Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed “moral Bayesianism,” from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, ifP(A∩B)=0thenP(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B), known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one (...) hand and degrees of desires on the other. Results generally converged to show that degrees of moral judgment are more similar to degrees of belief than to degrees of desire in this respect. This supports the adoption of a Bayesian approach to the study of moral judgments. To further support moral Bayesianism, we also demonstrated its predictive power. Finally, we discuss the relevancy of our results to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists. (shrink)

The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.

We present a new justification for methodological triangulation (MT), the practice of using different methods to support the same scientific claim. Unlike existing accounts, our account captures cases in which the different methods in question are associated with, and rely on, incommensurable theories. Using a nonstandard Bayesian model, we show that even in such cases, a commitment to the minimal form of epistemic conservatism, captured by the rigidity condition that stands at the basis of Jeffrey’s conditionalization, supports the practice of (...) MT. (shrink)

I discuss the trilemma that consists of the following three principles being inconsistent: 1. The Common Principle: if one distribution, A, necessarily brings a higher total sum of personal value that is distributed in a more egalitarian way than another distribution, B, A is more valuable than B. 2. (Weak) ex-ante Pareto: if one uncertain distribution, A, is more valuable than another uncertain distribution, B, for each patient, A is more valuable than B. 3. Pluralism about attitudes to risk (Pluralism): (...) the personal value of a prospect is a weighted sum of the values of the prospect’s outcomes, but the weight each outcome gets might be different from the probability the prospect assigns to the outcome. (shrink)

We present a minimal pragmatic restriction on the interpretation of the weights in the “Equal Weight View” regarding peer disagreement and show that the view cannot respect it. Based on this result we argue against the view. The restriction is the following one: if an agent, $$\hbox {i}$$ i, assigns an equal or higher weight to another agent, $$\hbox {j}$$ j,, he must be willing—in exchange for a positive and certain payment—to accept an offer to let a completely rational and (...) sympathetic $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him whether to accept a bet with positive expected utility. If $$\hbox {i}$$ i assigns a lower weight to $$\hbox {j}$$ j than to himself, he must not be willing to pay any positive price for letting $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him. Respecting the constraint entails, we show, that the impact of disagreement on one’s degree of belief is not independent of what the disagreement is discovered to be. (shrink)

As the use of nudges by governmental agencies becomes more common, the need for normative guidelines regarding the processes by which decisions about the implementation of specific nudges are taken becomes more acute. In order to find a justified set of such guidelines one must meet several theoretical challenges to Libertarian Paternalism that arise at the foundational level. In this paper, I identify three central challenges to Libertarian Paternalism, and suggest that Susan Hurley's political philosophy as presented in her Natural (...) Reasons (1989) can be viewed as offering powerful responses to them. (shrink)

This is a review of Henk Woldring's book on Karl Mannheim.

In this paper, I explore the approaches to methodological abstraction and self-alienation developed respectively in Karl Mannheim’s early sociology of intellectuals and in Edmund Husserl’s late transcendental phenomenology. In Mannheim’s early and experimental works, the resistance to abstraction and alienation is located in a stratum of intellectuals able to meaningfully combine diverse cultural currents in a social process of cultivation (Bildung). In Husserl, to contrast, this resistance is grasped as a constant crisis in the methods of pursuing philosophical (...) truth. While these approaches seem difficult to reconcile, I suggest in closing that this difficulty can be related to their shared emphasis on a theoretical response to the practical and historical reality of self-alienation. (shrink)

An introduction to Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge for a textbook.

This paper studies the conflict between critical rationalism and critical theory in Karl Popper and Theodor Adorno’s 1961 debate by analyzing their shared rejection of Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. Despite the divergences in their respective projects of critical social research, Popper and Adorno agree that Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge is uncritical. By investigating their respective assessments of this research program I reveal a deeper similarity between critical rationalism and critical theory. Though both agree on the importance of (...) critique, they are less concerned with the development of critical consciousness as a focus of this project. In this way, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, particularly in its formative stages, revolves around a set of problems relatively inaccessible to critical rationalism and critical theory, since it is centrally concerned with identifying and cultivating the possibility of critique in society. In closing, I gesture to the importance of political education in Mannheim’s early work, suggesting that a return to these experimental texts will yield resources for political thought today. (shrink)

Between 1910 und 1915 the Hungarian philosopher Béla Zalai (1882-1915) developed his “comparative metaphysics of systems”, which had a significant influence on both the young Georg Lukács and also on Karl Mannheim. Through an analysis of Zalai’s approach to metaphysics, we show how he served to mediate between the realist Austrian philosophy of Meinong and of the early Husserl on the one side, and the German (idealistic, Kantian) philosophy then dominant in Hungary.

This is a review of the book by Henk Woldring Karl Mannheim: the development of his thought Van Gorcum 1986.

Between 1910 und 1915 the Hungarian philosopher Béla Zalai (1882-1915) developed his “comparative metaphysics of systems”, which had a significant influence on both the young Georg Lukács and also on Karl Mannheim. Through an analysis of Zalai’s approach to metaphysics, we show how he served to mediate between the realist Austrian philosophy of Meinong and of the early Husserl on the one side, and the German (idealistic, Kantian) philosophy then dominant in Hungary.

I rapporti annuali su Gli italiani e lo stato, coordinati da Ilvo Diamanti, continuano a rilevare che i cittadini sono impegnati negli associazionismi ma disincantati dalla politica. Con le tipiche differenze nelle diverse aree del paese e a seconda del livello istituzionale, accanto alla sfiducia verso le istituzioni pubbliche c’è una propensione alla partecipazione. Come mostrano la diffusione delle primarie e le esperienze di democrazia partecipativa che si moltiplicano a livello locale, si riscontra, infatti, una disponibilità a sperimentare forme di (...) coinvolgimento differenti rispetto alla militanza politica che possono costituire un utile complemento della democrazia rappresentativa e degli strumenti di democrazia diretta. La partecipazione non solo richiede la possibilità legale di votare ma anche un contesto sociale che induca effettivamente il popolo a votare e ad esprimere i propri punti di vista elevando il livello di informazione e il confronto su argomenti alternativi, cercando di evitare nelle controversie pubbliche le valutazioni puramente opportunistiche o emotive. L’interesse qui si rivolge verso il “sondaggio deliberativo” di James S. Fishkin, una procedura molto diversa dal sondaggio d’opinione poiché rovescia la logica demoscopica. Le persone sondate dagli istituti di ricerca a volte non hanno indicazioni adeguate sul tema; altrettanto spesso non ci hanno riflettuto e non hanno confrontato le proprie preferenze, scelte o credenze con gli argomenti in contrasto in una libera e approfondita discussione. Renato Mannheimer, presidente dell’Istituto per gli studi sulla pubblica opinione (Ispo) è d’accordo con l’affermazione secondo cui le persone rispondono anche su ciò che non conoscono e, a suo parere, il problema si fa ancora più evidente a ridosso delle elezioni. Oggi, a suo avviso, la maggior parte della gente vota non per vera convinzione, ma sulla base di impressioni acquisite dalla TV durante le ultime settimane prima del voto. I sondaggi deliberativi, invece, sono diretti a migliorare la qualità del confronto pubblico, attraverso una procedura articolata che favorisce l’informazione,la riflessione e il dibattito, a partire, ovvio, dall’idea di creare un rapporto diverso tra i sondaggi e l’opinione pubblica intenso come misurazione di come muta l’opinione dopo che le persone hanno avuto l’opportunità di diventare più competenti e di confrontare in un dialogo aperto le loro idee. Nonostante alcune riserve di ordine metodologico e taluni rischi di strumentalizzazione politica, l’esame dei sondaggi deliberativi risveglia una viva ammirazione per uno studioso riuscito a riversare la passione civile e l'impegno politico in una pratica democratica concreta alla quale ha dedicato, quasi interamente, molti anni del suo lavoro. Rimane, certo, uno strumento insufficiente a rianimare e risollevare il momento deliberativo nelle democrazie contemporanee, ma nessuno può negare che indichi a tutti la direzione giusta. (shrink)

Is there a political philosophy of conservatism? A history of the phenomenon written along sceptical lines casts doubt on the existence of a transhistorical doctrine, or even an enduring conservative outlook. The main typologies of conservatism uniformly trace its origins to opposition to the French Revolution. Accordingly, Edmund Burke is standardly singled out as the ‘father’ of this style of politics. Yet Burke was de facto an opposition Whig who devoted his career to assorted programmes of reform. In restoring Burke (...) to his original milieu, the argument presented here takes issue with 20th-century accounts of conservative ideology developed by such figures as Karl Mannheim, Klaus Epstein and Samuel Huntington. It argues that the idea of a conservative tradition is best seen as a belated construction, and that the notion of a univocal philosophy of conservatism is basically misconceived. (shrink)

Już w latach sześćdziesiątych zjawisko walencji znacznie zyskało na znaczeniu. Przyczyną tego mógł być fakt, iż gramatyka oparta na teorii walencji w coraz większym stopniu znajdowała swoje miejsce w nauczaniu języków obcych. W procesie uczenia się języka obcego istnieje bowiem zależność pomiędzy przyswajaniem znaczeń słów a zapamiętywaniem ich struktur syntaktycznych, co niewątpliwie bazuje na zjawisku walencji. Punktem wyjścia tej tezy jest zasada, według której wyrazy o podobnym znaczeniu tworzą konstrukcje o podobnej składni, co z kolei wypływa z faktu, iż wyrazy (...) bliskoznaczne wykazują podobne cechy walencyjne. Problem pojawia się podczas przyswajania języka obcego, albowiem język ojczysty w większym lub mniejszym stopniu wpływa na proces uczenia się. Chodzi tu oczywiście o zjawiska: transferu (pozytywnego oddziaływania języka ojczystego na język obcy) oraz interferencji (negatywnego wpływu), z czego zjawisko interferencji zaistniałe poprzez przenoszenie konstrukcji języka ojczystego na konstrukcje w języku obcym prowadzi do tego, że uczący się popełniają błędy. Biorąc pod uwagę sposób przedstawiania składni i konstrukcji językowych w oparciu o teorię walencji, nie da się zaprzeczyć, iż wzrasta zapotrzebowanie na informacje o cechach walencyjnych głównych części mowy (czasowników, rzeczowników oraz przymiotników). Językoznawcy starają się wyjść temu naprzeciw i redagują słowniki walencyjne, w których oprócz takich właśnie informacji zawierane są również modele poprawnych konstrukcji zdaniowych z danym słowem. W Niemczech od połowy XX w. istnieją dwa instytuty, gdzie prowadzone są badania nad zjawiskiem walencji poszczególnych części mowy: das Herder-Institut der Universität Leipzig oraz das Institut für deutsche Sprache Mannheim. W prezentowanym artykule przedstawione zostały słowniki zredagowane przez językoznawców działających w tych instytutach, jak również inne koncepcje słowników walencyjnych. Na uwagę zasługują tu przede wszystkim prace kontrastywne, jak np. opisany w artykule Słownik walencyjny niemieckich i polskich czasowników (N. Morciniec, L. Cirko i R. Ziobro). Analizie poddane zostały każdorazowo: budowa słownika, informacje zawarte przy poszczególnych hasłach, adresat, założenia oraz praktyczność danej pozycji. (shrink)

I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. The (...) loss of an experiential reference makes for a vacuous set of concepts, giving way to ideologies, by which I mean the conscious prejudicial support for a set of ideas without the experiential, intuitive context that is necessary to see the value of those ideas. A critical phenomenology is a critique of ideological views by descriptively recovering the intuitive content whereby concepts can be adequately reevaluated. -/- This main aim of this work is to establish the methodological features of critical phenomenology by responding to the objections made against phenomenology and intuition by Frankfurt School critical theorists. Scheler’s phenomenology is used as a way forward due to his far-reaching critique of reason and emphasis on the phenomenological intuition of value. -/- Chapter 1 considers three Frankfurt School objections of Husserlian phenomenology, as (1) immanentist (Adorno), (2) idealist (Adorno), and (3) normatively empty (Habermas). Each fail to discern the subtle features of nonidentity with respect to Husserl’s notions of apperception and adumbrated phenomena. -/- Chapter 2 shows how Scheler’s original view of the phenomenological attitude makes more explicit Husserl’s subtle dialectical elements. Adequate and inadequate givenness is interpreted with respect to one’s intentional orientation and the moral attitudes carried within the world, influencing the content of the given. -/- Chapter 3 confronts the popular charge of idealism. Reality is a problem for phenomenology only to conscious modes of givenness. But through ecstatic modes of givenness (in resistances) Scheler’s phenomenology achieves an existential ground that is crucial for phenomenology to engage actually existing social structures and factors. -/- Chapter 4 concerns the charge that phenomenology is normatively empty. That Scheler had developed a theory of value is not enough to rebut the charge but his view of value-givenness as an attitude informed by the act of loving, opens an awareness of the values disclosed by that attitude. -/- Chapter 5 shows that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, in contrast to Karl Mannheim’s interpretation, provides a unified picture of the interdependency of spirit and life needed for the realization of values in the world and society. -/- Chapter 6 suggests a way of framing a phenomenological critique of ideology. Scheler points to the attitudinal factors of loving and hating to disclose systemic devaluation and overvaluation. This awareness arises (1) from noticing how individual valuation reflects social valuation, and (2) by being attuned to how one’s own intuitions contradict prevailing social valuation and thought, thereby opening a space for a critique of those patterns. (shrink)

Can transformative law become an ambitious program for rethinking the theoretical basis for our understanding of law and its position in society? A program which explicitly goes beyond emotion and ideology. One way of dealing with both emotion and the devotion to ideology is, as also argued by Karl Mannheim back in 1926, to deploy an analytical lens, i.e. to substitute emotion and ideology with sophisticated theorizing. A form of theorizing which only is possible if deployed while maintaining proper (...) analytical distance to the object matter. On this background one might distinguish between three models of transformative law: Instrumentalization, Political Programming or Normative Selection, with the latter providing a third way between the two hitherto dominant approaches. (shrink)