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  1. Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.
    In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
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  • Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993).Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1994 - Vienna: Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    Online collection of papers by Devitt, Dretske, Guarino, Hochberg, Jackson, Petitot, Searle, Tye, Varzi and other leading thinkers on philosophy and the foundations of cognitive Science. Topics dealt with include: Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science, Content and Object, Logic and Foundations, Language and Linguistics, and Ontology and Mereology.
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  • Toward a New Theory of Content.George Bealer - 1994 - In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
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  • Property Theories.George Bealer & Uwe Monnich - 2003 - In Dov Gabbay & Frans Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 10. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 143-248.
    Revised and reprinted; originally in Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251. -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the (...)
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  • Speaks's Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem.T. Scott Dixon & Cody Gilmore - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):275-284.
    Speaks defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2-adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore and King, against the view that propositions are n-tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman against King's view that propositions are facts (...)
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  • The Vagueness Argument Against Abstract Artifacts.Daniel Z. Korman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):57-71.
    Words, languages, symphonies, fictional characters, games, and recipes are plausibly abstract artifacts— entities that have no spatial location and that are deliberately brought into existence as a result of creative acts. Many accept that composition is unrestricted: for every plurality of material objects, there is a material object that is the sum of those objects. These two views may seem entirely unrelated. I will argue that the most influential argument against restricted composition—the vagueness argument—doubles as an argument that there can (...)
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  • Representation Without Thought: Confusion, Reference, and Communication.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2015 - Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
    I develop and argue for a novel theory of the mental state of identity confusion. I also argue that this mental state can corrupt the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication. Finally, I propose a theory according to which identity confusion should be treated as a the source of a new sort of linguistic performance error, similar to malapropism, slips of the tongue, and so-called intentional obfuscation (inducing false belief by manipulating language in specific ways). -/- Going into (...)
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  • Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates.Jeffrey C. King - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):516-535.
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  • Belief Sentences and Compositionality. Notional Part.Peter Pagin - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (2):241-284.
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  • Property Theory: The Type-Free Approach V. The Church Approach.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.
    In a lengthy review article, C. Anthony Anderson criticizes the approach to property theory developed in Quality and Concept (1982). That approach is first-order, type-free, and broadly Russellian. Anderson favors Alonzo Church’s higher-order, type-theoretic, broadly Fregean approach. His worries concern the way in which the theory of intensional entities is developed. It is shown that the worries can be handled within the approach developed in the book but they remain serious obstacles for the Church approach. The discussion focuses on: (1) (...)
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  • Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter and Stanley.David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):676-697.
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  • Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift.A. Moffett Marc - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.
    The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form 'the φ that p' strongly suggests that 'that'-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositional denotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that 'that'-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the (...)
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  • Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
    According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...)
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  • Formalization and the Objects of Logic.Georg Brun - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):1 - 30.
    There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put (...)
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  • Predication and Extensionalization.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
    In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. (...)
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  • Exports and Imports: Anaphora in Attitudinal Ascriptions.Tomis Kapitan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:273-292.
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  • How to Refrain From Answering Kripke’s Puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
    In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie, but not to the English sentence London is pretty, both of which he understands perfectly well. The question to (...)
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  • Words and Images in Argumentation.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (3):355-368.
    Abstract In this essay, I will argue that images can play a substantial role in argumentation: exploiting information from the context, they can contribute directly and substantially to the communication of the propositions that play the roles of premises and conclusion. Furthermore, they can achieve this directly, i.e. without the need of verbalization. I will ground this claim by presenting and analyzing some arguments where images are essential to the argumentation process. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9259-y Authors (...)
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  • Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
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  • A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle.M. A. Moffett - 2002 - Journal of Semantics 19 (2):159-166.
    In this note I argue that, relative to certain largely uncontroversial background conditions, any instance of Mates’ Puzzle is equivalent to some instance of Frege’s Puzzle. If correct, this result is surprising. For, barring the radical move of rejecting the possibility of synonymous expressions in a language tout court, it shows that there is no strictly lexical solution to at least some instances of Frege’s Puzzle. This forces the hand of theorists who wish to provide a semantic (rather than pragmatic) (...)
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  • A Repair of Frege’s Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
    Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...)
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  • Understanding Kripke's Puzzles About Belief.Michael McGlone - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):487-514.
    In his famous 1979 article 'A Puzzle About Belief' Saul Kripke presents two puzzles regarding belief attribution, and he uses them to cast doubt on classical substitution arguments against the Millian view that a proper name has a 'denotation' (or reference) but no 'connotation' (or sense). In this article, I present Kripke's puzzles in what I take to be their most revealing form, discuss their relevance to the abovementioned arguments, briefly survey the ways in which philosophers have responded to these (...)
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  • Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions.Wayne A. Davis - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):207-231.
    According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing (...)
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  • Descriptions, Ambiguity, and Representationalist Theories of Interpretation.Philipp Koralus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):275-290.
    Abstract Theories of descriptions tend to involve commitments about the ambiguity of descriptions. For example, sentences containing descriptions are widely taken to be ambiguous between de re , de dicto , and intermediate interpretations and are sometimes thought to be ambiguous between the former and directly referential interpretations. I provide arguments to suggest that none of these interpretations are due to ambiguities (or indexicality). On the other hand, I argue that descriptions are ambiguous between the above family of interpretations and (...)
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  • Actualism or Possibilism?James E. Tomberlin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):263 - 281.
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  • The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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