- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Results for 'Martin Schulte-Rüther'
977 found
Order:
- Aspectos da reprodução em bovinos.Deivid Marcel Souza da Silva - 2021 - Dissertation, Centro Universitário - AgesRESUMO A bovinocultura sempre esteve atrelada ao desenvolvimento do Brasil e, pensando no avanço, as exigências da máxima eficiência nos sistemas de criação foi pautada na forma de como conseguir realizar a reprodução de bovinos com ênfase na eficiência econômica e reprodutiva. O objetivo deste trabalho é elucidar as principais biotecnologias que auxiliam na maior produtividade reprodutiva de bovinos. Dessa forma, o estudo foi realizado usando artigos do banco de dados do Google acadêmico e SciELO, além de livros do acervo (...)
- Probleme des ‚kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion.Dennis Schulting - 2015 - Kant Studien 106 (4):561-580.:Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded, which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue (...)
- The "Proper" Tone of Critical Philosophy. Kant and Derrida on Metaphilosophy and the Use of Religious Tropes.Dennis Schulting - 2020 - In Sorin Baiasu & Alberto Vanzo (eds.), Kant and the Continental Tradition: Sensibility, Nature, and Religion. New York: Routledge.This is an essay on Kant's neglected late tract On a Recently Adopted Prominent Tone in Philosophy (RTP) and Derrida's oblique commentary on this work in his D'un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie. The theme of the essay is metaphilosophical and considers issues concerning the nature of critical philosophy, fanaticism (Schwärmerei), and the use of religious tropes in philosophy. I am primarily interested in the ways in which RTP thematises the legitimacy of speaking in an exalted, quasi-religious tone apropos (...)
- How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy.Hannah Altehenger, Leonhard Menges & Peter Schulte - 2024 - Philosophia (4):1-24.AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term—the (...)
- Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-255.In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content. Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intuition and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the (...)
- Kant, non-conceptuele inhoud en synthese.Dennis Schulting - 2010 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 72 (4):679-715.
- Remarks on Sprachgefühl.Joachim Schulte - 1988 - In J. C. Nyíri & Barry Smith (eds.), Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills. Croom Helm. pp. 136.
- Introduction.Dennis Schulting - 2016 - In Kantian Nonconceptualism. London, England: Palgrave.This is the introduction to the volume Kantian Nonconceptualism (Palgrave 2016).
- (1 other version)Maturity, Freedom of Thought, and Emancipation. On Kant's What is Enlightenment?.Dennis Schulting - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 18 (47):281-302.
- On Strawson on Kantian Apperception.Dennis Schulting - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):257-271.a revised version of the published version is uploaded here.
- Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 257-293.In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction (...)
- Transcendental Logic and the Logic of Thought.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - Studi Kantiani 34 (1):115-126.In this paper, I reflect on the idea, hinted at by Kant in a footnote to §16 of the B- Deduction that is not often discussed (KrV B 134n.), that transcendental logic is the ground of logic as a whole. This has important repercussions for the way we should see the role of transcendental logic with respect to the question of truth as well as the nature and scope of transcendental logic in relation to cognition, and in relation to general (...)
- Synthesis, Schmimagination and Regress.Dennis Schulting - manuscriptTalk at University of Turin, 'Kant, oltre Kant, May 5th 2023. --- -/- It is useful, while keeping in mind a holistic approach, to concentrate on a common theme in Kant’s text, which it will turn out is the quintessential element of his novel ‘way of thinking’, as he himself put it in preface of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This common theme is the idea of synthesis, which is what holds together, and is the entryway (...)
- 3. The Quid Juris.Dennis Schulting - 2019 - In Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 28-62.What is the Quid Juris in Kant's Deduction? Chapter 3 from my book on the Deduction (Kant's Deduction From Apperception) provides an answer to that question, and also contains an extensive discussion of the relevant literature on this topic (Henrich, Proops, Seeberg & Longuenesse).
- Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...)
- Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...)
- (1 other version)Gap? What Gap?—On the Unity of Apperception and the Necessary Application of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Giuseppe Motta & Udo Thiel (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 89-113.
- (2 other versions)Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress: The Court of Reason (Oslo, 6–9 August 2019). De Gruyter. pp. 641-650.talk Oslo-Kant congress. In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
- Apperception and Object. Comments on Mario Caimi's Reading of the B-Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2022 - Revista de Estudios Kantianos 7 (2):462-481.I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).
- When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of statistical frequency. (...)
- Introduction.Dennis Schulting - 2016 - In Kantian Nonconceptualism. London, England: Palgrave.This is the introduction to the volume Kantian Nonconceptualism (Palgrave 2016).
- What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...)
- The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State.Martin Smith - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 95-112.My concern in this paper is with the claim that knowledge is a mental state – a claim that Williamson places front and centre in Knowledge and Its Limits. While I am not by any means convinced that the claim is false, I do think it carries certain costs that have not been widely appreciated. One source of resistance to this claim derives from internalism about the mental – the view, roughly speaking, that one’s mental states are determined by one’s (...)
- (2 other versions)Review: Westphal, Kenneth, Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2009 - Kant Studien 100 (3):382-385.review of Westphal's Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism (CUP 2004).
- Review: K.L. Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögen. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2011 - Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism 8:356-361.Review of new edition of K. L. Reinhold's Versuch (1789), ed. E.-O. Onnasch.
- Decision theory and de minimis risk.Martin Smith - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2169-2192.A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling (...)
- Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much (...)
- The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.According to the principle of Conjunction Closure, if one has justification for believing each of a set of propositions, one has justification for believing their conjunction. The lottery and preface paradoxes can both be seen as posing challenges for Closure, but leave open familiar strategies for preserving the principle. While this is all relatively well-trodden ground, a new Closure-challenging paradox has recently emerged, in two somewhat different forms, due to Backes :3773–3787, 2019a) and Praolini :715–726, 2019). This paradox synthesises elements (...)
- The logic of epistemic justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases – predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But (...)
- Dynamic Montague grammar.Martin Stokhof - 1990 - In L. Kalman (ed.), Proceedings of the Second Symposion on Logic and Language, Budapest, Eotvos Lorand University Press, 1990, pp. 3-48. Budapest: Eotvos Lorand University Press. pp. 3-48.In Groenendijk & Stokhof [1989] a system of dynamic predicate logic (DPL) was developed, as a compositional alternative for classical discourse representation theory (DRT ). DPL shares with DRT the restriction of being a first-order system. In the present paper, we are mainly concerned with overcoming this limitation. We shall define a dynamic semantics for a typed language with λ-abstraction which is compatible with the semantics DPL specifies for the language of first-order predicate logic. We shall propose to use this (...)
- Against legal probabilism.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.Is it right to convict a person of a crime on the basis of purely statistical evidence? Many who have considered this question agree that it is not, posing a direct challenge to legal probabilism – the claim that the criminal standard of proof should be understood in terms of a high probability threshold. Some defenders of legal probabilism have, however, held their ground: Schoeman (1987) argues that there are no clear epistemic or moral problems with convictions based on purely (...)
- More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.In this paper I respond to Marcello Di Bello’s criticisms of the ‘normic account’ of the criminal standard of proof. In so doing, I further elaborate on what the normic account predicts about certain significant legal categories of evidence, including DNA and fingerprint evidence and eyewitness identifications.
- The genealogical method in epistemology.Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1057-1076.In 1990 Edward Craig published a book called Knowledge and the State of Nature in which he introduced and defended a genealogical approach to epistemology. In recent years Craig’s book has attracted a lot of attention, and his distinctive approach has been put to a wide range of uses including anti-realist metaepistemology, contextualism, relativism, anti-luck virtue epistemology, epistemic injustice, value of knowledge, pragmatism and virtue epistemology. While the number of objections to Craig’s approach has accumulated, there has been no sustained (...)
- Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...)
- Superación de la metafísica de Martin Heidegger / traducción de Jaime Sologuren.Martin Heidegger & Jaime Sologuren - 2020 - Revista de Filosofía.
- I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
- Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy.Martin Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97-121.Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species (...)
- Is ~ K ~ KP a luminous condition?Martin Smith - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-10.One of the most intriguing claims in Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance is that Timothy Williamson’s celebrated anti-luminosity argument can be resisted when it comes to the condition ~K~KP—the condition that one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know P. In this paper, I critically assess this claim.
- Essentialist Explanation.Martin Glazier - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2871-2889.Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphysical explanation, and philosophers have fixed on the notion of ground as the conceptual tool with which such explanation should be investigated. I will argue that this focus on ground is myopic and that some metaphysical explanations that involve the essences of things cannot be understood in terms of ground. Such ‘essentialist’ explanation is of interest, not only for its ubiquity in philosophy, but for its being in a sense an ultimate (...)
- A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, rest upon significant assumptions – amongst them a relatively strong structural assumption to the effect that the underlying probability space is both finite and uniform. In (...)
- Rationalism and Necessitarianism.Martin Lin - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):418-448.Metaphysical rationalism, the doctrine which affirms the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), is out of favor today. The best argument against it is that it appears to lead to necessitarianism, the claim that all truths are necessarily true. Whatever the intuitive appeal of the PSR, the intuitive appeal of the claim that things could have been otherwise is greater. This problem did not go unnoticed by the great metaphysical rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza’s response was to embrace necessitarianism. Leibniz’s (...)
- Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism.Martin Kusch - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1097-1105.This paper seeks to widen the dialogue between the “epistemology of peer disagreement” and the epistemology informed by Wittgenstein’s last notebooks, later edited as On Certainty. The paper defends the following theses: not all certainties are groundless; many of them are beliefs; and they do not have a common essence. An epistemic peer need not share all of my certainties. Which response to a disagreement over a certainty is called for, depends on the type of certainty in question. Sometimes a (...)
- Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. —All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. I shall call this view “No-metajustification”. No-metajustification is commonly taken (...)
- Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism.Martin Kusch - 2014 - In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 29-46.
- Scientific pluralism and the Chemical Revolution.Martin Kusch - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:69-79.In a number of papers and in his recent book, Is Water H₂O? Evidence, Realism, Pluralism (2012), Hasok Chang has argued that the correct interpretation of the Chemical Revolution provides a strong case for the view that progress in science is served by maintaining several incommensurable “systems of practice” in the same discipline, and concerning the same region of nature. This paper is a critical discussion of Chang's reading of the Chemical Revolution. It seeks to establish, first, that Chang's assessment (...)
- Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof 25 (3):183-199.The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak – there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, (...)
- How to model lexical priority.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2 – no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems – a fact which is (...)
- Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.In this paper I defend the claim that justification is closed under conjunction, and confront its most alarming consequence — that one can have justification for believing propositions that are unlikely to be true, given one's evidence.
- Using text-to-image generative AI to create storyboards: Insights from a college psychology classroom.Shantanu Tilak, Blake Bagley, Jadalynn Cantu, Mya Cosby, Grace Engelbert, Ja'Kaysiah Hammonds, Gabrielle Hickman, Aaron Jackson, Bryce Jones, Kadie Kennedy, Stephanie Kennedy, Austin King, Ryan Kozlej, Allyssa Mortenson, Muller Sebastien, Julia Najjar, Sydney Queen, Milo Schuehle, Nolan Schulte, Emily Schwarz, Joshua Shearn, Kalyse Williams & Malik Williams - 2024 - Journal of Sociocybernetics 19 (1):1-42.This participatory study, conducted in an introductory psychology class, recounts self-reflections of 22 undergraduate students and their instructor engaging in an GenAI-mediated storyboard generation process. It relies on Gordon Pask’s conversation theory, structuring out the nature of interactions between students, instructor, and GenAI, and then uses a qualitative narrative to describe these conversational feedback loops constituting the creation of draft and final storyboards. Results suggest students engaged in cyclical feedback driven processes to master their creations, used elements of photography related (...)
- In defence of normic de minimis expected utility theory.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Logique Et Analyse.In a recent paper, Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson (forthcoming) present three objections to normic de minimis expected utility theory (NDEUT) – a decision theoretic framework defended in Smith (2024). In this paper, I respond to these objections and outline some possible ways in which NDEUT might be modified or further developed. Like any de minimis framework, NDEUT employs a risk threshold to sort possibilities into those that must be considered when making a decision, and those that can be (...)
| 1 — 50 / 977 |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-648784bb4d-xlp8h uwo