Consequentializing involves both a strategy and conditions for its successful implementation. The strategy takes the features a target theory holds to be relevant to deontic evaluation of actions, and builds them into a counterpart ranking of outcomes. It succeeds if the result is 1) a substantive version of consequentialism that 2) yields the same deontic verdicts as the target theory. Consequentializers typically claim and their critics allow that all plausible alternative theories can be consequentialized. I demonstrate that even standard alternatives (...) such as Aristotelean virtue ethics and Kantian ethics cannot be. The strategy either leaves out features relevant to deontic evaluation on such target theories, resulting in failure of deontic equivalence, or, if it is altered to include these features, fails to produce a substantive version of consequentialism. The consequentializing strategy thus demonstrates not that we are all consequentialists now, but why so many of us are not, that it is misguided to impose a consequentialist account of deontic evaluation upon alternative theories, that it is the commitment to a constraint on value rationales that distinguishes consequentialist theories, and that the plausibility of this distinctive constraint should be the focus of the debate going forward. -/- . (shrink)

That many values can be consequentialized – incorporated into a ranking of states of affairs – is often taken to support the view that apparent alternatives to consequentialism are in fact forms of consequentialism. Such consequentializing arguments take two very different forms. The first is concerned with the relationship between morally right action and states of affairs evaluated evaluator-neutrally, the second with the relationship between what agents ought to do and outcomes evaluated evaluator-relatively. I challenge the consequentializing arguments for both (...) forms of consequentialism. The plausibility of the evaluator-neutral consequentializing of certain values, I argue, in fact establishes the implausibility of an evaluator-neutral consequentialist account of such values. The problems that beset this evaluator-neutral consequentializing argument do not beset its evaluator-relative counterpart. But I demonstrate that evaluator-relatively consequentialized theories can also readily be ‘deontologized’, located within an alternative evaluative framework that is congenial to the articulation of nonconsequentialist moral theories. Such an alternative framework can accommodate what is compelling in consequentialists’ ‘Compelling Idea,’ and what is attractive in their Explanatory Thought. This alternative, moreover, can function as a shared evaluative framework within which the merits of consequentialist and nonconsequentialist alternatives can be considered without begging the question either way. (shrink)

Panentheism is the position that the world is in some sense ‘in’ God, and God ‘in’ the world, without the world being identical to God. Thus, it tries, like what I call mainstream theism and against pan- theism, to protect the transcendence of God, while giving greater emphasis to his immanence in creation than the former. I aim to explicate an approach that I call Orthodox Panentheism. The word ‘orthodox’ is to be read in two ways. First, the picture is (...) derived from the writings of some of the most important figures in Eastern Christian thought, so that it is Orthodox in the ‘big “O” sense’. Second, I hope to show that it is a legitimate Christian picture of the God–world relation which is both distinctive and worthy of being called ‘panentheism’ – an orthodox panentheism in the ‘little “o” sense’. (shrink)

I distinguish two different senses in which philosophers speak of moral verdicts, senses that in turn invite two different senses of moral overridingness. Although one of these senses, that upon which moral verdicts are taken to reflect decisive reasons from a distinctively moral standpoint, currently dominates the moral overridingness debate, my focus is the other sense, upon which moral verdicts are taken to reflect decisive reasons that are distinctively moral. I demonstrate that the recent tendency to emphasize the now dominant (...) sense to the exclusion of the alternative, couple with the failure to disambiguate the two senses, has fundamentally skewed central debates in moral theory. (shrink)

I challenge the common picture of the “Standard Story” of Action as a neutral account of action within which debates in normative ethics can take place. I unpack three commitments that are implicit in the Standard Story, and demonstrate that these commitments together entail a teleological conception of reasons, upon which all reasons to act are reasons to bring about states of affairs. Such a conception of reasons, in turn, supports a consequentialist framework for the evaluation of action, upon which (...) the normative status of actions is properly determined through appeal to rankings of states of affairs as better and worse. This covert support for consequentialism from the theory of action, I argue, has had a distorting effect on debates in normative ethics. I then present challenges to each of these three commitments, a challenge to the first commitment by T.M. Scanlon, a challenge to the second by recent interpreters of Anscombe, and a new challenge to the third commitment that requires only minimal and prima facie plausible modifications to the Standard Story. The success of any one of the challenges, I demonstrate, is sufficient to block support from the theory of action for the teleological conception of reasons and the consequentialist evaluative framework. I close by demonstrating the pivotal role that such arguments grounded in the theory of action play in the current debate between evaluator-relative consequentialists and their critics. (shrink)

In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other nonmental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on (...) perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result). (shrink)

Teleological theories of reason and value, upon which all reasons are fundamentally reasons to realize states of affairs that are in some respect best, cannot account for the intuition that victims in non-identity cases have been wronged. Many philosophers, however, reject such theories in favor of alternatives that recognize fundamentally non-teleological reasons, second-personal reasons that reflect a moral significance each person has that is not grounded in the teleologist’s appeal to outcomes. Such deontological accounts appear to be better positioned to (...) identify the wrong committed against non-identity victims because a person wrongs another on such accounts if she violates his second-personal claims -- overall benefit to victims presents no obstacle to the identification of second-personal wrongdoing. Derek Parfit argues that non-identity is a problem for these deontological theories as well because the alleged victims are properly understood as consenting to the action in question, thereby waiving any such second-personal claim. But his arguments misrepresent the role of consent on such theories by articulating it through appeal to the very teleological theory of reasons that their advocates dismiss as inadequate. Properly understood, Parfit’s appeal to consent understood as retroactive endorsement only provides the answer on such deontological accounts to the question of whether, given that the non-identity victim is second-personally wronged, he is nonetheless better off existing. Indeed, it becomes clear that it is teleological theories for which non-identity poses a particular problem: they cannot -- while their deontological counterparts can – account for the intuition that non-identity victims have been wronged. (shrink)

This paper explores relationships between environment and education after the Covid-19 pandemic through the lens of philosophy of education in a new key developed by Michael Peters and the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia. The paper is collectively written by 15 authors who responded to the question: Who remembers Greta Thunberg? Their answers are classified into four main themes and corresponding sections. The first section, ‘As we bake the earth, let's try and bake it from scratch’, gathers wider philosophical (...) considerations about the intersection between environment, education, and the pandemic. The second section, ‘Bump in the road or a catalyst for structural change?’, looks more closely into issues pertaining to education. The third section, ‘If you choose to fail us, we will never forgive you’, focuses to Greta Thunberg’s messages and their responses. The last section, ‘Towards a new normal’, explores future scenarios and develops recommendations for critical emancipatory action. The concluding part brings these insights together, showing that resulting synergy between the answers offers much more then the sum of articles’ parts. With its ethos of collectivity, interconnectedness, and solidarity, philosophy of education in a new key is a crucial tool for development of post-pandemic education. (shrink)

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical (...) rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do. (shrink)

This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...) raised against them are presented. (shrink)

Evaluator-relative consequentialists frequently endorse the traditional doing-allowing distinction. Yet their endorsement of this traditional distinction only serves to clear the way for their argument against a more fundamental doing-allowing distinction, an argument that one never ought to do something when this will allow something worse to happen. Unlike the case against its more traditional counterpart, the case against this deeper doing-allowing distinction can draw for support upon widely held “state of affairs centered” accounts of attitudes, actions, reasons and value, accounts (...) upon which desires are (all) attitudes towards states of affairs, practical reasons are all reasons to promote states of affairs, and to act is to make something happen -- to promote, produce, or bring about some states of affairs. Moreover, to reject this deeper distinction is to accept the centerpiece of consequentialism – that the evaluation of actions is determined through appeal to the evaluation of states of affairs. Only once the nature of the deep doing-allowing distinction, and these grounds for its rejection, come into view, does it also become clear both what an adequate response to such arguments for its rejection will look like, and that many elements of such a response have already been proposed. (shrink)

This paper surveys medieval Christian philosophy.

The debate concerning the proper way of understanding, and hence solving, the “is-ought problem” produced two mutually exclusive positions. One position claims that it is entirely impossible to deduce an imperative statement from a set of factual statements. The other position holds a contrary view to the effect that one can naturally derive an imperative statement from a set of factual statements under certain conditions. Although these two positions have opposing views concerning the problem, it should be evident that they (...) both accept that the “is-ought problem” is concerned with the deducibility of imperative statements from factual statements. Later I will argue that this should not be our concern when we try to make sense of the way we reason about morality. (shrink)

Many consequentialists take their theory to be anchored by a deeply intuitive idea, the “Compelling Idea” that it is always permissible to promote the best outcome. I demonstrate that this Idea is not, in fact, intuitive at all either in its agent-neutral or its evaluator-relative form. There are deeply intuitive ideas concerning the relationship of deontic to telic evaluation, but the Compelling Idea is at best a controversial interpretation of such ideas, not itself one of them. Because there is no (...) Compelling Idea at the heart of consequentialism, there is no initial burden of proof to be discharged nor any air of paradox to be cleared away by its opponents. (shrink)

Consequentialism is a state of affairs centered moral theory that finds support in state of affairs centered views of value, reason, action, and desire/preference. Together these views form a mutually reinforcing circle. I map an exit route out of this circle by distinguishing between two different senses in which actions can be understood as bringing about states of affairs. All actions, reasons, desires, and values involve bringing about in the first, deflationary sense, but only some appear to involve bringing about (...) in a second, rationalizing sense. I demonstrate that the views making up this circle hold, implausibly, that all reasons, values, desires, and actions involve bringing about in both senses, and that failure to distinguish these senses obscures the implausibility of these views as a set. I demonstrate, in addition, that the distinction blocks two common arguments that otherwise threaten to leverage us back in to the consequentialist circle. (shrink)

According to a traditional conception, romantic love is both constant - if someone loves another, they continue to love them - and exclusive - if someone loves another, they love only the other. In this paper, we argue that the essentiality of constancy and exclusivity is incompatible with the possibilities of fission - roughly speaking, of one person becoming two - and fusion - roughly speaking, of two people becoming one. Moreover, if fission or fusion are possible, then constancy and (...) exclusivity are obligatory features of love only if there are moral dilemmas. We conclude by suggesting this casts doubt on the constancy and especially the exclusivity of love. (shrink)

This article is a review of David Hummel’s The Rise and Fall of Dispensationalism, a book that questions whether the academic debate around dispensationalism is truly dead. By exploring through the lens of metaphorical theology, we look at how commercialization caused academic dispensationalism to self-cannibalize. Applying analysis to both the ouroboros and butterfly metaphors we can examine whether dispensationalism is dead or if there is a potential for a newer, stronger version of academic debate on the topic to resurface once (...) again. Equally as plausible, is the notion that dispensationalism has changed its meaning through the metamorphosis process of changing from academic dispensationalism to pop-dispensationalism. By looking at the meaning change that occurs at the point of transaction, we see that the biography of dispensationalism shows a significant shift in meaning as it becomes a commercial hit. (shrink)

Van Gordon et al. outline the classification of their Ontological Addiction Theory (OAT), including its aetiology and treatment. In this review article I will from an appreciative perspective question some of its fundamental assumptions by presenting an alternative view on the ontology of ‘the person’, as distinct from its presently assumed conventional conflation with a contracted separate egoic self. I will propose this view as structurally and ethically significant for the ‘embodied’ experience of a reconstructed “dynamic and non-dual self”, as (...) cultivated in their treatment. Rather than this reconstructed self simply being socially desirable for functional purposes, I will underscore the meaning-generative case for ontological status, in the absence of which, a pervasive ‘sense of lack’ is evident, with all attendant individual, psychological, social, ecological and ethical implications. This article brings a developmental psychology perspective to bear in appreciating ‘personhood’ as an emergent, progressively realised and is thus similarly aligned with the intent of OAT in overcoming egoic addictive suffering. This mapping of the territory however populates a blind spot in OAT’s diagnosis by affirming unique personhood, a quality of ‘integrative presence’, meaningfully understood as a psycho-spiritual ontological reality. It offers, as with OAT’s stated intent, the merit of avoiding attendant mental health and developmental pitfalls, which can beset what we may discern as an implicit transcendental reductionist assumption operative in OAT, where ‘the many’ are reduced to ‘the One’ and there are, it is assumed, no real many. This framing is resonant with the lived experience of healthy ‘individuation’, a process distinct from the problematic phenomenon of ‘individualism’, evidenced by the empirical data on post-conventional human development, which potentially provides diagnostic markers for any optimal treatment discernment. It is also attuned to what many recognise as a contemporary Fourth Turning in Buddhism, in its conscious evolutionary recognition of the emergence in non-dual states of a ‘unique personal perspective’, and/or a relative individuation within the whole. This differentiation has formerly been interpreted through an ‘impersonal’ lens as an egoic holdover, and potentially inhibits ethical action in the world, as distinct from the ethical import and potential fruits stemming from the ontological affirmation of the person. Keywords: ego; unique personhood; ontology; epistemology; contemplative traditions; Western Enlightenment; developmental psychology; transcendental reductionism; Fourth Turning in Buddhism. (shrink)

Senior high school is known to be part of the newly implemented K-12 program in the Philippines' educational system. Hence, this program added two years to the academic learning program of students, which mainly focuses on different theoretical and vocational strands that aim to prepare and fully furnish the students for education and employment in the future. Due to adjustments to new online learning amidst the pandemic, students begin to experience various challenges, primarily social support and mental well-being. Hence, this (...) study investigates the relationship between social support and anxiety with 160 respondents from private schools. The findings revealed that social support and anxiety have a significant relationship (r=0.126). (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Rapid, accurate, and consistent interpretation of generated data is thereby of fundamental concern. Ontologies––structured, controlled, vocabularies––are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the COVID-19 research domain, by following principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and by reusing existing ontologies such as the Infectious Disease Ontology (...) (IDO) Core, which provides terminological content common to investigations of all infectious diseases. We report here on the development of an IDO extension, the Virus Infectious Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology covering viral infectious diseases. We motivate term and definition choices, showcase reuse of terms from existing OBO ontologies, illustrate how ontological decisions were motivated by relevant life science research, and connect VIDO to the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO). We next use terms from these ontologies to annotate selections from life science research on SARS-CoV-2, highlighting how ontologies employing a common upper-level vocabulary may be seamlessly interwoven. Finally, we outline future work, including bacteria and fungus infectious disease reference ontologies currently under development, then cite uses of VIDO and CIDO in host-pathogen data analytics, electronic health record annotation, and ontology conflict-resolution projects. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Ontologies – structured, controlled, vocabularies – are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the virus research domain, following the principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and drawing on the resources of the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) Core. We report the development of the Virus Infectious (...) Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology extending IDO Core covering viral infectious diseases. We examine newly minted terms, showcase ontology term reuse, and illustrate the use of VIDO by annotating selections from recent life science research on SAR-CoV-2, in the interest of supporting machine learning projects. (shrink)

Susan Hurley (1998a, 2003a, 2008) argues that our capacities for perception, agency and thought are essentially interdependent and co-emerge from a tangle of sensorimotor processes that are both cause and effect of the web of interactive and communicative practices they weave us into. In this paper, I reconstruct this view and its main motivations, with a particular focus on three important aspects. First, Hurley argues that an essential aspect of conscious perception – its perspectival unity – constitutively depends (...) on agency. That is, agency is a transcendental condition on the possibility of perception (§3). Second, understanding why this dependence obtains involves understanding why perception and agency emerge together, and how they do so on the basis of a web of interrelated capacities for sensorimotor control (§2, §4). Third, understanding these first two aspects of Hurley’s view is the key to understanding the sophisticated interplay between i) her arguments for the causal interdependence of sensory input and motor output, and ii) her arguments for the essential interdependence of perception and agency. (shrink)

As the use of nudges by governmental agencies becomes more common, the need for normative guidelines regarding the processes by which decisions about the implementation of specific nudges are taken becomes more acute. In order to find a justified set of such guidelines one must meet several theoretical challenges to Libertarian Paternalism that arise at the foundational level. In this paper, I identify three central challenges to Libertarian Paternalism, and suggest that Susan Hurley's political philosophy as presented in her (...) Natural Reasons (1989) can be viewed as offering powerful responses to them. (shrink)

For a symposium on Douglas W. Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.

Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their (...) vehicle externalism, objections by Ned Block (2005), Jesse Prinz (2006), and Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2008). Though in some ways these objections appear disparate, I will argue that all of them depend on a crucial presupposition, one which Hurley, Noë, and their sympathizers should reject. This presupposition is that perceptual character is fixed by an instantaneous snapshot of neural states, a view that Hurley dubbed ‘temporal atomism.’ To put the presupposition in more familiar terms, all three objections are implicitly committed to something like Dennett’s Cartesian Theater (1991). -/- In the first part of the article, I will discuss Hurley and Noë’s views, and include reasons why their views entail the rejection of the Cartesian Theater. In the next part of the article I will introduce the three objections and show how they presuppose something like a Cartesian Theater. I will also show that, if the Cartesian Theater is rejected, the objections all vanish. In the final part of the article I address the charge that Noë and Hurley confuse causation with constitution. This charge reveals a lack of appreciation for the way in which dynamical explanation motivates Hurley’s externalism. (shrink)

In recent years, a central debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science concerns the role of the body in perception and cognition. For many contemporary philosophers, not only cognition but also perception is connected mainly with the brain, where the processing of input from the senses takes place; whereas for the proponents of ‘embodied cognition’ other aspects of the body beyond the brain, including the environment, play a constitutive role in cognitive processes. In terms of perception, a new (...) theory has emerged which stresses perception’s active character and claims that the embodied subject and the environment, with which it interacts, form a dynamic system. Supporters of ‘enactive perception’ such as Susan Hurley and Alva Noë maintain that the physical substrate or the supervenience basis of perceptual experience and phenomenal consciousness may include besides the brain and the nervous system other bodily and environmental features. Yet, it will be argued in this paper that the interaction between the subject and the environment forms a system of causal relations, so we can theoretically interfere in the causal chains and create hallucinations, which cannot be distinguished from veridical perception, or a virtual reality as in the film Matrix (1999). This kind of argument and its related thought experiments aim to stress the primacy of the brain in determining phenomenal states, and show that the body and certain interactions with the environment have a causal, but not a constitutive or essential role, in forming phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Jeremiah Carey presents a version of panentheism which he attributes to Gregory Palamas, as well as other Greek patristic thinkers. The Greek tradition, he alleges, is more open to panentheistic metaphysics than the Latin. Palamas, for instance, hold that God’s energies are participable, even if God’s essence is not. Carey uses Palamas’ metaphysics to sketch an account on which divine energies are the forms of created substances, and argues it is open to Orthodox Christians to affirm that God is (...) in all things as their formal cause. I argue Carey’s reading is premised on a superficial examination of the patristic literature. More importantly, Palamas’ metaphysics is opposed to that of Carey, since Palamas’ distinction aims to uphold that created persons are only contingent participants in God. On this, Palamas and the Latins are in complete accord. In conclusion, I propose panentheistic metaphysics begins from a false dilemma. (shrink)

Block (Trends Cogn Sci 7:285–286, 2003) and Prinz (PSYCHE 12:1–19, 2006) have defended the idea that SSD perception remains in the substituting modality (auditory or tactile). Hurley and Noë (Biol Philos 18:131–168, 2003) instead argued that after substantial training with the device, the perceptual experience that the SSD user enjoys undergoes a change, switching from tactile/auditory to visual. This debate has unfolded in something like a stalemate where, I will argue, it has become difficult to determine whether the perception (...) acquired through the coupling with an SSD remains in the substituting or the substituted modality. Within this puzzling deadlock two new approaches have been recently suggested. Ward and Meijer (Conscious Cogn 19:492–500, 2010) describe SSD perception as visual-like but characterize it as a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia. Auvray et al. (Perception 36:416–430, 2007) and Auvray and Myin (Cogn Sci 33:1036–1058, 2009) suggest that SSDs let their users experience a new kind of perception. Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) refine this position, and argue that this new kind of perception depends on pre-existing senses without entirely aligning with any of them. So, they have talked about perceptual experience in SSDs as going "beyond vision". In a similar vein, MacPherson (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011a) claims that “if the subjects (SSD users) have experiences with both vision-like and touch-like representational characteristics then perhaps they have a sense that ordinary humans do not” (MacPherson in Oxford University Press, New York, 2011a, p. 139). (shrink)

According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual (...) systems. Given all of the available endogenous and exogenous evidence available to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for rather different reasons. Most importantly, it generates proprioceptive and efference-copy based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric object localization. (shrink)

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by (...) Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, and Jonathan Wolff. Key concepts such as responsibility (individual and collective), luck (thin and thick; brute and option), control, desert, and equality of opportunity are delineated, and the implementation of responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice is considered. The chapters of this book are positioned in relation to the wider literature on responsibility and distributive justice, and a brief outline of the chapters is provided. (shrink)

‘‘COGNITIVE ECOLOGY’’ is a fruitful model for Shakespearian studies, early modern literary and cultural history, and theatrical history more widely. Cognitive ecologies are the multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich ongoing interaction with our environments. Along with the anthropologist Edwin Hutchins,1 we use the term ‘‘cognitive ecology’’ to integrate a number of recent approaches to cultural cognition: we believe these approaches offer productive lines of engagement (...) with early modern literary and historical studies.2 The framework arises out of our work in extended mind and distributed cognition.3 The extended mind hypothesis arose from a post-connectionist philosophy of cognitive science. This approach was articulated in Andy Clark’s Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again, and further developed by Susan Hurley and Mark Rowlands, among others.4 The distributed cognition approach arose independently, from work in cognitive anthropology, HCI (Human-Computer Interaction), the sociology of education and work, and science studies. The principles of distributed cognition were articulated in Hutchins’s ethnography of navigation, Cogni- tion in the Wild,5 and developed by theorists such as David Kirsh and Lucy Suchman.6 These models share an anti-individualist approach to cognition. In all these views, mental activities spread or smear across the boundaries of skull and skin to include parts of the social and material world. In remembering, decision making, and acting, whether individually or in small groups, our complex and structured activities involve many distinctive dimensions: neural, affective, kines-. (shrink)

This paper discusses some political implications of humor, using as a point of departure the mechanisms that explain the sources of the comical. First, I briefly present the main explanations offered for why we laugh. I then focus on the cognitive view proposed Hurley, Dennett and Adams, according to which humor carries out the epistemic function of eliminating the errors that covertly entered a mental space. In the second section of the paper, I present two accounts of how liberalism (...) continues to extend the scope of individual liberties. I use these views on liberalism as a background for my analysis of the political implications of humor, advancing the claim that, as a result of its epistemic function, humor has a strong conservative bias. (shrink)

Even where an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions for responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. This paper argues that those who want to place considerations of responsibility at the centre of distributive and criminal justice ought to take this concern seriously. The common strategy of relying on what Susan Hurley describes as a 'black box of responsibility' has (...) the advantage of not taking responsibility considerations to be irrelevant merely because some specific account of responsibility is mistaken. It can, furthermore, cope perfectly well with an absence of responsibility, even of the global sort implied by hard determinism and other strongly sceptical accounts. Problems for the black box view come in where responsibility is present, but in a form that is curtailed in one significant regard or another. The trick, then, is to open the box of responsibility just enough that its contents can be the basis for judgements of justice. I identify three 'moderately sceptical' forms of compatibilism that cannot ground judgements of justice, and are therefore expunged by the strongest 'grey box' view. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE OS TRANSTORNOS DO CICLO ESTRAL DE VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- •__6. Transtornos do ciclo estral -/- Qualquer alteração na frequência, duração ou intensidade do ciclo estral é considerada uma perturbação do ciclo, cujas origens variam etiologicamente. As perturbações do ciclo podem originar-se em qualquer das partes do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-ovário (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996). Pode ou não ser do tipo (...) permanente e pode depender de sua origem, momento e intensidade cursar com outras alterações reprodutivas, por exemplo uma retenção do corpo lúteo, dá lugar a prolongamento da fase lútea, altos níveis de progesterona circulante e pode, finalmente, desencadear em um cisto luteal ou em uma metrite. Entre os fatores desencadeadores da falha do ciclo estral estão os fatores de origem nutricional, dentre eles: 6.1 Minerais 6.1.1 Relação Na:K (Sódio: Potássio) A deficiência de sódio pode causar distúrbios do ciclo estral, isto porque as células animais intracelularmente possuem uma alta concentração de K e uma baixa concentração de Na, esta relação pode chegar a 10:1 ou mais, em relação ao meio externo. Com esta relação, as concentrações intracelulares estão em equilíbrio com o meio externo. A absorção e secreção de cátions pela célula para conseguir o equilíbrio é simultânea, gerada por um sistema de transporte específico chamado "bomba Na-K". Se a nível celular não existe um balanço iônico de K:Na, a maior prioridade das células tubulares do rim é a de conseguir novamente um equilíbrio, o mecanismo destas células é o da reabsorção do íon que se encontre em excesso de água, diminuindo a quantidade deste no líquido para manter as funções em equilíbrio dinâmico. Os desequilíbrios não compensados a nível celular ou renal, levam a alterações na condutividade nervosa por alteração da bomba de transmissão elétrica. O ciclo estral é alterado por diminuir a expressividade dos sinais comportamentais de estro, que são produzidos por concentrações crescentes de estrogênio mas com alta necessidade de adequação nervosa para a exposição corporal do cio e a aceitação da monta. O potássio, em particular, desempenha um papel fundamental como coator em certas interações enzimáticas, incluindo a transferência de energia, a síntese de proteínas e o metabolismo de hidratos de carbono, em especial nos sistemas em que o ADP está envolvido, as hexoquinases e a anidrase carbônica. O sódio, por sua vez, é o principal cátion extracelular, regula o equilíbrio hídrico no organismo e a mecânica de fluidos, desta forma regula a pressão osmótica e a troca aquosa nos tecidos. Devido a esta função, um dos fatores importantes do fluxo Na:K é o rim, que é controlado pela aldosterona, a principal hormona reguladora da absorção de sódio e excreção de potássio. Qualquer desequilíbrio na relação Na:K, afetará o ciclo estral, de maneira direta e indireta, através da alteração na síntese de proteínas e da perda da regulação hídrica, fator importante pelas secreções que devem acompanhar as manifestações de cio/estro. 6.1.2 Relação Cobalto (Co) A deficiência de cobalto gera um efeito biológico determinado pela sua presença na molécula da vitamina B12, a qual regula a hematopoese (Ativa a síntese de protoporfirina) e afeta o metabolismo do nitrogênio e dos carboidratos. A vitamina B12 atua como uma coenzima da transmetilação (síntese do glutamato mutase, metilmalonil-CoA-Mutase, diol-dehidratase e redução dos ribonucleótidos a desoxirribonucleótidos, isomerização da a-lisina, etc.). Especialmente em ruminantes, a reação mutase da metilmalonina-CoA está relacionada com o metabolismo do ácido propiônico e, portanto, com a síntese de glicose e o equilíbrio energético. O cobalto também está envolvido na carboxilação da propionil-CoA à metilmalonil-CoA e na isomerização deste último para succinil-CoA. O metabolismo do ácido propiônico ocorre no fígado e é reduzido pelo fato do metilmalonil não poder ser convertido em succinil-CoA, impedindo a sua passagem para oxalacetato e glicose, gerando uma relação inversa entre os níveis de energia e proteína; causando uma diminuição de GnRH que afeta negativamente a liberação de LH que, por sua vez, cria um aumento na FSH. Isso produz uma anulação da ovulação e, consequentemente, ausência de um ciclo estral verdadeiro. Vale reforçar que, para prevenção da deficiência do cobalto, o criador pode optar pelo fornecimento de volumosos que dispõem de quantidades de cobalto que suprem as exigências dos animais, ou pela inserção de sais de cobalto à mistura da ração, sempre no intervalo sugerido de 0,07 e 0,11 mg/kg para cada animal, suprindo a necessidade do mesmo e garantindo assim a prevenção dos transtornos do ciclo estral ou outras afecções do sistema reprodutivo. 6.1.3 Relação Cobre (Cu) e Molibdênio (Mo) A deficiência de cobre gera, indiretamente, molibdênio, durante esse processo, tanto o macho como a fêmea são inférteis ou sub-férteis, mas, em geral, os transtornos surgem não por molibdeniose mas por hipocuprose condicionada por excesso de molibdênio nas pastagens e pelos sulfatos presentes na água de bebida (BREM, 2016). Isso leva à formação de tiomolibdato no rúmen, que por sua vez combina com o cobre para formar tiomolibdato de cobre, sal muito insolúvel. O tiomolibdato presente, formado em excesso e que não encontra cobre suficiente, contribuirá para produzir a diarreia, limitando ainda mais a absorção de cobre. A interferência mais importante do molibdênio ocorre no processo metabólico do cobre, interferindo sua atividade enzimática. O molibdênio atua sobre o complexo sulfeto-oxidase hepático. A enzima que está envolvida na oxidação de metabolitos sulfurados, reduz a sua atividade na presença de altos teores de molibdênio, especialmente quando a quantidade de cobre é baixa. Daqui resulta a formação de sulfureto de cobre, muito insolúvel e, portanto, pouco ou nada utilizável pelas células e/ou tecidos (QUIROZ-ROCHA & BOUDA, 2001). O excesso de molibdênio nas pastagens ou na água de bebida reduz a quantidade de cobre no fígado, mas para uma dada dose de molibdênio, esta redução é diretamente proporcional ao aumento dos sulfatos na ingestão, porque só na presença de sulfatos o molibdênio exerce sua ação limitante. O melhor modo de tratar o molibdênio e a ação dos sulfatos sobre o cobre, é aumentar a quantidade de cobre disponível pelos animais, seja por via bucal ou parenteral. Desta forma, há aumentos na cupremia e no ganho de peso. É conveniente, para o efeito, efetuar um controle dos resultados mediante a observação clínica, pesagem dos animais e análise de cobre no sangue. Isso permitirá estabelecer as doses ideais e adequadas para cada estabelecimento e efetuar um estudo econômico da suplementação (BAVERA, 2002). Como já foi tratado o requerimento do cobre para evitar os problemas reprodutivos das vacas, falemos do molibdênio (Mo). O Mo é um elemento primordial para bovinos leiteiros, uma vez que é componente de uma enzima presente no leite (xantina oxidasse). A deficiência de Mo a nível prático não foi relatada, porém casos podem acontecer. Para ovinos, que é uma espécie ruminante, a concentração exigida pelo animal em Mo presente na MS é de 5 a 10 mg/kg, porém deve levar em consideração a relação crítica entre o Mo e o Cu que deve ser no máximo 20 e nunca superior. O nível crítico de toxidade de Mo nos alimentos volumosos (forrageiras, gramíneas e leguminosas) não pode ultrapassar os 6% por kg de MS. Através de todos esses cuidados, o criador poderá obter sucesso tanto na prevenção contra os distúrbios do ciclo estral das vacas, quanto de outras complicações como toxidade, desnutrição, etc. 6.2 Relação energia:proteína Em relação ao aumento do consumo de proteína crua ou de deficiência de energia, aumenta-se a quantidade de ureia no sangue e produz-se uma toxicidade tecidular, afetando o endométrio e diminuindo a produção de prostaglandinas, que são as encarregadas de manter o corpo lúteo, caso não se mantenha acaba provocando um ciclo estral longo. A situação pode ser explicada a nível do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise, no qual os baixos níveis de glicose inibem a secreção de GnRH e resultam na diminuição da pulsatilidade da LH, seja por ação direta ou mediada através das ß-endorfinas. Outro fator que afeta o crescimento folicular é a nutrição, especificamente a perda da condição corporal, quando o animal não se alimenta direito ou quando se alimenta não tem uma condição balanceada que supra suas exigências nutricionais e que tenha um aceitável ganho de peso diário (GPD), acaba perdendo massa muscular ou de gordura, em outras palavras altera-se a condição corporal do mesmo, e se a perda for de 22 a 24 % de peso corporal (PC), os animais que perdem essa condição entram em anestro o que acaba tornando um animal inviável para a reprodução e também para o abate, uma vez que encontra-se fora do peso ideal. Tanto as proteínas quanto a energia foram tratados em trabalhos anteriores, porém nunca é tarde para salientar que ambas devem ser fornecidas em qualidade e quantidade que consiga favorecer ao desenvolvimento do animal e aos mecanismos fisiológicos do mesmo. 6.3 Fito-toxidade Finalmente, um fator adicional que induz a alteração da ciclicidade estral são os fitoestrógenos, plantas com altos teores de isoflavonas que possuem, no organismo animal, uma ação estrogênica. Os fitoestrógenos estão amplamente difundidos, nos trevos, alfafa, milho e nas pastagens de cultivo intensivo. Os fitoestrogênios são diferentes dos estrogênios produzidos pelo animal, mas a sua ação é idêntica nos receptores do trato reprodutivo; o seu metabolismo e excreção é diferente (por exemplo, desmetilização) e a sua excreção renal através dos glicoronosidos, assim mesmo a formação de ésteres sulfatos no tecido hepático é menor, acumulando-se em circulação e alterando a duração da fase estrogênica do ciclo, isso leva à ninfomania das vacas e com ela a perda da função reprodutiva. Deve-se estar atento ao pasto que se cultiva e ao solo em que se implanta o pasto, uma vez que o solo pode ter excessos de minerais prejudiciais ao animal e que o coloque em uma situação de toxidade, já que a planta absorve do solo o excesso e da planta vai para o animal por meio direto ou pela silagem. Um exemplo é o teor de molibdênio na planta que não pode ser maior que 6%, se for ocorrerá inúmeras transformações fisiológicas maléficas ao animal, que acabará sendo descartado do objetivo que seria a reprodução na fazenda. -/- Apoio -/- Realização -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BAVERA, Guillermo Alejandro. Aguas y aguadas para el ganado. Rio Cuarto: Inter-Medica Editorial, 2009. BERCHIELLI, Telma Teresinha; PIRES, Alexandre Vaz; OLIVEIRA, SG de. Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: funep, 2006. BINDARI, Yugal Raj et al. Effects of nutrition on reproduction-A review. Adv. Appl. Sci. Res, v. 4, n. 1, p. 421-429, 2013. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. BREM, J. J. et al. Alteraciones del ciclo estral provocadas por un alto ingreso de molibdeno en vaquillonas Brangus y respuesta a la suplementación con cobre. Revista Veterinaria, v. 12, n. 1 y 2, p. 28-33, 2016. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. GRAHAM, Thomas W. Trace element deficiencies in cattle. Veterinary clinics of North America: food animal practice, v. 7, n. 1, p. 153-215, 1991. GUEDES, Luciana Freitas et al. A importância do cobre, molibdênio e enxofre na alimentação de ovinos. Nucleus Animalium, v. 10, n. 2, p. 7-22, 2018. HURLEY, W. L.; DOANE, R. M. Recent developments in the roles of vitamins and minerals in reproduction. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 72, n. 3, p. 784-804, 1989. KUMAR, Sudhir et al. Importance of micro minerals in reproductive performance of livestock. Veterinary world, v. 4, n. 5, p. 230, 2011. MAAS, John. Relationship between nutrition and reproduction in beef cattle. The Veterinary Clinics of North America. Food Animal Practice, v. 3, n. 3, p. 633-646, 1987. MILLS, C. F. Cobalt deficiency and cobalt requirements of ruminants. Recent advances in animal nutrition, p. 129-141, 1981. NICODEMO, M. L. F.; SERENO, J. R. B.; AMARAL, T. B. Minerais na eficiência reprodutiva de bovinos. Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste-Documentos (INFOTECA-E), São Carlos, 2008. PASA, Camila. Relação reprodução animal e os minerais. Biodiversidade, v. 9, n. 1, 2011. QUIROZ-ROCHA, Gerardo F.; BOUDA, Jan. Fisiopatología de las deficiencias de cobre en rumiantes y su diagnóstico. Vet. Méx, v. 32, n. 4, p. 289, 2001. SHORT, Robert E.; ADAMS, D. C. Nutritional and hormonal interrelationships in beef cattle reproduction. Canadian Journal of Animal Science, v. 68, n. 1, p. 29-39, 1988. YASOTHAI, R. Importance of minerals on reproduction in dairy cattle. International Journal of Science, Environment and Technology, v. 3, n. 6, p. 2051-2057, 2014. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 29 de março de 2020. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE AS ALTERAÇÕES DO CORPO LÚTEO EM VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- •__7. ALTERAÇÕES DO CORPO LÚTEO -/- A estrutura funcional desenvolve-se a partir da cavidade folicular após a ovulação. O corpo lúteo é constituído pelas células da teca interna (pequenas e ativas na primeira fase do seu desenvolvimento) e células da granulosa (grandes e ativas na segunda metade do seu (...) desenvolvimento). As principais características de cada tipo de célula podem resumir-se da seguinte forma: As células pequenas são mais sensíveis à ação da LH porque possui uma quantidade maior de receptores biologicamente ativos para esta hormona e a resposta é mediada pelo sistema AMPc-adelinato ciclase. As grandes células lúteas têm menos receptores para a LH (a maior quantidade são para a PGF2α e a PGE2), e são as responsáveis pela produção da oxitocina luteal (BAH, et al. 2006; CAMPO, 2003). Contrariamente às pequenas células lúteas, a produção de progesterona (P4) é parcialmente controlada pelo sistema Ca+2 - Fosfatil inositol-quinase C (CAMPO, 2003). A regulação da função do corpo lúteo é um mecanismo complexo. Nela intervêm fatores tróficos e líticos que estão presentes em forma simultânea durante todo o ciclo estral, e portanto a estimulação ou inibição da síntese e secreção de P4 depende do balanço entre estes fatores. (CAMPO, 2003). Dentro dos fatores tróficos, os nutrientes desempenham um papel relevante sobre a luteólise e as funções luteotrópicas, entre estas pode-se citar a ação das seguintes: -/- 7.1 Vitaminas Deficiência em betacarotenos. Vitamina A é um termo genérico que designa qualquer composto com atividade de retinol, o trans-retinol, é o composto base, sua forma aldeído e ácido são chamados de retinol e ácido retinóico, respectivamente. Por outro lado, a forma ativa da Vitamina A participa no mecanismo da visão, como 11-cis-retinal. Adicionalmente, o betacaroteno, considerado uma provitamina A é a única forma em que esta encontra nas plantas. Em sentido nutricional, a família da Vitamina A compreende todos os compostos que possuem atividade de retinol, incluindo cerca de cinquenta carotenoides que possuem atividade de provitamina A, aceitando-se que o mais ativo é o trans-betacaroteno (TORRES, et al. 2002). As vitaminas que são necessárias para o crescimento e a produção, também são essenciais para a reprodução. As recomendações atuais de vitamina A são de 75.000 UI/dia durante a lactação e 80.000 UI/dia (nota: 1 mg de Vitamina A = 400 UI) durante o período seco nas vacas leiteiras. A suplementação com vitamina A tem pouco risco de toxicidade, enquanto a sua deficiência pode retardar o aparecimento do primeiro cio/estro, induzir cios/estros silenciosos, aumentar o número de quistos ováricos, reduzir os índices de concepção, causar abortos, mortes embrionárias e ocasionar o nascimento de bezerros debilitados e fracos, uma vez que não irão nascer com os índices e requerimentos ideais de nutrientes passados da mãe para o feto pela placenta, e que, já que a mãe possui deficiência nutricional, o colostro não terá o efeito completo para passar a imunidade essencial ao neonato. Embora os mecanismos de ação não sejam claros, foram notificadas maiores secreções de esteroides ováricos quando as concentrações de β-carotenos no fluido folicular foram elevadas; logo, foram observadas maiores concentrações elevadas de β- estradiol e vitamina A nos folículos que terminaram em ovulação do que naqueles que terminaram em atresia. Para evitar as perdas reprodutivas por deficiência de vitamina A, pode-se optar pela administração oral ou injetável desta ao animal, mediante dois métodos: o primeiro consiste em adicionar 1 a 2,5 kg de premix vitamínico em 1 tonelada de grãos o que supre de 4 a 6.000 UI o que é desejável; o segundo é a administração via injetável em quantidades vide bula do fármaco. 7.2 Minerais O excesso de fósforo é absorvido principalmente no intestino delgado dos mamíferos através de um mecanismo de transporte ativo dependente do sódio, que é estimulado pela pró-hormona 1,25- hidroxivitamina D3. Os ruminantes são capazes de absorver o fósforo dietético em proporção direta às quantidades presentes na ração. Estima-se que aproximadamente 1% do corpo animal é composto de fósforo, do qual 85% está presente nos dentes e no tecido ósseo. Os tecidos moles são capazes de conter entre 0,15-0,20% de fósforo sob a forma de fosfoproteínas, nucleoproteínas, fosfolipídios, fosfato creatinina, adenosintrifosfato, glicose-6-fosfato, etc. Ao nível do plasma sanguíneo, o fósforo apresenta valores de 12,09 mg/dl. Os valores plasmáticos de fósforo são regulados principalmente pelo rim, sendo observado um aumento na excreção urinária do elemento inorgânico quando este excede a capacidade de transporte (REBOLLAR & MATEOS, 1999). O fósforo faz parte dos fosfolipídios, que são importantes no transporte de lipídios e seu metabolismo, como componente das membranas celulares. O fosfato faz parte do RNA e do DNA, componentes celulares vitais, e são essenciais para a síntese proteica. O fosfato faz parte de sistemas enzimáticos como a cocarboxilase e NAD, portanto está envolvido em todos os processos de síntese e regulação energética, dado que o corpo lúteo requer altas quantidades de energia para a síntese celular e hormonal, um excesso de fósforo pode bloquear a capacidade renal da sua regulação gerando um desequilíbrio catiônico que descompensa a relação Na:K, já que deverão ser excretados íons fosfato para regular o equilíbrio ácido-básico, desta forma, os processos celulares em tecidos de alta sensibilidade como o ovário serão afetados em sua função. A situação para prevenção de problemas relacionados ao fósforo (P) já foi tratada em assuntos anteriores, porém, sempre vale frisar para o leitor fiel que me lê que as exigências de P presentes na matéria seca (MS) variam entre 0,17 e 0,59% de P por kg/MS para bovinos de corte e em 0,32 a 0,44% por kg/MS para o gado leiteiro. Dessa forma, dados obtidos por pesquisas, ditam que para a mantença de uma vaca ou quaisquer outra categoria bovina o ideal é o consumo de 1.43 g/100 kg de peso vivo (PV), garantindo assim a prevenção de possíveis afecções reprodutivas como as alterações do corpo lúteo. Gramíneas, forragens, leguminosas e os concentrados fornecem muito bem os requerimentos de fósforo para os animais, todavia deve-se estar atento as relações e dependências do P com outros elementos como o Ca e a relação Na:K (10-15:1 idealmente). 7.3 Compostos estrogênicos Os fitoestrogênios afetam repetidamente a estabilidade do corpo lúteo. Os compostos estrogênicos encontrados principalmente em leguminosas pertencem principalmente a três grupos: isoflavanos, isoflavonas, presentes no gênero Trifolium e praticamente restritos às leguminosas, e cumestanos, que foram estudados na alfafa (Medicago sativa) e na Melilotus alba. Todas as isoflavonas sofrem algum grau de transformação no rúmen, sendo o Isoflavonoide formononetina, na realidade um pró-estrógeno, o único que se ativa no ecossistema ruminal ao ser convertido em equol, enquanto que as demais são degradadas a produtos inativos (RAMOS, et al. 1998). Por fim, a alta concentração no sangue do equol retarda a retroalimentação sobre a hipófise mediante a qual se reduzem os níveis de FSH para dar lugar à onda ovulatória de LH, se esta não ocorrer, o corpo lúteo obviamente não se formará. O conhecimento acerca dos estrogênios na alimentação animal é defasado nos livros sobre o tema, no entanto, o criador pode ficar tranquilo no que tange o tema na prática da sua fazenda e dos seus animais, uma vez que tal elemento é muito bem fornecido naturalmente por meio dos alimentos volumosos presentes no seu pasto. -/- Apoio -/- Realização -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BAH, Mamadou M. et al. Role of intraluteal prostaglandin F2α, progesterone and oxytocin in basal and pulsatile progesterone release from developing bovine corpus luteum. Prostaglandins & other lipid mediators, v. 79, n. 3-4, p. 218-229, 2006. BERCHIELLI, Telma Teresinha; PIRES, Alexandre Vaz; OLIVEIRA, SG de. Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: funep, 2006. BINDARI, Yugal Raj et al. Effects of nutrition on reproduction-A review. Adv. Appl. Sci. Res, v. 4, n. 1, p. 421-429, 2013. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. CAMPO, E. Comportamiento reproductivo del ganado Bovino y Bufalino. 2003. Universidad Agraria de la Habana. Havana, 2003. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. HURLEY, W. L.; DOANE, R. M. Recent developments in the roles of vitamins and minerals in reproduction. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 72, n. 3, p. 784-804, 1989. KUMAR, Sudhir et al. Importance of micro minerals in reproductive performance of livestock. Veterinary world, v. 4, n. 5, p. 230, 2011. MAAS, John. Relationship between nutrition and reproduction in beef cattle. The Veterinary Clinics of North America. Food Animal Practice, v. 3, n. 3, p. 633-646, 1987. PASA, Camila. Relação reprodução animal e os minerais. Biodiversidade, v. 9, n. 1, 2011. RAMOS, Graciano et al. Los compuestos secundarios de las plantas en la nutrición de los herbívoros. Archivos de Zootecnia. 47: 597-620, 1998. REBOLLAR, Paloma García; MATEOS, Gonzalo González. El fósforo en nutrición animal. Necesidades, valoración de materias primas y mejora de la disponibilidad. CURSO DE ESPECIALIZACIÓN FEDNA. Avances en nutrición y alimentaciín animal, XV, p. 19-64, 1999. SHORT, Robert E.; ADAMS, D. C. Nutritional and hormonal interrelationships in beef cattle reproduction. Canadian Journal of Animal Science, v. 68, n. 1, p. 29-39, 1988. TEIXEIRA, J. C.; TEIXEIRA, LFAC. Alimentação de bovinos leiteiros. FAEPE, Lavras, 1997. TEIXEIRA, J. C. Nutrição de ruminantes. Lavras: FAEPE, 1992. TORRES, M. et al. Aspectos Farmacológicos relevantes de las Vitaminas Antioxidantes (E, A y C). Archivos Venezolanos de Farmacología y Terapéutica, v. 21, n. 1, p. 22-27, 2002. YASOTHAI, R. Importance of minerals on reproduction in dairy cattle. International Journal of Science, Environment and Technology, v. 3, n. 6, p. 2051-2057, 2014. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 29 de março de 2020. (shrink)

Peer Review Book Description - Maria Seykora (female, published age 28) -/- -/- Classical Logic will attempt to give a comprehensive and rigorous introduction and more advanced overview of the area of logic widely known as “classical logic,” as distinguished from modern-day “non-classical logic,” for undergraduate students in general. It will cover the topics of Informal Logic (including logical fallacies, deduction, induction, and abductive reasoning) and Formal Logic. (Because it aims to cover these two topics, the title may change to (...) Informal and Classical Logic for the first edition.) Within the category of Formal Logic, it will cover Syllogistic or Categorical Logic and Symbolic Logic. Furthermore, within Symbolic Logic, it will cover Propositional Logic, Predicate Logic, and Modal Logic. The Formal Logic component is currently unfinished, and the Informal Logic component is somewhat unfinished. The unique selling proposition is “the first comprehensive Classical Logic textbook.” It seems that many textbooks for college students today, including Patrick J. Hurley’s, are loosely organized around Classical Logic and other various areas of logic, yet there is not a clear-cut, comprehensive summation of Classical Logic in textbook form. For instance, Hurley’s textbook does not have a section on Modal Logic, and does not address some fallacies such as Hypothesis Contrary to Fact, the Genetic Fallacy, Appeal to Nature, No True Scotsman Fallacy, Emotionally Loaded Language fallacies, etc. Stan Baronett’s Logic textbook also does not include discussions of Modal Logic or these additional fallacies and others like them, and Siu-Fan Lee’s textbook does not include Modal Logic either. Additionally, abductive reasoning, which involves making an inference to the best explanation, is important in real life, yet it seems absent from most logic textbooks. (shrink)

Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness (...) based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here. (shrink)