Although the tradition of the Buddhist logic in India had been developed through the debates with non-Buddhists, that in pre-modern Japan hardly had such experiences. The applications of inmyō were limited to the disputes between the Hossō school (Japanese transmission of Yogācāra school) and another Buddhist schools. During the rapid modernization and westernization after the Meiji restoration, however, Buddhist logicians also encountered the non-Buddhist cultures including the deductive and inductive logics, Christianity, democracy and republicanism imported from Western countries. A part (...) of them, such as Kira Kōyō, regarded inmyō as useful for the democratic discussion, and promoted it to the politicians and the legal professionals. Their introductory books about inmyō included many sample expressions which criticized the existence of God and the authenticity of republicanism, as well as the unequal treaties forced by Europe and America. In spite of those efforts, inmyō did not become popular in modern Japan. In addition, it also lost the scholars' interest in the twentieth century, because of the introduction of the scriptures of Indian logic in Sanskrit and Tibetan. But the inmyō studies in Meiji period should not be ignored, since they were regarded not only as one of the intellectual refutations to the West in East Asia, but also as the previous researches which were studied by East Asian scholars of the Buddhist logic. (shrink)

Since the mid-twentieth century, treatments of code switching and associated practices have converged toward understanding linguistic hybridity and diverse sociality amid accelerating globalization of peoples, social groups, and commodified languages. This chapter reviews four traditions of code switching research that suggest divergent theoretical perspectives on language and identity. The first, established in the 1960s within the ethnography of communication, situates code switching as a product of local speech community identities. Research on language and political economy in the 1980s initiated a (...) second tradition, which analyzes language alternation with reference to the contrastive nation-state identities constituted through processes of nationalism. A third tradition, influenced by the discursive turn in the 1990s, views code switching as a resource in urban minority communities for the performance of multicultural and interethnic identities. A fourth tradition, developed since the millennium, focuses on hybrid identities as the social corollary to the language mixing brought about through accelerated globalization. (shrink)

This paper examines the intergenerational justice theory of obligations to future generations. I refer to queer temporality theory and highly evaluate its radical questioning. However, I argue that its destructive conclusions need not be accepted. Proper divisions of time spans according to the nature of the problem is important in order to reach a moderate conclusion.

The present working paper analyzes the world order in the past, present and future as well as the main factors, foundations and ideas underlying the maintaining and change of the international and global order. The first two sections investigate the evolution of the world order starting from the ancient times up to the late twentieth century. The third section analyzes the origin and decline of the world order based on the American hegemony. The authors reveal contradictions of the current unipolar (...) world and explain in what way globalization has become more profitable for the developing countries but not for the developed ones. The paper also explains the strengthening belief that the US leading status will inevitably weaken. In this connection we discuss the alternatives of the American strategy and the possibility of the renaissance of the American leadership. The last section presents a factor analysis which allows stating that the world is shifting toward a new balance of power and is likely to become the world without a leader. The new world order will consist of a number of large blocks, coalitions and countries acting within a framework of rules and mutual responsibility. However, the transition to a new world order will take certain time (about two decades). This period, which we denote as the epoch of new coalitions, will involve a reconfiguration of the World-System and bring an increasing turbulence and conflict intensity. There are grounds to conclude that in 2011–2012 the World-System experienced to some extent a phase transition to a qualitatively new state of global protest activity. This phase transition is shown to bear some resemblance to the one which the World-System experienced in the early 1960s. The first (after 1919) phase transition of this sort occurred in the early 1960s and was related to the growth of global informational connectivity after the World War II, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of television, portable radio receivers, portable electric loud-speakers and other technologies of the Fourth Kondratieff Cycle. The phase transition of the early 2010s was prepared by a new wave of growth of global informational connectivity, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of various technologies of the Fifth Kondratieff cycle (the Internet, satellite television, Twitter and other social networks, mobile telephony etc.). Similarly to what was observed during the Fourth Kondratieff Wave, during the Fifth Cycle while the spread of these technologies was going on for many years before 2011, their internal colossal potential for generating and spreading protest activity was realized in one leap, as a phase transition. (shrink)

In the 1960s Mancur Olson and Samuel Huntington suggested that the positive correlation between per capita income and the level of sociopolitical destabilization that they detected for low and middle income countries might be partly accounted for by the growth of the inequality associated with the economic and technological development in these countries. The empirical tests we perform generally support this hypothesis, but they also identify certain limits for such an explanation. Our tests reveal for low and middle income countries (...) a statistically significant correlation between GDP per capita and the economic inequality levels, but this correlation is not particularly strong. Earlier we found for the same countries significantly stronger positive correlations between GDP per capita and some important components of sociopolitical destabilization, such as the intensity of political assassinations, general strikes and anti-government demonstrations. It is quite clear that the strong association between the increase in the intensity of these components of sociopolitical destabilization and GDP per capita growth, can be explained by a much weaker tendency toward the growth of economic inequality only partly. In addition, our empirical tests suggest the presence of a certain threshold level of about 40 points on the Gini scale, after crossing which one can expect a radical increase in levels of sociopolitical destabilization in general, and the intensity of terrorist acts / guerrilla warfare and anti-government demonstrations in particular. According to the World Bank, the value of the Gini coefficient for Russia is now just in this zone, which suggests that the further growth of inequality in Russia could lead to an abrupt increase in political destabilization. (shrink)