As Augustine himself testifies, he did not know Origen’s work so well. However, this does not mean that he was not acquainted with his key soteriological hypotheses, especially his teachings on apocatastasis. Although Augustine’s doctrine of predestination has completely opposite consequences in comparison to Origen’s teaching about apocatastasis, we believe that these teachings share the common ontological basis, which is the subject of this study. While Origen’s Christology is often called into question, Augustine’s Christology is considered correct. However, with (...) both authors we find a certain marginalisation of Christology in the field of ontologically understood soteriology. Theological insights of these two authors influenced to a significant extent the development of theology of both the East and West, making their works significant up until today, both from the aspect of Christian self-understanding and from the aspect of ecumenical dialogue. (shrink)

W. Matthews Grant's "Dual Sources Account" aims at explaining how God causes all creaturely actions while leaving them free in a robust libertarian sense. It includes an account of predestination that is supposed to allow for the possibility that some created persons ultimately spend eternity in hell. I argue here that the resources Grant provides for understanding why God might permit created persons to end up in hell are, for two different reasons, insufficient. I then provide possible solutions to (...) these two problems, compatible with Grant's account overall, that help show why God might allow hell. (shrink)

Esta es una reseña crítica del libro de John Cowburn "Free Will, Predestination and Determinism".

This article transcribes three unpublished manuscripts by Domingo Báñez. The first is a review on the opuscule by Chrysostom Javelli on predestination. Báñez believes that this writing is Pelagian and advances several arguments which he will later use against Luis de Molina and the Molinists. The second is the last preserved writing by Báñez: a letter to the Master General of the Dominicans where he mentions his hope of seeing an end to the dispute on grace and free will. (...) The third is the account of Báñez’s death including his last words, in which he mentions the famous controversy de auxiliis. (shrink)

Fideism, as a philosophical and theological view, is defined in various manners. Sometimes it is defined as the priority of faith over accounts of all kinds of cognition based on human reason. The Geneva reformer John Calvin (1509–1564) was a fideist, and he simultaneously admired Saint Augustine — traces of that admiration can be found very easy in the chief Calvin’s work Institutio christianae religionis. However, this does not mean that he shared Augustinian views on faith‑reason relations. John Calvin adopted (...) late‑Augustinian interests, and was especially concerned with the issue of predestination. The Geneva reformer was the author of the double predestination doctrine. The chief claim of this doctrine is that: God intended one part of humanity for salvation; and the other one for damnation. This conclusion was supported with numerous quotations from the Old and the New Testament, and followed from the accepted exegetic principle that all words of the Holy Scripture are to be understood literally. Calvin also acted selectively and did not take into account other passages of the Bible contrary to them in sense. These different, even contradictory words and quotations create an incoherent image of God, which Calvin left unexplained as one of God’s mysteries. According to this image, God is a petulant despot, who by his irrational will treats people with unequal measure. God has settled a priori who would be saved and who would be damned, so the will of concrete man to act well or badly is without importance. In consequence, God is responsible for the evil and sins committed by people. Calvin’s God is unfair because he is merciful for one man, but not for other one. In approving a voluntaristic image of God, Calvin started becoming, particularly in the doctrine of double predestination, an extreme fideist, much more than his master Augustine. However, in later decades (especially in the seventeenth century), Calvin’s version of Christianity gaverise a rebellion against the double predestination doctrine, first in the ranks of the Dutch Calvinistic theologians (Armenians), and later in the circles of the English philosophers (Cambridge Platonics). In the end, Calvinism became a compromised Christianity and essentially contributed to the development of deism and atheism in Western European Countries in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

The two treatises Modus concionandi and Istructio pro concionatoribus were written by Gasparo Contarini for the preachers of Belluno between 1538 and 1541. With these works, Contarini explores three aspects of the predication. First, he focuses on a rhetorical issue: the language of the predication must be adequate for an inexpert audience. Second, he suggests to censure the most complex theological issues from the field of the predication since the audience could not understand such technical concepts like predestination and (...) causal bounds. Third, he reveals that the aim of the predication is to help a civil ethic and to avoid social disorders – like those triggered by Augustinian preachers. In the texts Contarini also shows his debt to Pietro Pomponazzi, who in his Tractatus and Apologia provided both a civic paradigm and an accusation of the bad preachers. (shrink)

Being a great jurist and influential scholar with seminal works on hadith, theology, biography and jurisprudence, al-Nawawī’s (d. 1277) views on epidemics are of great significance in these days of the pandemic. This article explores his views and explanations vis-à-vis epidemic to find his perspectives on balance between qadr (predestination) and ḥadhar (precaution) by conducting a content analysis of his various texts. In this article, the authors mainly referred to his texts Sharaḥ Muslim, Riyaḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn, al-Majmūʿ Sharaḥ Muhadhdhab, Rawḍat (...) al-Ṭālibīn and al- Adhkār al-Muntakhab. This study substantiates that in the view of al-Nawawī, Islam postulates a balanced position between taking precaution and faith in Allah’s decrees in dealing with the situations of an epidemic. Thus, it holistically complements the concepts of qadr and hadhar to guide people towards leading a faithful and safe life in the trying times of epidemic. (shrink)

This contribution discusses Leibniz’s views on key Christian doctrines which were surrounded, in the early modern period, by particularly lively debates. The first section delves into his defence of the Trinity and the Incarnation against the charge of contradiction, and his exploration of metaphysical models capacious enough to accommodate these mysteries. The second section focuses on the resurrection and the Eucharist with special regard to their connections with Leibniz’s metaphysics of bodies. The third section investigates Leibniz’s position on predestination, (...) grace, salvation, and damnation. It comes to the conclusion that salvation, for Leibniz, does not ultimately depend on believing a set of true doctrines, but on a practical attitude: the love of God above all things. Leibniz’s theology is thus fundamentally a theology of love which is ultimately practical, and tries to be both universalist and Christian. (shrink)

Beyond Dordt and ‘De Auxiliis’ explores post-Reformation inter-confessional theological exchange on soteriological topics including predestination, grace, and free choice. These doctrines remained controversial within confessional traditions after the Reformation, as Dominicans and Jesuits and later Calvinists and Arminians argued about these critical issues in the Augustinian theological heritage. Some of those involved in condemning Arminianism at the Synod of Dordt (1618-1619) were inspired by Dominican followers of Thomas Aquinas in Spain who had recently opposed the vigorous defense of free (...) choice by Jesuit Molinists in the Congregatio de auxiliis (1598-1607). This volume, appearing on the 400th anniversary of the closing of the Synod of Dordt, brings together a group of scholars working in fields that only rarely speak to one another to address these theological debates that cross geographical and confessional boundaries. (shrink)

Pedro de Ledesma became one of the most important professors in the theological faculty of the University of Salamanca at the beginning of the 17th century. He and Juan Vicente de Astorga were Dominican theologians in substantial agreement with Domingo Báñez about the main points of the disputes on grace. However, they manifest remarkable differences between them. Astorga believes that God could not maintain the infallibility of His predestination of creatures only through His foreknowledge of the acts of the (...) creature, as Luis de Molina defends. He thinks that God disposes by His providence each concrete act of creatures and, by His concurrence, effectively achieves their fulfillment. However, God does not influence created free will by means of a physical premotion, but by a moral one, i.e. by suggestions and inspirations. Ledesma criticizes Astorga’s thesis, although he uses Astorga’s arguments to defend the compatibility of physical premotion with the freedom of the creature. In this article, the thought of both theologians is presented in the light of their unpublished manuscript works. The opposition between these two friars manifests the variety of approaches adopted by Dominicans of the time, who cannot be considered as a uniform group. (shrink)

Il Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, composto da Guglielmo di Ockham tra il 1321 e il 1324, costituisce uno snodo cruciale nelle discussioni medievali sul tema del fatalismo teologico e sulle questioni che vi sono implicate, come la conoscenza dei futuri contingenti e il compatibilismo tra prescienza divina e libero arbitrio. Raccogliendo e ripensando fonti di diversa provenienza, Roberto Grossatesta e Pietro Lombardo in primis, il Venerabilis inceptor sposta il problema sul piano epistemologico e linguistico, (...) affrontandolo dal punto di vista di un’analisi proposizionale degli enunciati che parlano dei contingenti futuri. In questo modo egli affida agli strumenti dell’argomentazione logica e dell’indagine semantica il compito di sciogliere le implicazioni teologiche della questione, in una teoria che garantisca al contempo la prescienza di Dio e la libera volontà umana. Il principio della soluzione ockhamiana, che costituirà un punto di riferimento – pro o contro – nei dibattiti teologici del XIV secolo, consiste nell’intreccio tra analisi proposizionale e logica fidei, in nome di una soluzione pragmatica del dilemma compatibilista: come mostra il caso esemplare della profezia, gli enunciati della scienza divina costituiscono i postulati di una logica della credenza che poi procede da quelle premesse, attraverso una catena argomentativa, a formulare i precetti che guideranno i passi del cristiano nel mondo. Il volume rende disponibile per la prima volta al lettore non soltanto la prima traduzione in italiano del Tractatus, ma anche un ricco apparato di testi (le distinctiones 38, 39 e 40 dell’Ordinatio, i capitoli 7 e 27 della Summa Logicae, la quaestio IV.4 dei Quodlibeta, le Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum 41 e 44, il prologo della Expositio in libros Physicorum e un estratto dalla Expositio in Librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis) che consente di ricostruire in modo coerente una teoria ockhamiana della contingenza e di gettare luce su una nuova interpretazione del pensiero del teologo e filosofo inglese. (shrink)

German Lutheran scholar Johann Friedrich Weitenkampf (d.1758) sets out to explain and refute the Turkish concept of fate, dividing his dissertation into two sections: the first outlining the Turkish-Muslim view of fate; and the second seeking to prove the invalidity of the Muslim concept of fate with philosophical argumentation. He begins with some brief notes on the historical origin of the Turks, turning then to the backstory of the Qur’an, which he claims can be divided into six sections or topics, (...) the last of which concerns its teachings on fate. According to Weitenkampf, in mainstream Islamic thought, fate is predetermined and immutable. Weitenkampf categorizes most Turks as Jabrites who believe that God is the source of all evil and that men do not have free will. Therefore, men are compelled to do evil or good through God’s omnipotence. He offers examples of how this belief is manifested in the actions and values of the Turks. According to Weitenkampf, since Turks believe in predestination, they do not flee plague-ridden cities or shun contact with those infected. They do not fear death. If they suffer, they believe fate decreed it. In battle, this makes them brave to the point of foolhardy. Weitenkampf also paraphrases an exhortation from the Qur’an in which Muslims are told not to avoid danger, as God has already determined their fate. . . . Weitenkampf’s dissertatio is a symptom of the struggle between the weakened Lutheran orthodoxy and the rise of Pietism and rationalism in the wake of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. Unlike other Lutheran authors, he analyzes Islamic thought through systematic philosophical argumentation, deeply influenced by his logic and metaphysics teacher Knutzen, who tried to combine Wolffan Enlightenment rationalism with pietistic spirituality. (shrink)

This book tells the story of modern ethics, namely the story of a discourse that, after the Renaissance, went through a methodological revolution giving birth to Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s new science of natural law, leaving room for two centuries of explorations of the possible developments and implications of this new paradigm, up to the crisis of the Eighties of the eighteenth century, a crisis that carried a kind of mitosis, the act of birth of both basic paradigms of the two (...) following centuries: Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. The new science of natural law carried a fresh start for ethics, resulting from a mixture of the Old and the New. It was, as suggested by Schneewind, an attempt at rescuing the content of Scholastic and Stoic doctrines on a new methodological basis. The former was the claim of existence of objective and universal moral laws; the latter was the self-aware attempt at justifying a minimal kernel of such laws facing skeptical doubt. What Bentham and Kant did was precisely carrying this strategy further on, even if restructuring it each of them around one out of two alternative basic claims. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics of the Enlightenment attacked both not on their alleged failure in carrying out their own projects, but precisely on having adopted Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project. What counter-enlightenment has been unable to spell out is which alternative project could be carried out facing the modern condition of pluralism, while on the contrary, if we takes a closer look at developments in twentieth-century ethics or at on-going discussions on practical issues, we might feel inclined to believe that Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project is as up-to-date as ever. -/- Table of Contents -/- Preface I. Fathers of the Reformation and Schoolmen 1.1. Luther: passive justice and the good deeds; 1.2. Calvin: voluntarism and predestination; 1.3. Baroque Scholasticism; 1.4. Casuistry and Institutiones morales -/- II Neo-Platonists, neo-Stoics, neo-Sceptics 2.1. Aristotelian, neo-Platonic, neo-Epicurean and neo-Cynic Humanists; 2.2. Oeconomica and the art of living; 2.3. Neo-Stoics; 2.4. Neo-Sceptics; 2.5. Moralistic literature -/- III Neo-Augustinians 3.l. The Jansenists on natura lapsa, sufficient grace, pure love; 3.2. Nicole on the impossibility of self-knowledge; 3.3. Nicole on self-love and charity; 3.4. Nicole against civic virtue, for Christian civility; 3.5. Malebranche on general laws and necessary evil; 3.6. Malebranche on Neo-Augustinianism and Platonism. -/- IV Grotius, Pufendorf and the new moral science 4.1. Grotius against Aristotle and the sceptics; 4.2. Mersenne and Gassendi; 4.3. Descartes on ethics as the last branch of philosophy’s tree; 4.4. Hobbes on scepticism and the new moral science; 4.5. Spinoza on the new moral science as a descriptive science;4.6. Locke on voluntarism and probabilism; 4.7. Pufendorf on natural law as an exact science; 4.8. Pufendorf on physical and moral entities; 10. Pufendorf on self-preservation -/- V The empiricist version of the new moral science: from Cumberland to Paley 5.1. Cumberland against Hobbesian voluntarism; 5.2. Cumberland and theological consequentialism; 5.3. Cumberland on universal benevolence and self-love; 5.4. Shaftesbury on the moral sense; 5.5. Hutcheson on natural law and moral faculties; 5.6. Gay, Brown, Paley and theological consequentialism. -/- VI The rationalist version of the new moral science: from Cudworth to Price 6.1. The Cambridge Platonists; 6.2. Shaftesbury on the moral sense; 6.3. Butler and a third way between voluntarism and scepticism; 6.4. Price and the rational character of moral truths; -/- VII Leibniz’s compromise between the new moral science and Aristotelianism 1.Leibniz against voluntarism; 2.Leibniz against the division between the physical and the moral good; 3.Leibniz on la place d’autrui and theological consequentialism; 4.Thomasius, Wolff, Crusius -/- VIII French eighteenth-century philosophers without the new moral science 8.1. The genealogy of our ideas of virtue and vice; 8.2. Maupertuis and moral arithmetic 8.3. The philosophes and the harmony of interests; 8.4. Rousseau on corruption, self-love, and virtue; 8.5. Sade on the merits of vice -/- IX Experimental moral science: Hume and Adam Smith 9.1. Mandeville’s paradox; 9.2. Hutcheson on the law of nature and moral faculties; 9.3. Hume on experimental moral philosophy and the intermediate principles; 9.4. Hume’s Law; 9.5. Hume on the fellow-feeling; 9.6. Hume on natural and artificial virtues and disinterested pleasure for utility; 9.7. Adam Smith’s anti-realist metaethics; 9.8. Adam Smith on self-deception and the paradox of happiness; 9.9. Adam Smith on sympathy and the impartial spectator; 9.10. Adam Smith on the twofold criterion for moral judgement and its paradox; 9.11. Reid on the refutation of scepticism and the self-evidence of duty -/- X Kantian ethics 10.1. Kantian metaethics: moral epistemology; 10.2. Kantian metaethics: moral ontology; 10.3. Kantian metaethics: moral psychology; 10.4. Kantian normative ethics; 10.5. Kant on the impracticability of applied ethics; 10.6. Kantian moral anthropology; 10.7. Civilisation and moralisation; 10.8. Theology on a moral basis and the origins of evil; 10.9. Fichte and the transformation of theoretical philosophy into practical philosophy XI Bentham and utilitarianism 11.1. Bentham’s linguistic theory; 11.2. Bentham’s moral ontology, psychology, and theory of action; 11.3. The principle of greatest happiness; 11.4. The critique of religious ethics; 11.5. The new morality; 11.6. Interest and duty; 11.7. Virtues; 11.8. Private ethics and legislation -/- XII Followers of the Enlightenment: liberal Judaism and Liberal Theology 12.1. Mendelssohn; 12.2. Salomon Maimon; 12.3. Haskalā and liberal Judaism; 12.4. Liberal Theology. -/- XIII Counter-Enlighteners 13.1.Romanticism and the fulfilment of individuality as the Summum Bonum; 13.2. Hegel on history as the making of liberty; 13.3. Hegel on the unhappy consciousness and the beautiful soul; 13.4. Hegel on Morality and Sittlichkeit; 13.5. Marx on ideology, alienation, and praxis; 13.6. Schopenhauer on compassion; 13.7. Kierkegaard on faith beyond ethics. -/- XIV Followers of the Enlightenment: intuitionists and utilitarian 14.1 Whewell‘s criticism of utilitarianism; 14.2 Whewell on morality and the philosophy of morality; 14.3 Whewell on the Supreme Norm; 14.4 Whewell on the conflict between duties; 14.5 Mill and the proof of the principle of utility; 14.6 Mill’s eudemonistic utilitarianism; 14.7 Mill on rules -/- XV Followers of the Enlightenment: neo-Kantians and positivists 15.1. French spiritualism; 15.2. Neo-Kantians: the Marburg school; 15.3. Neo-Kantians: the Marburg school; 15.4. Comte’s positivism and the invention of altruism; 15.5. Social Darwinism; 15.6. Wundt and an ethic of humankind -/- XVI Post-enlighteners: Sidgwick 16.1. Criticism of intuitionism; 16.2. On ethical egoism; 16.3. Criticism of utilitarianism -/- XVII Post-enlighteners: Durkheim 17.1. Sociology as physics of customs; 17.2. Morality as physics of customs and as practical science; 17.3. On Kantian ethics and utilitarianism; 17.4. The variability of moralities;17.5. Social solidarity as end and justification of morality; 17.6. Secular morality as “sociodicy”; XVIII Post-enlighteners: Nietzsche 18.1. On the Dionysian; 18.2. On the deconstruction of the world of values 18.3 On the twofold genealogy of moralities; 18.4. On ascetics and nihilism; 18.5. Normative ethics of self-fulfilment -/- Bibliography / Index of names / Index of concepts -/- . (shrink)

Brecht’s Life of Galileo provides elements for elaborating what I call “a theory of the encounter of practices”. The concept of the encounter pushes back against teleological theories that predestine modern science to operate as an instrument of domination. I argue that Life of Galileo stages the missed encounters in modernity between science, politics, and art at the same time as it foregrounds the emancipatory power of science. I trace the encounter of practices from the play’s opening scenes – highlighting (...) what I call Galileo’s “double life”. Then, I turn to the most important scene of the play, Scene 10, in which political and artistic practices repurpose Galileo’s novel inventions for their emancipatory desires. In the virtual potentialities of this encounter, that is, despite the missed encounter between Galileo and “the people”, Brecht’s Life of Galileo continues to be fruitful for theorizing the emancipatory power of science. (shrink)

Religious world-views tend to make many seemingly contradictory claims. A well-known pair is God’s absolute goodness and the existence of intense evil. We present a simple model to show the compossibility of middle knowledge, grounded truth, libertarian free will, physical laws, deism, theism, predestination, evil, hell, a sin-free heaven, God being perfectly just, free, praiseworthy, and necessarily omni­benevolent, omni­scient, and omni­potent, this world being both replete with injustice and the best of all possible worlds, heinous suffering, no-one unjustly suffering, (...) God’s grace for the godly, the prospering of the godless, original sin, human responsibility, trans-world depravity, irresistible grace, and Arminian human choice. Besides that, the model also features an open future, fully grounded tensed facts, and bivalence, and allows for a kind of universalism and a pervasive principle of sufficient reason. The model is not intended to be realistic, but its possibility argues for the possibility that a realistic model containing such compossibles could exist – and even be actual. (shrink)

According to some critics, the putative superficiality of Winckelmann's appropriation of the Greek legacy is just one instance of the emptiness that characterizes the appropriation of the Greeks by the Germans in general. Thus Eliza Maria Butler has spoken of the 'tyranny of Greece over Germany': 'If the Greeks are tyrants, the Germans are predestined slaves ... The Germans have imitated the Greeks more slavishly; they have been obsessed by them more utterly, and they have assimilated them less than any (...) other race.” Not coincidentally, the putative freedom or unfreedom of one's appropriation of the Greek ideal is one of the basic problems at issue in this chapter. In the following pages, I argue that Winckelmann not only understood this basic problem but also touched on its actual solution, albeit in an inadequate, aesthetic manner. I go on to suggest that Hegel articulated this solution in an adequate and properly philosophical manner. (shrink)

This article investigates religious ideals persistent in the datafication of information society. Its nodal point is Thomas Bayes, after whom Laplace names the primal probability algorithm. It reconsiders their mathematical innovations with Laplace's providential deism and Bayes' singular theological treatise. Conceptions of divine justice one finds among probability theorists play no small part in the algorithmic data-mining and microtargeting of Cambridge Analytica. Theological traces within mathematical computation are emphasized as the vantage over large numbers shifts to weights beyond enumeration in (...) probability theory. Collateral secularizations of predestination and theodicy emerge as probability optimizes into Bayesian prediction and machine learning. The paper revisits the semiotics and theism of Peirce and a given beyond the probable in Whitehead to recontextualize the critiques of providence by Agamben and Foucault. It reconsiders datafication problems alongside Nietzschean valuations. Religiosity likely remains encoded within the very algorithms presumed purified by technoscientific secularity or mathematical dispassion. (shrink)

An analysis of Scripture uncovers a new model of God’s election and predestination of souls, which fits under the umbrella of the Calvinist theologies, but where this model involves an answer to the long-standing question of why God chose some, rather than all. It will be explored how before souls were elected (or condemned), God looked at them and knew them in a pre-election state, which God used to predestine each soul in physical reality. This analysis reveals why it (...) could be no other way but where God only would choose some, rather than all souls during the physical embodiment stage of the soul, and the vexing centuries-old Calvinist question of why God elected some not all has an answer. (shrink)

John Wesley insisted that love is the “sum of all” in real Methodism, Christianity, and True Religion. This “sum” includes “God is love,” the two love commandments, and all beliefs, affections, and good works that are derived from, express, and nurture love to God, neighbors, and every creature God has made. Wesley expressly rejected Biblical doctrines and practices that are unloving such as predestination, God hated Esau, and the many malicious and vengeful imprecatory Psalms. Wesley’s example encourages us to (...) reconsider LGBTQ issues in light of “What would be the most loving thing to do?,” and to reject such unloving and unethical Biblical commandments as putting to death all people who work on the Sabbath, all practicing male homosexuals, and both the male and female partners involved in adultery. What else? Taking Wesley very seriously might require changes in the curriculum of Wesleyan divinity schools, and in the contents of Wesleyan preaching. (shrink)

The “theses of Alcalá” were two controversial statements defended by certain Jesuits at the University of Alcalá de Henares in 1601. One of them was perceived by the Pope as particularly offensive: “It does not belong to Faith that this concrete man, for example, Clement VIII, is the Roman Pontiff”. When Pope Clement learned of this theological act, the Spanish Inquisition intervened, since it attempted to prevent the Supreme Pontiff from reserving the cause for himself. In this article, we delve (...) into these events thanks to several hitherto unpublished manuscripts. Among these documents we highlight several by F. Peña, a Spaniard who interpreted this statement as a subterfuge by the Society of Jesus to avoid the supposedly imminent condemnation of Luis de Molina, a Jesuit whose book on divine predestination and human freedom was being examined in Rome at the time. The documents transcribed here provide us with new details, such as the precise text of the conclusions defended in Alcalá. In addition, it is noteworthy that Peña was the first to understand correctly the position of the Dominican Domingo Báñez, because according to him it does belong to faith that Clement VIII is Pope, even though not in a primary way. (shrink)

In my review I shall look upon the theology of the Incarnation. The “mystery of Christ”, in the words of Polycarp, that created the centre and “stood at the very heart of the St. Maximus’ synthesis.” Maximus’ stands within the Cyrillian-Chalcedonian situation.’ This situation is eminent by three main properties. First is the acceptance of the Theopaschite form of St. Cyril. Second is that there was no contradiction into St. Cyril and the Council of Chalcedon. Third and finally is the (...) term of a consistent terminology into Triadology and Christology that is relevant to both. We shall see later in this paper, the Chalcedonian theme of “precision” and “tautology,” with respect to Christ’s natures, similarly role in Maximus’ vision of the divine incarnation of the logoi or power with respect to each other and the divine essence. It is within this deduction that Maximum “was competent of establishing the orthodox solution of the Monothelite question.” I will outline the metaphysics of Monenergism, its three folds dialectic, Maximum break up of this dialectic, and conclude with Maximu’s overall matrix for a coherent doctrine of predestination absorb under Christology and Eschatology. (shrink)

This chapter presents a historical study of how science has developed and of how philosophical theories of many sorts – philosophy of science, theory of the understanding, and philosophical theology – both enable and constrain certain lines of development in scientific practice. Its topic is change in the legitimacy or acceptability of scientific explanation that invokes purposes, or ends; specifically in the argument from design, in the natural science field of physico-theology, around the start of the eighteenth century. ... The (...) context that produced physico-theology was clearly religious and political. It is unsurprising that a large body of Protestant intellectuals well-placed in a relatively peaceful society with a strong tradition of open speech, would develop links between science and critical discussion of both divinity and the Bible. There were also bounds to the discussion, as Newton, who chose to sit on the sidelines, knew well. Many others on Europe’s continent lived much more intimately with religious division as well as the reminder, in 1633, of Galileo’s failure to arrange a peaceable arrangement between science and religion. These aspects of the rise of physico-theology have not been the focus of this chapter, which has surveyed the philosophical and social origins found in the English context. Science, philosophy of science and other English philosophical currents – most particularly the theory of ideas and understanding that we are familiar with in its later development by John Locke – were formative for a field that might alternatively have been called ‘empirical natural theology.’ Prior shifts in religious sensibility that emptied the Book of Nature of much of its content also prepared the ground. Other philosophical and theological currents not discussed here – most notably theories of divine agency and predestination – and other philosophical trends – the rise of Spinoza’s challenge to such natural theology on the continent – also had both shaping and limiting influences upon the field. Finally, philosophers, including natural philosophers, did much more to promote physico-theology than just write about it: Boyle in particular provided a very important launch pad for the further development of an already healthy tradition of natural theology with his named lectureship, which drew the interest of others in the Royal Society, most notably Isaac Newton, and which spawned two of the most influential physico-theological tracts shortly before and shortly after the turn of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

These two remarkable books, both published in 2010, share many themes but differ in significant ways, and each is very much worth reading and pondering. Oord’s The Nature of Love concentrates primarily on conceptual and theological themes relating to the very nature of love itself and what influential theologians have had to say about love. His Defining Love focuses on how the social and physical sciences impact our understanding of human and divine love. Both books presuppose and express many themes (...) that are prominent in process theology such as: freedom is universally present (by degrees) in all creatures, especially us; predestination is abhorrent and untenable; God exists necessarily and everlastingly but not .. (shrink)

Lisa Hill’s response to my critique of compulsory voting, like similar responses in print or in discussion, remind me how much a child of the ‘70s I am, and how far my beliefs and intuitions about politics have been shaped by the electoral conflicts, social movements and violence of that period. -/- But my perceptions of politics have also been profoundly shaped by my teachers, and fellow graduate students, at MIT. Theda Skocpol famously urged political scientists to ‘bring the state (...) back in’ to their analyses, and to recognise that political identities, interests and coalitions cannot be read off straightforwardly from people’s socio-economic position. In their different ways, this was the lesson that Suzanne Berger, Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen tried to teach us, emphasising the ways that political participation and conflict, themselves, can change people’s identities, their sense of what it is desirable and possible, and their ability to recognise, or oppose, the freedom and equality of others. -/- I do not therefore take it as self-evident that the poor and seemingly powerless should be politically apathetic, unwilling to vote, or incapable of imagining a political solution to at least some of the problems confronting them. Nor do I suppose that non-voters are all-of-a-piece, and that their shared interests are, inevitably, more significant, morally or politically, than those which divide them. Such assumptions seem mistaken in the case of voters, and I see no reason why they should be true of non-voters. The people we find in these categories are not predestined to be in one rather than the other; they do not always stay where they start off; and at an individual level, the reasons why people fall into one group, rather than another, are likely to be complex and sometimes unpredictable. -/- Above all I see nothing in a commitment to democratic government, understood realistically or in more idealistic terms, that requires us to treat raising turnout at national elections (once every four years or so) as of such moral or political importance that we should make it legally mandatory. Realistically, it is an open question how far the ballot box is, for most people, the path to empowerment – important though it is that people should have an equal right to vote and to stand as candidates at national elections. On a more idealistic view of democratic politics it is hard to avoid the thought that the importance of national elections to self-government, posited by proponents of compulsory voting, reflects an alienated and alienating view of democracy, in which the choice of our leaders becomes more important than the development and exercise of our own capacities to lead; and in which our awe at the power our leaders might wield is matched only by our inability to imagine less intimidating, distant and centralised forms of politics. -/- But before saying a little more about these points, and their significance for compulsory voting, I would like to dispel some misunderstandings or misrepresentations of my views in Hill’s essay. I do not believe socio-economic disparities in turnout are not worrying for democratic politics, nor do I believe that abstention is generally synonymous with consent. I do not assume that people have a right not to vote, but try to explain why moral and legal rights to abstain are an important part of democratic politics, including electoral politics. (shrink)

In this article I present the most important works by Domingo Báñez on the so-called De auxiliis controversy, on divine predestination, divine will and divine grace, and human freedom. It is a polemic against Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez, mainly. I review the works published by Báñez and his unpublished manuscripts, providing new historical data on them.

Metaphysics, seen as a legitimizing narrative or a paradigm (Lyotard, 1984), prop up a certain practice in providing the basis for its assumptions. While Western medicine can be properly characterized as governed by a biophysical model (Hewa, 1994; Bates, 2002), such a model for traditional healing practices in the Philippines has yet to be derived. No philosopher has attempted to derive an indigenous metaphysics from traditional healing practices. The only study made so far (Fajardo & Pansacola, 2013), however, needlessly pigeonholes (...) these unique practices into incommensurable Western scientific concepts. While they collated data from healers all over the country, they attempted to use Western scientific concepts such as oxygen, carbon, electro-magnetic force, and others. These concepts dangerously obfuscate indigenous understandings of the human body and reality as a whole since they are directly lifted from a language and practice informed by Western metaphysics. Therefore, there has yet to be an adequate extraction of a locally derived metaphysics that informs and self-legitimizes these medicinal practices. Conscious of recent critiques to homogenizing tendencies in Philippine Studies (Guillermo, 2009) and Filipino philosophy (Pada, 2014; Abulad, 2016), specifically that of Mercado (1972) and Timbreza (2017), I attempt to derive a Filipino metaphysics from the traditional healing practices of two traditional healers in San Mateo, Rizal of the Southern Tagalog Region in Luzon through a particularist anthropological approach in Filipino philosophy. I derive four distinct characteristics of this metaphysics which are distinct from the biophysical presuppositions of Western medicine: (1) a law of conservation based on the concept of “balik,” (2) predestination, (3) an ontological dualism between the visible and the invisible, and (4) the performativity of words as utterances. (shrink)

Divine grace is the hand of Christ that sustains the Christian in his acts: such is the mystery explored at the end of the 16th century in the profound studies carried out by various Catholic theologians in a debate in Spain known as the “Controversy on divine aids” (de auxiliis). Its problematic covers both the drama of the loving agreement between divine initiative and human response, as well as the subtle questions of causal determinism or freedom of the will. In (...) this book, the participation of one of the main Dominicans involved in this dispute, Pedro de Ledesma, one of the last members of the School of Salamanca, is studied for the first time. For this purpose, his manuscript work is reviewed, contrasting it with the teachings of other Dominicans of the time. This also makes it possible to show that among the theologians of the Order of Preachers, despite their profound coincidences, there were also different approaches to providence, predestination and divine grace. Thus, this book provides a specific introduction to Ledesma, whose understanding of physical premotion is quite original, but it also provides a broad overview of the early years of the controversy on grace in the Iberian Peninsula. (shrink)

l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...) supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available. (shrink)

Divine providence, according to Aquinas, is the order of divine wisdom by which it leads creatures to their end. The existence of necessary, contingent and free things is part of this disposition. The infallible character of divine knowledge and will is not at odds with the fallible nature of things ordained by God: providence has infallibly disposed things to happen in a fallible way. Even the acts of human freedom are under the direction of divine mind, for the creator cooperates (...) with free will. The care of divine providence is studied by Aquinas in a special way in his Commentary on the Book of Job, which constitutes the second part of this paper. In this work, he envisages how human evil and suffering are remedied by divine providence. There are rational arguments that shed some light on the problem of human suffering. However, it is the gaze of faith that provides the ultimate confidence in the salvation of sinful and suffering man. (shrink)

This article intends to examine the problematic question of the ontological status of “physical premotion,” that is, the divine motion of created free will. This idea was developed by the Dominican Báñez and was strongly criticised by the Jesuit Suárez. Suárez’s description of physical premotion shows that he gradually conditioned the debate in a way which compelled to see the premotion as an entity different from the creator and the free agent. Several texts of Suárez are also reviewed in discussion (...) with a recent study of Matava. Finally, the article concludes that Báñez follows the main lines of the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas; consequently, he does not believe that the divine motion has any other effect in the world than that of the free action of the created agent. (shrink)

Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian reflection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Although St. Thomas refers (...) to Boethius many times in his systematic works and even devotes two commentaries to two of his theological opuscules, it is of special interest that both authors composed a commentary on the abovementioned work by Aristotle. The commentary of Saint Thomas does not interpret the whole book, but it does study the pages about future contingents in dialogue with Boethius. We will study such texts in our presentation. They constitute one of the greatest contributions of Aquinas to the problem of necessity and contingency and therefore to the vexata quaestio of divine intervention in the world and particularly in human free will. Not only Augustin but also Aristotle (read by Boethius) and Nemesius of Emesa will be decisive in Aquinas’ perception of this matter. (shrink)

I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the “grounding problem” for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick (...) O’Neill. O’Neill responds in this present journal issue to that paper, arguing that I failed to be attentive to distinctions drawn by Garrigou-Lagrange which would resolve the dilemma. However, I fear that O’Neill’s presentation of both the dilemma and his own resolution is conceptually confused. I will try to illustrate that O’Neill’s own responses are at many points either a concession to a certain fork of the dilemma that I posed in the original paper, or change the subject and fail to address my concerns except superficially. However, since at many points O’Neill implies that I reject Báñezianism, despite my explicit qualification in the paper that I do not, I will end by proposing what would constitute a sufficient response to the dilemma. (shrink)

It is frequently claimed that an all-loving and good God cannot permit anyone to end up in hell. In this book, the author shows that this issue of God’s permission of hell has an intimate connection with age-old questions regarding why God would permit sin. Indeed, focus on why an all-loving and good God would permit hell is the best lens through which to explain sin. -/- Many arguments against the possibility of hell require affirming that God permits sin because (...) God could not achieve goods for us without allowing sin. The author argues that we have independent philosophical reasons to reject that sin is necessary for us in any way, and, further, we have similar reasons to hold that hell is necessarily possible if the God of classical theism exists. In the end, understanding why an all-loving and good God would permit hell reveals that there is always hope for us, even when things appear most hopeless. -/- The book will appeal to those working in metaphysics, theology, philosophy of religion, and medieval philosophy. (shrink)

As I read the texts of Aquinas and the state of the discussion among his interpreters on the question of the compatibility between creaturely freedom and divine providence, an alternative interpretation suggests itself. My impression is that traditional interpreters left Aquinas’ account of the relationships among human freedom, providence and divine goodness inadequately defended, while Maritain and Lonergan with fair intention subverted it, because their readings were hampered by libertarian intuitions about human freedom which Aquinas did not share. -/- Understanding (...) Aquinas’ account of freedom in compatibilist terms reveals greater coherence in his account of the nature of human freedom and the role our freedom plays in the created order than do accounts infected with libertarian notions of freedom. Once the compatibilist conception of freedom is comprehended, it functions like a lens of superior clarity through which other aspects of Aquinas’ thought concerning the created order can be seen afresh. Accordingly, our first task is to craft the lens itself: a compatibilist conception of freedom will be ground from the material available in Aquinas’ writing on the will, its acts, and their causes in a way unclouded by the apparent tensions between causality and freedom which libertarian intuitions introduce. Then grasping the compatibilist lens, we will see through it a coherent account of the high purpose in the plan of providence for free creatures. Finally, we will observe coherence in Aquinas’ account of the permission of sin and even the ultimate failure of free creatures through the perspective afforded by compatibilist freedom. (shrink)

Diego de Deza has been designed by Christian Pesch as a premolinist while Friedrich Stegmüller has stressed the alleged disagreement between his version of Thomism and the one professed by later Spanish theologians. This paper aims to revisit this interpretation of Deza’s doctrine of divine foreknowledge by showing its fundamental agreement with Domingo Báñez, especially in placing the divine free will as an ingredient of divine knowledge of created things. Moreover, Deza’s teaching about divine grace brings him quite close to (...) a Bañezian idea of premotion insofar as he supposes a special divine aid for every morally good act. (shrink)