Aristotle claims, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that in addition to being, for example, just and courageous, and temperate, the virtuous person will also be witty. Very little sustained attention, however, has been devoted to explicating what Aristotle means when he claims that virtuous persons are witty or to justifying the plausibility of the claim that wittiness is a virtue. It becomes especially difficult to see why Aristotle thinks that being witty is a virtue once it becomes clear that Aristotle’s witty (...) person engages in what he calls ‘educated insolence’. Insolence, for Aristotle, is a form of slighting which, as he explains in the Rhetoric, generally causes the person slighted to experience shame and anger. In this paper, I attempt to bring some clarity to Aristotle’s claim that being witty is a virtue by examining why Aristotle thinks that the object of a witty person’s raillery will find this joking pleasant. (shrink)

Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion (...) and critique, it remains underdeveloped and is often misrepresented by its critics (section 8). (shrink)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define four (...) criteria for individual and group epistemic rationality, and then prove that the four definitions diverge, in the sense that individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We conclude by explaining implications of the inconsistency thesis for (i) descriptive history and sociology of science and (ii) normative prescriptions for scientific communities. (shrink)

Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or “closeness to the truth” (1998). The second is a shift from a numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions (2010). We argue that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, we employ a (slightly-generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012), who show that (...) there is no strictly proper scoring rule for imprecise probabilities. -/- The question then is what should give way. Joyce, who is well aware of this no-go result, thinks that a quantifiability constraint on epistemic accuracy should be relaxed to accommodate imprecision. We argue instead that another Joycean assumption — called strict immodesty— should be rejected, and we prove a representation theorem that characterizes all “mildly” immodest measures of inaccuracy. (shrink)

This dissertation discusses several ethical and moral issues which arise from the cryonics movement. Within each section, the question is posed: how does that problem impact on how we should think about cryonics? Is cryonics morally permissible and/or morally obligatory? Issues include a consideration of economic resource allocation, bodily ownership and identity.

Christian B. Miller has noted a “realism challenge” for virtue ethicists to provide an account of how the character gap between virtuous agents and non-virtuous agents can be bridged. This is precisely one of Han Feizi’s key criticisms against Confucian virtue ethics, as Eric L. Hutton argues, which also cuts across the Aristotelian one: appealing to virtuous agents as ethical models provides the wrong kind of guidance for the development of virtues. Hutton, however, without going into detail, notes that the (...) notion of rituals in the Confucian tradition may be able to sidestep Han Feizi’s criticism. In this essay, I wish to explore not only how the notion of rituals, alongside its corollaries in Xunzi’s Confucian program for ethical cultivation, indeed addresses Han Feizi’s criticism, but also observe that Aristotle’s tragic poetry plays functionally equivalent roles in his own understanding of ethical upbringing. I will begin by considering Han Feizi’s critique of ethical cultivation in virtue ethics as such and how it poses a specific problem for the acquisition of the ‘constitutive reasoning’ shared by Aristotle and Xunzi. I will then briefly note that this problem trades on the synthetic structure of human nature found in both Aristotle and Xunzi (the rational/irrational parts of the soul and the heartmind/five faculties), which grounds the way they understand ethical action and agency. Finally, I will suggest how both Aristotle and Xunzi understand the role of the arts in their extensive programme of ethical cultivation, allowing them to respond to Han Feizi’s attack as too narrow a construal of their respective ethical projects. It is hoped that, through this, we may gain a better sense of how more recent virtue ethicists may similarly draw on aesthetic resources for ethical development. (shrink)

We evaluate the asymptotic performance of boundedly-rational strategies in multi-armed bandit problems, where performance is measured in terms of the tendency (in the limit) to play optimal actions in either (i) isolation or (ii) networks of other learners. We show that, for many strategies commonly employed in economics, psychology, and machine learning, performance in isolation and performance in networks are essentially unrelated. Our results suggest that the appropriateness of various, common boundedly-rational strategies depends crucially upon the social context (if any) (...) in which such strategies are to be employed. (shrink)

Introduction in chapter viii of book ii of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke provides various putative lists of primary qualities. Insofar as they have considered the variation across Locke's lists at all, commentators have usually been content simply either to consider a self-consciously abbreviated list (e.g., "Size, Shape, etc.") or a composite list as the list of Lockean primary qualities, truncating such a composite list only by omitting supposedly co-referential terms. Doing the latter with minimal judgment about what (...) terms are co-referential gives us the following list of eleven qualities (in the order in which they appear in this chapter of the Essay): solidity, extension, figure, mobility, motion or rest, number, bulk, texture, motion, size, and situation. Perhaps surprisingly given the attention to the primary/secondary distinction since Locke, Locke's primary qualities themselves have received little more than passing mention in the bulk of the subsequent literature. In particular, no discussion both offers an interpretation of Locke's conception of primary qualities and makes sense of Locke's various lists as lists of primary qualities. A central motivation for this paper is the idea that these two tasks are not independent. (shrink)

Controlling the names of places, environments, and species is one way in which settler colonial ontologies delimit the intelligibility of ecological relations, Indigenous peoples, and environmental injustices. To counter this, this article amplifies the voices of Native American scholars and foregrounds a philosophical account of Indigenous naming. First, I explore some central characteristics of Indigenous ontology, epistemic virtue, and ethical responsibility, setting the stage for how Native naming draws these elements together into a complete, robust philosophy. Then I point toward (...) leading but contingent principles of Native naming, foregrounding how Native names emerge from and create communities by situating (rather than individuating) the beings that they name within kinship structures, including human and nonhuman agents. Finally, I outline why and how Indigenous names and the knowledges they contain are crucial for both resisting settler violence and achieving environmental justice, not only for Native Americans, but for their entire animate communities. (shrink)

Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore (...) questions about faith in a variety of settings through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships (e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance. (shrink)

A dynamical system is called chaotic if small changes to its initial conditions can create large changes in its behavior. By analogy, we call a dynamical system structurally chaotic if small changes to the equations describing the evolution of the system produce large changes in its behavior. Although there are many definitions of “chaos,” there are few mathematically precise candidate definitions of “structural chaos.” I propose a definition, and I explain two new theorems that show that a set of models (...) is structurally chaotic if it contains a chaotic function. I conclude by discussing the relationship between structural chaos and structural stability. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.

It is common to assume that the problem of induction arises only because of small sample sizes or unreliable data. In this paper, I argue that the piecemeal collection of data can also lead to underdetermination of theories by evidence, even if arbitrarily large amounts of completely reliable experimental and observational data are collected. Specifically, I focus on the construction of causal theories from the results of many studies (perhaps hundreds), including randomized controlled trials and observational studies, where the studies (...) focus on overlapping, but not identical, sets of variables. Two theorems reveal that, for any collection of variables V, there exist fundamentally different causal theories over V that cannot be distinguished unless all variables are simultaneously measured. Underdetermination can result from piecemeal measurement, regardless of the quantity and quality of the data. Moreover, I generalize these results to show that, a priori, it is impossible to choose a series of small (in terms of number of variables) observational studies that will be most informative with respect to the causal theory describing the variables under investigation. This final result suggests that scientific institutions may need to play a larger role in coordinating differing research programs during inquiry. (shrink)

Perception solves computationally demanding problems at lightning fast speed. It recovers sophisticated representations of the world from degraded inputs, often in a matter of milliseconds. Any theory of perception must be able to explain how this is possible; in other words, it must be able to explain perception's computational tractability. One of the few attempts to move toward such an explanation has been the information encapsulation hypothesis, which posits that perception can be fast because it keeps computational costs low by (...) forgoing access to information stored in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access, and these threaten to make the costs of access irrelevant. If this is right, it undermines a core computational motivation for encapsulation and sends us back to the drawing board for explanations of perceptual tractability. (shrink)

According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell’s logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as aprioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell’s explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on recent work (...) by Andrew Irvine and Martin Godwyn, I argue that Russell thought a systematic reduction of mathematics increases the certainty of known mathematical theorems (even basic arithmetical facts) by showing mathematical knowledge to be coherently organized. The paper outlines Russell’s theory of coherence, and discusses its relevance to logicism and the certainty attributed to mathematics. (shrink)

This is the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s carta de 24 de octubre, 1851, a letter encapsulating many of his views on revolution and decision. This remarkable letter, sent as a diplomatic missive while he was serving the Spanish crown in Paris, describes how Napoleon III––stuck between the 1848 constitution’s prohibition against his election and his impending coup that will crown him emperor––must gain the support of the liberal bourgeoise middle class if he is to maintain his (...) rule over France. The letter is also of great importance to Donoso and Schmitt scholars because it contains the first and only time Donoso uses the complete term “las clases discutidoras,” which, through Schmitt’s injudicious and repeated misspellings as “una clasa discutidora” has become famous for its characterization of the liberal bourgeoisie as the “discussing” or “disputing” class that is incapable of action at the precise historical moment when a decision is most direly needed to save the constitution from inner or outer existential threats. (shrink)

Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and (...) the Agents of Life, explores the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences. You can download the table of contents here. (shrink)

One might suppose that Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is inhospitable to metaphysial indeterminacy (MI), given that, as A. Wilson (2020) puts it, "the central idea of EQM is to replace indeterminacy with multiplicity" (77). But as Wilson goes on to suggest, the popular decoherence-based understanding of EQM (henceforth: DEQM) appears to admit of indeterminacy in both world number and world nature, where the latter indeterminacy---our focus here---is plausibly metaphysical. After a brief presentation of DEQM (S1), we bolster the (...) case for there being MI in world nature in DEQM (S2). The remainder of the paper is devoted to a comparative assessment of the two main approaches to MI for purposes of accommodating this MI---namely, a metaphysical supervaluationist approach (as per Barnes and Williams 2011) and a determinable-based approach (as per Wilson 2013 and Calosi and Wilson 2018 and 2021). We briefly describe each approach (S3), then offer arguments in favour of a determinable-based approach to world nature MI in DEQM (S4). (shrink)

This is the introductory essay for the 80 or so philosophy articles in MITECS, covering philosophy's contribution to the cognitive sciences.

Philosophical exploration of individualism and externalism in the cognitive sciences most recently has been focused on general evaluations of these two views (Adams & Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2008, Wilson 2004, Clark 2008). Here we return to broaden an earlier phase of the debate between individualists and externalists about cognition, one that considered in detail particular theories, such as those in developmental psychology (Patterson 1991) and the computational theory of vision (Burge 1986, Segal 1989). Music cognition is an area in (...) the cognitive sciences that has received little attention from philosophers, though it has relatively recently been thrown into the externalist spotlight (Cochrane 2008, Kruger 2014, Kersten forthcoming). Given that individualism can be thought of as a kind of paradigm for research on cognition, we provide a brief overview of the field of music cognition and individualistic tendencies within the field (sections 2 and 3) before turning to consider externalist alternatives to individualistic paradigms (section 4-5) and then arguing for a qualified form of externalism about music cognition (section 6). (shrink)

The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception – associated in particular with the work of David Lewis – is not a good fit with our use of the word ‘chance’ and its cognates in ordinary discourse. In this paper we show how a generalized framework for chance can reconcile determinism with non-trivial chances, and provide for a more charitable interpretation of ordinary chance-talk. According to our proposal, variation in an admissible ‘evidence (...) base’ generates a spectrum of different chance functions. Successive coarse-grainings of the evidence base generates a partial ordering of chance functions, with finer trumping coarser if known. We suggest that chance-attributions in ordinary discourse express different chance functions in different contexts, and we sketch a potential contextual mechanism for making particular chance functions salient. The mechanism involves the idea that admissible evidence is available evidence: propositions that could be known. A consequence is that attributions of objective chances inherit the relatively familiar context-sensitivity associated with the modal ‘could’. We show how this context-dependency undermines certain arguments for the incompatibility of chance with determinism. (shrink)

What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this 'mediator view' of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in four (...) metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argument against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Universe's origin. (shrink)

Epistemic two-dimensional semantics, advocated by Chalmers and Jackson, among others, aims to restore the link between necessity and a priority seemingly broken by Kripke, by showing how armchair access to semantic intensions provides a basis for knowledge of necessary a posteriori truths. The most compelling objections to E2D are that, for one or other reason, the requisite intensions are not accessible from the armchair. As we substantiate here, existing versions of E2D are indeed subject to such access-based objections. But, we (...) moreover argue, the difficulty lies not with E2D but with the typically presupposed conceiving-based epistemology of intensions. Freed from that epistemology, and given the right alternative—one where inference to the best explanation provides the operative guide to intensions—E2D can meet access-based objections, and fulfill its promise of restoring the desirable link between necessity and a priority. This result serves as a central application of Biggs and Wilson, according to which abduction is an a priori mode of inference. (shrink)

This collection of original essays--by philosophers of biology, biologists, and cognitive scientists--provides a wide range of perspectives on species. Including contributions from David Hull, John Dupre, David Nanney, Kevin de Queiroz, and Kim Sterelny, amongst others, this book has become especially well-known for the three essays it contains on the homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds, papers by Richard Boyd, Paul Griffiths, and Robert A. Wilson.

A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of gene flow that (...) are central to the view we discuss. We conclude by tracing four broader implications for the study and conceptualization of species. (shrink)

David Sloan Wilson has recently revived the idea of a group mind as an application of group selectionist thinking to cognition. Central to my discussion of this idea is the distinction between the claim that groups have a psychology and what I call the social manifestation thesis-a thesis about the psychology of individuals. Contemporary work on this topic has confused these two theses. My discussion also points to research questions and issues that Wilson's work raises, as well as (...) their connection to externalist conceptions of the mind familiar since the work of Putnam and Burge. (shrink)

1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.

These essays draw on work in the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the development of concepts in children, conceptual..

Genes and the Agents of Life undertakes to rethink the place of the individual in the biological sciences, drawing parallels with the cognitive and social sciences. Genes, organisms, and species are all agents of life but how are each of these conceptualized within genetics, developmental biology, evolutionary biology, and systematics? The 2005 book includes highly accessible discussions of genetic encoding, species and natural kinds, and pluralism above the levels of selection, drawing on work from across the biological sciences. The book (...) is a companion to the author's Boundaries of the Mind (2004), also available from Cambridge, where the focus is the cognitive sciences. The book will appeal to a broad range of professionals and students in philosophy, biology, and the history of science. You can download the table of contents and the first chapter here. (shrink)

This is an introductory article on sociobiology, particularly its relationship to eugenics. Sociobiology developed in the 1960s as a field within evolutionary biology to explain human social traits and behaviours. Although sociobiology has few direct connections to eugenics, it shares eugenics’ optimistic enthusiasm for extending biological science into the human domain, often with reckless sensationalism. Sociobiology's critics have argued that sociobiology also propagates a kind of genetic determinism and represents the zealous misapplication of science beyond its proper reach that characterized (...) the eugenics movement. More recently, evolutionary psychology represents a sophistication of sociobiology that attends to the mind as the "missing link" between evolution and behaviour (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, Pinker 1997). (shrink)

RESUMO: As novas tecnologias revolucionaram tanto as relações humanas quanto as formas de exploração. Com o uso massivo e a dependência das redes sociais, muitas pessoas descobriram fontes de ganhos fnanceiros a partir da exposição da imagem, seja da sua ou de outrem. Nesse cenário, a intimidade de centenas de crianças é exposta por seus pais ou responsáveis em troca de audiência, fama e recursos fnanceiros. Partindo dessa problemática, o presente artigo investiga os impactos do trabalho infantil mediante a exploração (...) da imagem e da intimidade da criança nas plataformas digitais. Por se tratar de uma nova modalidade de produção abundante de artistas mirins, suas consequências têm impactado a atual geração, sobretudo na saúde biopsicossocial. -/- PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Trabalho Infantil. Exposição Virtual. Exploração da Imagem. Redes Sociais. -/- ABSTRACT: New technologies have revolutionized both human relationships and forms of exploitation. With the massive use and dependence on social networks, many people have discovered sources of fnancial gain from the exposure of the image, whether theirs or someone else’s. In this scenario, the intimacy of hundreds of children is exposed by their parents or guardians in exchange for audience, fame and fnancial gain. Based on this problem, this article investigates the impacts of child labor through the exploitation of the image and intimacy of the child on digital platforms. As it is a new modality of abundant production of child artists, its consequences have impacted the current generation, especially in biopsychosocial health. -/- KEYWORDS: Child Labor. Virtual Exposure. Image Exploitation. Social networks. (shrink)

Destaca-se a importância da vítima no processo de perfilamento de criminosos, pois é com base na averiguação dos traços físicos e psicológicos deixados na pessoa que sofreu o delito que é possível traçar o perfil criminal do ofensor. Constata-se a estagnação do ensino do criminal profiling no Brasil.

The ethical issues raised by cybersecurity practices and technologies are of critical importance. However, there is disagreement about what is the best ethical framework for understanding those issues. In this paper we seek to address this shortcoming through the introduction of a principlist ethical framework for cybersecurity that builds on existing work in adjacent fields of applied ethics, bioethics, and AI ethics. By redeploying the AI4People framework, we develop a domain-relevant specification of five ethical principles in cybersecurity: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, (...) justice, and explicability. We then illustrate the advantages of this principlist framework by examining the ethical issues raised by four common cybersecurity contexts: penetration testing, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), ransomware, and system administration. These case analyses demonstrate the utility of this principlist framework as a basis for understanding cybersecurity ethics and for cultivating the ethical expertise and ethical sensitivity of cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

Os autores estudam um caso de linchamento ocorrido na cidade de Guarujá. Formulam sua hipótese a partir da teoria mimética de René Girard, demonstrando, no caso concreto, a presença de sinais vitimários que tornam um indivíduo suscetível a ser tomado como bode expiatório de uma comunidade em crise. Problematizam sobre a questão da mentalidade persecutória, justiça comunitária e sistema judiciário.

RESUMO Versa o presente artigo sobre a regulação do linchamento no Direito Romano do período antigo, em especial sobre o artigo 9º da Tábua III das Leis das XII Tábuas. A partir de uma metodologia de análise qualitativa, revisão bibliográfica e interpretação textual, os autores objetivam ampliar a visão tradicional sobre o linchamento, compreendendo a institucionalização de sua prática no Direito Romano e sua função no contexto de formação da cultura jurídica do período antigo. A hipótese de trabalho é a (...) de que o artigo 9º da Tábua III das Leis das XII Tábuas apresenta, historicamente, uma forma de punição intermediária entre a linchamento popular extralegal e a pena criminal prevista em lei. Do ponto de vista jurídico-antropológico, a comprovação da hipótese permitiria concluir a ideia de que a pena praticada na antiguidade é uma evolução do controle social informal da violência. Palavras-chave: Linchamento; Direito Romano; XII Tábuas; Pena criminal. ABSTRACT The following paper is about the lynching regulation in Roman law in Ancient Era, especially in what comes about the article 9 of Table Three from Twelve Tables. Making use of a methodology based in qualitative analisys, literature review and interpretation, the auctor aim to expande the traditional view about lynching, understanding the institutionalization of their practice in Roman Law and it’s function in the legal culture in Ancient Era. The working hipothesis is that the article 9 of Table Three of Twelve Tables presents, in a historical context, a intermediate form of punishment between extralegal collective lynching and criminal penalty provided by law. From a legal-anthropological point of view, the proof of the hypothesis would allow us to conclude the idea that the penalty practiced in antiquity is an evolution of informal social control of violence. Keywords: Lynching; Roman Law; Twelve Tables; Criminal Penalty. (shrink)

For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and (...) other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological. (shrink)

A tragédia de Orestes, escrita pelo tragediógrafo grego Ésquilo, influenciou decisivamente o pensamento ético-político de Hegel. Em seu ensaio sobre o Direito Natural (1802-1803), o filósofo alemão associa seu conceito de absoluto com sua interpretação da tragédia grega, ato com o qual expõe sua concepção da vida ética absoluta, dando continuidade à ideia que havia esboçado, no âmbito teológico, em "O Espírito do cristianismo e seu destino", i.e., a de que o destino e a justiça trágica forneceriam os termos de (...) uma alternativa aos conceitos jurídicos kantianos e cristãos de justiça. Mas, em "Sobre as maneiras de tratar cientificamente o direito natural", Hegel vai além. Ele demonstra que o gênero trágico apresenta uma concepção de ética e política que pode ser uma alternativa às concepções modernas do direito natural, o que permite a Hegel opor a representação trágica da unidade da vida ética absoluta ao dualismo e às dicotomias que estruturam as teorias políticas de seu tempo. Essa intuição da tragédia propiciou ao filósofo compreender a vida ética absoluta como o verdadeiro fundamento da ética e da política. Enquanto tal, ela pressupõe, necessariamente, todas as teorias do Direito Natural. Hegel denomina essa representação da unidade da vida ético-política como "a representação da tragédia da vida ética". A obra emblemática e talvez até mesmo inspiradora dessa compreensão do direito natural é "Eumênides", de Ésquilo, peça que encerra a trilogia "Oresteia". A partir dela, Hegel desenvolve, no capítulo intitulado “a ciência especulativa e o direito natural”, sua concepção trágica da vida ética absoluta. É que a tragédia de Orestes expõe o problema político que Hegel quer resolver: as relações entre o universal e o particular, o todo e as partes, o Estado e o indivíduo, etc. Além de explicitar o problema político, a obra de Ésquilo também expõe a solução do que Hegel considera ser o conflito absoluto, i.e., o jogo das oposições (universal/particular, todo/partes, Estado/indivíduos) que consiste na essência da vida ética e política. Tal solução se dá, na peça, com o julgamento do herói, Orestes, e a consequente pacificação das Erínias, transformadas em Eumênides. Esse movimento é a culminação da trilogia "Oresteia" e ilustra o tipo de reconciliação que Hegel procurava produzir com sua Filosofia do Direito: a (re)organização da totalidade ética. (shrink)

Em sua Filosofia do Direito, Hegel, ao tratar da instituição da família e de seu papel na educação dos filhos, intuiu um traço característico da subjetividade infantil: no coração das crianças haveria um desejo de pertencer ao mundo dos adultos. Trata-se de um desejo que poderíamos qualificar de mimético, no sentido da teoria de René Girard, já que as crianças adotam os pais como seus primeiros modelos. Na teoria hegeliana, esse elemento mimético adquire, junto à educação infantil, uma importante função (...) na formação da personalidade moral. A educação é uma exigência da própria criança, que possui de maneira inata o sentimento de não estar satisfeita em ser aquilo que é e o desejo de pertencer ao mundo adulto. Hegel, por isso, é um crítico da pedagogia que estagna as crianças na subjetividade infantil. Representando-as como perfeitas no estado de imperfeição em que se encontram, essa pedagogia perturba a espontânea carência do estado infantil, traço que impele naturalmente a criança ao autodesenvolvimento. O erro desse tipo de abordagem pedagógica está em não conceber o papel da mediação na formação da personalidade moral. Se o adulto, enquanto modelo, valoriza a criança em seu estado de infantilidade, é natural que ela adote essa mesma estima sobre si mesma, seguindo a opinião exterior. Logo, a valoração subjetiva, que deveria centrar-se no modelo ético, volta-se, pela mediação do modelo adulto, ao próprio Eu vazio da criança, que cresce concebendo- se como realidade autônoma, independente dos demais, gerando nela o desinteresse pelas relações substanciais do “mundo do espírito”. O narcisismo infantil seria, pois, uma decorrência da perda de referência ao modelo ético da vida adulta. Desse vazio “ontológico” da criança surge a necessidade de sua formação por meio do processo pedagógico. Os pais, que constituem o modelo imediato das crianças, não só devem estimular nelas a adoção do comportamento ético, como também punir as suas transgressões morais. A finalidade da punição não é a justiça enquanto tal. Trata-se, antes, de uma intimidação subjetiva e moral exercida contra a liberdade ainda encerrada na natureza, tendo como escopo elevar, na consciência e na vontade, a esfera da universalidade e da razão. Portanto, na educação dos filhos, o ético e o mimético são indissociáveis. Lendo Hegel a partir de René Girard, poder-se-ia usar o termo “mimeticidade” para designar essa unidade entre a imitação natural (subjetividade) e a promoção pedagógica e cultural de modelos comportamentais voltados ao Bem (moral objetiva). Pela adoção de modelos éticos, a criança tem a oportunidade de vivenciar a “eticidade” ainda sem oposição, como seu sentimento mais imediato, mais íntimo e “próprio”, vindo a adquirir, na vida adulta, a autonomia moral concreta de uma personalidade livre e racional, exercida em coerência com as demais. (shrink)

Resumo: Objetivando compreender as ideologias que conformaram os regimes totalitários do século XX, o autor investiga a origem da ideia de progresso da história, especialmente para expor um tipo de racionalidade que está no cerne das ideologias progressistas, cujo elemento comum ´e a hipóstase do fim da história como um evento espiritual imanente ao processo histórico. Para tanto, observa na imanentização escatológica de Joaquim de Fiore uma das mais importantes manifestações da ideia de progresso na história, expondo sua influência nas (...) ideologias modernas. -/- Palavras-chave: Progresso em ideia de hist´oria. Ideologias progressistas. Gnosticismo em Joaquim de Fiore. (shrink)

The computational argument for individualism, which moves from computationalism to individualism about the mind, is problematic, not because computationalism is false, but because computational psychology is, at least sometimes, wide. The paper provides an early, or perhaps predecessor, version of the thesis of extended cognition.

The Eugenic Mind Project is a wide-ranging, philosophical book that explores and critiques both past and present eugenic thinking, drawing on the author’s intimate knowledge of eugenics in North America and his previous work on the cognitive, biological, and social sciences, the fragile sciences. Informed by the perspectives of Canadian eugenics survivors in the province of Alberta, The Eugenic Mind Project recounts the history of eugenics and the thinking that drove it, and critically engages contemporary manifestations of eugenic thought, newgenics. (...) An accessible, original work of scholarship adopting what the author calls a standpoint eugenics, this book focuses on the roots of eugenic thinking past and present. It will provoke and enrich discussions about human nature and human diversity, the social uses of biotechnology, and social policy governing future generations. You can download the preface and acknowledgements here. (shrink)

Philosophy in community projects provide powerful, immersive introductions to philosophical thinking for both children and tertiary students. Such introductions can jumpstart transformative learning as well as diversify who seeks out philosophy in the longer term, both in schools and in universities. Using survey responses from teachers, parents, participants, staff, and volunteers of two such programs – Eurekamp Oz! and philosothons – we show how participants find value in engaging in communities of inquiry and philosophical thinking more broadly. We argue correspondingly (...) that such philosophy in community projects are an asset to universities, both as highly successful university outreach programs and in offering high school, undergraduate, and postgraduate students mentoring and employment opportunities utilising their growing philosophical skills. For these reasons, philosophy in community programs provide alternative and supplementary pathways into sustained philosophical thinking to those available within traditional philosophy in the classroom approaches. (shrink)

There is a debate about whether particular properties are for Aristotle non-recurrent and trope-like individuals or recurrent universals. I argue that Physics I.7 provides evidence that he took non-substantial particulars to be neither; they are instead non-recurrent modes. Physics I.7 also helps show why this matters. Particular properties must be individual modes in order for Aristotle to preserve three key philosophical commitments: that objects of ordinary experience are primary substances, that primary substances undergo genuine change, and that primary substances are (...) ontologically fundamental. (shrink)

This volume celebrates the various facets of Alan Turing (1912–1954), the British mathematician and computing pioneer, widely considered as the father of computer science. It is aimed at the general reader, with additional notes and references for those who wish to explore the life and work of Turing more deeply. -/- The book is divided into eight parts, covering different aspects of Turing’s life and work. -/- Part I presents various biographical aspects of Turing, some from a personal point of (...) view. -/- Part II presents Turing’s universal machine (now known as a Turing machine), which provides a theoretical framework for reasoning about computation. His 1936 paper on this subject is widely seen as providing the starting point for the field of theoretical computer science. -/- Part III presents Turing’s working on codebreaking during World War II. While the War was a disastrous interlude for many, for Turing it provided a nationally important outlet for his creative genius. It is not an overstatement to say that without Turing, the War would probably have lasted longer, and may even have been lost by the Allies. The sensitive nature of Turning’s wartime work meant that much of this has been revealed only relatively recently. -/- Part IV presents Turing’s post-War work on computing, both at the National Physical Laboratory and at the University of Manchester. He made contributions to both hardware design, through the ACE computer at the NPL, and software, especially at Manchester. Part V covers Turing’s contribution to machine intelligence (now known as Artificial Intelligence or AI). Although Turing did not coin the term, he can be considered a founder of this field which is still active today, authoring a seminal paper in 1950. -/- Part VI covers morphogenesis, Turing’s last major scientific contribution, on the generation of seemingly random patterns in biology and on the mathematics behind such patterns. Interest in this area has increased rapidly in recent times in the field of bioinformatics, with Turing’s 1952 paper on this subject being frequently cited. -/- Part VII presents some of Turing’s mathematical influences and achievements. Turing was remarkably free of external influences, with few co-authors – Max Newman was an exception and acted as a mathematical mentor in both Cambridge and Manchester. -/- Part VIII considers Turing in a wider context, including his influence and legacy to science and in the public consciousness. -/- Reflecting Turing’s wide influence, the book includes contributions by authors from a wide variety of backgrounds. Contemporaries provide reminiscences, while there are perspectives by philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, historians of science, and museum curators. Some of the contributors gave presentations at Turing Centenary meetings in 2012 in Bletchley Park, King’s College Cambridge, and Oxford University, and several of the chapters in this volume are based on those presentations – some through transcription of the original talks, especially for Turing’s contemporaries, now aged in their 90s. Sadly, some contributors died before the publication of this book, hence its dedication to them. -/- For those interested in personal recollections, Chapters 2, 3, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 36 will be of interest. For philosophical aspects of Turing’s work, see Chapters 6, 7, 26–31, and 41. Mathematical perspectives can be found in Chapters 35 and 37–39. Historical perspectives can be found in Chapters 4, 8, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 19, 21–25, 34, and 40. With respect to Turing’s body of work, the treatment in Parts II–VI is broadly chronological. We have attempted to be comprehensive with respect to all the important aspects of Turing’s achievements, and the book can be read cover to cover, or the chapters can be tackled individually if desired. There are cross-references between chapters where appropriate, and some chapters will inevitably overlap. -/- We hope that you enjoy this volume as part of your library and that you will dip into it whenever you wish to enter the multifaceted world of Alan Turing. (shrink)

While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to diverse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory ‘‘goes beyond the individual’’ but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. (...) This paper reviews a sampling of recent work on collective memory in the light of emerging externalist views within the cognitive sciences, and through some reflection on broader traditions of thought in the biological and social sciences that have appealed to the idea that groups have minds. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between these kinds of cognitive metaphors in the social sciences and our notion of agency. (shrink)

This article examines when deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research. The first half analyses the concept of deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative, and argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. The second half of the article argues that the relevant ethical question which ethics committees should focus on is not whether the person from whom the information is withheld will be deceived, but rather on the reasonableness of withholding (...) the information from the person who is deceived. We further argue that the reasonableness of withholding information is dependent on the context. The last section examines how the context of research should shape our judgements about the circumstances in which withholding information from research participants is ethically acceptable. We argue that some important features of research make it more difficult to justify withholding information in the context of research than elsewhere. (shrink)

No capítulo 1, “Do escudo de Aquiles à capa do Batman: o heroísmo togado e seus riscos à democracia”, discutimos a ascensão do protagonismo político no Poder Judiciário a partir da categoria antropológica do herói, expondo a delicada relação entre heroísmo e instituições democráticas. Para isso, traçamos um breve histórico do heroísmo e suas características, apresentando, posteriormente, uma analogia entre elas e a atuação do Ministro Joaquim Barbosa no curso da Ação Penal nº 470 do STF (Caso Mensalão). Tecemos também (...) alguns apontamentos sobre o Estado Democrático de Direito, a função do Poder Judiciário e os riscos que a propagação de escândalos públicos e a flexibilização de regras e princípios jurídicos podem trazer às instituições do Estado Democrático de Direito. O tema de fundo dessa análise é a relação simbiótica entre a violência e a produção mítica de heróis, segundo a teoria de Girard. No capítulo 2, “Satã: a violência na fundação da cultura”, analisamos a obra “Vejo Satã cair como um relâmpago”, de René Girard, apresentando sua teoria (mimética) e seu estudo antropológico da Bíblia e dos Evangelhos. O intuito é demonstrar a possibilidade de interpretar racionalmente dados antes percebidos como sobrenaturais, explorando, com Girard, as contribuições da revelação judaico-cristãs para a relação entre o homem, a violência e a organização político-religiosa do mundo antigo. O principal tema exposto na resenha é o da violência fundadora, base da cultura e da sociedade, que Girard identifica na figura bíblica de Satã. Mais do que mero símbolo religioso, Satã é a representação de um mecanismo de pacificação deflagrado em situações de crise social. Seu modus operandi consiste na reunião da sociedade contra um inimigo comum, um bode expiatório contra o qual levantam-se falsas acusações que sustentam sua perseguição e assassinato. Consideramos esse tema fundamental para a moderna e contemporânea compreensão dos processos de perseguição e vitimização político-social. A revelação cristã é a entrada em cena, no campo histórico, de um pensamento que se coloca francamente ao lado da vítima acusada pela comunidade. As ideologias penais da proteção do débil, os direitos individuais e os direitos humanos são efeitos políticos e jurídico do triunfo da cruz sobre a cultura satânica do assassínio de bodes expiatórios. No capítulo 3, “A violência no Direito: confissão e produção de bodes expiatórios”, aplicamos a teoria mimética para compreender o instituto jurídico da confissão do ponto de vista antropológico. Com base no Livro de Jó, investigamos a origem religiosa da extração forçada de confissões e demonstramos sua íntima relação com os rituais religiosos praticados na antiguidade, que usavam da assunção de culpa como um instrumento para legitimar a violência contra seus bodes expiatórios. Com isso, pretendemos apontar para a necessidade de mitigação do valor probatório da assunção de culpa no contexto de um Estado Democrático de Direito. Incorporada às intuições jurídicas, a confissão deve ser tomada como instrumento laico e totalmente desvinculado das práticas expiatórias que lhe deram origem. No capítulo 4, “Direito penal e preocupação pelas vítimas: a renovação dos princípios de ofensividade e proteção de bens jurídicos após a experiência do totalitarismo", analisamos o surgimento e desenvolvimento da ideia de crime como ofensa a bens jurídicos. Trata-se de um ensaio de história das ideias jurídicas em que traçamos a evolução histórica das ideias de ofensividade e proteção de bens jurídicos, desde sua gênese na experiência liberal e iluminista, passando por seu enfraquecimento durante o Direito Penal nacional-socialista, até culminar em seu ressurgimento e renovação nos dias atuais. O intuito desta análise é situar o princípio da ofensividade, enquanto garantia assegurada nas Constituições do Pós-guerra, no quadro histórico da moderna preocupação pelas vítimas, efeito cultural da religião cristã que discutimos no capítulo 2 (“Satã: a violência na fundação da cultura”). Por fim, no quinto e último capítulo, “O Direito após a revelação do mecanismo vitimário”, procuramos rematar a temática do Direito no quadro da antropologia de Girard, explorando o papel desempenhado pela revelação cristã do mecanismo expiatório na cultura ocidental, especialmente no que diz respeito à formação de uma ética de proteção das vítimas, eixo fundamental dos Direitos Humanos. Por isso, demonstramos como o Direito Penal, no ocidente, está dividido entre o sacrifício e o perdão. Resultado da lógica do cristianismo sacrificial, o moderno Direito constitui-se na forma híbrida de um Katéchon: ou seja, como racionalização do mecanismo vitimário, re-direcionado, por meio das instituições jurídicas e políticas, contra atos de perseguição de minorias e vulneráveis . (shrink)

Esta investigação tem por objetivo geral promover uma exposição do estado da arte do conceito de dolo eventual na dogmática penal, e, como objetivo específico, estabelecer bases metodológicas de como esse conceito pode ser construído, sistematizado e delimitado em relação à culpa consciente. A delimitação dos conceitos jurídico-penais é um importante instrumento para o estabelecimento de limites ao exercício do poder punitivo estatal. O conceito de dolo, na medida em que autoriza a aplicação de penas mais rigorosas em comparação à (...) culpa, demanda que a dogmática estabeleça claramente seus limites. Tarefa necessária não apenas para o conceito geral de dolo, mas também para o controverso “dolo eventual”, figura jurídica cuja conceituação e aplicação tem propiciado intensos debates na doutrina especializada, que, há pelo menos 200 anos, discute o problema de sua distinção com relação à outra figura não menos debatida, a da culpa (consciente). Devido à dificuldade de sua resolução, o pai do finalismo, Hans Welzel, considerou a distinção entre dolo eventual e culpa consciente uma das questões mais tormentosas do direito penal. Visando contribuir para o esclarecimento do tema, esta investigação apresenta dialeticamente os principais critérios e argumentos formulados na resolução desse intrincado problema jurídico, abrangendo, para este fim, tanto a discussão do período clássico da dogmática alemã (que legou vários conceitos até hoje debatidos e usados nesta matéria) quanto da moderna dogmática jurídico-penal, que tenta, a partir de novas abordagens, resolver a “tormentosa” questão. (shrink)

Distinctions in fundamentality between different levels of description are central to the viability of contemporary decoherence-based Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). This approach to quantum theory characteristically combines a determinate fundamental reality (one universal wave function) with an indeterminate emergent reality (multiple decoherent worlds). In this chapter I explore how the Everettian appeal to fundamentality and emergence can be understood within existing metaphysical frameworks, identify grounding and concept fundamentality as promising theoretical tools, and use them to characterize a system of explanatory (...) levels (with associated laws of nature) for EQM. This Everettian level structure encompasses and extends the ‘classical’ levels structure. The ‘classical’ levels of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. are recovered, but they are emergent in character and potentially variable across Everett worlds. EQM invokes an additional fundamental level, not present in the classical levels picture, and a novel potential role for self-location in interlevel metaphysics. When given a modal realist interpretation, EQM also makes trouble for supervenience-based approaches to levels. (shrink)

This paper examines the standard view of realization operative incontemporary philosophy of mind, and proposes an alternative, generalperspective on realization. The standard view can be expressed, insummary form, as the conjunction of two theses, the sufficiency thesis andthe constitutivity thesis. Physicalists of both reductionist and anti-reductionist persuasions share a conception of realization wherebyrealizations are determinative of the properties they realize and physically constitutive of the individuals with those properties. Centralto the alternative view that I explore here is the idea that (...) the requisite,metaphysically robust notion of realization is ineliminably context-sensitive. I shall argue that the sufficiency and constitutivity theses aretypically not jointly satisfied by any one candidate realizer, and that goingcontext-sensitive in one's metaphysics is preferable to the standard view.The context-sensitive views developed here are implicit in a range ofcommon views in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology,even if they have not been explicitly articulated, and even though theyundermine other views that are commonly endorsed. (shrink)