In a recent opinion paper, it was argued that individuals with multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct should not serve as editors, including as editors-in-chief, on the editorial boards of scholarly or academic journals. As a first step towards appreciating how such a policy could be applied in practice, the presence of 30 individuals listed on the Retraction Watch Leaderboard on editorial boards was screened. Six cases are highlighted to gain an appreciation of the potential reputational risks that (...) journals and publishers might incur by including individuals with a tainted academic record on editorial boards. Given the reputational, legal and other risks associated with this type of assessment and decision, more formal positioning and guidance are needed by global ethics policy-related bodies such as COPE, the ICMJE, and the CSE, even more so in journals that claim to follow these organizations’ ethical guidelines. (shrink)

It is technically possible to clone a human being. The result of the procedure would be a human being in its own right. Given the current level of cloning technology concerning other animals there is every reason to believe that early human clones will have shorter-than-average life-spans, and will be unusually prone to disease. In addition, they would be unusually at risk of genetic defects, though they would still, probably, have lives worth living. But with experimentation and experience, seriously unequal (...) prospects between cloned and noncloned people should erode. We shall ignore arguments about cloning that focus on the potential for harm to the fetus or resultant human being, where harm is understood solely in terms of physical and mental health. Unless the resultant people would generally have lives worth living there is no positive case for cloning, or any other form of reproduction, for that matter. If the resultant beings will generally have lives worth living there is a prima facie case for allowing cloning. We imagine the case in which the resultant beings will have lives well worth living. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) made relevant contributions to deductive logic, but he was primarily interested in the logic of science, and more especially in what he called 'abduction' (as opposed to deduction and induction), which is the process whereby hypotheses are generated in order to explain the surprising facts. Indeed, Peirce considered abduction to be at the heart not only of scientific research, but of all ordinary human activities. Nevertheless, in spite of Peirce's work and writings in the field of (...) methodology of research, scarce attention has been paid to the logic of discovery over the last hundred years, despite an impressive development not only of scientific research but also of logic. -/- Having this in mind, the exposition is divided into five parts: 1) a brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional scientist; 2) an exposition of the classification of inferences by the young Peirce: deduction, induction and hypothesis; 3) a sketch of the notion of abduction in the mature Peirce; 4) an exposition of the logic of surprise; and finally, by way of conclusion, 5) a discussion of this peculiar ability of guessing understood as a rational instinct. -/- . (shrink)

Twenty years ago I put a sign on the door to my office —and it’s still there— with the sentence of Peirce that I have used in my title: "The life of science is in the desire to learn" (CP 1.235, c.1902). I learned this quote from the late professor of logic at MIT, George Boolos. Like him, I put it on my door to invite students to come in to inquire, to ask questions, since their questions are not just (...) the life of science, but also the sparks that inflame my passion for teaching. Those —professors and students— who desire to learn are the real agents, the main characters, of philosophical development. Philosophy should not be understood and taught as the transmission of old solutions to outdated problems, but as a way of life devoted to learning the truth wherever we might find it. My exposition will be divided into four sections: 1) A brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional scientist and a scientific philosopher; 2) Peirce considered as an educational philosopher; 3) Some practical suggestions I have drawn from Peirce's ideas and from my experience teaching philosophy today; and finally, 4) A brief conclusion. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to describe in some detail the actual relationship between Charles S. Peirce and Alfred N. Whitehead, paying particular attention to the Peircean notions of science and metaphysics, with the conviction that this contrast can help to understand better the scope and depth of C. S. Peirce’s thought.

In this article I pay attention to some of the reviews that Reason in Common Sense of George Santayana received from some of the most outstanding philosophers of his time: E. Albee, J. Dewey, A.W. Moore, G. E. Moore, C. S. Peirce and F. C S. Schiller. My paper is arranged in six sections: 1) Biographical circumstances of Reason in Common Sense; 2) Peirce’s reading of Santayana; 3) The reviews of John Dewey; 4) Other readers of Reason in Common Sense; (...) 5) Santayana returns on his book; and, finally, by way of conclusion, 6) Reading today Reason in Common Sense. (shrink)

Para intentar comprender la visión que Eugenio d'Ors tiene de España a principios de los años 30 del pasado siglo, es necesario entender su biografía. Cuando Eugenio d’Ors deja Barcelona en julio de 1921 solo le faltaban tres meses para cumplir los cuarenta años. A los cuarenta —escribió su hijo Álvaro— lo más normal es que los hombres no cambien ya su caudal de ideas. La originalidad de la época catalana sobre el resto de la producción de d'Ors no significa, (...) sin embargo, un menosprecio de los años posteriores. Fue en gran medida su producción no catalana y su constante actividad y participación en muchos otros proyectos españoles y europeos, lo que hizo que su “gloria catalana” no quedara diluida y que su figura tenga hoy un lugar destacado en las letras españolas. Por todo ello, la exposición está organizada en las tres secciones siguiente: 1) Su biografía catalana; 2) la primera etapa de su biografía castellana, y 3) Su visión de España en los años 30. (shrink)

According to Charles S. Peirce and to Mariano Artigas, science is the collective and cooperative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to discover the truth. The particular sciences are branches of a common tree. The unity of science is not achieved by the reduction of the special sciences to more basic ones: the new name for the unity of the sciences is cross-disciplinarity. This is not a union of the sciences themselves, but rather the unity (...) and dialogue of scientists, the real inquirers into the truth. In the light of Peirce’s and Artigas’s teachings, we can see that philosophers are in just the right place to call for this unity of sciences. This call should not be seen as promoting a return to the old scientism, but seeks a deep dialogue between the particular sciences and philosophy in order to deal with the presuppositions of the scientific enterprise. The key to the cross-disciplinarity of knowledge is not revolution, but rather shared efforts in a unique mixture of continuity and fallibilism, of affection and reason, of the attempt to understand others’ disciplines as well as our own. (shrink)

El artículo da noticia del marco de la discusión contemporánea acerca del lenguaje en el ámbito angloamericano, con el objetivo de lograr una mejor comprensión del trabajo en torno al lenguaje que viene desarrollándose en los últimos años. Se ofrece un breve panorama histórico de la filosofía del lenguaje de la primera mitad del siglo XX que se centró particularmente en la lógica y de describe la transformación pragmatista de la filosofía del lenguaje acaecida en las últimas décadas, para finalmente (...) desvelar algunas de las claves que —a juicio del autor— resultan decisivas para una cabal comprensión del lenguaje jurídico. (shrink)

A brief history of the reception of Charles S. Peirce in the city of Tucuman in the North of Argentina is described with some detail: 1) Courses and lectures; 2) Publications.

In my paper I make a summary assessment of the connection between Eugeni Crexells and Eugeni d'Ors and that of both of them with pragmatism. I organize it in three sections: 1. First, the philosophical formation of Crexells and its relation with D'Ors; 2. Eugeni d'Ors and pragmatism, and 3. Joan Crexells and pragmatism.

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like “It is raining”. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering “I will be back tomorrow”, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that “to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and I evaluate Peirce’s reasons for (...) holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirce’s case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of “responsibility to give reasons”. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirce’s view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirce’s account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the following hypotheses: The Davidsonian language thesis, which presupposes a set of beliefs and shared desires, is a quasi-rational phenomenon that weights the truths, and from them, is able to derive other objective thoughts in the domain of values. This view of Davidson conceives that thinking and language are prior to convention, and that necessarily implies the acknowledgement of humans as thinking beings; capable of understanding even when deprived of content, this is to say, (...) negating naturalism or substance in beliefs and innate desires. (shrink)

Thirty years ago Richard Rorty detected the similarities between Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953) and the philosophical framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of pragmatism. Rorty tried to show that Peirce envisaged and repudiated in advance logical positivism and developed insights and a philosophical mood very close to the analytical philosophers influenced by the later Wittgenstein (Rorty 1961). In spite of that, the majority of scholars have considered both thinkers as totally alien. Some scholars have attributed the pragmatist flavor (...) of the Philosophical Investigations to the influence of Frank P. Ramsey, who awoke Wittgenstein from the dogmatic slumber of the Tractatus. Nevertheless, the real scope of the influence of American pragmatist philosophy in Wittgenstein's later thought is not clearly known. The purpose of my paper is not to describe the common themes between Wittgenstein and Peirce, but the way in which recent scholarship has established some links between both philosophers. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole scientific enterprise. The belief in God is a natural product of abduction, of the "rational instinct" or educated guess of the scientist or the layman, and also the abduction of God may be understood as a "proof" of pragmatism. Moreover, I want to suggest that for Peirce scientific activity is a genuine religious enterprise, perhaps even the religious activity par excellence, (...) and that to divorce religion from science is antithetical to both the scientific spirit and the real Peirce. Understanding the real Peirce requires to deal with his religious concerns, which are increasingly recognized as being perhaps as philosophically important as his scientific concerns. Since a key notion in this project is the idea of "il lume naturale" that Peirce borrowed from Galileo, I want also to pay attention to that expression which during years I have been following through Peirce's papers and books. -/- In order to try to explain some of this, my paper is arranged into four brief sections after this already long introduction: 1) God and scientific inquiry; 2) The belief in God as a product of abduction; 3) Galileo and Peirce: Il lume naturale; and by way of conclusion 4) Some remarks on the religious framework of Peirce's approach. (shrink)

The relationship between William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) has recently been the subject of intense scholarly research. We know for instance that the later Wittgenstein's reflections on the philosophy of psychology found in James a major source of inspiration. Not surprisingly therefore, the pragmatist nature of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is increasingly acknowledged, in spite of Wittgenstein’s adamant refusal of being labeled a “pragmatist”. In this brief paper I merely want to piece together some of the available (...) evidence of Wittgenstein’s high regard for William James, not only for his thoughts, but even more so for his character. (shrink)

A surprising fact in the historiography of the Hispanic philosophy of this century is its almost total opacity towards the American philosophy, in spite of the real affinity between the central questions of American pragmatism and the topics addressed by the most relevant Hispanic thinkers of the century: Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, d'Ors, Vaz Ferreira. In this paper that situation is studied, paying special attention to Charles S. Peirce, his personal connections with the Hispanic world, the reception of his texts (...) in Spanish, and some of the connections that lie almost hidden under the mutual ignorance which divides the two traditions. -/- . (shrink)

"I do not call the solitary studies of a single man a science. It is only when a group of men, more or less in intercommunication, are aiding and stimulating one another by their understanding of a particular group of studies as outsiders cannot understand them, that call their life a science”. (MS 1334: 12–13, 1905). This beautiful quotation from Charles S. Peirce comes from his “Lecture I to the Adirondack Summer School 1905” and was catalogued as MS 1334 (Robin (...) 1967). In 1986 Kenneth L. Ketner chose fifteen pages (7–22) of the Notebook I of these lectures to represent Peirce’s conception of science in the volume Classical American Philosophy (Stuhr 1987: 46–48). “The Nature of Science” was the appropriate title assigned to that selection, which up to then had been almost unknown to the majority of Peirce scholars. Sara Barrena translated the piece into Spanish in 1996 (Barrena 1996: 1435–1440) and we chose the quotation above as the motto for our then incipient group of Peirce scholars in the Spanish- speaking world because it so finely expressed the aim of our undertaking. Against the traditional image of the philosopher as a solitary thinker near the stove, we wanted, following Peirce, to encourage cooperation and communication between our researchers not only as something useful, but as something essential for the real development of science. (shrink)

In this paper Peirce's notion of sign is studied to try to characterize the artistic sign as representation. Then, some considerations about the work of art as a sign are developed involving three elements: experience, expression and interpretation. Finally it is concluded that beauty requires for Peirce a peculiar balance, the imaginative conjunction of the sensible and the reasonable in an artistic sign; it requires moreover the expression of something that transcends the sensible; it requires, as a sign, an interpretation (...) which is not exact and which implies growth. It requires, finally, love, because an artist will only reach beauty guided by agape updating and harmonizing possibilities through abduction, that is, creating new signs that give form to what does not have it; the artist only reaches beauty when he loves what he does and when he can express himself freely. -/- En este artículo se estudia, en primer lugar, la noción de signo de Peirce para tratar de caracterizar después el signo artístico como representación. Se desarrollan enseguida algunas consideraciones sobre la obra de arte como signo que como tal conlleva tres elementos: experiencia, expresión e interpretación. Finalmente se concluye que la belleza requiere para Peirce un peculiar equilibrio, la conjunción imaginativa de lo sensible y lo razonable en un signo artístico; requiere además la expresión de algo que trasciende lo sensible; requiere, en tanto signo, de una interpretación que no es exacta y que implica crecimiento. Requiere, por último, amor, pues el artista solo alcanzará lo bello cuando sea guiado por el ágape y a través de la abducción vaya actualizando y armonizando posibilidades, creando nuevos signos que den forma a lo que no la tiene, cuando ame lo que hace y se exprese libremente. (shrink)

A surge in post-publication activity related to editing, including by technical editors and copyeditors, is worthy of some discussion. One of these issues involves the issue of 'tortured phrases', which are bizarre terms and phrases in academic papers that replace standard English expressions or jargon. This phenomenon may reveal an attempt to avoid the detection of textual similarity or to masquerade plagiarism, and yet remain undetected by editors, peer reviewers and text editors. Potentially thousands of cases have already been discovered (...) and reported publicly on the post-publication platform PubPeer. In this opinion paper, 35 cases from ranked scholarly journals are presented, mainly the fields of materials, computer and engineering sciences. This collation serves to expand discussion about this integrity-related phenomenon and to increase educational awareness of the topic. (shrink)

The Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness is one of the most powerful objections against restricted composition. Many have resisted the argument by rejecting its key premise, namely that existence is not vague. In this paper, I argue that this strategy is ineffective as a response to vagueness-based objections against restricted composition. To that end, I formulate a new argument against restricted composition: the argument from determinate vagueness. Unlike the Lewis-Sider argument, my argument doesn’t require accepting that existence is not vague, but (...) only that it is not vague in a specific way, which, I argue, is entailed by restricted composition. I show that the rejection of this species of vague existence follows from assumptions even friends of vague existence should be happy to accept. (shrink)

This entry is a presentation of C. S. Peirce and of his connections with A. N. Whitehead. Also Whitehead's connections with Peirce are explored.

El objetivo de esta colaboración es, en primer lugar, dar noticia de algunas coordenadas básicas de la discusión contemporánea acerca del lenguaje y la diferencia de los sexos, prestando especial atención a la acusación de esencialismo con la que se descalifican los contendientes entre sí. En segundo lugar, quiero llamar la atención acerca de la insuficiencia de las razones esgrimidas por el discurso feminista de la diferencia y por el discurso de la complementariedad cultural, que en última instancia vienen a (...) favorecer —en total oposición, sin duda, a los deseos de sus valedores— una perpetuación de la discriminación de las mujeres1. En tercer lugar, esbozo unas pautas para la eliminación de algunos elementos sexistas que todavía subsisten en la lengua española. -/- El trabajo se articula en cuatro secciones: 1) El debate contemporáneo sobre el esencialismo; 2) El discurso biológico sobre la diferencia sexual; 3) La construcción cultural de la diferencia sexual; y finalmente, 4) La búsqueda de un nuevo lenguaje. El propósito unificador que otorga sentido al conjunto radica en el empeño por ganar en comprensión de lo que es el ser humano mediante la reflexión filosófica sobre la diferenciación sexual que se detecta, se expresa o se crea, a través o en el lenguaje. La perspectiva que adopto —desde una óptica preferentemente hispánica, pero prestando especial atención a la cultura angloamericana— es decididamente filosófica, y aspira a integrar armónicamente aportaciones multidisciplinares, datos y planteamientos teóricos procedentes de las ciencias biomédicas y de las humanidades. Esta actitud supone una concepción de la filosofía que, lejos de un eclecticismo acrítico, busca encontrar las razones de la verdad en la confrontación de opiniones opuestas, sabedora con la mejor tradición que todos los pareceres formulados seriamente, en cierto sentido, dicen algo verdadero. Una segunda consecuencia de la adopción de esta perspectiva filosófica es que he evitado convertir el trabajo en una investigación lexicográfica de la lengua española, limitando ésta exclusivamente al final de la última sección. (shrink)

The American novelist Walker Percy (1916-90) considered himself a "thief of Peirce", because he found in the views of C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, an alternative approach to prevailing reductionist theories in order to understand what we human beings are and what the peculiar nature of our linguistic activity is. -/- This paper describes, quoting widely from Percy, how abduction is the spontaneous activity of our reason by which we couple meanings and experience in our linguistic expressions. This coupling (...) of personal creativity and cultural tradition makes it possible to bridge the gaps between persons and cultures. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was never to forget the course he gave in Barcelona in the spring of 1920. In the bitter title-page of An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940), after the legal ruling which had suspended him from teaching at City College, New York, he expressly mentions his lectures in Barcelona, along with those he had given at the Universities of Uppsala and Copenhagen and at the Sorbonne. He also alludes briefly to them in his Autobiography (Russell 1990, II, 143), (...) but their circumstances and import have received no attention to date. The aim of this paper is to bring to light the available information on this subject in the Russell Archives (McMaster University, Canada) and the papers left by Joan Crexells (1896-1926) and Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954), the two Catalan philosophers behind Russell's visit, and to put forward an assessment of Russell's influence on Spanish philosophy. (shrink)

In this short paper I try to present William James’s connection with the Argentinian writer Macedonio Fernández (1874-1952), who was in some sense a mentor of Borges and might be considered the missing link between Borges and James.

In a world of ever growing specialization, the issue of complexity attracts a good amount of attention from cross-disciplinary points of view as this Congress provides evidence. Charles S. Peirce's thought may help us not only to shoulder once again philosophical responsibility which has been largely abdicated by much of 20th century philosophy, but also to tackle some of the most stubborn contemporary problems. The founder of pragmatism identified one century ago most of these problems, and he also mapped out (...) some paths that we could follow to overcome the poverty of contemporary scientistic reductionism. One of these paths is related with the issue of complexity, that lies at the heart of all his conception. -/- Along this line, the aim of my paper is to describe what Peirce can teach about complexity to semioticians coming from very different scientific backgrounds. The lecture will be divided in three sections: 1) a presentation of Peirce, stressing his personal authority as a scientist philosopher, providing also some biographical details; 2) the theory of categories as the heart of complexity according to Peirce and, finally, 3) some consequences of Peirce's notion of complexity in relation with abduction and creativity, semiosis, cross-disciplinarity and communication. -/- . (shrink)

En diciembre de 1996 fui invitado a impartir una sesión a profesores de lógica en los estudios institucionales del Studium Generale de la Prelatura del Opus Dei. En aquella ocasión preparé concienzudamente un texto escrito que pasé a mi querido y admirado colega Ángel Luis González para su revisión. Pocos días después Ángel Luis me lo devolvió con unas pocas correcciones y sugerencias y un alentador “¡Mucho ánimo!” en su encabezamiento. Durante muchos años conservé ese texto con sus anotaciones manuscritas. (...) Por este motivo, me ha parecido que podría ser adecuado reproducir en este volumen en homenaje de Ángel Luis aquella exposición en forma abreviada con unas pocas correcciones y actualizaciones de detalle. Mi exposición se divide en tres partes: 1) Situación de la lógica en la filosofía contemporánea; 2) El papel de la lógica en los estudios institucionales; y termina con 3) A modo de conclusión, una reflexión más personal. (shrink)

In this paper the relations between the almost unknown Spanish mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper (1863-1922) with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin are described. Two brief papers from Reyes Prósper published in El Progreso Matemático 12 (20 December 1891), pp. 297-300, and 18 (15 June 1892) pp. 170-173 on Ladd-Franklin, and on Peirce and Mitchell, respectively, are translated for first time into English and included at the end of the paper.

Connections between W. James and L. Wittgenstein have been widely highlighted in recent scholarship: his mature reflections on the philosophy of psychology found in James a major source of inspiration. This paper gives reason of Wittgenstein's refusal to being labelled "pragmatist" and stresses -against Schulte- the influential role of James in the development of Wittgenstein's thought.

The aim of this paper is to describe the situation of mutual ignorance between American and Hispanic philosophical traditions, paying special attention to the figure and thought of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). In order to do this, first of all I will justify the usage of the expression "Hispanic Philosophy", highlighting its heuristic and practical value. Secondly, I will discuss some of Peirce's comments in relation with the Hispanic world. And finally, by way of conclusion, I (...) will mention some of the connections that lie nearly hidden under the cloak of ignorance which divides the two traditions. (shrink)

En este artículo se estudia con cierto detenimiento y con abundantes textos la relación entre filosofía, fe y cultura cristiana, que ha resultado a veces problemática, quizá porque se tenía una concepción racionalista de la filosofía -casi asimilable a las matemáticas- o porque se creía erróneamente que un cristiano no podía ser un verdadero filósofo. La exposición está organizada a grandes rasgos en sentido histórico con una primera sección dedicada al impacto del cristianismo en la filosofía antigua; en segundo lugar, (...) la grave situación en la modernidad y la reacción de la Iglesia Católica en el siglo XIX; para finalmente sugerir en la tercera sección algunas claves para la renovación de la filosofía cristiana en el siglo XXI. (shrink)

In the academic world, despite their corrective nature, there is still a negative stigma attached to retractions, even more so if they are based on ethical infractions. Editors-in-chief and editors are role models in academic and scholarly communities. Thus, if they have multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct, this viewpoint argues that they should not serve on journals’ editorial boards. The exception is where such individuals have displayed a clear path of scholarly reform. Policy and guidance is needed (...) by organizations such as the Committee on Publication Ethics. (shrink)

What I argue in this article is neither new nor very original, but important, in my opinion, for the organization of the political space and for the intellectual work of each person. I try to defend epistemological pluralism, that is, that problems and things have facets, different faces, and that there are different ways to think about them. At the same time I want to reject relativist skepticism and vulgar pragmatism, with which this view is frequently associated. The rejection of (...) scientific foundationalism or of ethical fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to relativist skepticism. With the help of the best pragmatist tradition, it is possible to try a compromise that supports fallibilism without resorting to skepticism and cooperative pluralism. A pluralist pragmatism holds —with Hilary Putnam— that there is nothing such as a privileged vision of man and the world offered by the Science. Sciences, on the contrary, are cooperative and communicative human activities through which we humans really progress, not without having doubts or making mistakes, in our understanding of the world and ourselves. It is argued that non-relativist pluralism is not only one of the best results of contemporary scientific research but also is an indispensable requirement to achieve a truly democratic social organization. -/- My paper is divided in three sections. Firstly, pragmatism is briefly discussed; secondly, the connection between relativism, "vulgar pragmatism" and the so-called "neopragmatism" is described; and finally, I will offer an explanation of why the pluralism, which is the legacy of the best pragmatism, is not relativist. (shrink)

Connections between J.L.Vives and C.S. Peirce are shown. Not only is reflec-tion on language and meaning central in both thinkers, but Peirce also knew Vives' thought especially through W. Hamilton and the Scottish common sense school. Peirce credited Vives with being a forerunner of the use of dia-grams in logic, and both share a critical view of late medieval nominalistic logicians and a social and hierarchical conception of knowledge.

In a world of ever growing specialization, the idea of a unity of science is commonly discarded, but cooperative work involving cross-disciplinary points of view is encouraged. The aim of this paper is to show with some textual support that Charles S. Peirce not only identified this paradoxical situation a century ago, but he also mapped out some paths for reaching a successful solution. A particular attention is paid to Peirce's classification of the sciences and to his conception of science (...) as a collective and cooperative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to discover the truth. -/- . (shrink)

In this article we wish to share the work in which the Group of Peirce Studies of the University of Navarra has been involved since 2007: the study of a very interesting part of the extensive correspondence of Charles S. Peirce, specifically, his European letters. Peirce wrote some of these letters over the course of his five trips to Europe (between 1870 and 1883), and wrote others to the many European scientists and intellectuals he communicated with over the course of (...) his life. The translation of those letters has been an excellent practical example of the creative and abductive nature of translation, as well as of the cooperative character of research. Translating Peirce's letters has allowed us a deep study of some theoretical aspects, and at the same time it has permitted us to work creatively and cooperatively to enrich the common vision of this scientist and philosopher. (shrink)

Abstract: Faced with the thesis of the exhaustion of analytic philosophy, the work of Susan Haack shows a process of deep transformation within analytical philosophy. Instead of considering the analytic tradition as an abrupt breakdown with classical pragmatism, the resurgence of pragmatism in the last decades endorses, on the contrary, the continuity between both movements. In this process Susan Haack's work has a decisive role. This paper around the pragmatism of Susan Haack is organized into three sections: 1) The pragmatist (...) development in Haack's biography; 2) the two rival versions of pragmatism; and 3) the future of pragmatism. -/- Frente a la tesis del agotamiento de la filosofía analítica, el trabajo de Susan Haack muestra un proceso de profunda transformación en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En lugar de considerar la tradición analítica como una abrupta ruptura con el pragmatismo clásico, el resurgimiento del pragmatismo de las últimas décadas avala, por el contrario, la continuidad entre ambos movimientos. En este proceso el trabajo de Susan Haack tiene un papel decisivo. Esta colaboración en torno al pragmatismo de Susan Haack está organizada en tres secciones: 1) El desarrollo pragmatista en la biografía de Haack; 2) las dos versiones rivales del pragmatismo; y 3) el futuro del pragmatismo. (shrink)

La atención relativamente escasa que los estudiosos del filósofo y científico norteamericano Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) han prestado a lo largo de los años a las dimensiones religiosas de su pensamiento siempre me ha parecido cuando menos sorprendente. Desde mis primeras lecturas de Peirce me impresionó profundamente esa desatención que tanto contrastaba con la ubicuidad de las referencias religiosas en los escritos de Peirce, especialmente en sus años de madurez. En mis encuentros con reconocidos estudiosos peirceanos solía preguntarles acerca de (...) Dios y la religión en Peirce, y la respuesta que recibí casi siempre fue que efectivamente había una gran cantidad de cuestiones religiosas en su obra, pero que no estaban interesados en ellas. Por otra parte, me sorprendió gratamente que el fallecido novelista Walker Percy se considerara a sí mismo en su correspondencia con Ken Ketner como “un ladrón de Peirce”, aspirando a “usar a CSP como uno de los pilares de la apologética cristiana”. Me pareció que el novelista converso al catolicismo estaba en algún sentido mucho más cercano al Peirce real que aquellos estudiosos a los que les había preguntado acerca de Dios y la religión en Peirce. -/- El objetivo de este artículo es subrayar el hecho de que para Peirce la creencia en Dios no es sólo un producto natural de la abducción o "instinto racional", de las conjeturas educadas del científico o del hombre corriente, sino que también la creencia en Dios y el desarrollo científico están interrelacionados. No sólo la creencia en Dios es capaz de cambiar la conducta del creyente, sino que de acuerdo con Peirce la realidad de Dios dota de sentido a toda la empresa científica. Esto puede sonar un poco extraño a los oídos positivistas contemporáneos, pero para comprender realmente a Peirce es preciso estudiar sus preocupaciones religiosas, que de forma creciente se consideran quizá tan importantes filosóficamente como sus preocupaciones científicas6. Más aún, en algún sentido quiero sugerir que para Peirce la actividad científica es una empresa genuinamente religiosa, quizá incluso la actividad religiosa por excelencia, y que separar religión y ciencia es contrario tanto al espíritu científico como al Peirce real. (shrink)

The relations between the Scottish School of Common Sense and the Catalan philosophy of Martí d'Eixalà and Llorens i Barba are well known. But the links between that Catalan tradition and the thought of Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954) have not been studied. The study of the texts from d'Ors and of the cultural context of his philosophical development gives strong support to the suggestion that the germinal role that Scottish philosophy had during the XIX century in the so-called School of Barcelona (...) was taken over in the first decades of the XX century by a special blend of pragmatism and vitalism coming from Paris. (shrink)

George M. Searle (1839-1918) and Charles S. Peirce worked together in the Coast Survey and the Harvard Observatory during the decade of 1860: both scientists were assistants of Joseph Winlock, the director of the Observatory. When in 1868 George, a convert to Catholicism, left to enter the Paulist Fathers, he was replaced by his brother Arthur Searle. George was ordained as a priest in 1871, was a lecturer of Mathematics and Astronomy at the Catholic University of America, and became the (...) fourth superior general of his congregation from 1904 to 1909. Among the books he wrote for non-Catholic audiences was Plain Facts for Fair Minds (1895). On the 8th of August of 1895, Peirce found that book in a bookstore and the following day wrote a letter to George Searle developing his strong reservations about the question of the infallibility of the Pope. This letter (L 397) is almost unknown amongst Peirce's scholars. -/- After describing these historical circumstances as a framework, the aim of my paper is to describe Peirce's arguments against papal infallibility presented by George Searle in his book, and the contrast between the genuine scientific attitude and the putative metaphysical notion of absolute truth that is —according to Peirce— behind Searle's defense of infallibility. In this sense, Peirce's fallibilism will be explained with some detail, giving an account also of his practical infallibilism: "The assertion that every assertion but this is fallible, is the only one that is absolutely infallible. But though nothing else is absolutely infallible, many propositions are practically infallible; such as the dicta of conscience" (Minute Logic, CP 2.75, c. 1902). -/- Finally, having in mind the present interest in Peirce's religious ideas it will be suggested that some of Peirce's ideas on infallibility are nearer to contemporary understanding of that issue than Searle's defense. "I would with all my heart join the ancient church of Rome if I could. But your book," —Peirce writes to Searle— "is an awful warning against doing so." -/- . (shrink)

In this reply to Professor Hookway’s lecture the comments are focused, first, on the topic of what dichotomies really are, since it is an illuminating way of understanding pragmatism in general and Putnam’s pragmatism in particular. Dichotomies are artifacts that we devise with some useful purpose in mind, but when inflated into absolute dichotomies they become metaphysical bogeys as it is illustrated by the twentieth century distinction between fact and value. Secondly, a brief comment on the so-called “thick” ethical concepts (...) and artifact terms is presented, and finally it is added a word on John L. Austin, whose approach to dichotomies is aligned with pragmatism and Putnam. (shrink)

La atención relativamente escasa que los estudiosos del filósofo y científico norteamericano Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) han prestado a lo largo de los años a la dimensión religiosa de su pensamiento siempre me ha resultado un tanto sorprendente. Desde mis primeras lecturas de Peirce me impresionó profundamente la ubicuidad de las referencias religiosas en sus escritos, especialmente en los años de madurez. En mis encuentros con reconocidos estudiosos peirceanos solía preguntarles acerca de Dios y la religión en Peirce, y la (...) respuesta que recibí casi siempre era que efectivamente había una gran cantidad de cuestiones religiosas en su obra, pero que no estaban interesados en ello. Dentro del espacio disponible, mi exposición está organizada en cuatro secciones: 1) Una presentación del artículo de 1908; 2) La noción de realidad; 3) ¿Cuál es realmente el Argumento Olvidado?, y 4) Una discusión de su alcance destacando el poder de la abducción. Citaré a algunos de los comentaristas más relevantes y aportaré un texto del propio Peirce interpretando su artículo que no he visto hasta ahora citado: se trata de la carta de Peirce del 28 de noviembre de 1908 (L 212) en la que explica a su amiga Mary Huntington el artículo publicado en el Hibbert Journal poco tiempo antes. (shrink)

La propuesta metodológica de la «Analytical Jurisprudence» o escuela analítica del Derecho encabezada por H. L. A. Hart (1907-1992) abrió un nuevo espacio de reflexión en el ámbito jurídico anglosajón al emplear el análisis del significado de las palabras como medio para dilucidar la estructura del pensamiento jurídico. Hart, miembro del grupo de Oxford, aplicó una nueva sensibilidad por las distinciones lógicas y lingüísticas a la filosofía del derecho (PANNAM, 2008) y aportó a la discusión de los teóricos del derecho (...) de la segunda mitad del siglo XX una de las convicciones centrales que guiaron su trabajo: la de que las interrogantes más complejas de la teoría del derecho podían dilucidarse esclareciendo el modo en que los términos jurídicos se utilizan en la práctica (ETCHEVERRY, 2009). -/- El objetivo de este artículo es exponer cómo esta propuesta metodológica ha marcado la discusión en las actuales teorías analíticas anglosajonas de la interpretación jurídica, más específicamente, entre las denominadas teorías convencionalistas y teorías realistas del significado. Aspiramos a mostrar cómo una teoría realista del lenguaje jurídico —que incluya una teoría sobre el significado de los términos y enunciados jurídicos— sigue siendo una tarea pendiente que podría ser decisivamente enriquecida mediante la recuperación del pensamiento analógico desarrollado por Mauricio Beuchot. (shrink)

Criticisms of analytic philosophy have increased in intensity in the last decade, denouncing specifically its closing in on itself, which results in barrenness and ignorance of real human problems. The thought of C. S. Peirce is proposed as a fruitful way of renewing the analytic tradition and obviating these criticisms. While this paper is largely a reflection on Hilary Putnam’s study of the historical development of analytic philosophy, not only can some of its main roots be traced back to Peirce, (...) but also the recent resurgence of pragmatism can be regarded as a pragmatist renovation of the analytic tradition. Further, Peirce’s thought offers suggestions for tackling some of the most stubborn problems in contemporary philosophy, thereby enabling us to shoulder once more the philosophical responsibility which has been abdicated by much of twentieth-century philosophy. The most accurate understanding of Peirce is to see him as a traditional and systematic philosopher, but one dealing with the modern problems of science truth, and knowledge from a valuable personal experience as a logician and an experimental researcher in the bosom of an interdisciplinary community of scientists and thinkers. (shrink)

The year of the centennial of the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges is probably the right time to exhume one of the links that this universal writer had with William James. In 1945, Emece, a publisher from Buenos Aires, printed a Spanish translation of William James’s book Pragmatism, with a foreword by Jorge Luis Borges.

Es realmente un honor y un gusto para mí poder acompañar a Fernando Zalamea y a sus numerosos discípulos en la celebración de sus 60 años. En mi breve texto, deseo dar noticia de su colaboración con nuestro Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos y del importantísimo catálogo que constituye la Bibliografía Peirceana Hispánica (1883- 2000) por él preparada y que publicamos en un volumen conjunto en el año 2006 [Nubiola & Zalamea 2006].

Our aim in this article, after providing the general framework of the reception of William James in Spain, is to trace the reception of The Varieties of Religious Experience through Unamuno’s reading of this book.