The Schwarzschild solution (Schwarzschild, 1915/16) to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR) is accepted in theoretical physics as the unique solution to GTR for a central-mass system. In this paper I propose an alternative solution to GTR, and argue it is both logically consistent and empirically realistic as a theory of gravity. This solution is here called K-gravity. The introduction explains the basic concept. The central sections go through the technical detail, defining the basic (...) solution for the geometric tensor, the Christoffel symbols, Ricci tensor, Ricci scalar, Einstein tensor, stress-energy tensor and density-pressure for the system. The density is integrated, and some consistency properties are demonstrated. A notable feature is the disappearance of the event horizon singularity, i.e. there are no black holes. So far this is for a single central mass. A generalization of the solution for multiple masses is then proposed. This is required to support K-gravity as a viable general interpretation of gravity. Then the question of empirical tests is discussed. It is argued that current observational data is almost but not quite sufficient to verify or falsify K-gravity. The Pioneer spacecraft trajectory data is of particular interest, as this is capable of providing a test; but the data (which originally showed anomalies that match K-gravity) is now uncertain. A new and very practical experiment is proposed to settle the matter. This would provide a novel test of GTR, and a novel test of the cause of the Pioneer anomalies. In conclusion, K-gravity has extensive ramifications for gravitational physics and for the philosophy of GTR and space-time. (shrink)

This book deals with Colombeau solutions to Einstein field equations in general relativity: Gravitational singularities, distributional SAdS BH spacetime-induced vacuum dominance. This book covers key areas of Colombeau nonlinear generalized functions, distributional Riemannian, geometry, distributional schwarzschild geometry, Schwarzschild singularity, Schwarzschild horizon, smooth regularization, nonsmooth regularization, quantum fields, curved spacetime, vacuum fluctuations, vacuum dominance etc. This book contains various materials suitable for students, researchers and academicians of this area.

General Relativity’s Schwarzschild solution describes a spherically symmetric gravitational field as an utterly static thing. The Space Generation Model describes it as an absolutely moving thing. The light propagation time-delay experiment of Shapiro-Reasenberg [1] and the falling atomic clock experiment of Vessot-Levine [2] provide the ideal context for illustrating how, though the respective world views implied by these models are radically di fferent, they make nearly the same prediction for the results of these experiments.

In 1916, Johannes Droste independently found an exact (vacuum) solution to the Einstein's (gravitational) field equations in empty space. Droste's solution is quasi-comparable to Schwarzschild's one . Droste published his paper entitled “The field of a single centre in Einstein's theory of gravitation, and the motion of a particle in that fieldˮ. The paper communicated (in the meeting of May 27, 1916) by Prof. H.A. Lorentz, and published in ʻProceedings of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and (...) Science. 19 (1): 197-215 (1917)ʼ. In the present article, the Droste's solution is scrutinized and proven to be invalid purely and simply because the procedure used by Droste is mathematically questionable since he had systematically, deliberately, and without any justification ‒removed the constant coefficient ʻ2ʼ from the differential term (v'w') in Eq.(6) and added the differential term (wv'') to the same Eq.(6) in order to obtain Eq.(7) which was and is his principal objective, that is, the desired solution. Consequently, Eqs.(6,7) had clearly been falsified. (shrink)

This study analyses the predictions of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) against a slightly modified version of the standard central mass solution (Schwarzschild solution). It is applied to central gravity in the solar system, the Pioneer spacecraft anomalies (which GTR fails to predict correctly), and planetary orbit distances and times, etc (where GTR is thought consistent.) -/- The modified gravity equation was motivated by a theory originally called ‘TFP’ (Time Flow Physics, 2004). This is now replaced (...) by the ‘Geometric Model’, 2014 [20], which retains the same theory of gravity. This analysis is offered partially as supporting detail for the claim in [20] that the theory is realistic in the solar system and explains the Pioneer anomalies. The overall conclusion is that the model can claim to explain the Pioneer anomalies, contingent on the analysis being independently verified and duplicated of course. -/- However the interest lies beyond testing this theory. To start with, it gives us a realistic scale on which gravity might vary from the accepted theory, remain consistent with most solar-scale astronomical observations. It is found here that the modified gravity equation would appear consistent with GTR for most phenomena, but it would retard the Pioneer spacecraft by about the observed amount (15 seconds or so at time). Hence it is a possible explanation of this anomaly, which as far as I know remains unexplained now for 20 years. -/- It also shows what many philosophers of science have emphasized: the pivotal role of counterfactual reasoning. By putting forward an exact alternative solution, and working through the full explanation, we discover a surprising ‘counterfactual paradox’: the modified theory slightly weakens GTR gravity – and yet the effect is to slow down the Pioneer trajectory, making it appear as if gravity is stronger than GTR. The inference that “there must be some tiny extra force…” (Musser, 1998 [1]) is wrong: there is a second option: “…or there may be a slightly weaker form of gravity than GTR.” . (shrink)

This paper dealing with extension of the Einstein eld equations using apparatus of contemporary generalization of the classical Lorentzian geometry named in literature Colombeau distributional geometry, see for example [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] and [32]. The regularizations of singularities presented in some solutions of the Einstein equations is an important part of this approach. Any singularities present in some solutions of the Einstein equations recognized only in the sense of Colombeau generalized functions [1], [2] and not classically. (...) In this paper essentially new class Colombeau solutions to Einstein eld equations is obtained. The vacuum energy density of free scalar quantum field  with a distributional background spacetime also is considered. It has been widely believed that, except in very extreme situations, the influence of gravity on quantum fields should amount to just small, sub-dominant contributions. Here we argue that this belief is false by showing that there exist well-behaved spacetime evolutions where the vacuum energy density of free quantum fields is forced, by the very same background distributional spacetime such distributional BHs, to become dominant over any classical energy density component. This semiclassical gravity effect finds its roots in the singular behavior of quantum fields on curved spacetimes. In particular we obtain that the vacuum fluctuations have a singular behavior on BHs horizon. (shrink)

In this paper, we make a proposal for addressing the cosmological constant problem. Our approach will be based on a reinterpretation of two non-standard de Sitter solutions given by the Einstein vacuum equations with Λ>0. As a first result, we derive an uncertainty principle for both variants of the de Sitter space (Theorem). Subsequently, a decomposition of the cosmological constant in a pair of time-dependent pieces is introduced (Corollary). The time-dependence of the corresponding energy and dark energy density is discussed (...) and especially matched at the Planck scale. Furthermore, we show that for every instant of cosmic time this approach can be revealed in terms of a Schwarzschild-Anti-de Sitter cosmology with Λ>0. The corresponding field equations are provided. (shrink)

This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...) used to defend antiexistentialism against existentialist prejudices. The paper closes with a suggestion about how this theory of content might enable us to give purely semantic (as opposed to pragmatic) solutions to the puzzles based on a novel formulation of the principle of compositionality. (shrink)

In a recent paper in Astrophysics and Space Science Vol. 364 no. 11 (2019), S. Ershkov & D. Leschenko presented a new solving procedure for Euler-Poisson equations for solving momentum equations of the CR3BP near libration points for uniformly rotating planets having inclined orbits in the solar system with respect to the orbit of the Earth. The system of equations of the CR3BP has been explored with regard to the existence of an analytic way of presentation of the approximated (...) class='Hi'>solution in the vicinity of libration points. A new and elegant ansatz has been suggested in their publication whereby, in solving, the momentum equation is reduced to a system two coupled Riccati ODEs. In this paper, we presented a numerical solution of such coupled Riccati ODEs using Mathematica software package. (shrink)

According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...) developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution. (shrink)

Pursuing difficult long-term goals typically involves encountering substantial evidence of possible future failure. If decisions to pursue such goals are serious only if one believes that one will act as one has decided, then some of our lives’ most important decisions seem to require belief against the evidence. This is the puzzle of difficult action, to which I offer a solution. I argue that serious decisions to φ do not have to give rise to a belief that one will (...) φ, but can instead be accompanied by a hope to φ. Hope can motivate and rationalize the various actions that we associate with serious commitment. It can also account for the existence of special pressures to adopt an agential stance toward one’s future. Because hope can be cognitively rational when belief is not, there is no problematic tension between the ideal of epistemic rationality and the phenomenon of difficult action. (shrink)

On April 19, 2024, the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness was announced at the “Emerging Science of Animal Consciousness” conference held at New York University. The New York Declaration is an effort to showcase a scientific consensus on the presence of conscious experiences across all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fish) and many invertebrates (at least including cephalopods, decapod crustaceans, and insects). Scientifically, the New York Declaration marks a significant advancement for humanity. However, it also brings heightened awareness to (...) the moral challenges associated with animals that have conscious experiences (or phenomenal consciousness). This article will discuss philosophical approaches to the moral issue of killing sentient beings, thereby highlighting an existing moral dilemma in human society: In sustaining human survival, a species considered to have morality, we have to violate our own moral standards by killing other species with intrinsic value, consciousness, or sentience. This moral dilemma has long been present in human society. Various solutions have been proposed and implemented in practice to address this issue, such as the non-violence and vegetarian approach of Buddhism, the application of Islamic law and sacred rituals to animals in Islam, animal rights movements and voluntary extinction in Western countries, and the technology producing meat using animal cells. However, despite these approaches, we have not yet been able to fully resolve the dilemma, as sentient beings continue to be killed for our survival. We believe the most feasible solution is to change the current food consumption culture, build an eco-surplus culture to mitigate climate change, prevent deforestation, and promote peace. (shrink)

This work presents a novel formulation of quantum mechanics as the solution to an entropy maximization problem constrained by empirical measurement outcomes. By treating the complete set of possible measurement outcomes as an optimization constraint, our entropy maximization problem derives the axioms of quantum mechanics as theorems, demonstrating that the theory's mathematical structure is the least biased probability measure consistent with the observed data. This approach reduces the foundation of quantum mechanics to a single axiom, the measurement constraint, from (...) which the full theory emerges through entropy maximization. In contrast to the conventional axiomatic approach, the framework grounds the axioms directly in empirical data, substantially restricting the interpretational landscape ruling out interpretations inconsistent with this empirical foundation. (shrink)

i. a poetic solution of the Goldbach Conjecture; ii. several responses to the Epimenides Paradox; iii. the volitional solution to Russell's Paradox.

Each well-known proposed solution to the mind-body problem encounters an impasse. These take the form of an explanatory gap, such as the one between mental and physical, or between micro-subjects and macro-subject. The dialectical pressure to bridge these gaps is generating positions in which consciousness is becoming increasingly foundational. The most recent of these, cosmopsychism, typically casts the entire cosmos as a perspectival subject whose mind grounds those of more limited subjects like ourselves. I review the dialectic from materialism (...) and dualism through to panpsychism, suggesting that explanatory gaps in the latter stem from assuming foundational consciousness to be perspectival. Its renunciation may yield the notion of an aperspectival, universal, “non-dual” consciousness that grounds all manifestation and is unstructured by subject, object or any differentia. Not only is such consciousness suggestive of a natural successor to cosmopsychism, but it has also been reported to be the direct experience of mystics who claim to have transcended the individual perspective. Their purported insight — that our aperspectival conscious nature is identical to the ground of all being — has been termed “the Perennial Philosophy”. Believing this Perennial Philosophy to offer the most promising way forward in the mind-body problem, I construct from it the foundations of a metaphysical system that I call “Perennial Idealism”. This attempts to account for manifestation in terms of dispositional, imagery-bound subjects. I then address an age-old “Parmenidean” conundrum that I refer to as “the problem of the one and the many”: How can an undifferentiated substratum ground differentia without the ground itself differentiating? The proposed solution takes its cue from mystico-philosophical writings in the Advaita Vedānta tradition, known as the ajāta doctrine. (shrink)

I consider the fundamental philosophical problem for Christology: how can one and the same person, the Second Person of the Trinity, be both God and man. For being God implies having certain attributes, perhaps immutability, or impassibility, whereas being human implies having apparently inconsistent attributes. This problem is especially vexing for the proponent of Conciliar Christology – the Christology taught in the Ecumenical Councils – since those councils affirm that Christ is both mutable and immutable, both passible and impassible, etc. (...) Many extant solutions to this problem approach it by claiming that the predicates are incompatible when said of the same thing without qualification, but that once the appropriate qualification is added, compatibility is achieved. I provide a different approach. Here I argued that the predicates can be understood so that they are compatible. I then work out the logical relations between the predicates, so understood, showing that no contradiction follows from understanding them in the way I suggest. After that, I consider some of the motivations we have for believing the purportedly incompatible pairs to be, in fact, incompatible, and argue that, on the view offered here, we can salvage most of our intuitions that motivate taking the predicates as incompatible. Finally, I consider three objections. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that one approach to normative political theory, namely contextualism, can benefit from a specific kind of historical inquiry, namely genealogy, because the latter provides a solution to a deep-seated problem for the former. This problem consists in a lack of critical distance and originates from the justificatory role that contextualist approaches attribute to contextual facts. I compare two approaches to genealogical reconstruction, namely the historiographical method pioneered by Foucault and the hybrid method of pragmatic (...) genealogy as practiced by Bernard Williams, arguing that they both ensure an increase in critical distance while preserving contextualism’s distinctiveness. I also show, however, that only the latter provides normative action-guidance and can thus assist the contextualist theorist in the crucial task of discerning how far certain contextual facts deserve their justificatory role. I prove this point by showing how a pragmatic genealogy of the practice of punishment can inform the contextualist’s reflection about the role this practice should play in a transitional scenario, i.e. in the set of circumstances societies go through in the aftermath of large-scale violence and human rights violations. (shrink)

According to Russellianism (or Millianism), the two sentences ‘Ralph believes George Eliot is a novelist’ and ‘Ralph believes Mary Ann Evans is a novelist’ cannot diverge in truth-value, since they express the same proposition. The problem for the Russellian (or Millian) is that a puzzle of Kaplan’s seems to show that they can diverge in truth-value and that therefore, since the Russellian holds that they express the same proposition, the Russellian view is contradictory. I argue that the standard Russellian appeal (...) to “ways of thinking” or “propositional guises” is not necessary to solve the puzzle. Rather than this retrograde concession to Fregeanism, appeal should be made to second-order belief. The puzzle is solved, and the contradiction avoided, by maintaining that both sentences are indeed true in addition to the sentence ‘Ralph (mistakenly) believes that he does not believe Mary Ann Evans/George Eliot is a novelist’. (shrink)

In this paper it is analyzed from the informational perspective the relation between mind and body, an ancient philosophic issue defined as a problem, which still did not receive up to date an adequate solution. By introducing/using the concept of information, it is shown that this concept includes two facets, one of them referring to the common communications and another one referring to a hidden/structuring matter-related information, effectively acting in the human body and in the living systems, which determines (...) the dynamic inter-change of information between specific structures of the organism by electric/electronic/chemical agents and genetic/epigenetic processes. It is shown that the maintenance of body, permanently and obligatory depending on the external matter (foods, air, water) resources, needed to provide both the structuring/restructuring basic material and energy, determines the necessary existence of an info-managing system, administrating the internal mechano-chemical/physical processes. As a natural consequence, such a system should organize and assure own survival by an effective informational operability to detect the external food resources, to select the appropriate interest information and to decide as a function of circumstances. One important component in such an informational system is memory, allowing to dispose of the reference informational data for analysis/comparison and the selection between good and bad binary possible decisions. The memory receives and stores therefore signals from external reality and from the body itself, referring to the emotional reaction, digestion status, creation, and inherited predilections, within specific info-neural communication circuits between the brain and body execution/sensitive organs, the human body appearing as an integrated info-matter self-managed dynamic system. The specific body components memorize information with different degrees of info-integration: short/long-term integration, emotive/action reaction, info-abilities, culminating with the integration in the chromosomal structures by epigenetic processes. The new acquired information is transgenerationally transmissible, and is manifested as new traits, showing the adaptation capability of the human and close relation between mind and body. Analyzing the results of such a mind-body informational model in comparison with the earlier assumed/proposed/asserted archaic, Greek and Occidental philosophies, which represent only partial aspects of this relation, it is shown that this informational model, elaborated in terms of information on the basis of scientific reasons and arguments, constitutes a general, realist, and coherent model of the mind-body relation, able to integrate and/or explain most of the others. (shrink)

Prior's puzzle is a puzzle about the substitution of certain putatively synonymous or coreferential expressions in sentences. Prior's puzzle is important, because a satisfactory solution to it should constitute a crucial part of an adequate semantic theory for both proposition-embedding expressions and attitudinal verbs. I argue that two recent solutions to this puzzle are unsatisfactory. They either focus on the meaning of attitudinal verbs or content nouns. I propose a solution relying on a recent analysis of that-clauses in (...) linguistics. Our solution is superior, as it not only avoids the problems faced by previous solutions, but it also brings developments in linguistics in line to solve an old puzzle in philosophy. (shrink)

Analytic theologians have proposed numerous “solutions” to the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT), mostly versions of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI). Both types of solution are controversial, but many hold out hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may yield some as yet unimagined, and somehow importantly different, solution to the LPT. I first give a precise definition of the LPT and of what would count as a solution to it. I then show how, though (...) there are infinitely many possible solutions, all solutions can be grouped together into a finite, exhaustive taxonomy, based precisely on those features which make them either controversial, heretical, or inconsistent. The taxonomy reveals why ST and RI have been the major proposed solutions, and also proves that there can be no importantly different, new solutions to the LPT. (shrink)

I argue that the two-dimensional hyperintensions of epistemic topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics provide a compelling solution to the access problem. I countenance an abstraction principle for epistemic hyperintensions based on Voevodsky's Univalence Axiom and function type equivalence in Homotopy Type Theory. I apply, further, modal rationalism in modal epistemology to solve the access problem. Epistemic possibility and hyperintensionality, i.e. conceivability, can be a guide to metaphysical possibility and hyperintensionality, when (i) epistemic worlds or epistemic hyperintensional states are interpreted as (...) being centered metaphysical worlds or hyperintensional states, i.e. indexed to an agent, when (ii) the epistemic (hyper-)intensions and metaphysical (hyper-)intensions for a sentence coincide, i.e. the hyperintension has the same value irrespective of whether the worlds in the argument of the functions are considered as epistemic or metaphysical, and when (iii) sentences are said to consist in super-rigid expressions, i.e. rigid expressions in all epistemic worlds or states and in all metaphysical worlds or states. I argue that (i) and (ii) obtain in the case of the access problem. (shrink)

Following a hypothesis by Marciak-Kozlowska, 2011, we consider one-dimensional Schumann wave transfer phenomena. Numerical solution of that equation was obtained by the help of Mathematica.

The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of which hinge on (...) intricacies of provability logic and its arithmetical interpretations. To check whether Égré’s solutions are satisfactory, we use the criteria for solutions to paradoxes defined by Susan Haack and we propose some refinements of them. This article aims to describe to what extent the knower paradox can be solved using provability logic and to what extent the solutions proposed in the literature satisfy Haack’s criteria. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the relation between knowledge, proof, and provability, as inspired by the knower paradox and its solutions. (shrink)

The solution to the Sorites Paradox is discussed.

In this article, the concept of system of symbolic 2-plithogenic linear equations and its solutions are introduced and studied. The Cramer's rule was applied to solve the system of symbolic 2-plithogenic linear equations. Also, provided enough examples for each case to enhance understanding.

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

I discuss the argument Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23-32. I discuss (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it as eristic and inconclusive and (i) the solution (lusis) Aristotle proposes against it.

There is a difference between the conditions in which one can felicitously assert a ‘must’-claim versus those in which one can use the corresponding non-modal claim. But it is difficult to pin down just what this difference amounts to. And it is even harder to account for this difference, since assertions of 'Must ϕ' and assertions of ϕ alone seem to have the same basic goal: namely, coming to agreement that [[ϕ]] is true. In this paper I take on this (...) puzzle, known as Karttunen’s Problem. I begin by arguing that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous only if there is a shared argument for its prejacent. I then argue that this generalization, which I call Support, can explain the more familiar generalization that ‘must’-claims are felicitous only if the speaker’s evidence for them is in some sense indirect. Finally, I sketch a pragmatic derivation of Support. (shrink)

This article discusses the logic of the Epimenides Paradox using a graphical representation of the logical operators involved. The graphical representation of the Logical Operators is the one used in digital electronics. This method of investigation is very effective in revealing the hidden error in the reasoning that leads to the contradiction. The article explains the vicious circle that the mind goes through when trying to analyze the Paradox. Finally, the article proposes a solution of the Paradox with final (...) conclusions that are not paradoxical but simply counterintuitive. The endless deduction is generated by subsequent evaluations that take place on different levels. In its evaluation the Mind alternates a level of logical evaluation with a level of semantic evaluation. (shrink)

It has been long known that a year after Schrödinger published his equation, Madelung also published a hydrodynamics version of Schrödinger equation. Quantum diffusion is studied via dissipative Madelung hydrodynamics. Initially the wave packet spreads ballistically, than passes for an instant through normal diffusion and later tends asymptotically to a sub‐diffusive law. In this paper we will review two different approaches, including Madelung hydrodynamics and also Bohm potential. Madelung formulation leads to diffusion interpretation, which after a generalization yields to Ermakov (...) equation. Since Ermakov equation cannot be solved analytically, then we try to find out its solution with Mathematica package. It is our hope that these methods can be verified and compared with experimental data. But we admit that more researches are needed to fill all the missing details. (shrink)

The subject of this essay is the classical problem of induction, which is sometimes attributed to David Hume and called “the Humean Problem of Induction.” Here, I examine a certain sort of Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem, which appeals to the concept of natural kinds in its response to the inductive skeptic. This position is most notably represented by Howard Sankey and Marc Lange. The purpose of this paper is partly destructive and partly constructive. I raise two questions. The (...) first is: Are the natural kind solutions to the problem successful? The first thesis of this paper is that they are not, and I will show how and why they fail. And the second question I raise here is: Is there nonetheless some alternative Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem which is successful and can overcome the shortcomings endemic to the Sankey-Lange account? The second thesis is that there is, and I’ll attempt to sketch one. My stance here may be summarized by saying that, while I agree with Sankey and Lange that the problem of induction can be adequately resolved, and while I am on the whole sympathetic with the Aristotelian spirit of their account, I am, for all that, dissatisfied with the letter of them. Nothing short of a more thoroughgoing Aristotelianism about the epistemology of induction will do. (shrink)

It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but (...) is structurally identical to the temporal-parts solution preferred by perdurantists. In addition to providing a general characterization of this new type of solution, I discuss certain of its anticipations in the literature on bundle theory, as well as provide a detailed development of it in terms of my own preferred metaphysics of ordinary objects — namely, a distinctive form of substratum theory tracing to Aristotle. (shrink)

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most (...) theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action. (shrink)

The Generality Problem is widely recognized to be a serious problem for reliabilist theories of justification. James R. Beebe's Statistical Solution is one of only a handful of attempted solutions that has garnered serious attention in the literature. In their recent response to Beebe, Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson successfully refute Beebe's Statistical Solution. This paper presents a New Statistical Solution that countenances Dutant and Olsson's objections, dodges the serious problems that trouble rival solutions, and retains (...) the theoretical virtues that made Beebe's solution so attractive in the first place. There indeed exists a principled, rigorous, conceptually sparse, and plausible solution to the Generality Problem: it is the New Statistical Solution. (shrink)

The idea of the uniformity of nature, as a solution to the problem of induction, has at least two contemporary versions: natural kinds and natural necessity. Then there are at least three alternative ontological ideas addressing the problem of induction. In this paper, I articulate how these ideas are used to justify the practice of inductive inference, and compare them, in terms of their applicability, to see whether each of them is preferred in addressing the problem of induction. Given (...) the variety of contexts in which inductive inferences are made, from natural science to social science and to everyday thinking, I suggest that no singular idea is absolutely preferred, and a proper strategy is probably to welcome the plurality of ideas helpful to induction, and to take pragmatic considerations into account, in order to judge in every single case. (shrink)

This paper considers a paradox which the historian of anthropology George Stocking draws attention to: from the point of view of parts of the Victorian middle class, Victorian society was highly evolved yet also contained savage components. I clarify the paradox and propose a solution.

In this paper I present an empirical solution to the puzzle of Macbeth's dagger. The puzzle of Macbeth's dagger is the question of whether, in having his fatal vision of a dagger, Macbeth sees a dagger. I answer this question by addressing a more general one: the question of whether perceptual verbs are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). I present seven experiments, each of which tests a collection of perceptual verbs for one of the three features characteristic of ITVs. One (...) of these features is Nonexistence: the failure of sentences involving transitive verbs to entail the existence of their direct objects. The experiments reveal that with respect to all three of these features, "see" behaves much more like a paradigmatically extensional verb than an intensional one. But surprisingly, unlike "see", "perceive" behaves much more like a paradigmatically intensional verb. This shows that the category of perceptual verbs is not uniform with respect to the features of intensionality; while Macbeth does not see a dagger, he may still perceive one. (shrink)

Nature-based solutions (NbS) have in recent years occupied a central position in conservation and climate discussions among both scientists and policy makers. NbS generally refer to a set of strategies which use nature, or natural objects, to address societal (human) issues while simultaneously supporting the broader environment. This paper examines the concept of NbS to determine whether it is a useful and well-motivated category to guide future climate and conservation efforts. I argue that NbS may in fact be a valuable (...) contribution to environmental thought and policy, but not for the reasons that they are typically thought to be. Specifically: while we have reason to doubt that NbS should be prioritized over other environmental strategies on the grounds that they are uniquely environmentally-friendly or supportive of biodiversity, they may nevertheless have an advantage insofar as they play a vital aesthetic role in developing a healthier relationship between humans and the nonhuman world. (shrink)

A recently developed computational and neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness is applied to a series of persistent philosophical problems of consciousness (in recent formulations by Tye, Searle, and Chalmers). Each problem has a clear solution according to this theory, as is briefly explained here. A slightly modified version of this paper can be found as Chapter 16 ('Philosophical problems of consciousness') in my book 'The estimator theory of life and mind: how agency and consciousness can emerge', see VANTET-8 at (...) philpapers . (shrink)

This paper presents a relativistic interpretation of Elizabeth Colson's paradox of empathy and a solution.

The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than (...) the kind black. The solution applies to any generalization “All F’s are G” in which F is more natural than G. (shrink)

Disclosure of true but reputation-damaging information is generally legal. But threats to disclose true but reputation-damaging information unless payment is made are generally criminal. Many scholars think that this situation is paradoxical because it seems to involve illegality mysteriously arising out of legality, a criminal act mysteriously arising out of an independently legal threat to disclose conjoined with an independently legal demand for money. -/- But this formulation is not quite right. The real paradox raised by the different legal statuses (...) of blackmail threats to disclose and disclosure itself involves a contradiction between our strong intuition that blackmail threats should be criminal and some equally strong arguments, all of which depend on the fact that disclosure is legal, that blackmail threats should be legal. So an adequate solution to the real Blackmail Paradox requires us either to drop the intuition or to refute the pro-legalization arguments. -/- This Article will adopt the latter approach. It will explain why the six main arguments for legalizing blackmail threats all fail. In the course of refuting one of these arguments, it will also offer a novel positive justification for criminalizing blackmail threats: they should be criminal for the same reason that menacing, harassment, and stalking are criminal--namely, because they involve the reasonable likelihood, and usually the intent, of putting the victim into a state of especially great fear and anxiety. -/- Of course, one might object that disclosure itself is likely to have the same effect, if not malicious purpose. Yet, again, it is still legal. But this point shows only that we as a society value freedom of speech more than we value freedom from infliction of emotional injury. It does not show that we do not value freedom from infliction of emotional injury sufficiently to protect it when competing moral or institutional interests such as freedom of speech are not at stake. (shrink)

This chapter proposes a solution to the Trolley Problem in terms of the Kantian prohibition on using a person ‘merely as a means.’ A solution of this type seems impossible due to the difficulties it is widely thought to encounter in the scenario known as the Loop case. The chapter offers a conception of ‘using merely as a means’ that explains the morally relevant difference between the classic Bystander and Footbridge cases. It then shows, contrary to the standard (...) view, that a bystander who diverts the trolley in the Loop case need not be using someone ‘merely as a means’ in doing so. This makes it possible to show why the Loop scenario does not undermine the explanation of the salient moral difference between the Bystander and Footbridge cases. (shrink)

In Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus contends two major claims: (1) justice is the advantage of the stronger, and (2) justice is the good of the other, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage. In the beginning of Book II, Glaucon self-proclaims that he will be representing Thrasymachus’ claims in a better way, and provides a story of how justice has originated from a state of nature situation. However, Glaucon’s story of the origin of justice has an (...) implication that justice is the advantage of the weak rather than the stronger. This is inconsistent with Thrasymachus’ first claim which states that justice is the advantage of the stronger. This is a problem for Glaucon since Glaucon is supposed to be representing Thrasymachus’ original claims in a better way. In this paper, I provide two solutions to this puzzle with the help of elementary game theory. (shrink)

The non-identity problem is that some actions seem morally wrong even though, by affecting future people’s identities, they are worse for nobody. In this paper, I further develop and defend a lesser-known solution to the problem, one according to which when such actions are wrong, it is not because of what they do or produce, but rather just because of why they were performed. In particular, I argue that the actions in non-identity cases are wrong just when and because (...) they result from, or reflect in those who have performed them, a morally dubious character trait. (shrink)

On a widely shared assumption, our mental states supervene on our microphysical properties – that is, microphysical supervenience is true. When this thesis is combined with the apparent truism that human persons have proper parts, a grave difficulty arises: what prevents some of these proper parts from being themselves thinkers as well? How can I know that I am a human person and not a smaller thinker enclosed in a human person? Most solutions to this puzzle make radical, if not (...) absurd, claims. Recently, however, Michael Burke and Howard Robinson proposed conservative solutions that, according to them, do not have such undesired consequences. This paper argues that the conservative solutions tacitly assume at least one of the radical ones, and therefore they provide no alternative to the extreme solutions. (shrink)

Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent tour (...) through tenacity, authority and a priori speculation to the method of science – the only method which is both public and self-correcting. Although in the West we (mostly) proudly self-conceive as living in a ‘scientific age’, I argue that this is premature. Precisely insofar as we treat the misbehavior of governments as a harbinger of doom, we remain trapped in authoritarian modes of thinking which Peirce identified with medievalism, although modernity is increasingly quickening around us in worldwide information-sharing practices that are shaped entirely by mutual help. With this framework in mind, many tactics of recent media are most helpfully seen as belonging not to a post-truth, but a pre-truth stage of human intellectual development. Advice on this is sought from Plato, who of course also faced a world that was ‘pre-academic’. (shrink)