This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast (...) with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed. (shrink)

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of (...) the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men. (shrink)

There seems to be an inconsistency at the heart of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: a differentia is said both to presuppose its genus (in vii 12) and to be logically independent from it (in x 7). I argue that the relation of analogy resolves this inconsistency, restores the coherence of the concepts of differentia and species, and gives x 7 its rightful place in the development of the Metaphysics.

Cet article est consacré au problème du rapport entre l’entrelacement des genres (συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν) et le logos dans le Sophiste. Après avoir brièvement présenté le problème, je discute, dans la première partie, différentes solutions proposées par les commentateurs. Je cherche à montrer qu’aucune de ces solutions n’est pleinement satisfaisante. Dans la deuxième partie, je propose une nouvelle solution au problème de la συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν fondée sur une distinction entre deux types de logos, le logos dialectique et le logos (...) doxique. Dans la troisième partie, je cherche à justifier textuellement cette solution en recourant à la fois au texte du Sophiste lui-même et à la dernière partie du Théétète. Dans ma conclusion, je suggère que la distinction entre logos dialectique et logos doxique correspond à une différence qui traverse toute l’œuvre de Platon, à savoir la différence entre connaissance et opinion. / This paper deals with the problem of the συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν in the Sophist. In the first part, after a brief presentation of this problem, I discuss different solutions which have been proposed in the recent literature. I try to show that none of them is entirely satisfying. In the second part, I propose and explain a new solution based on a distinction between two types of logos : dialectical logos and doxastic logos. In the third part, I try to justify this solution on the basis of some passages of the Sophist and of the final part of the Theaetetus. To conclude, I suggest that the distinction between dialectical logos and doxasticlogos matches the difference between knowledge and belief made by Plato in his dialogues. (shrink)

The διακριτικὴ τέχνη (the art of separating or discriminating), from which the sixth definition of theSophiststarts (226b1–231b9), is puzzling.Prima faciethe art of separating does not fit the initial division of art between ποιητικὴ τέχνη (production) and κτητικὴ τέχνη (acquisition) at 219a8–c9. Therefore, scholars generally agree that, although mutually exclusive, ποιητική and κτητική are not exhaustive and leave room for a third species of art, διακριτικὴ τέχνη, on a par with ποιητική and κτητική. However, I argue that textual evidence suggests otherwise.

I argue that, although Aristotle himself does not say it in so many words, the Phaedrus has a deep influence on the three books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I also show that this influence is not only negative, as some scholars believe, but that Aristotle draws and expands on some of the results and propositions of the Phaedrus. After demonstrating how influential the Phaedrus is for the Rhetoric, I return in my conclusion to the difference between the two works.

Člověk se od jiných živočišných druhů odlišuje mnoha způsoby, k nejpodstatnějším z nichž patří rozum, jazyk a také schopnost řídit se pravidly. V tomto textu argumentuji, že je to především ta poslední schopnost, která je klíčová a bez které jsou ty další nepředstavitelné. Člověk je společenská bytost nejenom v tom smyslu, že žije ve společenstvích, ale i v tom, že tato společenství jsou strukturována složitým pletivem pravidel, která zásadním způsobem determinují modus vivendi lidí, kteří je tvoří, a v důsledku toho (...) determinují i člověka jako takového. Soustava pravidel může vytvořit jistý „vnitřní prostor" - to jest tato pravidla můžeme přijímat a tím vstoupit do tohoto prostoru, nebo je můžeme jenom zaznamenávat. Dialektika těchto dvou postojů nám umožňuje nahlédnout, že ač je normativní rozměr pro člověka jakožto společenskou bytost naprosto klíčový a těžko postižitelný běžnými vědeckými metodami „nezúčastněného pozorování", není tento normativní rozměr ničím esoterickým, něčím, co by bylo z hlediska vědy pochybné. (shrink)

Nedávné vědecké poznatky týkající se lidského vnímání a lidského konání naznačují, že nejenom není konání bez vnímání, ale že není ani vnímání bez konání. Zcela se mění pohled na to, jak lidé vnímají ; a objevují se dokonce i extrémní názory, že vnímání a konání jsou vlastně jednou a toutéž věcí. Podobně se v důsledku zkoumání motivačních struktur stojících v základu tvorby teorií rozmývá ostrou hranici mezi teorií a praxí. Zdá se mi, že tohle všechno je poněkud překvapivá voda na (...) mlýn filosofického pragmatismu. (shrink)

In his proof of the first incompleteness theorem, Kurt Gödel provided a method of showing the truth of specific arithmetical statements on the condition that all the axioms of a certain formal theory of arithmetic are true. Furthermore, the statement whose truth is shown in this way cannot be proved in the theory in question. Thus it may seem that the relation of logical consequence is wider than the relation of derivability by a pre-defined set of rules. The aim of (...) this paper is to explore under which assumptions the Gödelian statement can rightly be considered a logical consequence of the axioms of the theory in question. It is argued that this is the case only when the all the theorems of the theory in question are understood as statements of the same kind as statements of arithmetic and statements about provability in the theory, and only if the language of the theory contains logical expressions allowing to include certain predicates of meta-language in the language of the theory. (shrink)

1. La parution d’une nouvelle traduction française du Sophiste fait figure d’événement pour les nombreux amateurs du dialogue, puisque près de trente ans déjà nous séparent de la dernière traduction en date, proposée par Nestor-Luis Cordero (Platon : le Sophiste, Traduction inédite, introduction et notes, Paris, GF Flammarion, 1993). La traduction récente de Létitia Mouze est donc bienvenue, d’autant plus qu’elle arrive accompagnée de ce que l’autrice nomme un « guide de lecture » du dialogue...

Tato recenzní studie sleduje analogii, na níž založil svoji metodu bádání i psaní Douglas R. Hofstadter v knize Gödel, Escher, Bach. Proti Hofstadterovu pojetí analogie, kromě jiného ilustrované zavádějícími příklady skladeb J. S. Bacha, je analogie v této studii precizována. Zároveň jsou ve studii napraveny nedostatky hudebních příkladů, jež by patrně neodhalili čtenáři bez přímé vazby na hudební teorii. Tyto aspekty sleduje tato studie až k závěru, že recenzovaná vlivná kniha, neprávem aspirující na metodologii veškerenstva, patří mezi poulárně naučnou literaturu.

One of the moral questions concerning autonomous vehicles (henceforth AVs) is the choice between types that differ in their built-in algorithms for dealing with rare situations of unavoidable lethal collision. It does not appear to be possible to avoid questions about how these algorithms should be designed. We present the results of our study of moral preferences (N = 2769) with respect to three types of AVs: (1) selfish, which protects the lives of passenger(s) over any number of bystanders; (2) (...) altruistic, which minimizes the number of casualties, even if this leads to death of passenger(s); and (3) conservative, which abstains from interfering in such situations. We differentiate between scenarios in which participants are to make their decisions privately or publicly, and for themselves or for their offspring. We aim to answer two research questions: (1) whether the public visibility of the choice of an AV type choice make this choice more altruistic and (2) which type of situation makes it more difficult to choose altruistically: when choosing for society as a whole, when choosing only for oneself, or when choosing only for one’s offspring. Our results show that respondents exhibit a preference for an altruistic strategy for AVs and that it is reinforced when signaled to others. The altruistic preference is strongest when applies to everybody else, weaker when it reflects a solely personal choice, and weakest when choosing for one’s own child. We conclude that a public choice is considerably more likely to pressure consumers into accepting a more socially beneficial solution. (shrink)

The authors of the book have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to effectively use modern approaches to developing and implementation strategies of sustainable socio-economic development in order to increase efficiency and competitiveness of economic entities. Basic research focuses on economic diagnostics of socio-economic potential and financial results of economic entities, transition period in the economy of individual countries and ensuring their competitiveness, assessment of educational processes and knowledge management. The research results have been implemented in the different (...) models and strategies of supply and logistics management, development of non-profit organizations, competitiveness of tourism and transport, financing strategies for small and medium-sized enterprises, cross-border cooperation. The results of the study can be used in decision-making at the level the economic entities in different areas of activity and organizational-legal forms of ownership, ministries and departments that promote of development the economic entities on the basis of models and strategies for sustainable socio-economic development. The results can also be used by students and young scientists in modern concepts and mechanisms for management of sustainable socio-economic development of economic entities in the condition of global economic transformations and challenges. (shrink)

Jaroslav Peregrin, Člověk v zrcadle teorie her: Jak nám matematika a filozofie pomáhají zjišťovat, co jsme zač, Praha: Dokořán, 2021, 119 s., ISBN 978-80-7675-012-8.

An adequate semantics for generic sentences must stake out positions across a range of contested territory in philosophy and linguistics. For this reason the study of generic sentences is a venue for investigating different frameworks for understanding human rationality as manifested in linguistic phenomena such as quantification, classification of individuals under kinds, defeasible reasoning, and intensionality. Despite the wide variety of semantic theories developed for generic sentences, to date these theories have been almost universally model-theoretic and representational. This essay outlines (...) a range of proof-theoretic analyses for characterizing generics. Particular attention is given to an expressivist proof-theory that can be traced to 1) work on logical syntax that Carnap undertook prior to his turn toward truth-conditional model theory in the late 1930s, and 2) research on sequent calculi and natural deduction systems that originate in work from Gentzen and Prawitz.11 This essay offers a more precise exposition of some of the material discussed in the first two chapters of my dissertation (Stovall Citation2015a). These ideas developed in the context of a working group on non-monotonic logic run by Robert Brandom, and they were subsequently clarified through the work of Nissim Francez (particularly Francez Citation2015). I am indebted to many people for feedback and criticism on this essay, though I am sure none among them would agree with everything I say and do here. I would particularly like to thank Brandom, Francez, Ulf Hlobil, Daniel Kaplan, Jared Millson, Bernhard Nickel, Jaroslav Peregrin, Jeffry Pelletier, Thomas Ricketts, Mark Risjord, Shawn Standefer, and two reviewers for this journal. Work on this essay was supported by the joint Lead-Agency research grant between the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF) and the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR), Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality, GF17-33808L. It was substantially revised prior to its final submission. (shrink)

Recenze: Apostolos Doxiadis - Christos H. Papadimitriou - Alecos Papadatos - Annie Di Donna, Logikomiks: Hledání absolutní pravdy. Praha: Dokořán 2012, 336 s. Z anglického originálu Logicomix: An Epic Search for Truth přeložil Jaroslav Peregrin.

Abstract: Any normative inferentialist view confronts a set of challenges in the form of how to account for the sort of ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary that is involved, paradigmatically, in our noninferential perceptual responses and knowledge claims. This chapter lays out that challenge, and then argues that Sellars’ original multilayered account of such noninferential responses in the context of his normative inferentialist semantics and epistemology shows how the inferentialist can plausibly handle those sorts of cases without stretching the notion of (...) inference beyond its standard uses. Finally, it is suggested that for Sellars there were deeply naturalistic motivations for his own normative inferentialism, though the latter raises further questions as to whether this really represents, as Sellars thought, a genuinely scientific naturalist outlook on meaning and conceptual cognition. (shrink)