Argumentation is the gear of a cognitive process of reconstruction when it manifests itself in the discursive proximal space. The cognitive-semiotic perspective of multimodal argumentation suggests that, depending on the knowledge, the codes and signs employed (modes) and the context, certain multimodal structures can lead some audiences towards an accurate mental representation of argumentation, without the need forany formal standardized and verbal structure. We are able to argue with other(s) effectively without the need for a verbal translation of the contents (...) in a space that includes the semiotic interpretation of the message. (shrink)

Résumé : Les domaines de la philosophie et de la théorie politique ont connu un certain nombre de changements au cours des quarante dernières années. L'un attire notre attention tout particulièrement ; le basculement d'un point de vue national, cristallisé par le contrat social rawlsien, vers un point de vue non-national. En effet, plusieurs penseurs abordent un ensemble de phénomènes considérés comme nouveaux, tels que les traités de libre commerce et l'économie globale, les entreprises et les institutions supra et transnationales, (...) l'immigration et les contrôles frontaliers etc. Ces changements sont intéressants puisqu'ils obéissent, principalement, à une évolution majeure du terrain politique et social que l'on appelle mondialisation. Les théoriciens travaillant dans le domaine de la justice globale semblent s'adresser à deux questions différentes mais reliées. La première concerne la justice globale : dans quelle mesure et pourquoi l'ordre mondial est-il juste ou injuste ? Qu'est-ce qu'un ordre global juste ? La deuxième est dans un sens corollaire à la première, et concerne la responsabilité : qui devrait être blâmé ou digne d'éloge pour l'ordre mondial ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables de l'ordre mondial ? Qui devrait redresser ses éventuelles conséquences injustes ? Face à l'économie mondialisée et aux institutions politiques et économiques internationales et trans-nationales, cette interrogation devient légitime et nécessaire : suis-je responsable à l'égard des travailleurs des sweat shop lorsque j'achète des habits à Auchan ou bien à l'égard des caféiculteurs très mal payés lorsque je prends un capuccino dans un café Starbucks ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables des traités de libre commerce que leurs gouvernements signent ? Ces questions sur la responsabilité des individus dans le contexte de la mondialisation seront l'enjeu de ce travail de recherche. Nous interrogerons plus exactement la responsabilité d'un agent lorsqu'il fait partie d'un chaîne causale complexe, lorsqu'il participe d'une injustice structurelle. Ainsi, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une chaîne causale, mais de connexions qui sont l'issue d'un changement des modes de productions, de consommation et de la concurrence dans un marché mondialisé. Plus important encore, il ne s'agit pas simplement de la responsabilité individuelle mais plutôt de la responsabilité individuelle en tant que citoyen, et donc d'une responsabilité politique. Elle peut certes être individuelle, mais nous devons tenir compte du fait qu'elle doit être pensée en tant que responsabilité politique, et pas uniquement morale, puisque l'individu et ses actions sont déterminés par des communautés politiques dans lesquelles il participe, ou dans lesquelles il est représenté. Ainsi, la mondialisation nous invite à repenser la responsabilité individuelle pour pouvoir rendre compte des intuitions morales et politiques qui guident une bonne partie du champ de la justice globale. Pour cela, nous verrons dans un premier temps la manière dont les théories de la justice globale essaient de répondre à ce défit. Grâce à cela nous dégagerons l'hypothèse qui nous guidera, l'idée que dans la mondialisation, un agent peut être responsable, avec d'autres, des raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas considéré comme responsable. C'est-à-dire qu'il sera méta-responsable. Dans un second temps, nous essaierons de déterminer un model de responsabilité individuelle, et de comprendre comment la responsabilité est attribuée. Ensuite, nous essaierons de formuler une manière de concevoir la responsabilité politique. Grâce à ces deux éléments, la responsabilité individuelle et la responsabilité politique, nous pourrons parvenir à formuler une conception de la méta-responsabilité comme forme de penser l'agentivité traversée par la mondialisation. (shrink)

Resumen Con el presente artículo se pretende analizar la colonialidad del poder como eje central de las relaciones de dominación que marcaron la primera década del siglo XXI en Colombia, más específicamente estudiando los casos del clientelismo político en zonas periféricas como el Casanare, y el caso Carimagua. Para desarrollar esta investigación, se realizó un análisis documental tomando como referente autores de la filosofía política latinoamericana como Anibal Quijano y Santiago Castro- Gómez quienes a su vez se apoyan en Michel (...) Foucault para definir el concepto de relaciones de poder, y la propuesta de Fernán González en torno a la necesidad de un análisis multiescalar del poder y la violencia, con el fin de proponer una alternativa al análisis tradicional de las relaciones de poder en Colombia. -/- . (shrink)

Epistemic Injustice in the Education of People with Mental Disabilities. This article offers a perspective on inclusive education based on Fricker's conception of epistemic injustice. What is the relationship between inclusive education and epistemic injustice in the case of students with mental deficiencies? By adapting Fricker's thesis to this extreme case, epistemic injustice can be explored via the social model of disability (SMD). Accordingly, we propose that epistemic injustice harms the entire educational community and society. -/- Mental Disability. Epistemic Injustice. (...) Inclusive Education. Social Model of Disability. (shrink)

RESUMEN ‒ Injusticias Epistémicas en la Educación de Personas con Dis- capacidad Mental. Se ofrece en este artículo una perspectiva de la educa- ción inclusiva a partir de la concepción de las injusticias epistémicas de Fricker. Se pregunta cuál es la relación entre la educación inclusiva y la in- justicia epistémica en el caso de estudiantes con deficiencias mentales. Es necesario adaptar las tesis de Fricker a este caso límite, por lo que se debe pensar la injusticias epistémicas a partir (...) del modelo social de la discapaci- dad. Se propone que la injusticia epistémica perjudica a toda la comunidad educativa y a la sociedad. -/- . (shrink)

ABSTRACT – Epistemic Injustice in the Education of People with Mental Disabilities. This article offers a perspective on inclusive education based on Fricker’s conception of epistemic injustice. What is the relationship be- tween inclusive education and epistemic injustice in the case of students with mental deficiencies? By adapting Fricker’s thesis to this extreme case, epistemic injustice can be explored via the social model of disability (SMD). Accordingly, we propose that epistemic injustice harms the entire educa- tional community and society. -/- (...) . (shrink)

ésumé : Les domaines de la philosophie et de la théorie politique ont connu un certain nombre de changements au cours des quarante dernières années. L'un attire notre attention tout particulièrement ; le basculement d'un point de vue national, cristallisé par le contrat social rawlsien, vers un point de vue non-national. En effet, plusieurs penseurs abordent un ensemble de phénomènes considérés comme nouveaux, tels que les traités de libre commerce et l'économie globale, les entreprises et les institutions supra et transnationales, (...) l'immigration et les contrôles frontaliers etc. Ces changements sont intéressants puisqu'ils obéissent, principalement, à une évolution majeure du terrain politique et social que l'on appelle mondialisation. Les théoriciens travaillant dans le domaine de la justice globale semblent s'adresser à deux questions différentes mais reliées. La première concerne la justice globale : dans quelle mesure et pourquoi l'ordre mondial est-il juste ou injuste ? Qu'est-ce qu'un ordre global juste ? La deuxième est dans un sens corollaire à la première, et concerne la responsabilité : qui devrait être blâmé ou digne d'éloge pour l'ordre mondial ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables de l'ordre mondial ? Qui devrait redresser ses éventuelles conséquences injustes ? Face à l'économie mondialisée et aux institutions politiques et économiques internationales et trans-nationales, cette interrogation devient légitime et nécessaire : suis-je responsable à l'égard des travailleurs des sweat shop lorsque j'achète des habits à Auchan ou bien à l'égard des caféiculteurs très mal payés lorsque je prends un capuccino dans un café Starbucks ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables des traités de libre commerce que leurs gouvernements signent ? Ces questions sur la responsabilité des individus dans le contexte de la mondialisation seront l'enjeu de ce travail de recherche. Nous interrogerons plus exactement la responsabilité d'un agent lorsqu'il fait partie d'un chaîne causale complexe, lorsqu'il participe d'une injustice structurelle. Ainsi, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une chaîne causale, mais de connexions qui sont l'issue d'un changement des modes de productions, de consommation et de la concurrence dans un marché mondialisé. Plus important encore, il ne s'agit pas simplement de la responsabilité individuelle mais plutôt de la responsabilité individuelle en tant que citoyen, et donc d'une responsabilité politique. Elle peut certes être individuelle, mais nous devons tenir compte du fait qu'elle doit être pensée en tant que responsabilité politique, et pas uniquement morale, puisque l'individu et ses actions sont déterminés par des communautés politiques dans lesquelles il participe, ou dans lesquelles il est représenté. Ainsi, la mondialisation nous invite à repenser la responsabilité individuelle pour pouvoir rendre compte des intuitions morales et politiques qui guident une bonne partie du champ de la justice globale. Pour cela, nous verrons dans un premier temps la manière dont les théories de la justice globale essaient de répondre à ce défit. Grâce à cela nous dégagerons l'hypothèse qui nous guidera, l'idée que dans la mondialisation, un agent peut être responsable, avec d'autres, des raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas considéré comme responsable. C'est-à-dire qu'il sera méta-responsable. Dans un second temps, nous essaierons de déterminer un model de responsabilité individuelle, et de comprendre comment la responsabilité est attribuée. Ensuite, nous essaierons de formuler une manière de concevoir la responsabilité politique. Grâce à ces deux éléments, la responsabilité individuelle et la responsabilité politique, nous pourrons parvenir à formuler une conception de la méta-responsabilité comme forme de penser l'agentivité traversée par la mondialisation. -/- . (shrink)

En este trabajo pretendemos dar cuenta de cómo los criterios de delimitación entre el conocimiento animal y el conocimiento humano en la epistemología contemporánea no son adecuados para agotar la complejidad epistemológica del fenómeno. Buscamos, así, establecer una tercera vía de interpretación, proponiendo una taxonomía de niveles que satisfaga las necesidades de clasificación del conocimiento animal sin dejar de lado la particularidad propia del conocimiento humano, a saber, la reflexividad. De esta manera, se pretende reinterpretar cómo ha sido concebido el (...) conocimiento animal en la epistemología contemporánea para reconstruir, a partir de las posturas mencionadas, una vía alternativa que dé cuenta, adecuadamente, de las particularidades del conocimiento animal en relación con el conocimiento humano. (shrink)

With an extensive amount of research on the social lives of primates, Frans de Waal has been a pioneering advocate for the continuity of human and non-human minds, putting forward the idea that these creatures exhibit rudimentary political and moral behaviors. One of the traits which de Waal focuses on is animal normativity, a set of behaviors functionally defined as adherence to social standards. Recently, some philosophers have endorsed this position, holding that animals show a psychological capacity called normative cognition (...) underlying those and other social behaviors. In this paper, I assess whether advocacy for animal normativity is an exercise of theory construction in comparative cognition. To that end, I present three features of this kind of theory construction. First, the explanatory goal of building functional analyses of cognitive capacities. Second, the conceptual aid of comparative thinking for theory construction. Third, the heuristic value of theory in specifying possible roads of inquiry. Taking these features into account, I assess whether the claims advocates make regarding animal normativity consider them. My answer is negative. First, since some advocates focus on behavioral traits and not on psychological capacities, they are not producing theory in comparative cognition, although, as I argue, they should. Second, there is a disregard for hypothesis testing and no evolutionary considerations to support their views. Finally, the claim that non-human animals exhibit normativity does not seem to have heuristic value. (shrink)

Los materiales que integran este libro provienen del II Encuentro de Egresados realizado en el verano de 2012 por la Maestría en Estética y Arte de la BUAP. Regresaban a su academia los que alguna vez fueron sus estudiantes. Venían con el propósito de reencontrarse con los avances investigativos de sus profesores y a traer ellos mismos los resultados de la continuidad de su trabajo de investigación. Algunos dejaron también en el encuentro una muestra de su arte. El ciclo de (...) conferencias impartido por profesores de la planta académica y por varios invitados encuentra su plasmación en la primera parte del libro intitulada “Desde la academia”. “De regreso a la academia”, la segunda parte, incluye trabajos que los egresados de la MEyA presentaron con sus avances investigativos posteriores a su egreso del programa. La tercera parte muestra el Catálogo de las obras que seis de los egresados-artistas presentaron en la exposición de artes plásticas “En las pupilas del que regresa”. (shrink)

The distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of psychological explanation has proved useful in order to differentiate ways of understanding human behavior. Yet little has been discussed about how these kinds of explanations would work in making sense non-animals’ intelligent behavior. In this paper I assess the main characterizations of personal and subpersonal explanations and how they could be applied in interpreting animal behavior in a scientific setting. Specifically, my claim is that personal level explanation is especially relevant to explain (...) human actions as singular events. Through this, I will argue that instances of animal behavior can potentially be taken as singular events in the same way in which we take human action to be. Thus, personal level explanation plays an important role in behavioral sciences of non-human animals. -/- La distinción entre los niveles personal y subpersonal de explicación psicológica ha resultado de gran utilidad para diferenciar distintos modos de comprender el comportamiento humano. La discusión teórica en torno a la distinción se ha enfocado particularmente en torno a cómo caracterizar el nivel personal. Sin embargo, poco se ha dicho sobre cómo estas explicaciones operarían a la hora de hacer inteligible el comportamiento inteligente de animales no humanos. En este trabajo analizo las principales caracterizaciones que se han dado de las explicaciones de nivel personal y cómo éstas aplicarían a la interpretación del comportamiento animal en contextos científicos. Específicamente, defenderé que las explicaciones de nivel personal son especialmente relevantes para explicar las acciones humanas en tanto eventos singulares. A partir de esto, argumentaré que también los comportamientos animales pueden potencialmente ser eventos singulares como lo son las acciones humanas. Así, las explicaciones de nivel personal juegan un rol importante en las ciencias del comportamiento animal. (shrink)

A constitutive theory of representation must address two challenges. The content determination challenge requires specifying why a particular state has a given content. The job description challenge requires spelling out the explanatory role that representational notions play in that theory. Recently, Nicholas Shea has advanced *varitel semantics* as a hybrid approach to representation to answer those challenges, supplementing teleosemantics with non-historical features –namely, exploitable relations and robustness. In this paper, I critically assess the hybrid theory’s answers to both challenges, arguing (...) that their hybrid nature undermines their merits. In each case, I will show that it is hard to establish how the alleged complementariness of the hybrid account components works. I will conclude that internal problems beset Shea’s theory of representation. (shrink)

De acuerdo con una caracterización filosófica estándar, el comportamiento humano se hace inteligible a partir de estados mentales, atendiendo especialmente a dos relaciones explicativas: la racionalidad y la causalidad. En el presente artículo evaluaremos cuán adecuada es dicha caracterización respecto a las explicaciones que se dan en las psicoterapias contextuales. Nuestro análisis establece varias respuestas por la negativa. Por un lado, el objetivo de estas terapias no es la comprensión ni la evaluación normativa, por lo que la racionalidad no juega (...) allí un rol explicativo. A su vez, el rol de la causalidad es secundario en la evaluación diagnóstica, dado que en esa etapa del proceso terapéutico es la función de los comportamientos la que busca elucidarse. Finalmente, sostenemos que la intervención terapéutica de estas psicoterapias se centra en explicaciones causales, aunque no desde el modelo de sentido común que la caracterización filosófica supone. Sugerimos, por la positiva, que las explicaciones del comportamiento en psicoterapias contextuales son híbridas: al evaluar apelan a explicaciones funcionales y al intervenir a explicaciones causales. (shrink)

El presente ensayo plantea la posibilidad de considerar nuevamente al diseño editorial como una actividad artística. Este campo no pudo escapar al fenómeno de la sociedad del espectáculo que hoy envuelve a casi toda actividad humana. Ello indiscutiblemente afecta la manera en que se valora esta actividad actualmente, vista las más de las veces como un simple aditamento utilitario con más fines comerciales que artísticos. A pesar de ello no deja de ser loable una revaloración de la disciplina que la (...) considere como una producción también transutilitaria, un fenómeno a la vez estético y extraestético y una actividad que, a través de su propia praxis, construye al ser histórico... (shrink)

The goal of the 2010 Ontology Summit was to address the current shortage of persons with ontology expertise by developing a strategy for the education of ontologists. To achieve this goal we studied how ontologists are currently trained, the requirements identified by organizations that hire ontologists, and developments that might impact the training of ontologists in the future. We developed recommendations for the body of knowledge that should be taught and the skills that should be developed by future ontologists; these (...) recommendations are intended as guidelines for institutions and organizations that may consider establishing a program for training ontologists. Further, we recommend a number of specific actions for the community to pursue. (shrink)

La formación docente es indispensable para responder a los requerimientos de la compleja sociedad actual. De su conocimiento, iniciativa, praxis y creatividad depende el éxito o el fracaso del sujeto que aprende. Al modificar el rol del docente se transforma la actitud de los estudiantes. ¿Cómo entender la formación filosófica transdisciplinar? Este texto responde a este y otros cuestionamientos: ¿cuáles son los planteamientos pedagógicos afines a la era digital? ¿en qué medida las TIC se encuentran al servicio de una filosofía (...) educativa transdisciplinar?, ¿cómo se explica ese enfoque en la formación del docente?, ¿cuál es la función de la formación en la innovación educativa?, ¿cómo formar para la ciudadanía mundial?, ¿cuáles son las contribuciones de las nuevas ciencias para la formación educativa? El crecimiento exponencial de la ciencia y de la tecnología nos obliga a pensar en procesos formativos innovadores. En tal sentido, resulta imprescindible el estudio de estas problemáticas. (shrink)

En forma de síntesis reflexiva sobre la vida y la obra de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, el trabajo responde in inicialmente a una solicitud de la revista Casa de las Américas. Esta revista-institución había pedido, en justo homenaje a este genuino marxista, un comentario a dos volúmenes que celebraban desde México, con inteligente selección, abierta a la controversia, su 80 aniversario (1995). Se trataba de los libros Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez: los trabajos y los días y En torno a la (...) obra de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, editados por Federico Álvarez y Gabriel Vargas Lozano, respectivamente. Publicado originalmente con el título “La empecinada herejía de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez” en la mencionada revista (núm. 203, La Habana,1996, pp.142-147), el texto fue revisado y actualizado para la presente edición. (shrink)

El texto constituye una reseña-comentario a dos volúmenes que celebraban desde México, con inteligente selección, abierta a la controversia, el 80 aniversario (1995) del destacado pensador hispano-mexicano. Se trataba de los libros Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez: los trabajos y los días y En torno a la obra de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, editados por Federico Álvarez y Gabriel Vargas Lozano, respectivamente. El título del comentario hace alusión a la permanente actitud de principios de Sánchez Vázquez, quien mantuvo, primero, (...) una actitud crítica ante el marxismo ortodoxo y dogmático que se difundía desde la URSS y el llamado socialismo real y, después, asumió estoicamente la defensa del marxismo cuando aquellos habían desaparecido. (shrink)

The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Keefer et al., 2018; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2021). For instance, it has been shown that affect influences key learning-relevant processes, such as motivation, perception, behavior, and critical thinking (Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Evidence also shows that emotion and mood strongly influence attention, which in turn drives learning and memory (Elbertson et al., 2010; Elias et al., 1997). Intersubjective phenomena, such as the degree of affection and (...) respect between child and teacher, also affect the child’s learning processes, academic outcomes, and brain development (Kusché & Greenberg, 2006; Ryan & Patrick, 2001). However, the relevant literature is not paying attention to increasing evidence showing that affective phenomena are rooted in interoceptive and homeostatic self- and co-regulatory processes within and between people’s living bodies (Barrett, 2017; Carvalho & Damasio, 2021; Craig, 2015, 2018; Fotopoulou et al., 2022; Fotopoulou & Tsakiris, 2017; Seth & Friston, 2016). In this theoretical chapter, we explore this connection and its importance for learning. We argue that affective experience plays a fundamental role in learning, and that affective experience is rooted in the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies. Therefore, the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies plays a fundamental role in learning. In other words, there is an intra- and interpersonal somatic dimension of learning that demands explicit consideration in educational contexts. In this way, we aim to contribute to an understanding of learning and education that moves away from an individualistic, brain-centered information-processing conception toward one centered on sentient, interdependent living bodies. (shrink)

Luego de un rápido bosquejo de las etapas por las que ha pasado el pensamiento filosófico-cristiano en América Latina, el trabajo se concentra en la principales tendencias y autores en el período que va de la década del 40 del siglo XX hasta el momento que se publica el ensayo en 1998.

El trabajo realiza un recorrido histórico sumario por la siempre presente temática axiológica en el pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano. Luego de una introducción en la que se abunda sobre las razones por las cuales el tema de los valores siempre ha estado presente en la filosofía, se analiza su trayectoria en América Latina a través de los siguientes apartados: "El pensamiento latinoamericano: una historia cargada de contenido axiológico", "La crítica al positivismo y la introducción a un pensamiento explícitamente axiológico", "Adopción de (...) un paradigma axiológico preponderante", "Oposición al predominio axiológico del objetivismo fenomenológico", "Multidireccionalidad axiológica hacia los setenta", ¿Fin del pensamiento axiológico latinoamericano?", "Renacer teórico de la axiología". (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state (...) of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called “objectless” awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labelled as ‘nothingness phase’ since it described what participants took to be an experience of ‘nothingness’. his common phase was characterised by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being ‘somewhere’—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...) action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively.1. (shrink)

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

En este texto nos proponemos abordar la última clase del semanario de Deleuze sobre el poder en Foucault a partir de dos momentos. El primero tiene que ver con el concepto de imagen y la interpretación sobre el cine que ya venía siendo una constante —aunque marginalmente— en estas clases de Deleuze. Seguidamente, el segundo momento tiene que ver con la relación entre poder y resistencia que arroja como resultado una interpretación del pensamiento de Foucault por parte de Deleuze como (...) una obra viva y en constante construcción. Así, cumpliremos con la exigencia de una lectura que invita a pensar en los conceptos como herramientas de análisis integradas al desarrollo de situaciones donde el poder se presenta como noción central. (shrink)

The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood can (...) be defined independently of naturalness, if we help ourselves to the notion of a fundamental physical property. I end by showing how the notions of naturalness and lawhood that my account delivers help illuminate a number of other important philosophical notions, like causation, reference/meaning, and rational induction. (shrink)

Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults ( (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and (mean age of 68.92 ± 5.72)). The (...) analysis reveals the benefits of training, showing that it lowers cerebral activation while increasing the number of correct responses in the trained reasoning task (). The brain source generators were identified by time-averaging low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) current density images. In both groups, a bilateral overactivation associated with the task and not with age was identified. However, while the profile of bilateral activation in younger adults was symmetrical in anterior areas, in the older ones, the profile was located asymmetrically in anterior and posterior areas. Consequently, bilaterality may be a marker of how the brain adapts to maintain cognitive function in demanding tasks in both age groups. However, the differential bilateral locations across age groups indicate that the tendency to brain modulation is determined by age. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast (...) with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed. (shrink)

This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...) we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Aunque no puede hablarse en sentido estricto de una teoría moral del existencialismo a la manera de los grandes sistemas y modelos éticos de occidente, sí existen muchos argumentos que respaldan una versión en la cual es discutida la moral tradicional en contraposición a la posibilidad de una moral de la situación apoyada por las tesis más importantes de los existencialistas. Simone de Beauvoir ha elaborado un conjunto de textos donde esta posibilidad es expuesta.

This essay proposes a reductive account of robust macro-regularities. On the view proposed, regularities can earn their elite scientific status by featuring in good summaries of restricted regions in the space of physical possibilities: our “modal neighborhoods.” I argue that this view vindicates “nomic foundationalism”, while doing justice to the practice of invoking physically contingent generalizations in higher-level explanations. Moreover, the view suggests an explanation for the particular significance of robust macro-regularities: we rely on summaries of our modal neighborhoods when (...) reasoning hypothetically about “agentially accessible” possibilities. (shrink)

This work was my theses to get the MA in Philosophy. Their focus is the ethics implied in digital culture and networked society. Themes are Ethics, culture, technology, political control, autonomous systems.

The field of Latin American philosophy has established itself as a relevant subfield of philosophical inquiry. However, there might be good reasons to consider that our focus on the subfield could have distracted us from considering another subfield that, although it might share some geographical proximity, does not share the same historical basic elements. In this paper, I argue for a possible and meaningful conceptual difference between Latin American Philosophy and Indigenous philosophy produced in Latin America. First, I raise what (...) I call Mariátegui’s Solidarity Challenge to show that there might be some neglectful treatment of the philosophical views of different Indigenous groups. I then depart from Mariátegui and engage in a critical exercise to show that even he would be guilty of failing in his own solidarity demands. I follow that by drawing out some implications of the argument. I first sketch how this differentiation would play out against the political project of “Mestizaje,” a project that seems to inform some of the Latin American philosophical tradition. I then speculate about the kinds of duties that the field of Latin American philosophy might have towards the field of Indigenous Philosophy produced in Latin America. (shrink)

One challenge faced by aesthetics is the development of an account able to trace out the continuities and discontinuities between general experience and aesthetic experiences. Regarding this issue, in this paper, I present an enactive model of some raw cognitive dynamics that might drive the progressive emergence of aesthetic experiences from the stream of general experience. The framework is based on specific aspects of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and embodied aesthetic theories, while also taking into account research in ecological psychology, (...) cognitive sciences, and dynamic systems theory. The model focuses on dynamically relevant nodes at the pre-reflective and the reflective side of experience that would work as nested rhythmic constraints at different cognitive timescales with the potential to shunt experiences toward the aesthetic in everyday situations. My proposal constitutes a way to explore aesthetic experiences from an enactive perspective that regards them as transformative events in which cognitive processes entrain and are entrained by changes taking place in the environment, the brain, and the body. (shrink)

In this article we argue that the social value of health research should be conceptualized as a function of both the expected benefits of the research and the priority that the beneficiaries deserve. People deserve greater priority the worse off they are. This conception of social value can be applied for at least two important purposes: in health research priority setting when research funders, policy-makers, or researchers decide between alternative research projects; and in evaluating the ethics of proposed research proposals (...) when research ethics committees assess whether the social value of the research is sufficient to justify the risks and burdens to research participants and others. In assessing how far a proposed research project will advance the interests of people who are more disadvantaged, research priority setters and RECs should examine the diseases that the research targets and the type of research. Just as certain diseases impose a greater burden on people who are more disadvantaged, so certain types of intervention and forms of research are more likely to benefit people who are more disadvantaged. We outline which populations are likely to be representative of the global worst off and identify what types of health research, and which disease categories, are priorities for these populations. (shrink)

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as ``physically real" and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

ABSTRACT: In this text, we are going to try to introduce a few brief notes - without excessive pretensions -, concerning those things that, from a historical and also from an intellectual and point of view, surround the figures of Robert Owen, Fourier or Saint Simon. Certainly, intellectually, our sources do not let us notice a very specific influence on the "utopian socialists" of the 19th Century. It will be very difficult to find historical evidence. However, what we can do (...) is to assume the French Revolution of 1789 as a turning point for the radical traditions, both British and Continental, to introduce Romanticism as the real source from which the utopian nineteenth-century thought was derived from. Then, Romanticism is where we will be able to read something about Robert Owen. Likewise, we will approach a very succinct reading of paleo-socialism, focusing on the context of the British Islands where the Industrial Revolution took place to become another great event in the lifetime of the "utopian socialists". Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of (...) the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men. (shrink)