The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...) starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

The goal of this paper is to suggest that theoretical thinking with respect to metaphysical determinations or indeterminations is not the appropriate realm for attributing moral responsibility. On the contrary, judgments that attribute moral responsibility (S is responsible for...) depend on the possibility that a rational narrative be built. Agents are capable of forging their future actions, as well as of reflecting upon past actions. With this it will also be shown how we assume control of our behavior because we (...) ignore whether actions are the result of causality or chance. It is claimed that contexts determine the degree of causal demand in narratives that attribute moral responsibility. In order to construct this type of narrative one must focus on a specific link in the causal chain of explanations. If context alone is not demanding enough so as to require that theoretical reflections strive for the ultimate foundation of our actions, then the agent may be considered responsible for his behavior. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

Pretendo demostrar que a) el tratado *De ira* de Séneca incluye no una sino dos estrategias terapéuticas diseñadas para evitar la ira, y que b) que la segunda de estas estrategias –la cual ha sido desatendida en la literatura secundaria– presenta problemas irresolubles cuando la contrastamos contra la teoría estoica de la acción, la cual se funda en premisas intelectualistas.

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

A primeira tese de Sober é que não podemos agir livremente, a não ser que o Argumento da Causalidade ou o Argumento da Inevitabilidade tenham alguma falha. O Argumento da Causalidade é o seguinte: nossos estados mentais causam movimentos corporais; mas nossos estados mentais são causados por fatores do mundo físico. Nossa personalidade pode ser reconduzida à nossa experiência e à nossa genética. E tanto a experiência quanto a genética foram causados por itens do mundo físico. Assim, o meio ambiente (...) e os genes são os causadores de nossas crenças e desejos. E estes, por sua vez, causam o nosso comportamento. Como, em última instância, não escolhemos nem os nossos genes e nem o meio ambiente no qual adquirimos as nossas experiências, também não escolhemos o nosso comportamento: ele é causado por fatores além do nosso controle; isso nos faz não ser livres. E o Argumento da Inevitabilidade é exposto por Sober assim: se uma ação foi praticada livremente, então deve ter sido possível ao agente agir de outra forma. Mas, dado que as causas de nossas ações são as nossas crenças e desejos, não poderíamos ter agido diferentemente de como elas nos determinam a agir. (shrink)

Neste capítulo, Loux apresenta alguns problemas com relação às modalidades e algumas das relações entre elas e o vocabulário dos mundos possíveis, expondo as duas principais posições ontológicas com relação a tais mundos e às modalidades e com relação à natureza das modalidades, a saber, o possibilismo e o actualismo, defendidos respectivamente por Lewis e Plantinga. Essas são teorias inconsistentes entre si, que intentam nos dizer se os mundos possíveis são concretos ou abstratos e se existe algo além do que (...) é actual. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt’s _Moral Foundation Theory _has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, _i) _it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering (...) of our evolved moral intuitions, and that _ii) _that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies. (shrink)

Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...) Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning. (shrink)

Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...) epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes. (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en el segundo acápite, (...) mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an epistemic framework and the relationship between said criterion and a meta-criterion, but also from the collaboration with other subjects who share the same standards. Thus, one (...) can choose between particularist and methodist criteria according to the context of assessment. This position has the advantage of presenting a new perspective concerning both the criterion problem and the problem of inter-contextuality in the evaluation of different epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

This paper discusses there is no sustainable theoretical alternative for building knowledge without principles including cooperation –aimed at the preparation and distribution of beliefs– among individuals. This principle helps to conceive both the relation among internalist and externalist theories, and a cognitive explanation based on the concept of epistemic warrant. The concluding remark is that concepts, like evidence or reliability, can only be conceived as skills of subjects belonging to a community.

This paper presents the theory of epistemic safety in relation to three problems: similarity, closure, and generality. Within the neo-Moorean framework of skepticism, the epistemic safety theory complements contextualist theories, where a difference is established between sceptical-thought and everyday contexts. In this way, it is claimed that conviction–i.e., when the bases upon which a belief is constructed remain unquestioned–is an intellectual virtue that makes trustworthy processes in near worlds possible. Finally, the aim of the paper is to highlight the modal (...) difference between beliefs that presuppose near worlds as their core and those that take nearby words as their core. (shrink)

En las dos entregas anteriores abordamos el inicio de la evolución del pensamiento matemático, desde el uso de herramientas matemáticas para problemas de cálculo concreto en la antigua Babilonia, pasando por el inicio de las matemáticas abstractas, las demostraciones y el nacimiento de la “geometría por la geometría” desde la visión religioso-filosófica de Platón y los pitagóricos, hasta la síntesis de ambas visiones en las matemáticas de la India, China y el mundo árabe, que fue la puerta de entrada de (...) las matemáticas a Europa, alrededor del siglo XV. (shrink)

My aim here is to answer the question about why is there something rather than nothing by arguing for the existence of some necessary beings (that, as such, couldn’t not exist) – the space, the time, and the natural basic laws – and by showing that the existence of nothingness is logically impossible. I also try to account for the fact that contingent beings arise from necessary beings by distinguishing between necessary existence and necessary arising, as to answer the question (...) about why is there anything contingent at all and to propose a solution to the Dilemma of Contingency. (shrink)

Descartes niega que una máquina pueda ser inteligente, pues los mecanismos son predecibles, inflexibles y limitados. Los seguidores de la Inteligencia Artificial clásica (o IA fuerte) argumentan lo contrario. Pese a esto, Descartes y la IA proponen que la mente podría no estar adscrita a propiedades físicas, posibilidad explorada por el primero a partir de una intuición modal que separa mente y cuerpo. La IA fuerte se acerca a esta tesis cuando reduce la mente a una Máquina de Turing cuya (...) realización física resulta irrelevante. Aunque ambos argumentos presuponen teorías e implicancias diferentes, en este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo resulta compatible con una forma de Dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica del Materialismo que originalmente la inspiró. (shrink)

Christine Tappolet’s book Philosophy of Emotion: A contemporary introduction, and many other works in emotion theory, focus primarily on emotional episodes at the expense of so-called “emotional dispositions.” I argue that there are no reasons for theories of emotion to focus on emotional episodes, or to reserve the term “emotion” for emotional episodes.

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

It is often claimed that fear has an important epistemological function in making us aware of danger. Reactive theories challenge this view. According to them, fear is a response to real or apparent danger. In other words, real or apparent danger is the reason for which we experience fear. Thus, fear depends on awareness of danger instead of making us aware of danger. Proponents of the reactive theory have appealed to phenomenological and, most prominently, linguistic observations to support their views. (...) In particular, they argue that how we talk about the objects of fear supports the view that fear is a response (rather than a perception), and that how we talk about reasons for fear supports the view that reasons for fear are necessarily evaluative (about danger). Building on systematic linguistic observations in the form of corpus analyses and survey data, we argue that how we talk about the objects of fear and how we talk about reasons for fear do not support the reactive theory. Indeed, these linguistic considerations undermine the reactive theory. Most importantly, they suggest that there are non-evaluative reasons for fear. This is good news for rival theories, like perceptual theories, which hold that emotions have epistemic value in contributing to knowledge of evaluative properties such as danger. (shrink)

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and (...) ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions. (shrink)

Against the epicurean position, the rationality about the preoccupation with death is discussed by the present paper. For this purpose two elemental thesis are proposed. The first one supports that it is rational to worry about death before dying because we conceive the idea of a discourse in which the impossibility of interfere in the world to satisfy our pending goals is lamented. The second thesis is that death afflicts any prejudice only to whom wonders about it, because this question (...) encloses the idea that one transcends by means of the achievement of our purpose, for that it is presupposed that with death the interests and aim are kept constant. (shrink)

Los objetivos específicos son los siguientes: (i) reconstruir en forma sistemática la relación entre λόγος y ἔθος/ἄσκησις desarrollada por Musonio Rufo en las Disertaciones 5 y 6; (ii) postular las reflexiones de Aristóteles sobre el problema de la habituación como un marco conceptual relevante para encuadrar el análisis de ambas disertaciones; (iii) analizar las posibles tensiones lógicas entre la concepción de Musonio de ἔθος/ἄσκησις y la concepción intelectualista de la acción humana defendida por la ortodoxia estoica. Sugeriré asimismo que el (...) recurso a las Dissertationes de Epicteto puede ofrecer una respuesta tentativa a interrogantes no resueltos en las Disertaciones 5 y 6. -/- The specific goals are the following: (i) to put together in a systematic manner the relationship between λόγος and ἔθος/ἄσκησις presented by Musonius Rufus in Lectures 5 and 6; (ii) to propose Aristotle’s reflections on the problem of habituation as a relevant framework to make sense of both lectures; (iii) to analyze the possible logical conflicts between Musonius’ conception of ἔθος/ἄσκησις and the intellectualist conception of human agency defended by Stoic orthodoxy. I will further suggest that Epictetus’ Discourses may offer a tentative answer to questions that are left unanswered in Lectures 5 and 6. (shrink)

La respuesta que demos a la problemática del nominalismo en la obra de Baruch Spinoza determina en forma decisiva las posibilidades de responder satisfactoriamente a la pregunta por la naturaleza humana. Dictaminar (junto con numerosos intérpretes contemporáneos) que el spinozismo se construye sin concesiones sobre principios nominalistas, implica sustraer todo fundamento ontológico a las consideraciones acerca de la natura humana, piedra de toque de la deducción spinozista de los afectos y de las estrategias terapéuticas que señalan el camino hacia la (...) beatitudo. Nuestra intención, por el contrario, consistirá en señalar el componente necesariamente universal que subyace bajo la psicología spinozista, para lo cual habremos de señalar ciertos aspectos centrales en cuanto a la problemática de los géneros de conocimiento, así como respecto de la teoría spinozista de la definición. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo propongo una interpretación de las Dissertationes de Epicteto estructurada sobre dos argumentos centrales: el Argumento Eudaimonista y el Argumento Teleológico. Sugeriré que a pesar de las estrategias que el autor presenta para evitar la acusación de solipsismo, Epicteto no puede escapar a la misma, y que la figura de la divinidad adquiere, por esa misma razón, una dimensión que ha sido desestimada por los comentaristas contemporáneos. -/- In the present paper I put forward an interpretation of (...) Epictetus Discourses which is based on two main arguments: the Eudaimonistic Argument and the Teleological Argument. I suggest that despite the author's strategies to avoid the accusation of solipsism, Epictetus cannot escape it, and that the figure of the divinity acquires, for this very reason, a dimension that has been overlooked by contemporary critics. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento que, pese al llamado “escepticismo cartesiano”, el significado y alcance de la refutación cartesiana del escéptico y del ateo pueden comprenderse a la luz de tres hitos metafísicos. En la primera sección examino de qué forma este filósofo emplea argumentos escépticos como método, no como fin. Tal como enfatizo, el cogito es el punto en que la duda hiperbólica debe detenerse. Luego, en la segunda sección, discuto por qué Descartes es contrario al fideísmo. Debido a que (...) este se relaciona con el escepticismo, y con la imposibilidad de probar la existencia de Dios, Descartes prueba que Él existe. Sostengo, en la sección final, que Dios es garante de la certeza epistemológica, incluso en el caso de las ideas claras y distintas, cuya confiabilidad pareciera en peligro debido a la hipótesis escéptica del genio maligno. Según el francés, entonces, probar que Dios existe es necesario para garantizar el conocimiento cierto, y es base para inferir la existencia del mundo externo. Los tres hitos, entonces, parecen suficientes para delimitar el sentido y alcance del llamado escepticismo cartesiano. (shrink)

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...) to reply to the appeals made by AI emotional expressions? In this paper, we examine the conditions under which AI emotional expressions could give us prudential or even moral reasons to change our behavior. We argue that these conditions do not depend on whether the emotional expression is genuine or not, but rather on the presence of features some of which can be implemented in emotive AI given our current level of technological development. We extract recommendations and warnings for the development of emotive AI. (shrink)

The present paper aims to revisit the virtues and disadvantages of epistemic conservatism, which claims that it is rational to adhere to a belief until there is evidence to the contrary. Two main theses are put forward: first, while conservatism presents several epistemological flaws, from a contextualist point of view it is not only desirable but also is essential to knowledge accumulation in everyday life; second, conservatism provides a solution to sceptical challenges and to the problem of easy knowledge.

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

In this article, we will analyze the positive dimension of silencing for epistemic practices. Since: silencing refers to a communicative impediment; and at least in part our epistemic agency depends on this ability to express and make ourselves understood, it would be possible to conclude that silencing necessarily harms our epistemic interactions. However, Barrett Emerick reminds us that in some cases silencing helps to preserve the integrity and dignity of those whose epistemic agency is violated. Based on this initial insight, (...) we listed three premises that culminated in the justification for silencing other people: epistemic silences stem from socio-historical processes and the power relations that permeate them; the limits of epistemic agencies are established through social norms and conventions that affect identities in different ways; and, the dignity of the human person must be the criterion for establishing the limits between what should or should not be said. Considering that in order to act correctly it is necessary not only the justifications for acting, but also the appropriate occasion, we defend that practical wisdom is the proper virtue for individuals, groups and institutions to know when to silence other people. (shrink)

En este ensayo argumento que, en la ontología social de John Searle, existe un círculo virtuoso entre la cooperación, las instituciones y los poderes deónticos. Son categorías de la realidad social que se retroalimentan y fortalecen mutuamente. La primera sección es introductoria a los conceptos y problemas aquí tratados, mientras que la segunda versa sobre el abecé de la ontología social. En la tercera sección abordo cómo las instituciones están ligadas a prácticas sociales; es decir, las primeras de alguna manera (...) sintetizan la existencia de las segundas. Sin instituciones no podría haber ciertas prácticas, y estas necesariamente llevan a la creación de instituciones. Finalmente, en la última sección argumento acerca de la existencia de un círculo virtuoso entre la cooperación (y la confianza), las instituciones y los poderes deónticos en la realidad social. Es decir, sostengo que existe un fenómeno de retroalimentación y de fortalecimiento mutuo, en tanto la existencia de una categoría fortalece la existencia de las demás categorías. (shrink)

This article addresses a neglected problem in Searle’s social ontology, namely, how human civilization may collapse. In the first section, I provide the theoretical framework. In the second section, I offer the key elements to understanding Searle’s ontology as well as his philosophy of society, emphasizing the role of constitutive rules and deontic powers. In the third section I examine how they improve trust and co-operation. Global and local natural disasters are distinguished in the fourth section, because the former is (...) sufficient to undermine pacts, promises, constitutive rules and deontic powers, while the latter is neither sufficient nor necessary. In the fifth and final section, I put forward an argument via a thought experiment that allows us to anticipate what would occur if people did not keep promises and pacts, on the one hand, and did not respect constitutive rules and deontic powers, on the other hand. Such events, I argue, would result in the collapse of civilization. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis to defend the philosophical view of the new ante rem substantivism against its supposed alternatives. To achieve such goal, we will present four views about the nature of laws, two kinds of realism and two kinds of anti-realism, and evaluate them critically. The disadvantages from those theories are going to be presented for us to show that they are insufficient to provide a metaphysics that is able to explain the world's counterfactuality, universality, and regularity, and (...) that just one form of realism, the new ante rem substantivism, can. This goal is important because the concept of laws of nature is widely used in many areas of science and philosophy, and because according to the view we accept, the laws may fulfill some theoretical roles, and not others. We intent to show that the new ante rem substantivism's laws are able to fulfill the roles that scientists would hope the natural laws to fulfill. (shrink)

It was argued by Célia Teixeira (2003) that the actualized descriptivist theory of names have the problem of generating undesired epistemic necessities. In this paper I want to argue for a descriptivis theory that does not suffer from such problem. For this I will explain Teixeira's objections and later present my own conception of an actualized descriptivist theory of names; it is, protected against the problem of undesired necessities.

The current challenges of implementing responsible innovation can in part be traced back to the assumptions behind the ways of thinking that ground the different pre-existing theories and approaches that are shared under the RI-umbrella. Achieving the ideals of RI, therefore not only requires a shift on an operational and systemic level but also at the paradigm-level. In order to develop a deeper understanding of this paradigm shift, this paper analyses the paradigm-level assumptions that are being brought forward by the (...) different conceptualizations of RI. To this purpose it deploys a pragmatic stance on paradigms that allows discerning ontological and axiological elements shared by the RI community and an accompanying critical hermeneutic research approach that enables the profiling of paradigmatic beliefs and assumptions of accounts of RI. The research surfaces the distance of four salient RI accounts from the currently dominant techno-economic innovation paradigm RI seeks to shift. With this, our contribution helps to raise the self-awareness of the RI community about their presuppositions and the paradigm level barriers and enablers to reaching the RI ideal. This insight is needed for a successful transition to responsible research and innovation practices. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to indicate the purpose of education and how it implies changes in the curricula of basic education and in the methods of teaching, guidance and evaluation. We start with the concepts of capacities and overlapping consensus, created respectively by Amartya Sen and John Rawls, and find something that we can call a good life and what it means to improve life. So, we established that education should have as its primary function to enable the (...) subject to lead a good life in harmony with the social environment. To decide whether the basic educational curriculum fulfills this function, we started with an analysis of school subjects. We realized that both the curriculum and the teaching methods were important for the fulfillment of the function of education, and that Brazilian basic education fails to fulfill these two points satisfactorily, as the current curriculum does not fully enable the individual to lead a good life and teaching methods are not guided and evaluated pedagogically by professionals. Anyway, the conclusion we reached was that we need certain changes in the curriculum and teaching methods. / O objetivo deste artigo é indicar qual a finalidade da educação e como isso implica modificações nos currículos da educação básica e nos métodos de orientação e avaliação de ensino. Partimos dos conceitos de capacidades e consenso sobreposto, criados respectivamente por Amartya Sen e John Rawls, e encontramos algo que podemos chamar de vida boa e o que significa melhoria de vida. Então, estabelecemos que a educação deve ter como função primordial capacitar o sujeito a levar uma vida boa em harmonia com o meio social. Para decidirmos se o currículo educacional básico cumpre essa função, partimos para uma análise das disciplinas escolares. Percebemos que tanto o currículo, quanto os métodos de ensino eram importantes para a realização da função da educação, e que a educação básica brasileira não consegue cumprir esses dois pontos satisfatoriamente, pois o currículo atual não capacita plenamente o indivíduo a levar uma vida boa e os métodos de ensino não são orientados e avaliados pedagogicamente por profissionais. Enfim, a conclusão que chegamos foi a de que precisamos de certas mudanças no currículo e nos métodos de ensino. (shrink)

The aim of the paper will be to analyze the different strategies that the Stoics of the Imperial times designed in order to put our sense of justice on hold, due to the fact that it is deemed responsible for certain attitudes which do not contribute to our search for _eudaimonía_. I will organize such strategies in two groups: the first one corresponds to the strategies that target the idea that an injustice has been committed; the second one corresponds to (...) the ones that aim to show that there are more convenient attitudes towards injustice than the demand for punishment or the desire for revenge. I will end by pointing at the difficulty of reconciling both sets of strategies, and I will suggest a possible way to account for that difficulty. (shrink)

This paper examines an insoluble Cartesian problem for classical AI, namely, how linguistic understanding involves knowledge and awareness of u’s meaning, a cognitive process that is irreducible to algorithms. As analyzed, Descartes’ view about reason and intelligence has paradoxically encouraged certain classical AI researchers to suppose that linguistic understanding suffices for machine intelligence. Several advocates of the Turing Test, for example, assume that linguistic understanding only comprises computational processes which can be recursively decomposed into algorithmic mechanisms. Against this background, in (...) the first section, I explain Descartes’ view about language and mind. To show that Turing bites the bullet with his imitation game, in the second section I analyze this method to assess intelligence. Then, in the third section, I elaborate on Schank and Abelsons’ Script Applier Mechanism (SAM, hereby), which supposedly casts doubt on Descartes’ denial that machines can think. Finally, in the fourth section, I explore a challenge that any algorithmic decomposition of linguistic understanding faces. This challenge, I argue, is the core of the Cartesian problem: knowledge and awareness of meaning require a first-person viewpoint which is irreducible to the decomposition of algorithmic mechanisms. (shrink)

With this book we want to illustrate the way we philosophers think that public argument and debate should be. Our goal is not to present a collection of academic texts. Although most of us are part of the academy, we want to present to the lay public shorter, more essay-like texts, originally published on an Internet page called Refutations. The page is not, of course, an academic journal; it is a digital magazine with opinion texts that share simplicity, rigor and (...) total accessibility to anyone not initiated to the philosophers' way of thinking. And although the magazine's columnists are friends, they actively disagree on the most diverse topics, such as politics, economics, ethics and art. The reader, therefore, has before him a book with the most varied opinions on some of the main contemporary themes. Naturally, we do not expect to have the last word on any matter. Our intention is much more modest, but also very important: to show that it is possible, even without putting an end to the debates, to think in a creative, clear and civilized way. / Com este livro queremos ilustrar a maneira como nós, filósofos, pensamos que a argumentação e o debate públicos devem ser. Nosso objetivo não é apresentar uma coletânea de textos acadêmicos. Embora a maioria de nós seja parte da academia, queremos apresentar ao público leigo textos mais curtos e ensaísticos, originalmente publicados em uma página na Internet chamada Refutações. A página não é, naturalmente, um periódico acadêmico; trata-se de uma revista digital com textos de opinião que compartilham a simplicidade, o rigor e a total acessibilidade a qualquer não iniciado ao modo de pensar dos filósofos. E, embora os colunistas da revista sejam amigos, eles discordam ativamente a respeito dos mais diversos temas, como política, economia, ética e arte. O leitor, portanto, tem diante de si um livro com as mais variadas opiniões a respeito de alguns dos principais temas contemporâneos. Naturalmente, não esperamos dar a última palavra a respeito de qualquer assunto. Nossa pretensão é bem mais modesta, mas também muito importante: mostrar que é possível, mesmo sem colocar pontos finais aos debates, pensar de forma criativa, clara e civilizada. (shrink)

Since the automation revolution of our technological era, diverse machines or robots have gradually begun to reconfigure our lives. With this expansion, it seems that those machines are now faced with a new challenge: more autonomous decision-making involving life or death consequences. This paper explores the philosophical possibility of artificial moral agency through the following question: could a machine obtain the cognitive capacities needed to be a moral agent? In this regard, I propose to expose, under a normative-cognitive perspective, the (...) minimum criteria through which we could recognize an artificial entity as a genuine moral entity. Although my proposal should be considered from a reasonable level of abstraction, I will critically analyze and identify how an artificial agent could integrate those cognitive features. Finally, I intend to discuss their limitations or possibilities. (shrink)

La literatura sobre razonamiento probatorio busca incidir en la determinación de los hechos en los procesos judiciales. Para alcanzar dicho propósito, no basta con dirigir la mirada hacia disciplinas extrajurídicas exitosas e integrar lo que de ellas pueda extraerse a las teorías jurídicas de la prueba y a la práctica judicial. Es necesario, además, considerar el tipo de hechos a probar, los roles de las reglas jurídicas aplicables, y asumir que litigantes y jueces, actuando en un contexto institucional, podrán ser (...) más o menos agudos en la discusión fáctica, entre otras cosas. Minimizar la influencia de tales factores expone a los estudios probatorios a tener un bajo rendimiento práctico. Algo de esto ha ocurrido con la llamada concepción racionalista de la prueba. Su innegable aporte al debate académico en español no ha ido a la par de su impacto judicial. Para explicar esta brecha entre teoría y práctica, identificamos tres creencias-obstáculo que afectan a su discurso sobre la prueba y que deben ser sorteadas si lo que se busca es influir en la forma en que se juzgan los hechos en un sistema judicial realmente existente. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo examinar cómo el legado kantiano de la razón crítica sigue vigente, pues se sostiene en un imperativo teórico fundado en la autonomía. Tal como argumento, este imperativo «categórico-teórico» se estructura gracias a la primacía de la razón práctica por sobre la razón teórica. El ensayo está estructurado en tres secciones. En la primera discuto brevemente el compromiso con la verdad propio de la ética de Sócrates y Platón, quienes inauguran el racionalismo crítico, según Popper. Luego, (...) en la segunda sección examino la filosofía kantiana y su propuesta, la cual ciertamente influye en el «Tratado contra el Método» de Paul Feyerabend. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, analizo la conexión entre razón crítica y razón teórica. En particular, muestro que la primera gobierna la segunda, y que la autonomía es parte de la naturaleza racional humana. Dicha naturaleza ciertamente explica por qué la razón crítica sigue vigente en la época contemporánea. (shrink)

Are emotions bodily feelings or evaluative cognitions? What is happiness, pain, or “being moved”? Are there basic emotions? In this chapter, I review extant empirical work concerning these and related questions in the philosophy of emotion. This will include both (1) studies investigating people’s emotional experiences and (2) studies investigating people’s use of emotion concepts in hypothetical cases. Overall, this review will show the potential of using empirical research methods to inform philosophical questions regarding emotion.