology, raising the controversy over which, of Epistemology or Metaphysics, is to be accorded the prime status of first philosophy. However, Aquinas is wise to build his epistemological premise on a firm metaphysical support, clarifying the needed development from being to knowledge. For, being has to first exist to constitute the object of perception, belief, and knowledge. Accordingly, our exposition of Aquinas’ epistemology will first take a cursory look at the theoretical and historical background to Aquinas’ Philosophy, before offering a general characterization of his theory of knowledge. Then, the paper will discuss his concept of sense perception as a basis for all knowing, followed closely by an analysis of cognition and Scientia. (shrink)

This collection of articles explores a wide range of subject, from Godel’s incompleteness theorem, to possible technocalypse and neutrofuturology. Articles on historical debates on irrational number to electroculture, on vortex particle, or on different Neutrosophic applications are included.

This article pinpoints two lacunae – freedom and the subject of action – in post-structuralist epistemology and proposes to rethink agency through Hannah Arendt’s theory of action. It is argued that, given the sense of disorientation in theoretical and political practices, it is all the more important to re-conceptualize the singularity or uniqueness of agents as initiators of social change.

This article proposes to read John Banville’s The Book of Evidence, a crime story narrated from the protagonist’s first-person gaze, from a Lacanian perspective by referring to his mirror stage theory. As an extension of testimonial literature, the novel is deemed to be a narrative of introspective self-examination, thus introducing a creation of “the self” paralleling the text. The protagonist’s mnemonic narrative is accompanied by the idea of an alternative world of not only self-expression but also self-depiction and (...) presentation, as in Lacan’s Imaginary. This self-creation, however, may not be as innocent as it seems. The reason for this is that although the mirror phase involves a transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, it presupposes the role of the other, biologically (m)other, in order to accustom the subject to the law of society. However, just because the protagonist, Freddie, mentions his mother’s presence as “nothing,” there is no soothing force for his adaptation to societal laws. Here, Freddie is subject to what Lacan sees as a minor prototype who lives in a society and yet is attached to his own rules, which is the first principle of male violence associated with this novel. Therefore, this article also tries to find answers for Freddie’s performance of male violence within the axis of psychoanalytic postulations elaborated on Lacan’s identity theory. (shrink)

Show more ▾ There are various dichotomies in Kant’s philosophy: sensibility vs. rationality, nature vs. freedom, cognition vs. morality, noumenon vs. phenomenon, among others. There are also different ways of mediating these dichotomies, which is the systematic undertaking of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. One of the most important concepts in this work is the sublime, which exemplifies the connections between the different dichotomies; this fact means the concept’s construction is full of tension. On the one hand, as (...) a pure reflection of aesthetic judgment the sublime must be without interest or purpose, but on the other hand it is “based on the concept of reason” (KU AA:292). On the one hand, the sublime “represents merely the subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious” (KU AA5:258), but on the other hand, reason “exercises dominion over sensibility” and the imagination is “purposively determined in accordance with a law” of reason (KU AA5:268f). Taking into account these problems concerning the essential definition the sublime, this paper will first illustrate how the sublime embodies the a priori principle of aesthetic judgment through contrasting the judgment of the sublime with the judgment of taste in order to establish a basic logical frame for the judgment of the sublime. Second, this paper redefines the boundary between the mathematically and dynamically sublime in order to reveal both the coexistence of contemplation and movement within the sublime and the unrevealed function of reason and imagination. Finally, contrasting the sublime with moral feeling, this paper elaborates the turning-structure (from sensibility to rationality and from object-intuition to idea-exhibition) of the sublime. (shrink)

Starting from two propositions, 1. The observer is part of reality and 2. Observers are independent of each other, we develop an approach to Hume’s problem of scepticism. We show that despite all knowledge coming through subjective perceptions we can nevertheless construct objective or transitive knowledge through relationships between entities, rather than the entities themselves. We posited that some phenomena of the real world are transitive and some are not. Transitive phenomena are transferable between observers without change and are (...) thus independent of observation. Transitive phenomena are relative quantities. Relative quantities are observational invariants and form the building blocks of our objective world. We show objective knowledge is developed from relative quantities whereas subjective knowledge is rooted in absolute quantities. The recognition that transitive quantities are invariants of observation gives them an independence from which we can construct an objective world. (shrink)

This article examines public administration from 1890 to 2023 to see how it evolved and influenced practice and if good governance is a crucial component in this transformation. This paper presents an in-depth review of several different pieces of secondary literature sources. This paper produced several key findings. The most important finding of this literature study is that, between 1890 and 1980, the Public Administration transitioned from "Traditional Public Administration" to "New Public Management" due to the growing need (...) for good governance. The year 2000 saw the birth of a novel idea in public administration known as "New Public Governance," which has persisted in practice ever since. This paper will be useful to Public Administration practitioners worldwide. There has been little empirical research into how the evolution of Public Administration encourages governments to act more like private corporations. Consequently, more research on this subject is encouraged. (shrink)

George Berkeley's apparently strange view – that nothing exists without a mind except for minds themselves – is notorious. Also well known, and equally perplexing at a superficial level, is his insistence that his doctrine is no more than what is consistent with common sense. It was every bit as crucial for Berkeley that it be demonstrated that the colors are really in the tulip, as that there is nothing that is neither a mind nor something perceived by a mind. (...) In what follows, I shall attempt to re-examine Berkeley's argument in terms of what it appears to have meant to him. I am especially interested in the connection between Berkeley's thought concerning the relation between perception and metaphysics and that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with whom, perhaps surprisingly, Berkeley shared a great many intuitions and concerns. Thus part of my objective is to compare and contrast the work of two thinkers who had many common interests, and whose thought frequently led them down similar paths. I shall be especially interested in apparent points of departure, both those that turn out to reflect real divergences and those which reflect confusions of one kind or another. My main objective, however, is not mere textual analysis. Like both Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty, my main hope is to make progress in clarifying how things are. As odd as some of Berkeley's pronouncements may sound to contemporary ears – concerning especially the metaphysical consequences of what he regarded as perceptual facts – I shall argue that, in substance, he was often not far wrong at all – at least as measured by important strands of more contemporary work on the subject. More particularly, I shall contend that for going a long way down an extraordinarily fruitful path which has been subsequently explored more fully by (especially) Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam, Berkeley deserves considerably more credit than he is usually accorded as a progenitor of contemporary approaches to metaphysical issues. (shrink)

When Bertalanffy advocated a new scientific discipline called general system theory, this generalist mode of understanding was to be based on the isomorphism of laws, principles, and models in the different sciences, and on structural uniformities (isomorphies) in the subject matters of those sciences. There is a conceptual shift in Bertalanffy’s work from the logico-mathematical mode to a deeper more complex understanding. There is a corresponding shift in the understanding of isomorphies from the isomorphy of laws and principles (...) to the isomorphy of qualities of real systems. The recognition of isomorphies in real situations and systems has resulted in the creation of the modern generalist mode of understanding and from there the development of discipline-independent-transdisciplinarity. This paper gives an introduction to this form of transdisciplinarity, and explains how this mode of understanding naturally develops a universal transdisciplinary language. (shrink)

Serial Endosymbiosis Theory, or SET, was conceived and developed by Lynn Margulis, to explain the greatest discontinuity in the history of life, the origin of eukaryotic cells. Some predictions of SET, namely the origin of mitochondria and chloroplasts, withstood the test of the most recent evidence from a variety of disciplines including phylogenetics, biochemistry, and cell biology. Even though some other predictions fared less well, SET remains a seminal theory in biology. In this paper, I focus on two aspects (...) of SET. First, using the concept of "universal symbiogenesis”, developed by Freeman Dyson to search for commonalities in astronomy and biology, I propose that SET can be extended beyond eukaryogenesis. The extension refers to the possibility that even prokaryotic organisms, themselves subject to the process of symbiogenesis in SET, could have emerged symbiotically. Second, I contrast a recent “viral eukaryogenesis” hypothesis, according to which the nucleus evolved from a complex DNA virus, with a view closer to SET, according to which the nucleus evolved through the interplay of the archaeal host, the eubacterial symbiont, and a non-LTR transposon, or telomerase. Viruses joined in later, through the process of viral endogenization, to shape eukaryotic chromosomes in the process of karyotype evolution. These two proposals based on SET are a testament to its longevity as a scientific theory. (shrink)

For the OK, there is in fact no opposition between the logical and the material or the spiritual: reality is a formless logical substance. Representation is morphogenesis and the terms 'material' and 'spiritual' only denote categories of morphogenesis. Our constant experience shows us that spiritual and material interact. The border between understanding and becoming, between meaning and act, which seems trivial to us, is elusive when we try to approach it. For example: when the subject follows the object of his (...) attention with his gaze, where to draw the line between material and spiritual ? Representation is morphogenesis and the OK uses the term 'horizon', not to separate the material from the spiritual, but to distinguish the formless from the representable, the unspeakable from the speakable. For the OK the speakable is not 'something else' than the unspeakable, it is a mode of order: The rainbow is not 'an other thing' than rain, light, sun, the walk that brought me here and now, my sense of vision, my culture etc ... all this unspeakable set of logical interdependencies from which emerges, for me subject, the meaning of the rainbow. And above all, this horizon is not 'in my mind'. The ordaining of the unspeakable is not carried out 'by my understanding'. The emergence of the meaning from the unspeakable logic is not happening 'in' and 'by' my mind. On the contrary, it is a process of pure logic*, a progressive aglomeration of interdependance, which makes the subject emerge as a representation of the world and of his own existence. The logical transcends the Existing. This is the key to understanding this article: We have not left the Garden of Eden. The representation is not 'overhanging' the world, it is 'the' world. Representation is not "grasping form" but "morphogenesis", not as "attribution of form" but as "necessary ordering mode of logical reality". Common sense (including science and logic) does not represent reality, it emerges from it in the form of modes of order of reality, of logic. My representation of this white stone is not 'something else' than the unspeakable logic from which the meaning of 'white stone' emerges for me, it is only a mode of order. There are no "other things" than the things which represent themselves in me and which are modes of order. The Existing is representation. Existence is a mode of order *. The amorphous logical "substance" precedes (transcends) its representation. The logical transcends logic. (shrink)

This article focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s Categories by the first three representatives of Greek Neoplatonism: Plotinus (204/205–270 CE), Porphyry (ca. 234–ca. 305 CE), Iamblichus (ca. 242–ca. 325 CE). The first section argues that Plotinus’ acquaintance with Aristotle’s treatises marked a fresh start vis-à-vis the previous Platonist tradition. Aristotle’s views, arguments and vocabulary are ubiquitous in Plotinus writings (the Enneads) and they must be considered an essential part of his philosophical project. Plotinus, however, does not share some of Aristotle’s (...) key theories and is critical of them. The second section focuses on Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s Categories in the tripartite treatise On the Genera of Being (6.1–3). There he rejects the Peripatetic division into ten categories as providing an incomplete account of the genera of being that unduly omits “those which are most authentically beings”, i.e. Plato’s separate Forms. While drawing on earlier Platonist objections to Aristotle, Plotinus’ approach is original insofar as he criticizes Aristotle and his followers not only for omitting intelligible beings in the division of categories, but also for being unable, for this very reason, to work out an adequate division of sensible beings themselves. The third section is devoted to Porphyry, a student of Plotinus’ and the editor of his works. Porphyry worked intensively on Aristotle’s Categories, which he regarded as an introduction not only to logic, but to philosophy as a whole. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyry aimed to integrate Aristotle into Platonism and his engagement with the Categories was a key part of his project after Plotinus’ in-depth criticism. Porphyry’s approach is connected to his view of the subject-matter of the Categories, which he sees as focusing on words insofar as they signify beings, and not on beings as such. The fourth section focuses on some parallels between Plotinus’ Genera of Beings and Porphyry’s works, which may reflect the debate within Plotinus’ school. The fifth section focuses on Iamblichus of Chalcis. Both in theology and in the interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, Iamblichus aimed to both continue and supplant Porphyry’s work. While Plotinus criticizes Aristotle’s categories for omitting intelligible beings, and while Porphyry accepts Aristotle’s categories insofar as they focus on words signifying sensible things, Iamblichus incorporates his Neoplatonist and Pythagorizing metaphysics into the interpretation of the Categories. (shrink)

The paper continues my earlier Chat with OpenAI’s ChatGPT with a Focused LLM Experiment (FLEX). The idea is to conduct Large Language Model (LLM) based explorations of certain areas or concepts. The approach is based on crafting initial guiding prompts and then follow up with user prompts based on the LLMs’ responses. The goals include improving understanding of LLM capabilities and their limitations culminating in optimized prompts. The specific subjects explored as research subject matter include a) diagonalization techniques as practiced (...) by Cantor, Turing, Gödel, and the advances, such as the Forcing techniques introduced by Paul Cohen and later investigators, b) Knowledge Hierarchies & Mapping Exercises, c) Discussions of IJ Good’s Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, AGI, and Super- intelligence. Results suggest variability between major models like ChatGPT-4, Llama-3, Cohere, Sonnet and Opus. Results also point to strong dependence on users’ preexisting knowledge and skill bases. The paper should be viewed as ’raw data’ rather than a polished authoritative reference. (shrink)

In the twentieth century, certain locations, symbols, and ritual practices along the Italian- Slovenian border were subject to various social and cultural representations. During that century, they primarily represented a subject of disagreement between both ethnic communities; however, in the last ten years, some groups and local authorities have been seeking opportunities to live together in coexistence.

Although Fuzzy logic and Fuzzy Mathematics is a widespread subject and there is a vast literature about it, yet the use of Fuzzy issues like Fuzzy sets and Fuzzy numbers was relatively rare in time concept. This could be seen in the Fuzzy time series. In addition, some attempts are done in fuzzing Turing Machines but seemingly there is no need to fuzzy time. Throughout this article, we try to change this picture and show why it is helpful to consider (...) the instants of time as Fuzzy numbers. In physics, though there are revolutionary ideas on the time concept like B theories in contrast to A theory also about central concepts like space, momentum… it is a long time that these concepts are changed, but time is considered classically in all well-known and established physics theories. Seemingly, we stick to the classical time concept in all fields of science and we have a vast inertia to change it. Our goal in this article is to provide some bases why it is rational and reasonable to change and modify this picture. Here, the central point is the modified version of “Unexpected Hanging” paradox as it is described in "Is classical Mathematics appropriate for theory of Computation".This modified version leads us to a contradiction and based on that it is presented there why some problems in Theory of Computation are not solved yet. To resolve the difficulties arising there, we have two choices. Either “choosing” a new type of Logic like “Para-consistent Logic” to tolerate contradiction or changing and improving the time concept and consequently to modify the “Turing Computational Model”. Throughout this paper, we select the second way for benefiting from saving some aspects of Classical Logic. In chapter 2, by applying quantum Mechanics and Schrodinger equation we compute the associated fuzzy number to time. These, provides a new interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.More exactly what we see here is "Particle-Fuzzy time" interpretation of quantum Mechanics, in contrast to some other interpretations of Quantum Mechanics like " Wave-Particle" interpretation. At the end, we propound a question about the possible solution of a paradox in Physics, the contradiction between General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. (shrink)

For centuries, philosophers studying the great mysteries of human subjectivity have focused on the mind/body problem and the difference between human beings and animals. Now a new ontological question takes center stage: to what extent can a manufactured object (a computer) exhibit qualities of mind? There have been passionate exchanges between those who believe that a "manufactured mind" is possible and those who believe that mind cannot exist except as a living, socially situated, embodied person. As with earlier arguments, this (...) one shows no sign of being resolved. But the fight over computationalism (the belief that all mental processes can be generated by computer programs) has immediate, "hard" consequences for technological research and development, social- and cognitive-science methodology, and for our everyday experience of the world and ourselves. This special issue consists of papers presented at a conference of the same title held at the Center for Cognitive Science at the University at Buffalo, 22-23 May 1990. The authors come from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds (Computer Science, Linguistics, Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, etc.), and bring a wide variety of perspectives to the topic. (shrink)

The book results from several years of work on the problems of consciousness and the self as they are currently posed in the Philosophy of mind and Philosophy of psychiatry. I debate various theories of the self, including those found in contemporary versions of dualism, panpsychism, structuralism, enactivism, and predictive processing, while working towards naturalising the phenomenology of subjectivity.

One of the most widely debated and influential implications of the "demise" of positivism was the realization, now a commonplace, that philosophy of science must be firmly grounded in an understanding of the history of science, and/or of contemporary scientific practice. While the nature of this alliance is still a matter of uneasy negotiation, the principle that philosophical analysis must engage "real" science has transformed philosophical practice in innumerable ways. This short paper is the introduction to a symposium presented at (...) the 1994 PSA Biennial meetings that focused attention on recent developments at the interface between various disciplinary science studies fields. It brought together two philosophers who explore the implications of sociological and historical contextualization for philosophical studies of science, Brian Baigrie and Joseph Rouse; and a sociologist and historian, Andy Pickering and Betty Smocovitis, whose work raises philosophical questions about the sciences and about science studies. Each argued for ways of reconceptualizing our subject domains, our purposes, and our conventional strategies of inquiry that promise much richer understanding of the sciences, but necessarily challenge discipline-specific traditions of science studies quite profoundly. If there is a common theme to be discerned in these discussions it is that, in the spirit of Rouse's recommendations, science studies should be understood to be an essentially open ended and dynamic enterprise, like the sciences they study. (shrink)