Abstract: In this article we introduce an input-oriented democratic innovation – that we term ‘TaxTrack’ – which offers individual taxpayers the means to engage with their political economies in three ways. After joining the TaxTrack program, an individual can: (1) see and understand how much, and what types, of taxes they have contributed, (2) see and understand how their tax contributions are, or have been, used, and (3) control what their tax contributions can, or cannot, be spent on. We explain (...) this democratic innovation in two ways. The first is through evocation to prefigure what the innovation could look like in future practise which raises the prospects for both good and problematic outcomes. The second is through formal theory to produce a detailed model of the innovation to assist theory building. We conclude by discussing three interactive outcomes of ‘TaxTrack’ through the democratic innovations literature to establish the beginnings of a theory for the model. This theory tells us that ‘TaxTrack’ can return benefits to its users and the democratic regimes in which they are located but it may also place restrictions on output-oriented innovations like Participatory Budgeting. (shrink)

Radical democratic thinking is becoming intrigued by the material situatedness of its political agents and by the role of nonhuman participants in political interaction. At stake here is the displacement of narrow anthropocentrism that currently guides democratic theory and practice, and its repositioning into what we call ‘the nonhuman condition’. This Critical Exchange explores the nonhuman condition. It asks: What are the implications of decentering the human subject via a new materialist reading of radical democracy? Does this reading dilute political (...) agency? Or should this be seen, on the contrary, as an invitation for new voices and demands to enter into democratic assemblages? How might engagement with the more-than-human disrupt or extend theories of radical democracy? Hans Asenbaum and Amanda Machin discuss the human democratic subject both through radical democratic and new materialist lenses. They suggest that a new materialist decentred subject does not lose agency but further gains political responsibility in radical democracy. Jean-Paul Gagnon highlights the possibility of becoming through loss. In losing our anthropocentric arrogance—our understanding of being other and better than animal—we become more connected and discover our place in human-nonhuman assemblages. Melissa Orlie agrees that something can be gained through renouncing dominant human fantasies and presents a ‘radical democratic naturalism’. By renouncing land violence and acknowledging nature’s subjectivity, we can further nonexploitative radical democratic politics. This is where the notion of ‘tidalectic’ processes introduced by James L. Smith is helpful. Focusing on water and the Indigenous knowledges around rivers, he considers how democracy and community can be reimagined as plural, cyclical and attentive to the nonhuman with which the human is inevitably entangled. Diana Leong offers a different approach. Considering the nonhuman from the perspective of Black Studies demands an awareness to how blackness has long been constituted as non- or partially human. (shrink)

Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism is a classic critique of France's policies in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and inspired much subsequent writing on colonialism, post-colonialism, politics, and literature. It includes Sartre's celebrated preface to Fanon's classic Wretched of the Earth. Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism had a profound impact on French intellectual life, inspiring many other influential French thinkers and critics of colonialism such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, Frantz Fanon, Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Derrida.

Masculinity? This book attempts to answer this one-word question by revisiting key philosophical concepts in the construction of masculinity, not in order to re-write or debunk them again, but in order to provide a radically new departure to what masculinity means today. This new departure focuses on an understanding of sexuality and gender that is neither structured in oppositional terms nor in performative terms, but in a perpendicular relation akin to that which brings space and time together. In doing so, (...) this book doesn’t aim to establish yet another theory within the field of masculism or men’s studies, but to put forward a personal account of how a revised understanding of the relationship between space, time, and gender can thoroughly alter concepts of masculinity. virility and patriarchy. (shrink)

Réponses à Juliette Grange sur ses remises en cause peu argumentées d'une partie de la philosophie en France.

This article proposes, firstly, a general study of the ideological positioning of the Société scientifique de Bruxelles during the first forty years of its existence by means of a detailed reconstruction of its programme, and, secondly, a specific account of its situation within the alternative represented by the Intransigent and Progressive Catholic camps. In order to achieve this objective, it favours the motto of the Société and the figure of its second Secretary, namely Paul Mansion, basing itself primarily on (...) a corpus of texts consisting of his annual reports and those of his predecessor, Father Carbonnelle. While taking particular care in identifying that which, following the Roman injunction in 1890, might have differentiated Mansion’s mandate from Carbonnelle’s, it offers to test the hypothesis that this difference lies, not only in a more favourable attitude towards neo-Thomism, but also in the transition from an intransigent apologetics to a more balanced apologetics. (shrink)

Po II wojnie światowej Paul Ricoeur podjął sie nauczania filozofii w Collège Cévenol w wiosce Chambon-sur-Lignon, gdzie napisał swój doktorat poświęcony fenomenologicznej analizie woli. Przejęte od Milana Kundery paradoksalne pojęcie „mądrości niepewności”, zastosowane do dzieła Ricoeura jako całości naświetla specyfikę jego wkładu w rozwój hermeneutyki filozoficznej XX wieku.

What was René Girard’s attitude towards philosophy? What philosophers influenced him? What stance did he take in the philosophical debates of his time? What are the philosophical questions raised by René Girard’s anthropology? In this interview, Paul Dumouchel sheds light on these issues.

Le Père Ignace Carbonnelle, l'un des principaux fondateurs de la Société scientifique de Bruxelles en 1875 et son secrétaire général depuis cette époque, décède inopinément en 1889 après une quin­zaine d'années durant lesquelles il fut «l'homme fort» de ladite Société. Aussitôt, la Revue des questions scienti­fiques annonce la triste nouvelle, promettant, pour un prochain numéro, une étude détaillée de sa vie et de son œuvre. Elle ne paraîtra jamais, de sorte que sa mort ne fut pas saluée avec l'ampleur qu'on (...) était en droit d'attendre. Et pour cause ! Au ter­me d'une enquête digne d'un roman policier, cette étude révèle que Rome, agacée par l'atomisme de Carbonnelle, profita de sa mort pour rappeler à l'ordre la Société en l'invitant à marcher dans les pas de l'Aquinate. En réponse à cette pressante invi­tation et par un excès de zèle non requis, la Société élut comme président le célèbre thomiste français Edmond Domet de Vor­ges, cependant que le mathématicien Paul Mansion s'attacha d'établir, à partir des publications de Pierre Duhem prônant un retour à une physique des qualités, que la Société se conformait bien, mais à sa manière, aux injonctions romaines. ––– Fr. Ignace Carbonnelle, who founded the Brussels Scientific Society in 1875 and was from this date onwards her Secretary General, passed away suddenly in 1889, after fifteen years during which he was the leading figure of the aforementioned Society. “La Revue des Question scientifique” announced the sad news but promised that their next publication would include a detailed article on the great man and his works. Sadly this article never appeared, meaning that the passing of Fr. Carbonnelle was not marked with the importance which we might have otherwise expected. For what reason, you may well ask? After a detailed investigation, worthy of Agatha Christie herself, it would appear that Rome had been rather alarmed by the “atomism” present in Fr. Carbonnelle's reflections, and had taken the opportunity of his death to invite the Scientific Society to opinions more in line with those of St Thomas. In response to this firmly worded invitation, and with overzealous spontaneity, the Society elected the celebrated French Thomiste Edmond Domet de Vorges as their new President. At the same time the mathematician Paul Mansion relied on the publications of Pierre Duhem, which advocated a stronger adhesion to a physics of an object's qualities, to establish that the Society was, in fact, well aligned with the desires of Rome. (shrink)

Introduction / St.L. JAKI (pp. 9-19). Présentation / J.-Fr. STOFFEL (p. 21). – L'œuvre de Pierre Duhem (pp. 25-113). Publications post­humes (pp. 115-129). – IIe partie : Les travaux de ses doc­torands. Fernand Caubet (pp. 133-135). Henry Chevallier (pp. 137-141). Émile Lenoble (pp. 143-144). Lucien Marchis (pp. 145-154). Eugène Monnet (pp. 155-156). Henri Pélabon (pp. 157-168). Paul Saurel (pp. 169-172). Albert Turpain (pp. 173-197). – IIIe partie : La litté­rature secondaire. Thèses et mé­moires (pp. 201-202). Livres (pp. 203-205). Biographies (...) et étu­des générales (pp. 207-209). Duhem en perspective (pp. 211-212). Le philosophe de la physique (pp. 213-234). L'histo­rien des théories physiques (pp. 235-243). Le physicien (pp. 245-251). Le croyant (pp. 253-256). Notices nécrologiques (pp. 257-258). Notices de dictionnaires et d'encyclopédies (pp. 259-260). – IVe partie : Index. (shrink)

Anne TIHON, Théorie et réalité : l’exemple de l’astronomie an­cienne (pp. 7-23) ; Isabelle DRAELANTS, Les encyclopédies com­me sommes des connaissances, d’Isidore de Séville au XIIIe siè­cle, avec les fondements antiques (pp. 25-50) ; Andrée COLINET, Alchimie antique et médiévale avant 1300 : mystères et réalités (pp. 51-70) ; Baudouin VAN DEN ABEELE, Quelques pas de grue à travers l’histoire naturelle médiévale : un regard diversifié sur le réel (pp. 71-98) ; Régine LEURQUIN, L’astrolabe plan (pp. 99- 117) ; Patricia (...) RADELET-DE GRAVE, Copernic, Stevin, Galilée et la réalité des orbites célestes (pp. 119-151) ; Brigitte VAN TIGGELEN, Étiqueter ou définir : le réalisme dans la nomen­cla­ture chimique aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (pp. 153-183) ; Michel GHINS, L’existence de l’espace et du temps selon Leon­hard Euler (pp. 185-193) ; Chantal TILMANS-CABIAUX, Le rap­port de l’idée théorique à l’expérimentation chez Hahnemann : le système homéo­pathique naissant et le réalisme (pp. 195-214) ; Jean MAWHIN, La Terre tourne-t-elle ? À propos de la philosophie scientifique de Poincaré (pp. 215-252) ; Michel WILLEM, Paul Lévy et les fondements du calcul des probabilités (pp. 253-263). (shrink)

Compared to the existing bibliographies devoted to Paul Mansion, this list of his written and spoken words increases the number of items pertaining to the Annales de la Société scientifique de Bruxelles from 123 to 208, and from 32 to 142 for those pertaining to the Revue des questions scientifiques, thus representing an increase of 40% and 77%, respectively. Based directly on an analysis of these two journals themselves, it makes the relevant bibliographical information — contained both in these (...) earlier bibliographies and in the analytical indexes devoted to these journals — accessible to researchers in a more accurate, convenient and comprehensive manner. (shrink)

ROUDAUT (François) & STOFFEL (Jean-François), Avant-propos (pp. 371-372). BLAY (Michel), Soleil de Copernic et soleil de Galilée (pp. 373-389). MEHL (Édouard), Le Soleil au cinquième concile du Latran (1512-1516) : Copernic et la réforme du calendrier julien (pp. 391-408). STOFFEL (Jean-François), «Qui choisirait de poser ce flambeau dans un lieu autre ou meilleur que celui d’où il peut illuminer le tout simultanément ?»: examen de la pertinence d’un argument copernicien de convenance (pp. 409-458). ROUDAUT (François), Le Soleil chez (...) quelques lexicographes et vulgarisateurs (pp. 459-485). CÉARD (Jean), Le Soleil selon les physiciens de la Renaissance (pp. 487-498). MÉNAGER (Daniel), Le soleil dans les fêtes de cour sous les derniers Valois (pp. 499-510). SEIDENGART (Jean), La parenté du Soleil et des étoiles fixes dans la cosmologie de Giordano Bruno (pp. 511-529). ŠPELDA (Daniel), Les soleils et leurs observateurs au XVIIe siècle (pp. 531-577). MELLINGHOFF-BOURGERIE (Viviane), Connivences héliologiques entre théologie et astronomie chez François de Sales et Bérulle: le cas du barnabite Redento Baranzano (pp. 579-610). NEJESCHLEBA (Tomáš), De la métaphysique de la lumière à l’héliocentrisme: la vision du Soleil selon Valérien Magni (pp. 611-627). Les auteurs (pp. 629-630). (shrink)

LEITE (Fábio Rodrigo) – STOFFEL (Jean-François), Introduction (pp. 3-6). BARRA (Eduardo Salles de O.) – SANTOS (Ricardo Batista dos), Duhem’s analysis of Newtonian method and the logical priority of physics over metaphysics (pp. 7-19). BORDONI (Stefano), The French roots of Duhem’s early historiography and epistemology (pp. 20-35). CHIAPPIN (José R. N.) – LARANJEIRAS (Cássio Costa), Duhem’s critical analysis of mecha­ni­cism and his defense of a formal conception of theoretical phy­sics (pp. 36-53). GUEGUEN (Marie) – PSILLOS (Stathis), Anti-­scepticism and epistemic (...) humility in Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science (pp. 54-72). LISTON (Michael), Duhem : images of science, historical continuity, and the first crisis in physics (pp. 73-84). MAIOCCHI (Roberto), Duhem in pre-war Italian philos­ophy : the reasons of an absence (pp. 85-92). HERNÁNDEZ MÁRQUEZ (Víctor Manuel), Was Pierre Duhem an «esprit de finesse» ? (pp. 93-107). NEEDHAM (Paul), Was Duhem justified in not distinguishing between physical and chemical atomism ? (pp. 108-111). OLGUIN (Roberto Estrada), «Bon sens» and «noûs» (pp. 112-126). OLIVEIRA (Amelia J.), Duhem’s legacy for the change in the historiography of science : An analysis based on Kuhn’s writings (pp. 127-139). PRÍNCIPE (João), Poincaré and Duhem : Resonances in their first epistemological reflec­tions (pp. 140-156). MONDRAGON (Damián Islas), Book review of «Pierre Duhem : entre física y metafísica» (pp. 157-159). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of P. Duhem : «La théorie physique : son objet, sa structure» / edit. by S. Roux (pp. 160-162). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of St. Bordoni : «When historiography met epistemology» (pp. 163-165). (shrink)

"In 'Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition' Professor Hampton undertakes an "extensive examination" of Hobbes's argument, primarily as stated in Leviathan, for the institutionof an absolute sovereign. Hampton, however, is concerned to accomplish more than "a description or explication" of Hobbes's political philosophy. Rather, it is her intention to develop a "rational reconstruction" of Hobbes's argument.... 'Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition' is an important and valuable contribution to the study of Hobbes's political philosophy. Throughout this work one acquires new (...) and illuminating insights into Hobbes's argument and its contemporary significance. ... it is essential reading for all those who are seriously concerned to come to grips with Hobbes's social contract theory. Hobbes scholar and political theorist alike will learn a great deal from it.". (shrink)

The phenomenological tradition is commonly understood as the domain of “philosophy of the subject”, and in this regard it is often criticized in contemporary thought. In respect to it, the originality of Michel Henry is to enter into this tradition by formulating to it an inverse objection: a mistake of the “historic” phenomenology is that it has not been able to conceive the subject in its own being or better, in its “interiority”. The aim of this paper is to determine (...) the meaning and scope of such criticism, the development of its consequences, not only regarding the positive concept of subjectivity but also in the sense of opening its possibilities to renew the understanding of artistic phenomenon. (shrink)

VAN PRAAG (Paul), Introduction : le Père Henri Bosmans, histo­rien des mathématiques (pp. 7-16). SAUVAGE (Pierre), Notice biographique du Père Henri Bosmans (pp. 17-25). HERMANS (Michel), Henri Bosmans : sa formation et ses réseaux de rela­tions (pp. 27-72). DELANGHE (Richard), Quelques aspects de la vie et de l’œuvre de Paul Mansion (1844-1919) (pp. 73-82). BRIGAGLIA (Aldo), Saccheri vu par Corrado Segre en Italie et par Mansion et Bosmans en Belgique / traduit de l’italien par Bruna GAINO et Patricia (...) RADELET-DE GRAVE (pp. 83-104). MAWHIN (Jean), La tentative belge d’édition des œuvres complètes d’Euler vue par Henri Bos­mans (pp. 105-133). GOLVERS (Noël), Henri Bosmans, s.j., et la mission jésuite en Chine / traduit du néerlandais par Anne-Sophie MEURICE (pp. 135-152). ROMANO (Antonella), Henri Bosmans, jésuite et historien des mathéma­tiques dans la Belgique du premier XXe siècle (pp. 153-168). SAUVAGE (Pierre), Le Père Henri Bosmans et l’historiographie au tournant du XXe siècle (pp. 169-187). RADELET-DE GRAVE (Patricia), Le fonds Henri Bos­mans / avec un ajout de Michel HERMANS (pp. 189-215). MANSION (Paul), Correspondance de Paul Mansion adres­sée à Henri Bosmans / introduction, trans­cription et annotation par Michel HERMANS (pp. 217-251). HEEFFER (Albrecht) – HERMANS (Michel) – STOFFEL (Jean-François), Bibliographie d’Henri Bosmans (pp. 253-298). (shrink)

... The Philosophers’ Quarrel is an enjoyable tour through the salons, great cities and country retreats of the Enlightenment, in the company of some of its brightest stars. Although much of the tale turns on some tedious details of the various intrigues of Hume and Rousseau, together with their friends and collaborators, Zaretsky and Scott manage to provide their account with a number of interesting and valuable insights into the character of the thinkers involved and the social and cultural life (...) of Enlightenment Europe at this time. I particularly recommend this book to contemporary academics, who may be comforted and reassured to see that prickly, neurotic and insecure dispositions are not the invention of contemporary academic life. (shrink)

The literature of Twelve Step groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous contains apparently contradictory implications regarding powerlessness and personal responsibility. In this essay I examine the treatment of these concepts in Twelve Step literature and their implications for the self-conception of people in these programs. In the first section, I examine the literature to demonstrate that addicts are presented as powerless over, yet responsible for, their addictive behaviors. In the second section, I outline two potential ways people in Twelve Step programs (...) might reconcile this contradiction within their self-conception, but I argue that neither is satisfactory. In the third section, I draw on Paul Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity to develop an account of how someone ni a Twelve Step group could coherently understand herself as both powerless and responsible. (shrink)

“Applying the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to 21st Century Art” was delivered to the 2009 Congress of the International Association of Art Critics (AICA) in Dublin as a guide to critical thinking through a paradigm shift. This new paper uncovers a new critical theory in the form of a formula that has been successfully applied to a universal appraisal of arts across all boundaries, whether they be gender, discipline or culture. The configuration predicted by Pauli as arising from under the collapsed (...) quantum wave is sourced in an ancient icon: the hieros gamos. As her functional role as newspaper critic shifted to a more esoteric passage as performance artist/curator/blogger, the author spent 14 years theorizing; and another 14 years applying a new critical theory to contemporary art. Her (R)evolution series for the Huffington Post places the containment of the hieros gamos at the forefront of contemporary art practice. The goal is the embodiment of Jean Gebser’s 360-degree aperspectival awareness, whereas the shadow is contacted and absorbed into the very body of art. This paper will reveal the strategy for determining holistic art forms containing the 21st century icon that Pauli understood would arise from under the collapsed quantum wave. (shrink)

Freedom is a necessary prerequisite for living, as most existentialists emphasized. A prominent existentialist, Sartre, fully appreciated the importance of freedom in helping humans lead authentic lives. In his philosophical magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, he boldly contends that human beings possess absolute freedom, meaning they are not determined by external factors or pre-existing essence, and are therefore responsible for creating their 'own' meaning and purpose in life. Admittedly, Sartre claims that man's freedom is tied to responsibility. He proposed the (...) notion of freedom and responsibility as a moral compass for leading an authentic existence. This critical analysis explores Sartre's notion of existential freedom, focusing on its philosophical conceptions, implications, and deficiencies. This paper will properly understand Jean-Paul Sartre's notion of freedom and responsibility, starting by defining freedom in the way Sartre wants us to conceive it. This paper will examine some of the objections raised by Alvin Plantinga against Sartre's philosophy of freedom. And finally, this paper will also analyze Sartre's notion of freedom and responsibility and reveal its incompatibilities with universal morality. By critically evaluating Sartre's concept of existential freedom, this analysis aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of his existentialist philosophy and stimulate further dialogue on the nature and implications of human freedom. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory (...) of consciousness’ which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of consciousness and reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspective. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called ‘analytic Anglo-American’ tradition, but I attempt to show how this obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contemporary theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre is rarely discussed in the philosophy of religion. In 2009, however, Jerome Gellman broke the silence, publishing an article in which he argued that the source of Sartre’s atheism was neither philosophical nor existential, but mystical. Drawing from several of Sartre’s works – including Being and Nothingness, Words, and a 1943 review entitled ‘A New Mystic’ – I argue that there are strong biographical and philosophical reasons to disagree with Gellman’s conclusion that Sartre was a ‘mystical (...) atheist’. Moreover, I question the likelihood of drawing any definitive conclusions regarding the sources of Sartre’s ambiguous atheism. (shrink)

Within Jean Paul Sartre’s atheistic program, he objected to Christian mysticism as a delusory desire for substantive being. I suggest that a Christian mystic might reply to Sartre’s attack by claiming that Sartre indeed grasps something right about the human condition but falls short of fully understanding what he grasps. Then I argue that the true basis of Sartre’s atheism is neither philosophical nor existentialist, but rather mystical. Sartre had an early mystical atheistic intuition that later developed into (...) atheistic mystical experience. Sartre experienced the nonexistence of God. (shrink)

Most readers of Sartre focus only on the works written at the peak of his influence as a public intellectual in the 1940s, notably "Being and Nothingness". "Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts" aims to reassess Sartre and to introduce readers to the full breadth of his philosophy. Bringing together leading international scholars, the book examines concepts from across Sartre's career, from his initial views on the "inner life" of conscious experience, to his later conceptions of hope as the binding (...) agent for a common humanity. The book will be invaluable to readers looking for a comprehensive assessment of Sartre's thinking - from his early influences to the development of his key concepts, to his legacy. (shrink)

Este texto se propone explorar la relación intelectual de Jean-Paul Sartre y Michel Foucault respecto de su activismo intelectual en la forma de sus manifestaciones públicas. Además de ello, también busca analizar sus desacuerdos teóricos y la forma en la cual se debatió en favor de cada una de sus consideraciones filosóficas y los posicionamientos que asumieron uno y otro autor respecto de la sociedad a la cual les tocó asistir. De otra parte, también se asume que existe (...) un punto de conexión teórica en relación al concepto de resistencia que se puede derivar de la crítica al capitalismo en Sartre y de la crítica al neoliberalismo en Foucault. (shrink)

(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre las (...) víctimas inocentes de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to theorize insurgent political action on the basis of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason. It reconstructs a Sartrean model of insurgency that prioritizes an insurgent group’s capacity for situated inventions. It argues that, similar to Fanon, Sartre theorized that groups that struggle against oppression and exploitation constantly invent novel conditions that steer society in unforeseeable directions. However, these inventions of insurgent action are never absolutely contingent but always take place in concrete (...) situations which never cease to condition them. This paper analyses two concrete factors which condition the inventions of insurgent action: the seriality from which the group arises and to which it always threatens to return, and the actions of hostile groups. Taken together, this paper claims that Sartre provides a coherent and innovative account of insurgent political action. (shrink)

El siguiente trabajo tiene por objetivo exponer y problematizar la relación entre las nociones de temporalidad, imagen y libertad en el pensamiento del filósofo francés Henri Bergson, a la luz de la crı́tica desarrollada por Jean-Paul Sartre. Para ello, en primer lugar, se expone, de modo sintético, dos conceptos que dan forma al pensamiento bergsoniano, a saber, duración e intuición. Con esto, se pone de manifiesto el problema que suscita la definición de imagen entregada por Bergson, debido a (...) que entra en conflicto con la noción de duración. Es por esto que, en segundo lugar, se revisa la crı́tica desarrollada por Jean-Paul Sartre a las definiciones entregadas por Bergson, advirtiendo que el problema surgido de las definiciones de duración e imagen implican un empirismo y determinismo que supeditan la imagen a la percepción, lo que conduce a una contradicción relativa a la espontaneidad de la conciencia, que en Sartre se muestra como conciencia intrı́nsecamente libre. (shrink)

Se presentan las concepciones sobre el argumento ontológico en Paul Tillich y en Jean-Luc Marion. Paul Tillich no ha creado una propia escuela de pensamiento, pero ha influido sobre muchos pensadores. Abre el camino a posteriores reflexiones, desde diversos puntos metodológicos, sobre el problema ontológico, sobre la realidad de Dios y sobre la relación del Ser con la cultura. Se puede decir que, a partir de él, se abren caminos para pensar el papel de la mística en (...) el conocimiento del Being itself (el ser mismo), la relación dinámica en la vida del hombre, el darse del Ser como ágape, la correlación entre mística y cultura. Y Jean-Luc Marion lleva a su plenitud las ideas de Anselmo y Tillich: Dios no se piensa sino que se da. (shrink)

This is the outline : I - Quelques étapes aux avancées significatives II - La pensée chrétienne et le hasard d’ignorance III - De quelques difficultés de raisonner sur le probable IV - Téléologie et évolutionnisme V - Où est l’« étage » qui permette de parler d’indépendance ? VI. Qu’y a-t-il à la base de nos concepts d’ordre ? VII - Quelle place pour le hasard ? VIII. Le hasard appréhendé de dos ?

In this article, we shall first show the dynamic cosmology present in Teilhard de Chardin’s work, as well as the ways in which he revives a tradition that puts philosophizing at the heart of living. Then, we shall show how he thinks of the problem of evil as the dismembering of a movement towards unity that he deems identical to the process of creation. Teilhard’s peculiar perspective distances him from catastrophic visions based on a Fall or original transgression. We will (...) then show that Teilhard’s imaginings of the interaction between God and primal matter leave something to be desired. Nevertheless, we conclude that there is a real strength in this vision, when it construes morality as something truly evolutionary. (shrink)

This paper investigates the degree to which information theory, and the derived uses that make it work as a metaphor of our age, can be helpful in thinking about God’s immanence and transcendance. We ask when it is possible to say that a consciousness has to be behind the information we encounter. If God is to be thought about as a communicator of information, we need to ask whether a communication system has to pre-exist to the divine and impose itself (...) to God. If we want God to be Creator, and not someone who would work like a human being, ‘creating’ will mean sustaining in being as much the channel, the material system, as the message. Is information control? It seems that God’s actions are not going to be informational control of everything. To clarify the issue, we attempt to distinguish two kinds of ‘genialities’ in nature, as a way to evaluate the likelihood of God from nature. We investigate concepts and images of God, in terms of the history of ideas but also in terms of philosophical theology, metaphysics, and religious ontology. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a means of advocating a re-engineering of conditions that surround human existence at both ends. The problem set before us in this chapter is to inquire into what determined its appearance, in particular in the humanism it seeks to overcome. We look at the spirit of overcoming itself, and the impatience with the Self, in order to try to understand why it seeks a saving power in technology. We then consider how the evolutionary account of the production of (...) organisms does not set them against a perfect standard, but rather injects in them a contingency that seems to be near to the heart of the problem. We then try to assess the objective basis for improvements and manipulation of nature, and although we do not find it forbidden on all occasions, it seems that the criteria for such alterations are impossible to detach from a form of eugenics. We finally open a window toward a theological account of the problem, and find that the desire of autonomy and independence is inevitably going to be challenged by the Christian dogma of creation. (shrink)

In his oft-cited book Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio claims that Descartes is responsible for having stifled the development of modern neurobiological science, in particular as regards the objective study of the physical and physiological bases for emotive and socially-conditioned cognition. Most of Damasio’s book would stand without reference to Descartes, so it is intriguing to ask why he launched this attack. What seems to fuel such claims is a desire for a more holistic understanding of the mind, the brain and (...) the self. For Descartes however, here allowed to answer back, the question of accounting for the whole diversity of human potential experiences was what could not be left out of sight. Concerning the question of his neglect of the mind said to be "abysmally" detached from the body, it is claimed here that, in the light of Descartes' move which was to break with the scholastic practice of putting more and more things under the control of the soul, the program of using the reality of embodiment to understand the mind was one he actually started. An answer is also suggested to counter the charge that Descartes failed to account for the interaction of the two substances, the mind and the material body, by showing why and how Descartes actually believed in the substantial union of mind and body. Yet, he kept in the picture an ingenium, a faculty of pure understanding overarching a cybernetic model of the body-mind, of which we also here seek to appreciate the significance. This project of accounting for the mind-body interaction ended-up in a study the "passions," as emotions were then called. (shrink)

This paper evaluates the claim that it is possible to use nature’s variation in conjunction with retention and selection on the one hand, and the absence of ultimate groundedness of hypotheses generated by the human mind as it knows on the other hand, to discard the ascription of ultimate certainty to the rationality of human conjectures in the cognitive realm. This leads to an evaluation of the further assumption that successful hypotheses with specific applications, in other words heuristics, seem to (...) have a firm footing because they were useful in another context. I argue that usefulness evaluated through adaptation misconstrues the search for truth, and that it is possible to generate talk of randomness by neglecting aspects of a system’s insertion into a larger situation. The framing of the problem in terms of the elimination of unfit hypotheses is found to be unsatisfying. It is suggested that theories exist in a dimension where they can be kept alive rather than dying as phenotypes do. The proposal that the subconscious could suggest random variations is found to be a category mistake. A final appeal to phenomenology shows that this proposal is orphan in the history of epistemology, not in virtue of its being a remarkable find, but rather because it is ill-conceived. (shrink)

I present first the challenge for epistemology when it faces the dilemma between rationalism and empiricism, followed by a presentation of the ideas introduced by Ruyer in order to ask if they can be articulated to the "third way" in epistemology. I explore the consequences of Ruyer's inversion of our understanding of space which can be looked upon as psychic. I consider Ruyer's refusal to locate in pure immanence the scheme of eupraxic resolution of successful aggregates–as living forms–in our experience. (...) I then highlight the major principles of Gaston Bachelard's and Michel Serres's respective epistemologies, and in a lesser measure those of Bergon and Deleuze as well, in order to underscore Ruyer's refusal to limit philosophy to what science allows one to say, but also in order to finally situate the verticalism of his position. (shrink)

The need to act in networks and to function in a society where we relate in complex fashions has fostered the use of data in accordance with distributed models. In a big data context, the individual is often overcome with the sentiment that one’s life does not matter, nor does it make a difference. What are sought are trends, and since there is no detached observer, those change things as much as they measure them. Where can we find a vantage (...) point, a ‘topsight’ necessary before the conception of any program? One could seek it in the direction of a collective figure, somewhat like the Leviathan of Hobbes, made up in its gigantism of smaller figures. Those that have been schooled in the classical tradition, or philosophia perennis, might think that we are abandoning solid realism, which seeks a conformation of statements, propositions, and language to what there is. They might criticize the reign of opinion. But what we entered into is not, upon closer inspection, some overarching paradigm of truth as success. It is rather a rationality of the likely, and it requires assessing the truths that can seem distributed between alternating or competing positions. But then, to seek decisions despite this, is to erase from our world this ‘esprit de finesse’ which Pascal deemed necessary to balance the illusions of a procedural mathematical rationality claiming that its end-products are simply in correspondence with reality. When we gather information, we frame it within an ontology for classification purposes, but this does not import with itself the immanence of this information as endogenous power to harmonise and give form. Feeling, as Whitehead construed it, seeks to take within it a receptivity to the world in order to turn it into an internalised representation. For this, it needs to be possible for a part of the world to reflect in itself the whole. Yet, this reflection is not a totalisation in an immaterial data range, it is rather a grounding in the mystery of the flesh, which is found here as a signpost on the way, if we are to heal dreams of complete mastery. (shrink)

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PRIZE for the best published book in the history of philosophy [Awarded in 2010] _______________ -/- Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. It is an established orthodoxy among almost all commentators that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, (...) however, that Hume's skeptical arguments and commitments appear to undermine and discredit his naturalistic ambition to contribute to "the science of man". This schism appears to leave his entire project broken-backed. The solution to this riddle depends on challenging another, closely related, point of orthodoxy: namely, that before Hume published the Treatise he removed almost all material concerned with problems of religion. Russell argues, contrary to this view, that irreligious aims and objectives are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence. It is Hume's basic anti-Christian aims and objectives that serve to shape and direct both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. When Hume's arguments are viewed from this perspective we can solve, not only puzzles arising from his discussion of various specific issues, we can also explain the intimate and intricate connections that hold his entire project together. This "irreligious" interpretation provides a comprehensive fresh account of the nature of Hume's fundamental aims and ambitions in the Treatise. It also presents a radically different picture of the way in which Hume's project was rooted in the debates and controversies of his own time, placing the Treatise in an irreligious or anti-Chrisitan philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Spinoza and freethinking followers. Considered in these terms, Hume's Treatise constitutes the crowning achievement of the Radical Enlightenment. (shrink)

(Back Cover:) « La pensée métaphysique renaîtra demain. Ce sont des savants qui ont le goût et le sens de la pensée conduite jusqu’au terme de ses exigences internes, et des philosophes initiés aux sciences expérimentales qui, en commun, la feront. » L’œuvre de Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) illustre parfaitement cette recherche de la métaphysique d’un monde en devenir, qui sait écouter et se modeler sur la transformation – la métamorphose – promise à une Création finalisée. Le trait commun aux exposés (...) ici présentés sous forme définitive a été cette recherche autour d’une pensée qui renouvelle de l’intérieur la métaphysique en réalisant le vœu de Bergson qu’elle devienne « auscultatrice », que l’énigme que pose l’homme face à son origine et sa destinée ne soit pas recouverte par une pensée qui se perdrait dans la description des choses ou dans l’esprit de système, mais qui non plus n’irait se recroqueviller sur elle-même, en narrant sa propre expérience subjective sous le mode de la déréliction. Claude Tresmontant a su penser l’être en genèse, et il a cherché à renouveler la question de l’existence de Dieu, en en transformant la problématique en dialogue avec les sciences contemporaines. À ce goût de l’être dont les sciences ont renouvelé l’approche, il a également voulu infuser un « supplément d’âme », en repensant la réalité de la création et l’horizon de la cause finale, toujours à partir de la nature ultimement théologique de la réponse à la question « qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » Contributeurs : Yves Tourenne, Philippe Gagnon, Fabien Revol, Brunor, Frédéric Crouslé, Bertrand Souchard, Emmanuel Gabellieri. Table of Contents: Note Liminaire (Ph. Gagnon) - 7 En quoi la pensée de Claude Tresmontant nous stimule-t-elle encore ? Hommage et critique (Y. Tourenne) - 13 L’imbrication de la preuve de Dieu et de la cosmologie chez Tresmontant représente-t-elle une preuve ? (Ph. Gagnon) - 27 L’usage apologétique de la philosophie de Tresmontant dans les Indices pensables de Brunor (F. Revol) - 49 Réponse à Fabien Revol (Brunor) - 77 Qu’est-ce qui cloche dans la théologie de Claude Tresmontant ? (Fr. Crouslé) - 85 Les métaphysiques principales de Claude Tresmontant : la foi biblique est-elle à part de la raison philosophique grecque ? (B. Souchard) - 109 Maurice Blondel et Claude Tresmontant (E. Gabellieri) - 123 La vision informationnelle de Tresmontant, surtout en référence au problème de l’âme (Ph. Gagnon) - 133. (shrink)

Theology used to be the discipline that arbitrated and ‘said’ the truth. Some argued that its methodical engagement had to make it a search-driven experimentation with an inductive outlook intended at tracking truth through practice and praise, in short conversion. The empirico-formal sciences have sought canonical norms of knowledge away from any regimentation. Neopositivism had for a time entertained a fact-derived language and, as such, it banned metaphor as mingling problems by perpetuating the belief in entirely theoretical knowledge-terms. Here we (...) aim at putting together an examination of some of the reasons why a pluralistic epistemology has come to be adopted, and an attempt at finding pluralistic responses to that very idea through interdisciplinary comparison. This is the editors' (M. Fuller & A. Runehov) introduction: Philippe Gagnon asks the interesting question: Does pluralism itself need to be plural? He argues that neo-positivism has for some time now focused on using a fact-derived language, banning metaphoricity. He explores the reasons pluralistic epistemology came to be adopted, and leads us through some important philosophical problems and how they were tackled by different philosophers and in various times. Such philosophical problems or questions concern theories, truth and knowledge. If a theory is considered to be the best one, on which criteria is this judgement made? Might it be better to have several theories that are ex æquo? Gagnon argues that even though ‘pluralism’ is a better term compared to ‘the many’, it does not entirely escape relativism. Hence, he proposes to use ‘plurality’ instead, which does not threaten the unity of truth. After this philosophical exploration, he turns to theology, specifically Trinitarian theology, to implement his findings there. (shrink)

This is the Outline: 1. Introduction 2. L’information en première approche 3. L’information-Janus 4. À quoi sert l’information? 5. Les usages que l’on fit de la théorie de l’information 6. L’information dite de « second ordre » 7. Doit-on mettre l’information au service d’une vision théologique ? 7.1 Une incidence à partir de nos images de Dieu.

In his 1968 poetry collection „Fadensonnen“, Paul Celan offers a hermetic blend of existentialism and mysticism, which is unusual in two respects. Firstly, the European philosophy of existence, especially with its proponents Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and Martin Heidegger, had gone to great lengths to criticize and delegitimize the Abrahametic religions, for the concept of god seemed to be an obstacle to humanity in pursuit of its own humanization. Secondly, in the aftermath of the holocaust, the idea (...) of man wanting to merge with a god that had not prevented this cruelty from happening had lost much of its plausibility. Despite these two objections, Celan's poems address the struggle of togetherness in a world that negates the mere possibility of otherness, trying to salvage the unique identity and dignity of the other. With this in mind, the modus operandi of his poems is that of a butcher: Whatever has previously been alive – before the Shoah – now has to be stripped bare of its layers of individual and collective history, has to become less than body and flesh. In this way, the poems' inherent pain and misery transform the reader into a nobody, for only a nobody has got the prerequisites to encounter other people unbiasedly in their unique wholeness. Within this space of encounter, only the reminiscence of body and sexuality exists, commemorating the other, so that radical corporeality seems to be the prerequisite for togetherness. In this ahistorical sphere there is no room for a god that permitted the holocaust, redefining mysticism as the connection between men instead of one between man and god. Celan's poems act as a catalyst, for they exclude god from the spheres of man, making poetry a memorial site to the dead and the ones living in pain. This way, the poems are trying to save Eros (in the sense of creaturely love) from being mutilated by the crimes of European history while at the same time aiming at rehabilitating mankind in a post-holocaust world. (shrink)

In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded (...) cognition view and analyze how the Internet aids certain cognitive tasks. After that, we conceptualize how the Internet enables new kinds of embodied interaction, extends certain aspects of our embodiment, and examine how wearable technologies that monitor physiological, behavioral and contextual states transform the embodied self. On the basis of the degree of cognitive integration between a user and Internet resource, we then look at how and when the Internet extends our cognitive processes. We end this chapter with a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facilitated by the Internet. (shrink)