Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...) argue that this deadlock can be traced back to an inadequate understanding of inner sense shared by both sides. Drawing upon an analysis of the notion of obscure representations, I offer an alternative interpretation of inner sense with a special regard to self-affection, apprehension, and attention. From this basis, I will infer that outer sense delivers sensory content that is initially and intrinsically unaccompanied by phenomenal consciousness; inner sense contributes by endowing such content with phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, phenomenal qualities can be regarded as the sensory manifold of inner sense. This alternative interpretation solves the long-standing dispute concerning inner sensations and would further illuminate Kant’s notion of inner experience. (shrink)

It is well known that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness: transcendental apperception and empirical apperception (or, approximately, inner sense). However, Kant sometimes claims that “I think,” the general expression of transcendental apperception, expresses an indeterminate empirical inner intuition (IEI), which differs in crucial ways from the empirical inner intuition produced by inner sense. Such claims undermine Kant’s conceptual framework and constitute a recalcitrant obstacle to understanding his theory of self-consciousness. This paper analyzes the relevant passages, evaluates the major (...) interpretations of IEI, revisits the notion of pure apperception, and proposes an alternative reading: IEI is a ubiquitous, nonfocal, “obscure,” and empirical inner intuition that is built into all nonintrospective conscious states. This reading can successfully account for the peculiarities of IEI, resolving a major mystery in Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Recent discourse in the philosophy of scientific explanation involves an account known as the Kairetic account. I proposed implementing a complementarity view involving a mapping scheme to the Kairetic account and similar models. There are two natural concerns related to this mapping. The first concern is the treatment of multiple mappings required for an explanation: phenomena may involve two complementarity features. The second concern is regarding the acquisition of understanding and whether context-dependence facilitates understanding. This article aims to address the (...) first thought through an example involving interference and photon detectors in a telescope. I claim that context-dependent mapping is on a particle basis, accommodating the wave-particle duality for every single particle without generalization. I further introduce the implications of mathematical developments of a complementarity relation grounded in the uncertainty principle. In addition, I will offer the stance that context-dependence facilitates understanding because it ensures that explanations are logically consistent, precise, relevant, and comprehensive. (shrink)

Discussions in the philosophy of explanation involving scientific explanations often include a form of logical entailment, causal history, unification, and more. Strevens constructs the Kairetic account in an attempt to unify the entailment structure, causal relations, and the notion of difference-making in a manner that also offers high-level explanations. When dealing with quantum mechanics, Strevens then points toward Railton's account of probabilities, known as the DNP account. In this paper, I will introduce the preliminary accounts (D-N, causal, Unificationism) and the (...) Kairetic and DNP accounts and offer an extension of the Kairetic/DNP account to accommodate the view of complementarities. This will be done through a scheme that I call "context-dependent mapping." This will be illustrated in a couple of example cases. (shrink)

This paper explores the integration of Michael Strevens' concept of idealizations with my previous framework of similarity spaces and context-dependence to develop a comprehensive account of ideal explanations in scientific practice. Idealizations, which involve deliberate falsifications, play a crucial role in distinguishing between causally relevant and irrelevant factors in scientific models. Context-dependent mapping provides a structured approach to handling complementarities and context-dependent phenomena by mapping different observational contexts to distinct sets of physical laws. By combining these two ideas, I will (...) construct an idealized context-dependent mapping structure and discuss how ideal similarity spaces within the framework of context-dependent mapping can enhance our understanding of complex scientific phenomena, especially those involving wave-particle duality and black hole complementarity. I also aim to discuss the types of idealizations that may exist within explanation and examine their relations to the mapping. (shrink)

People often think of objects teleologically. For instance, we might understand a hammer in terms of its purpose of driving in nails. But how should we understand teleological thinking in the first place? This paper separates mere teleology (simply ascribing a telos) and teleological explanation (thinking something is explained by its telos) by examining cases where an object was designed for one purpose but is now widely used for a different purpose. Across four experiments, we show that teleology judgments and (...) teleological explanation judgments are dissociable, and identify three factors that influenced teleology judgments (and one that did not). (shrink)

Recent psychological research shown that the places where we live are linked to our personality traits. Geographical aggregation of personalities has been observed in many individualistic nations; notably, the mountainousness is an essential component in understanding regional variances in personality. Could mountainousness therefore also explain the clustering of personality-types in collectivist countries like China? Using a nationwide survey (29,838 participants) in Mainland China, we investigated the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and mountainousness indicators at the provincial level. Multilevel (...) modelling showed significant negative associations between the elevation coefficient of variation (Elevation CV) and the Big Five personality traits, whereas mean elevation (Elevation Mean) and the standard deviation in elevation (Elevation STD) were positively associated with human personalities. Subsequent machine learning analyses showed that, for example, Elevation Mean outperformed other mountainousness indicators regarding correlations with neuroticism, while Elevation CV performed best relative to openness models. Our results mirror some previous findings, such as the positive association between openness and Elevation STD, while also revealing cultural differences, such as the social desirability of people living in China’s mountainous areas. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...) judge that “I feel pain,” we are tautologically aware that feels pain is instantiated and that it is instantiated in oneself. Moreover, he contends that this relationship holds not just for bodily sensations, but also for the sense of agency and for visual perception. But we deny that this relationship is tautological; instead, we treat Shoemaker’s principle (IEM) as a hypothesis. We then proceed to show that certain pathological states and experimentally-induced illusions can be adduced to show that IEM describes not a necessary relationship but a contingent relationship, one that sometimes fails to obtain. That we are not immune to error in the way Shoemaker describes has grave consequences for many aspects of his ideas concerning the first-person perspective. In the course of arguing that these empirical phenomena count against IEM, we also show that not only can the content of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the subject: that is, not only can the what of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the who. (shrink)

This paper integrates type functionalism with the Kairetic account to develop context-specific models for explaining mental states, particularly pain, across different species and systems. By employing context-dependent mapping f_c, we ensure cohesive causal explanations while accommodating multiple realizations of mental states. The framework identifies context subsets C_i and maps them to similarity subspaces S_i, capturing the unique physiological, biochemical, and computational mechanisms underlying pain in different entities such as humans, octopi, and AI systems. This approach highlights the importance of causal (...) relations in defining mental states and preserves their functional roles across diverse contexts. Furthermore, the paper incorporates elements of token functionalism by recognizing species-specific realizations of mental states. By acknowledging the unique representations of mental states within different species and systems, the framework provides a nuanced understanding of how similar functional roles can be fulfilled by diverse physical substrates. This synthesis of type and token functionalism enhances our explanatory power and coherence in addressing the complex nature of mental states. The resulting framework offers a robust tool for analyzing and understanding mental phenomena, with significant implications for cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and artificial intelligence. By maintaining the functional roles of mental states while accommodating their multiple realizations, this approach not only advances theoretical understanding but also opens new avenues for practical applications in cross-species empathy, AI ethics, and the development of context-aware cognitive models. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence(AI) is a subject nurtured by western traditional philosophy and modern science, it studies how to build Intelligent machine system and expands human intelligence. The biggest problem of AI being treated is structural imbalance, which the technology is advanced, while the intelligent generation and AI Ethics are weakened. In the development of Chinese religion, The Book of Changes is not only the representative of primitive religion, but also promoted the birth of Taoism, it played an important role in shaping (...) Chinese Buddhism, and integrating Islam, Catholicism, and Christianity into Chinese religion. The biggest problem of Chinese religion being treated is how to get rid of the backwardness of ancient superstition and clear its position as well as function under the background of globalization and modernization. There are many intersections between AI and The Book of Changes in cognitive science, human intelligence, ethical construction and so on, which provides the possibility for both parties to have a mutual therapeutic dialogue. In a word, the AI's structural imbalance which brings the fragmentation and utilitarian problems can be treated from the intuitive, holistic and dialectical thinking of The Book of Changes. While the Chinese religion that has been deeply shaped by The Book of Changes can obtain prescriptions from the AI discipline system. (shrink)

Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the (...) HOT necessarily representsthe subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say, conscious presence does not imply mental ownership. (shrink)

A primary aim of mind-wandering research has been to understand its influence on task performance. While this research has typically highlighted the costs of mind wandering, a handful of studies have suggested that mind wandering may be beneficial in certain situations. Perhaps the most-touted benefit is that mind wandering during a creative-incubation interval facilitates creative thinking. This finding has played a critical role in the development of accounts of the adaptive value of mind wandering and its functional role, as well (...) as potential mechanisms of mind wandering. Thus, a demonstration of the replicability of this important finding is warranted. Here, we attempted to conceptually replicate results of a highly cited laboratory-based experiment supporting this finding. However, across two studies (N = 443), we found no evidence for the claim that mind wandering during a creative-incubation interval facilitates a form of creativity associated with divergent thinking. We suggest that our failed conceptual replication stems from an inadequate characterization of mind wandering (task-unrelated thought), and that there are good reasons to think that task-unrelated thought is unlikely to be causally related to creativity. Our results cast doubt on the claim that task-unrelated thought during an incubation interval enhances divergent creativity while also offering some prescriptions for how future research might further elucidate the cognitive benefits of mind wandering. (shrink)

Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We (...) begin by introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage. (shrink)

According to Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, first-order mental states become conscious only when they are targeted by HOTs that necessarily represent the states as belonging to self. On this view a state represented as belonging to someone distinct from self could not be a conscious state. Rosenthal develops this view in terms of what he calls the ‘thin immunity principle’ (TIP). According to TIP, when I experience a conscious state, I cannot be wrong about whether it is (...) I who I think is in that state. We first suggest that TIP is a direct consequence of the HOT theory. Next we argue that somatoparaphrenia—a pathology in which sensations are sometimes represented as belonging to other people—shows that TIP can be violated. This violation of TIP in turn shows that the HOT theory’s claim that conscious states are necessarily represented as belonging to self is in error. Rosenthal’s attempt to account for pathological cases is found to be inadequate when applied to somatoparaphrenia, and other possible defenses are also shown to be incapable of preserving TIP. We further conclude by suggesting that the HOT theory’s failing in this regard is not a failing that is peculiar to this theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Liver transplantation (LT) activities during the COVID-19 pandemic have been curtailed in many countries. The impact of various policies restricting LT on outcomes of potential LT candidates is unclear. We studied all patients on the nationwide LT waitlists in Hong Kong and Singapore between January 2016 and May 2020. We used continuous time Markov chains to model the effects of different scenarios and varying durations of disruption on LT candidates.

This study investigated changes in the prevalence of depression, stress, and suicidal attempts during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ≥19-year-old population in the Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey in 2019 and 2020 was included. The histories of depression, stress, and suicidal attempts were compared between the 2019 and 2020 cohorts using multiple logistic regression analysis with complex sampling. The prevalence of depression was not significantly different between the 2019 and 2020 groups (4.1% vs. 4.5%, p = 0.326). The prevalence (...) of stress and suicide attempts was also not significantly different between groups (all p > 0.05). The rates of depression, stress, and suicide attempts were not associated with the 2020 group compared to the 2019 group (all p > 0.05). The 19- to 39-year-old group in the 2020 group indicated a higher rate of depression (diagnosed by physicians) than the 19- to 39-year-old group in the 2019 group (adjusted odds ratio = 1.58, 95% confidence intervals = 1.00–2.50, p = 0.049). The risks of depression, stress, and suicidal attempts were not related to the COVID-19 pandemic in Korean adults. A young adult population demonstrated an increased risk of depression associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

COVID-19 often manifests with different outcomes in different patients, highlighting the complexity of the host-pathogen interactions involved in manifestations of the disease at the molecular and cellular levels. In this paper, we propose a set of postulates and a framework for systematically understanding complex molecular host-pathogen interaction networks. Specifically, we first propose four host-pathogen interaction (HPI) postulates as the basis for understanding molecular and cellular host-pathogen interactions and their relations to disease outcomes. These four postulates cover the evolutionary dispositions involved (...) in HPIs, the dynamic nature of HPI outcomes, roles that HPI components may occupy leading to such outcomes, and HPI checkpoints that are critical for specific disease outcomes. Based on these postulates, an HPI Postulate and Ontology (HPIPO) framework is proposed to apply interoperable ontologies to systematically model and represent various granular details and knowledge within the scope of the HPI postulates, in a way that will support AI-ready data standardization, sharing, integration, and analysis. As a demonstration, the HPI postulates and the HPIPO framework were applied to study COVID-19 with the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO), leading to a novel approach to rational design of drug/vaccine cocktails aimed at interrupting processes occurring at critical host-coronavirus interaction checkpoints. Furthermore, the host-coronavirus protein-protein interactions (PPIs) relevant to COVID-19 were predicted and evaluated based on prior knowledge of curated PPIs and domain-domain interactions, and how such studies can be further explored with the HPI postulates and the HPIPO framework is discussed. (shrink)

This paper provides a structured response to Jingkai Liang’s On Forward Time Travel, focusing on forward time travel paradigms: “stretched-out streaks,” where travelers experience slowed passage of time, and “broken streaks,” representing instantaneous leaps forward. Using the Philosophy of Ethical Empirical Rationalism, we introduce three key insights—termed Hume’s Beacons—to examine continuity of identity, the measurability of time, and the ethical considerations involved in skipping time. Each insight is explored through hypotheses rooted in empirical observation, rational justification, and ethical application, (...) offering Liang a framework for further analysis of forward time travel. Visual models accompany each hypothesis to provide clarity. This paper aims to expand the discourse on temporal metaphysics by grounding theoretical time travel concepts in empirical rationalism and ethical reasoning. (shrink)

Liang Tao and Kuang Zhao, trans. Confucian rights can be characterized as a kind of “fallback apparatus,” necessary only when preferred mechanisms—for example, familial and neighborly care or traditional courtesies—would otherwise fail to protect basic human interests. In this paper, I argue that the very existence of such rights is contingent on their ability to function as remedies for dysfunctional social relationships or failures to develop the virtues that sustain harmonious Confucian relationships. Moreover, these remedies are not, strictly speaking, (...) rights-based, for having a right consists in having the power to claim one's rights for oneself, which the classical Confucians would curtail. I conclude by noting how we might revise standard assumptions about the practice of “claiming one's rights” to make it more compatible with core Confucian principles. 梁涛 匡钊译 儒家权利可称为是一种“备用机制”（fallback apparatus），诉诸权利仅当其他首选机制，如家族与邻里的关怀或对传统礼俗的依赖等，不能有效维护人们的基本利益时才是必要的。儒家权利的存在取决于其补救功能，其需要补救的是儒家谐社会关系及相应美德中 出现的危机、过失。但儒家的补救并不完全是基于权利之上的，古典儒家不认为人民可以代表自己提出主张，也不认为民众可以直接推翻昏庸的暴君，有抵抗权的主要是汤、武等第一级的贵族。对于儒家国家来讲，从制度上认可 人民的权利主张可能是获得社会和谐最有效的手段。. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the Earth King of Ba Sing Se, King Kuei, willfully maintained ignorance of the true state of his kingdom so that he could enjoy the privileges that came with his position, while remaining derelict in his duty to his people. The King maintains this ignorance at the expense of his people, both by condoning certain urban designs and by resisting knowledge that upsets his lifestyle. When the Avatar team first arrive at Ba Sing Se in “City (...) of Walls and Secrets,” Joo Dee tells them that the city has many walls and each wall serves a purpose, but people know there is more to the walls than their utility. This chapter looks at the ways that urban design promote artificial social homogeneity and prevent cross‐economic and cultural socialization. (shrink)

Somatoparaphrenia is a pathology of self characterized by the sense of alienaton from parts of one’s body. It is usually construed as a kind of delusional disorder caused by extensive right hemisphere lesions. Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are common in somatoparaphrenia but deep cortical regions (for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example, the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated (Valler and Ronschi 2009). Patients are often described as feeling that a limb belongs to another person and (...) thus attribute ownership of the limb and bodily sensation to someone else. There is also some question as to whether or not the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness can plausibly account for the depersonalization psychopathology of somatoparaphrenia (Liang and Lane 2009, Rosenthal 2010, Lane and Liang 2010). Liang and Lane argue that it cannot. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that it is the target of a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). When the HOT is itself is unconscious, the conscious state is still outer-directed. When the HOT is conscious, we have introspection and so the conscious thought is directed at the mental state. In section I, I briefly review the previous exchange between Lane and Liang and David Rosenthal. In section II, I further explore somatoparaphrenia and the nature of delusion while offering a number of additional replies to Lane and Liang. In section III, I examine the central notions of “mental state ownership” and “self-concepts” in an effort to account especially for the depersonalization aspect of somatoparaphrenia against the background of HOT theory. In section IV, I argue that to the extent that somatoparaphrenia casts doubt on the notion that some thoughts are “immune to error through misidentification” (IEM), the most fundamental aspect of IEM is still consistent with HOT theory. Overall, I argue that HOT theory is left unscathed by the pheneomenon of somatoparaphrenia and can even help to explain what happens in these cases. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia (...) and the Body Swap Illusion fail to meet those desiderata. Thus, despite being puzzling phenomena, somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion are not counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. (shrink)

This ninth volume of Collected Papers includes 87 papers comprising 982 pages on Neutrosophic Theory and its applications in Algebra, written between 2014-2022 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 81 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 19 countries: E.O. Adeleke, A.A.A. Agboola, Ahmed B. Al-Nafee, Ahmed Mostafa Khalil, Akbar Rezaei, S.A. Akinleye, Ali Hassan, Mumtaz Ali, Rajab Ali Borzooei , Assia Bakali, Cenap Özel, Victor Christianto, Chunxin Bo, Rakhal Das, Bijan Davvaz, R. Dhavaseelan, B. Elavarasan, Fahad Alsharari, T. (...) Gharibah, Hina Gulzar, Hashem Bordbar, Le Hoang Son, Emmanuel Ilojide, Tèmítópé Gbóláhàn Jaíyéolá, M. Karthika, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Huma Khan, Madad Khan, Mohsin Khan, Hee Sik Kim, Seon Jeong Kim, Valeri Kromov, R. M. Latif, Madeleine Al-Tahan, Mehmat Ali Ozturk, Minghao Hu, S. Mirvakili, Mohammad Abobala, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohammed Abdel-Sattar, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohamed Talea, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Aslam, Muhammad Aslam Malik, Muhammad Gulistan, Muhammad Shabir, G. Muhiuddin, Memudu Olaposi Olatinwo, Osman Anis, Choonkil Park, M. Parimala, Ping Li, K. Porselvi, D. Preethi, S. Rajareega, N. Rajesh, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Riad K. Al-Hamido, Yaser Saber, Arsham Borumand Saeid, Saeid Jafari, Said Broumi, A.A. Salama, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Songtao Shao, Seok-Zun Song, Tahsin Oner, M. Mohseni Takallo, Binod Chandra Tripathy, Tugce Katican, J. Vimala, Xiaohong Zhang, Xiaoyan Mao, Xiaoying Wu, Xingliang Liang, Xin Zhou, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Juanjuan Zhang. (shrink)

El conocimiento de la filosofía feminista del este asiático, en general, y de China en particular, se ha difundido habitualmente como apéndice dentro de las grandes historias de las ideas y del feminismo europeo como teoría y filosofía política. En el mejor de los casos, como puras notas al margen. En la actualidad, ya estamos en disposición de descentralizar las ideas y dar espacio a la historia, la diversidad de voces y textos de pensadoras no-europeas. Por lo tanto, el primer (...) objetivo de esta propuesta es contribuir a la presentación y descubrimiento, para el lector en castellano, de algunas perspectivas feministas chinas que no sólo ayudarán a conocer una desconocida pluralidad filosófica, sino, a la vez, quizás de modo más importante, a pensar “con” y “contra”, críticamente, las tesis de las pensadoras. Para sumar esfuerzos a las muchas voces filosóficas feministas que conceptúo como “in-disciplinadas”, pues se sitúan fuera de la disciplina y del canon filosófico hegemónico, la propuesta de capítulo presentará y disertará en torno a la figura de He-Yin Zhen (1880-1920?). Intelectualmente presentada como representativa del anarco-feminismo chino, sus escritos de vindicación, como “Sobre la venganza de las mujeres”, “Sobre la cuestión del trabajo de las mujeres” o “El Manifiesto Feminista”, datados en 1907 y que forman el corpus de artículos publicados por la autora durante su estancia como exiliada en Japón, se erigen en una defensa de las mujeres, desde una mirada internacionalista, y, a la vez, en un paso de restitución de lo que pertenece, por derecho, a las mujeres, conjugando las dos acepciones de la acción vindicatoria. El estudio que se propone partirá de la estructuración dialógica y reflexionada con los textos de la pensadora, poniendo la mirada frente a los mismos, en su textualidad y contexto, para explorar sus argumentos. Asimismo, se enfrentarán sus tesis a aquellas quizás más difundidas, como las surgidas de los ilustrados reformistas, como las expresadas por Liang Qichao (1873-1929) en su “Sobre la educación de las mujeres” (1897), explorando, entre otras cosas, hasta qué punto la autora responde y erosiona una trampa del reformismo ilustrado al defender derechos básicos, como la educación, como elemento subordinado al fortalecimiento -económico, social- de la China atravesada también por el mal del siglo XIX, por el espíritu finisecular. (shrink)