The basic assumption present in these articles is that naturalism is highly compatible with a wide range of relevant philosophical questions and that, regardless of the classical problems faced by the naturalist, the price paid in endorsing naturalism is lower than that paid by essentialist or supernaturalist theories. Yet, the reader will find a variety of approaches, from naturalism in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology to naturalism in the Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind and of the Aesthetics.

Na década de 1980, um programa de pesquisa se popularizou no campo da filosofia e psicologia das emoções. Esse programa, denominado construcionismo social, afirmava que emoções eram produtos de fatores sociais e não poderiam ser compreendidas em um vocabulário adaptacionista. No entanto, ao longo do tempo essas teorias perderam grande parte de sua força e popularidade, e praticamente desapareceram da filosofia das emoções contemporânea. O objetivo do presente artigo será diagnosticar esse predicamento, e perguntar se o construcionismo social ainda poderia (...) ser uma via teórica interessante para o estudo das emoções. Para isso, iremos clarificar o significado da metáfora da “construção” e examinar algumas das principais teorias construcionistas de emoções. Embora nossas conclusões sejam negativas em relação ao rótulo da construção social, elas podem ainda assim trazer algum alívio para aqueles que se simpatizam com suas pretensões teóricas, prescrições metodológicas e foco de análise. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate and discuss Clifford's two main arguments in favor of the norm that it is illegitimate to believe based on insufficient evidence. The first argument appeals to the instrumental value of belief, and the second one appeals to our intrinsic interest in the truth. Both arguments bring to the fore the relevance of moral and social factors to determine norms for belief. I sustain that the first argument is insufficient to establish Clifford's norm in general. Beliefs (...) that are not a mean to an action fall outside the scope of the first argument. The second argument has a wider scope. However, it can be undermined if the agent follows an intellectualized norm that aims to protect the rest of her cognitive and active life from her unjustified beliefs. It’s an empirical matter whether a human agent is able to follow this norm. I defend that Clifford’s norm should be reformulated, including some parameters that have influence on the sufficiency of evidence. Finally, prudential and moral factors can affect the legitimacy of belief. It’s legitimate to believe without sufficient evidence only in special cases, when the agent insulates the unjustified belief, or when the good that results from believing surpasses the harms yielded by credulity. (shrink)

The initial problem which motivated the writing of this thesis arose from reading of Emile by Rousseau. In this work, it was possible to detect the influence of different theoretical approaches, such as rationalism and empiricism, inspiring the development of the educational plan designed by Rousseau for his imaginary student (Emile). The very core question of the present thesis regards to whether there was a theory of knowledge pertaining to Rousseau’s philosophical thinking and, if so, how it was related to (...) his theories of education. In the set of his oeuvre, Rousseau’s affiliation to authors like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Malebranche, as well as Condillac, Diderot, D’Holbach and Helvétius was discovered. As the reading of the great philosophical work of Rousseau progressed, an original knowledge theory was discovered, of the kind which accepts the coexistence of opposite thoughts. Pedagogy, in the context of (the work) Emile, arose out of the miscellany of such theories and also for the intense philosophical maturing process on the core of Rousseau’s thinking. This study intended, therefore, to understand the origin and development of Rousseau’s theory of knowledge, and also to figure out how the philosopher formulated his theories on Education, especially in Emile. The object of this research, materialized through the extensive bibliography of the Swiss philosopher, was intensively read and analyzed. The methodology used was that of comparative, descriptive and critical documentary research of the mentioned authors. This research is divided into three sections: the first one intends to investigate the philosophical influence from different authors on the foundations of Rousseau’s epistemology; the second section addresses Rousseau’s theories of Education; the third and final part investigates the link between theory of knowledge and Education within Rousseau’s philosophical thought. -/- . (shrink)

In this book symposium text, I focus on Ciurria’s critique of P. F. Strawson’s incredibly influential paper “Freedom and Resentment”, and more generally present-day Strawsonians about moral responsibility. Ciurria rightfully argues that the picture painted of “our responsibility practices” is highly idealized; it ignores crucial power asymmetries and oppression. I agree with this. However, it seems to me that Ciurria sometimes lacks awareness of exactly how profound the disagreement between her and Strawson and his followers is.

Justin Garson introduces the distinction between two views on Madness we encounter again and again throughout history: Madness as dysfunction, and Madness as strategy. On the latter view, Madness serves some purpose for the person experiencing it, even if it’s simultaneously harmful. The strategy view makes intelligible why Madness often holds a certain allure – even when it’s prima facie terrifying. Moreover, if Madness is a strategy in Garson’s metaphorical sense – if it serves a purpose – it makes sense (...) to use consciously chosen strategies for living with Madness that doesn’t necessarily aim to annihilate or repress it as far as possible. In this paper, we use our own respective stories as case studies. We have both struggled to resist the allure of Madness, and both ended up embracing a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism about reality instead of clinging to sane reality. (shrink)

This article explores the relation between cinema and philosophy through the lens of interest shown by some filmmakers in the lives and works of philosophers. It begins by delving into contemporary perspectives on the relationship between philosophy and cinema. In order to assess how the constitutive dissimilarity of the two terms and the ways in which they can be brought together are at the origin of speculative short circuits and experiences of wonder, it brings together the works of thinkers – (...) Cavell, Benjamin, and Kracauer; and filmmakers Rossellini, Montaldo, Keaton, and Jarman. Reflecting on the aesthetic and cultural impact of cinema is all the more important given the current omnipresence of images and prosthetic technologies that, with their incessant solicitations, threaten the processes of apprehension, learning, and conveying of knowledge. Thinking and perceiving differently thus becomes an essential function of cinema, one keenly performed in Safaa Fathy’s Derrida’s Elsewhere, analyzed in the last two sections. (shrink)

How should we adjust our beliefs in light of the testimony of those who are in a better epistemic position than ourselves, such as experts and other epistemic superiors? In this paper, I develop and defend a deference model of epistemic authority. The paper attempts to resolve the debate between the preemption view and the total evidence view of epistemic authority by taking an accuracy-first approach to the issue of how we should respond to authoritative and expert testimony. I argue (...) that when we look at the debate through the lens of accuracy, it becomes clear that matters are more complicated than either the preemption view or the total evidence view are able to account for. Consequently, a deference model, outlined within a credence-based framework, does a better job of capturing the relevant phenomena, and explaining how we should update our beliefs in response to epistemically authoritative testimony. (shrink)

When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. (...) Delusions and psychosis are often seen as marking the end of intelligibility. In this paper, I argue first for the importance of seeing other people as intelligible as long as this is at all possible. Second, I argue, based on both previous literature and my own lived experience, that more psychotic phenomena than previously thought can be rendered at least somewhat intelligible. Besides bizarre experiences like illusions, hallucinations and intense feelings of significance, I also explain what it is like to lose one’s bedrock, and how this loss impacts which beliefs one has reason to reject. Finally, I give an inside account of some disturbances of reason, and show that there are important similarities between certain psychotic reasoning problems and common non-pathological phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...) while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë's actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call 'space of actions' to the logical space of reasons. (shrink)

O presente artigo almeja refletir sobre os pressupostos educacionais presentes na obra Sobre a Pedagogia, de Kant e A destinação do erudito, de Fichte. Quanto a Kant, buscar-se-á demonstrar a importância que o pensador confere a uma sólida formação na infância, que será refletida no adulto do futuro. No que se refere a Fichte, o pensador, partindo de pressupostos kantianos, reafirma a importância da construção de uma sociedade moral, na qual cada indivíduo tem uma vocação a ser exercida livremente e (...) que beneficiará a todos os demais. Em ambos os pensadores, pode-se perceber uma ênfase no estabelecimento da educação moral, com o objetivo de promover uma boa convivência em sociedade. A finalidade dessa educação é fazer com que os instintos se submetam à lei moral, que, em última instância, serve para permitir que o indivíduo conviva em harmonia com seus semelhantes. (shrink)

There are compelling reasons to believe that musical works are abstract. However, this hypothesis conflicts with the platitude that musical works are appreciated by means of audition: the things that enter our ear canals and make our eardrums vibrate must be concrete, so how can musical works be listened to if they are abstract? This question constitutes the audibility problem. In this paper, I assess Julian Dodd’s elaborate attempt to solve it, and contend that Dodd’s attempt is unsuccessful. Then I (...) discuss what I take to be the ideal response to the audibility problem, and show that it ultimately fails. I contend, consequently, that the project of construing musical works as audible is disheartening. Accordingly, in my last section, I will argue the audibility problem may be satisfactorily resolved without ascribing audibility to musical works. (shrink)

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models (...) of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. (shrink)

Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...) belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self. (shrink)

The medical and social model of disability is discussed and debated among researchers, scholars, activists, and people in general. It is common to hold a mixed view and believe that some disabled people suffer more from social obstacles and others more from medical problems inherent in their bodies or minds. Rachel Cooper discusses possible ‘test environments’, making explicit an idea which likely plays an implicit part in many disability discussions. We place or imagine placing the disabled person in a range (...) of different environments. If there is a relevant test environment in which they do fine, their problem was societal/external; if there is not, it was medical/internal. Cooper admits that deciding on the appropriate range of test environments is an ethical and political question. In this chapter, I argue that we often ought to widen our scope when discussing psychiatric disabilities. (shrink)

Nos proponemos estudiar las objeciones de Cavendish hacia la filosofía experimental desde una perspectiva no dicotómica para mostrar que, lejos de establecer un enfrentamiento entre la filosofía contemplativa y la experimental, la razón y la sensación, o la naturaleza y el arte, la autora plantea una cooperación organizada entre estos aspectos. La postura de Cavendish puede comprenderse adecuadamente si se tiene en cuenta que su epistemología se arraiga en su metafísica, en la que los grados de la materia y los (...) distintos seres vivos que conforman el universo ocupan un lugar determinado y cumplen cierta función conformando una totalidad orgánica y armónica. (shrink)

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called (...) hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. (shrink)

Saul Smilansky’s theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is the thesis that both compatibilism and hard determinism are partly true, and has puzzled many philosophers. I argue that Smilansky’s dualism can be given an unquestionably coherent and comprehensible interpretation if we reformulate it in terms of pro tanto reasons. Dualism so understood is the thesis that respect for persons gives us pro tanto reasons to blame wrongdoers, and also pro tanto reasons (...) not to blame them. These reasons must be we ighed against each other (and against relevant consequentialist reasons) in order to find out what we all things considered ought to do. (shrink)

Durante vários anos, Jean Héring (1890-1966) foi professor de teologia na Université de Strasbourg. Um fato pessoal que o marcou definitivamente, foi o privilégio de ter sido discípulo de Husserl, em Göttingen. Nesta oportunidade, também teve contato com outros representantes da fenomenologia, como Edith Stein, Adolf Reinach e Alexandre Koyré. No breve texto a seguir, datado de 1939, um ano antes da morte de Husserl, Héring relembra a sua chegada em Göttingen, no ano de 1909 e o modo como Husserl (...) impressionava os seus discípulos, pelo seu brilhantismo. Fato este que acompanhou Héring durante todo o restante de sua vida, impactando decisivamente em sua obra. (shrink)

O presente artigo almeja demonstrar o projeto de Husserl, de construção de uma ciência rigorosa. Primeiramente, demonstrar-se-á como oconceito pode ser utilizado como um recurso à tentativa psicologista de fundamentação da teoria do conhecimento. Para tal, é imprescindível a distinção entre leis ideais e leis fáticas, isto é, entre o plano real e ideal. Por fim, almeja-se demonstrar queembora o termo “rigor” apareça ao público principalmente em seu artigo Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft(1911), é possível notar que esta pretensão acompanha, de (...) um modo geral, a sua obra. Mesmo dentre as três grandes fases de seu pensamento i) Halle (1887-1900); ii) Göttingen (1901-1916) e iii) Freiburg (1916-1938), pode-se perceber que o conceito de “rigor” em Husserl, diz respeito ao projeto de construção de uma doutrina apriorique escape à qualquer tipo de relativismo e que constitua as bases para a legitimidade do conhecimento, aplicando-se, inclusive, às demais ciências. (shrink)

It has been argued that we cannot be morally responsible in the sense required to deserve blame or punishment if the world is deterministic, but still morally responsible in the sense of being apt targets for moral criticism. Desert-entailing moral responsibility is supposed to be more freedom-demanding than other kinds of responsibility, since it justifies subjecting people to blame and punishments, is nonconsequentialist, and has been shown by thought experiments to be incompatible with determinism. In this paper, I will show (...) that all these arguments can be resisted. (shrink)

In the world of Philosophy for Children (P4C), the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a (...) problem with regards to the concept of method in P4C, and to question the consequences of that concept in the practice of philosophical dialogue with children. To better situate the concept of method within P4C (which, we think, will help to clarify some of the dialogues and debates within P4C as a philosophical field), we will identify two different historical understandings—represented by Rene Descartes and Hans Georg Gadamer—of the concept, and suggest new possibilities for understanding philosophical practice with children in light of their difference. (shrink)

A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição (...) da psicologia ecológica, eu defendo que a percepção se estende ao meio ambiente. Então, apoiado no fenômeno da atenção conjunta, eu estendo a noção de affordance para encorporar affordances sociais. Assim, a percepção pode, em algumas situações, ser também estendida socialmente. (shrink)

In Mind and World, John McDowell intends to make the diagnosis of a fundamental philosophical anxiety, whose hard core, from his point of view, is deeply rooted in the relationship that usually occurs between mind and world, as the title suggests. Moreover, assuming entirely the clinical consequences of metaphor, McDowell’s main aim is to point towards a cure. This therapy, as we shall see, doesn’t have an effective Wittgensteinian direction, in contrast with McDowell’s assertions. On the other hand, I will (...) show, in particular on the issue of skepticism, a contrasting vision of «analytical» and «phenomenological» approaches to the problems of knowledge. (shrink)

En este trabajo me ocuparé de las resonancias que tuvo el modo en el que Hume aborda la cuestión de la materialidad de la mente en uno de los materialistas más notables de las Islas Británicas del siglo XVIII, Joseph Priestley. La influencia que ejerció el enfoque humeano acerca del materialismo en la obra de Priestley no ha sido suficientemente puesta de relieve o ha sido desestimada. En buena medida, esto se debe a que Priestley tienen una actitud crítica hacia (...) las consecuencias escépticas y ateas que se desprenden de la filosofía de Hume, por lo que generalmente se tiende a presentarlo como uno de sus adversarios. Sin embargo, existen dos grandes puntos de contacto entre sus propuestas que estudiaré en lo que sigue: (1) ambos abordan la cuestión del origen del pensamiento, haciendo a un lado la cuestión de la naturaleza de la sustancia de la que estaría compuesta la mente —por ser inaccesible a nuestro conocimiento— y preguntándose por la causa del pensamiento, y (2) Priestley se sirve de una concepción de la causalidad inspirada en buena medida por la de Hume y la emplea como uno de los pilares de su materialismo, al sostener que la conjunción constante entre características mentales y organismos con un cerebro funcional nos da la mayor seguridad posible de que existe una relación causal entre ambos. (shrink)

The biblical passage from Luke 16, 19-31 is one of the most cited and discussed in the New Testament. However, when analyzed based on the relationships engendered following the narrated facts, a series of presupposed narrative programs contributes to the elucidation of the meaning of this text. This research, therefore, will analyze the aforementioned passage from the perspective of Greimasian semiotics. The method aims to reveal the generative path of meaning and highlight the intratextual elements, which make up the path (...) of construction of the meaning of the passage. It allows you to analyze your superficial and deep structures: it goes from the simple to the complex, from the most abstract to the most concrete. It can thus highlight the semantic oppositions from which the meaning of the text and its fundamental semantic category are constituted. The method has the potential to represent the relational organization between the social conditions of the subjects of the narrative. Furthermore, it provides neutral methodological support that avoids a priori conclusions and bias. The analysis of intertextuality completes the process started with Greimasian semiotics. This is because a careful reading of Lc 16,19-31 will not ignore its immediate and broader context: Luke and Acts read sequentially. By placing the parable in this broader narrative, Luke's readers could perceive connective elements, linking the story told by Jesus to what was happening in the early church. Thus, in Jesus' mouth the story of the rich man and the beggar was told as a criticism of avarice, but in Luke's editorial plan it was used to challenge believers to get involved in caring for the poor. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum argues that animals are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of “unnatural” animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast’s belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed (...) are tragic. I argue that the high diversity of the dog species and the ultimate arbitrariness of breed norms support the thesis that a conception of welfare must be tied to what the individual requires in order to flourish. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the implications that an individualized welfare conception has for the breeding of dogs for conformation shows, for the pet market and for the performance of various tasks for which we need working dogs. (shrink)

Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few (...) breeds that are healthier than other breeds as well as mutts; we could maximize wellbeing for the next generations by focusing all our breeding resources on those. However, in the long run such a strategy would severely deplete the canine gene pool. If we are to breed for wellbeing in the long run, we must thus weigh the benefits of selection against physical and mental problems against the benefits of genetic diversity. The optimal breeding strategy for canine wellbeing is to preserve many breeds, though not all of them. Furthermore, we ought to combine strict health programs with looser barriers between breeds. Such a policy conflicts with the goal of breed preservation, at least if we think of breeds as populations registered within kennel clubs rather than types of dogs, but not with the goal of producing good working dogs capable of performing various tasks. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...) circumstances. Relying on Austin position, I argue that self-knowledge does not have any epistemic privilege in relation to knowledge of the external world. These kinds of knowledge equally depend on objective circumstances of the utterance situation. (shrink)

The concept of expression has always held an important place in Fernando Gil’s thought. The author’s reflection on the idea of expression is well reflected among his writings – either in his early essays or throughout his entire work –, attaining a special focus in the lectures that he gave at Johns Hopkins University during the years of 2002, 2003 and 2004. Actually, these lectures represent the strongest testimony of the relevancy given by Fernando Gil to this concept. However, despite (...) being a concept which crosses all his work, clearly having a central place in his thought, Fernando Gil never got to write a systematic theory on the concept of expression. Thus, closely following the author’s works, the main purpose of this study is to suggest a personal vision of what could have been Fernando Gil’s theory on expression. Combining some of the main ideas of Johns Hopkins lectures to some fundamental notions of Fernando Gil’s thought, we will try to show that Fernando Gil’s theory on expression is a theory on the ordination of thought, on cognitive construction and, above all, a theory on the elevation of thought to what shall be considered its higher modality, the aesthetical thought. In fact, our major hypothesis is that Fernando Gil’s theory on expression is not only a cognitive theory but also an aesthetical one. As such, its major guidelines shall be: to explain the adequacy of expression to its objects; to show how expression evolves according to the cognitive development of the subject; and, finally, to explain and to justify the elevation of thought to universality, harmony and beauty. (shrink)

This literature review explores the issues and risks in non-conscious data collection and evaluates people’s attitudes towards it. In the modern world, data is one of the most valuable resources, yet studies focused on the potential negative implications of the new data-driven technologies are lacking. Therefore, this thesis conducts a comprehensive literature review to identify and assess risks in non-conscious data collection technologies that are most relevant and referenced in current literature. Accordingly, the most prominent risks are related to privacy (...) issues with personal data, bias in algorithms creating inequality, and the difficulties in creating adequate legislation. Subsequently, the thesis will explore existing studies about people’s attitudes towards non-conscious data collection and examine the most significant socio-demographic determinants of those attitudes. Therefore, despite socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, and economic status affecting the attitudes people have towards data collection technologies, this thesis argues how these approaches can be explained by varying external factors such as prior experiences with similar technologies. (shrink)

A presente dissertação almeja analisar, a partir de Husserl, a forma com que o idealismo transcendental contribui na construção de uma fenomenologia enquanto fundamento de toda a filosofia. Para tal, o primeiro capítulo tem como foco determinar quais são os elementos que conduzem Husserl à virada transcendental. O segundo capítulo concentra-se na tarefa de apresentar a especificidade que Husserl confere ao seu idealismo, principalmente em relação a Kant. O terceiro e último capítulo, tem o objetivo de apontar o papel atribuído (...) ao idealismo fenomenológico-transcendental na fundamentação da filosofia. Em linhas gerais, pode se observar que Husserl enfatiza que somente a fenomenologia, ao retornar às coisas-mesmas, e com a consciência transcendentalmente purificada, promove as condições legítimas para o alcance do conhecimento. Esta organização da fenomenologia transcendental descobre a possibilidade de desenvolver uma doutrina que forneça as condições de consolidação de uma ciência rigorosa. Pois o idealismo fenomenológico, segundo o autor, possui uma abrangência universal, sendo que ao efetivar a redução fenomenológica, afasta-se de qualquer fundamentação que possa ser proveniente algo subjetivo, e, portanto, relativo. O fundamento da fenomenologia, revelado sob a forma do cogito, isto é, do Eu puro, detém uma veracidade apodítica, a partir da qual toda a reflexão se faz possível. Por isso, é que o fundamento da filosofia repousa sobre o idealismo fenomenológico-transcendental. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

Durante los siglos XVII y XVIII hubo un intenso debate en las Islas Británicas en torno al materialismo. Mi objetivo consiste en caracterizar la postura de David Hume en el marco de ese debate. Sostengo que, no obstante rechazar la metafísica sustancialista para centrarse en el estudio de las percepciones, Hume sienta una posición respecto de la relación entre mente y materia. Sin embargo, esa posición reviste cierta complejidad en tanto no es explicitada en los textos que se editaron en (...) vida de Hume. Propongo definirla como un materialismo restringido, ya que, respecto de la naturaleza de la mente, Hume desestima tanto las posturas materialista como inmaterialista, pero respecto de las causas del pensamiento, termina acercándose al materialismo a partir de argumentos basados en la experiencia y en la analogía con la naturaleza. (shrink)

Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s metaphysics dissolves the necessary relationship between immateriality, immortality and thought. While in her youth this leads her to admit the possibility of thinking matter, in her mature work, it allows her to conceive space as non-thinking immaterial substance that links non-thinking material substance and thinking immaterial substance. To ground this conception of space, she draws on the thesis of the great chain of being. However, the possibility of thinking matter is not consistent with the hierarchy of beings, (...) because within this frame matter occupies the lowest place. My aim is to evaluate whether there is any alternative within Trotter's philosophy to solve this contradiction. -/- La metafísica de Catharine Trotter Cockburn disuelve la relación necesaria entre inmaterialidad, inmortalidad y pensamiento. Mientras que en su juventud esto la lleva a admitir la posibilidad de la materia pensante, en su madurez le permite concebir al espacio como sustancia inmaterial no pensante que oficia como eslabón entre la sustancia material no pensante y la sustancia inmaterial pensante. Para ello, apela también a la tesis de la gran cadena del ser. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de la materia pensante no es consistente con la tesis de la jerarquía de seres, porque en ella la materia ocupa el lugar más bajo. Me propongo estudiar si existe alguna alternativa dentro de la filosofía de Trotter que permita resolver esta contradicción. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao (...) sofrimento. Com isso em mente, este artigo irá analisar algumas ações inábeis do eu e do não-eu em suttasselecionados do Cânone Pali, mostrando como se encaixam na estratégia do Buddha de se utilizar de elementos como ferramentas para o abandono desses próprios elementos. Nessa perspectiva, o eu não é negado em absoluto desde o início do caminho, mas aprende-se a usa-lo de forma hábil como um meio de abandoná-lo. (shrink)

En la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII tuvo lugar un debate entre Thomas Reid y Joseph Priestley acerca de la naturaleza de la mente y su interacción con el cuerpo. En el marco de la defensa de la religión cristiana y en nombre de principios metodológicos experimentalistas y newtonianos, los autores defienden propuestas radicalmente diferentes acerca de la relación entre la mente y la materia. Sus divergencias se vinculan con la interpretación del método newtoniano y su concepción de la materia, (...) lo que delineará dos actitudes: una dualista, de carácter más conservador por parte de Reid y una materialista, heterodoxa e innovadora por parte de Priestley. (shrink)

O presente artigo incide sobre o conceito de expressão no âmbito do pensamento leibniziano, pretendendo, a partir da sua análise, expor a crítica que Fernando Gil lhe tece, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à ideia de “causalidade expressiva”. Passando por vários conceitos leibnizianos como “substância simples”, “força”, “apetição” ou “entre-expressão”, o que se pretende analisar é a reflexão de Fernando Gil relativamente àquilo que o autor considera “a aporia da expressão leibniziana”, e, ainda, a sua reabilitação da inteligibilidade expressiva como (...) pensamento do contínuo, onde inteligibilidade, beleza e simplicidade se implicam mutuamente. (shrink)

A diagnosis based exclusively on the so-called scientifi c evidence does not take into account the problem of the theoryladenness, widely debated in Twentieth Century epistemology. The theory of knowledge developed by Ludwik Fleck, physician and philosopher active in the 30s, can still be useful for shedding light on how psychiatric diagnoses are infl uenced by a specifi c thought style that directs the observations and affects the development of knowledge and the formation of connections between concepts.

O que é a «harmonia universal»? Uma causa, um efeito, um estado-de-coisas? Como Leibniz escreve a este respeito numa carta a Magnus Wedderkopf, a última razão para o intelecto divino e, consequentemente, a vontade de Deus, é a harmonia. Porém, como razão última, nada existe para lá da própria harmonia. Segundo o raciocínio leibniziano, a harmonia pode assim ser perspetivada não só como um estado-de-coisas, mas também como causa da própria organização das coisas. Muito embora a harmonia possa ser perspetivada (...) de diferentes modos, que manifestam uma unidade entre si, o foco desta análise incide justamente sobre a possibilidade de «perceber», «percecionar», ou melhor, «compreender» a harmonia universal. (shrink)

Indagando a possibilidade e o sentido de uma poética do eu, será nosso objetivo clarificar, a partir do contributo incontornável do filósofo francês Paul Ricœur, de que forma o texto poéticose assume como uma mediação fundamental da compreensãodo si, bem como da sua configuração e refiguração enquanto um si mesmo. Neste sentido, atentaremos especialmente nas obras Temps et Récit (1983‑85) e Soi-Même Comme un Autre (1990), fulcrais para entendermos a relação que o filósofo tece entre narrativa, tempo e identidade, mais (...) especificamente a importância da mediação narrativa para a superação das apo‑rias ligadas às experiências humanas da temporalidade e da construção identitária. Gravitaremos, neste contexto, em torno da noção seminal de identidade narrativa –enquanto ponto de mediação entre uma identidade idem e uma identidade ipse. (shrink)

My response to Rashed's critique of my account as theorizing instead of showing what it is like.

The belief that obese people ought to lose weight and keep it off is widespread, and has a profound negative impact on the lives of the obese. I argue in this paper that most obese people have no such obligation, even if obesity is bad, and caused by calorie input exceeding output. Obese people do not have an obligation to achieve long-term weight loss if this is impossible for them, is worse than the alternative, or requires such an enormous effort (...) in relation to what stands to be gained that this option is supererogatory rather than obligatory. It is highly plausible that most obese people fall into one of these three groups. Politicians may still have obligations to fight obesity, but they ought to do so through progressive politics rather than blaming and shaming. (shrink)

Published on Daily Philosophy 2021-10-18 Why do we have a criminal justice system? What could possibly justify the state punishing its citizens? Philosophers, scholars of law, politicians and others have proposed different justifications, one of them being retributivism: the view that we ought to give offenders the suffering that they deserve for harming others. However, intentionally harming other people and making them suffer is serious business. If we are to do this in the name of what’s right and good, we (...) better be very certain that what we do really is right and good. The so-called Epistemic Argument Against Retributivism calls this certainty into question. (shrink)

My aim is to look into the representational aspect of ideas, exploring not only to what Hume refers as adequate ideas, but also these cases where for a number of reasons an idea does not reach that standard. It has been suggested that the latter are fictions, but an in-depth examination of Hume texts reveals that there are several types of imperfections, such as incompleteness or imprecision that prevent an idea from being adequate. This leads to an analysis of the (...) status of supposed or pretended ideas, and the possibility of there being terms with no ideas annexed to them. (shrink)