Results for 'Narasimhan Srinivasan'

6 found
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  1. Societal-Level Versus Individual-Level Predictions of Ethical Behavior: A 48-Society Study of Collectivism and Individualism.David A. Ralston, Carolyn P. Egri, Olivier Furrer, Min-Hsun Kuo, Yongjuan Li, Florian Wangenheim, Marina Dabic, Irina Naoumova, Katsuhiko Shimizu, María Teresa Garza Carranza, Ping Ping Fu, Vojko V. Potocan, Andre Pekerti, Tomasz Lenartowicz, Narasimhan Srinivasan, Tania Casado, Ana Maria Rossi, Erna Szabo, Arif Butt, Ian Palmer, Prem Ramburuth, David M. Brock, Jane Terpstra-Tong, Ilya Grison, Emmanuelle Reynaud, Malika Richards, Philip Hallinger, Francisco B. Castro, Jaime Ruiz-Gutiérrez, Laurie Milton, Mahfooz Ansari, Arunas Starkus, Audra Mockaitis, Tevfik Dalgic, Fidel León-Darder, Hung Vu Thanh, Yong-lin Moon, Mario Molteni, Yongqing Fang, Jose Pla-Barber, Ruth Alas, Isabelle Maignan, Jorge C. Jesuino, Chay-Hoon Lee, Joel D. Nicholson, Ho-Beng Chia, Wade Danis, Ajantha S. Dharmasiri & Mark Weber - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 122 (2):283–306.
    Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...)
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  2. No Platforming.Robert Mark Simpson & Amia Srinivasan - 2018 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom. Oxford, UK: pp. 186-209.
    This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose purpose isn’t just (...)
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  3. Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - manuscript
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  4. Radical Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    When is a belief justified? I consider three sorts of arguments for different accounts of justification on the spectrum from extreme internalism to extreme externalism: arguments from intuitive responses to examples; arguments from the theoretical role of the term in epistemology; and arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses to which we wish to use the term. I focus particularly on the third sort, considering arguments from Clayton Littlejohn (2014) and Amia Srinivasan (2018) in favour of different versions (...)
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  5. Anger, Affective Injustice and Emotion Regulation.Alfred Archer & Georgina Mills - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    Victims of oppression are often called to let go of their anger in order to facilitate better discussion to bring about the end of their oppression. According to Amia Srinivasan (2018), this constitutes an affective injustice. In this paper, we use research on emotion regulation to shed light on the nature of affective injustice. By drawing on the literature on emotion regulation, we illustrate specifically what kind of work is put upon people who are experiencing affective injustice and why (...)
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  6. Radical Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    When is a belief justified? I consider three sorts of arguments for different accounts of justification on the spectrum from extreme internalism to extreme externalism: arguments from intuitive responses to examples; arguments from the theoretical role of the term in epistemology; and arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses to which we wish to use the term. I focus particularly on the third sort, considering arguments from Clayton Littlejohn (2014) and Amia Srinivasan (2018) in favour of different versions (...)
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