It is not uncommon to think that having a desire involves taking its object to be good in some sense. This idea has been developed in two directions: either toward a view that understands the positive evaluation in terms of a judgment or belief or a view according to which the relevant evaluation is perception-like. In this article, I defend a novel proposal that takes the positive evaluation of the object of desire to be a kind of imagining.

This chapter argues that our self-knowledge is often mediated by our affective self-knowledge. In other words, we often know about ourselves by knowing our own emotions. More precisely, what Cassam has called “substantial self-knowledge” (SSK), such as self-knowledge of one's character, one's values, or one's aptitudes, is mediated by affective forecasting, which is the process of predicting one's emotional responses to possible situations. For instance, a person comes to know that she is courageous by predicting her own emotional reactions to (...) possible risks and dangers. This hypothesis explains why attaining substantive self-knowledge tends to be difficult. Attaining substantive self-knowledge is difficult because, first, SSK is mediated by affective forecasting and, second, we tend to be wrong about predicting the intensity and duration of our own emotional reactions. As a result, we can identify what is common to central cases of SSK: such cases require knowledge about complex dispositions whose manifestations involve affective responses that one is not sufficiently familiar with. One thus needs to resort to the highly fallible method of affective forecasting. (shrink)

In this essay I ask if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. I call those considerations desire's own reasons. I argue that desire's own reasons are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to regulate desires through experience (...) and imagination because desires are naturally sensitive to them. I also analyze the limits of application that such reasons have and how desire's own reasons relate to other kinds of reasons. (shrink)

When we think about what others believe and want, we are usually affected by what we know about their attitudes. If I’m aware that another person believes something, I have an opportunity to agree or disagree with it. If I think that another person wants something, I can endorse or disapprove of her desire. The importance of such reactions to attributed beliefs and desires has thus far been overlooked in philosophy of mind where the focus has been on explanatory and (...) predictive roles of attitude attribution. The primary goal of this thesis is to fill this lacuna and to articulate the indispensability of such reactions – agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval – for social cognition. In the process of doing it I also show how these initial reactions ground certain further possible responses in intersubjective communication: manipulation, negotiation or adoption of attributed attitudes. The second aim of this thesis is to explicate what is it about belief and desire attributions that makes the responses I’ve described possible. Because one can agree or disagree both with beliefs and assertions and endorse or disapprove both desires and requests, I argue that we should understand belief attributions in terms of assertions and desire attributions in terms of requests. When we think what someone believes and wants, we treat her as a conversation partner because her attitudes call for the same responses as speech acts do, even if she hasn’t made any explicit assertion or request herself. In short, beliefs and desires have communicative significance. Given such significance, we can also see what one needs to take into consideration when attributing these attitudes to another. My answer in the thesis is that belief and desire attributions have to be grounded in facts about the behaviour and well-being of attributees and that these facts also constitute the nature of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

Arguments attempting to debunk moral beliefs, by showing they are unjustified, have tended to be global, targeting all moral beliefs or a large set of them. Popular debunking arguments point to various factors purportedly influencing moral beliefs, from evolutionary pressures, to automatic and emotionally-driven processes, to framing effects. We show that these sweeping arguments face a debunker’s dilemma: either the relevant factor is not a main basis for belief or it does not render the relevant beliefs unjustified. Empirical debunking arguments (...) in ethics can avoid this predicament, but only if they are refocused on highly selective classes of moral belief. Experimental data can combine with familiar consistency reasoning to reveal that like cases are not being treated alike. Selective debunking arguments are unlikely to yield sweeping sceptical conclusions, but they can lead to rational moral change. (shrink)

Can reasoning improve moral judgments and lead to moral progress? Pessimistic answers to this question are often based on caricatures of reasoning, weak scientific evidence, and flawed interpretations of solid evidence. In support of optimism, we discuss three forms of moral reasoning (principle reasoning, consistency reasoning, and social proof) that can spur progressive changes in attitudes and behavior on a variety of issues, such as charitable giving, gay rights, and meat consumption. We conclude that moral reasoning, particularly when embedded in (...) social networks with mutual trust and respect, is integral to moral progress. (shrink)

We articulate a holistic understanding of hope, going beyond the common conceptualization of hope in terms of positive affect and cognition by considering what hope means for the underprivileged. In the recognition that hope is always situated in a particular place, we explore the perspective of the privileged and the underprivileged, clarifying how spatial contexts shape their goals for the future and their agency toward attaining these goals. Where some people experience precarity due to their disability, race, gender, sexuality, and (...) social class, others enjoy enhanced agency due to their privilege. In our analysis, this loss of agency does not mean the underprivileged are hopeless; instead, it suggests that hope can incorporate negative affect and cognition. In our view, a spatial understanding acknowledges the power of hope in discouraging situations, and it points to practical measures through which hope can be cultivated by marginalized communities. (shrink)

This article is an update of our previous article in this SGJ journal, titled: On Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, Artificial Intelligence & Human Mind. We provide some commentary on the latest developments around AI, humanoid robotics, and future scenario. Basically, we argue that a more thoughtful approach to the future is "techno-realism.".

Sensorimotor theory claims that what you do and what you know how to do constitutes your visual experience. Central to the theory is the claim that such experience depends on a special kind of knowledge or understanding. I assess this commitment to knowledge in the light of three objections to the theory: the empirical implausibility objection, the learning/post-learning objection and the causal-constitutive objection. I argue that although the theory can respond to the first two objections, its commitment to know-how ultimately (...) renders it vulnerable to the third and arguably most serious objection. I then suggest that sensorimotor theory has two options: concede the causal-constitutive objection or challenge it. I shall argue for the latter. I will claim that a radical sensorimotor theory offers the best means of responding to this objection. (shrink)

Sound is one of the types of waves that can be felt by the sense of hearing (ears). In physics, the definition of sound is something that is produced from objects that vibrate. Objects that produce sound are called sound sources. The sound source that vibrates will vibrate the molecules into the air around it. Sound is mechanical compression or longitudinal waves that propagate through the medium. This medium or intermediate agent can be liquid, solid, gas. So, sound waves can (...) propagate for example in water, coal, or air. Most sounds are a combination of various vibratory signals composed of harmonic waves, but pure sound can theoretically be explained by oscillating vibrational speed or frequency measured in Hertz (Hz) vibration units and amplitude or loudness of sound with measurements in decibels (dB). The effect sounds can have on us humans is simply astounding. While everyday life becomes stressful, overcrowded and increasingly hectic, we seek ways for inner peace and balance. The power of music, felt through overtone-rich sound therapy and sound massage, can be a solution. No matter how much scientific explanation is behind it, healing through music remains fascinating, even magical. This paper introduces a new field called cymatics and sound healing with their plausible impact to spirituality and consciousness research. (shrink)

Contents I Introduction II Subalternation and Theology III Theology and Dogmatic Declarations IV The Mixed Principles of Theology V Virtual Revelation: The Unity of Theology VI Theology as a Natural Science VII Theology’s Certitude VIII Conclusion Notes Bibliography All the contents are fully attributable to the author, Doctor Victor Salas. Should you wish to get this text republished, get in touch with the author or the editorial committee of the Studia Poinsotiana. Insofar as possible, we will be happy to (...) broker your contact. (shrink)

A Better Ape covers the evolution of morality from the birth of our ape family through the evolution of human species and all the way up to the development of modern societies. In this summary, we highlight several main elements of this account: the co-evolution of morality with intelligence and complex sociality; the role of social institutions and religious morality in the cultural evolution of behaviorally modern humans in prehistory; the increasing complexity of the moral mind through biological evolution in (...) apes, gene-culture co-evolution in various human species, cultural evolution in Homo sapiens, and rational-cultural evolution in recent centuries; and, finally, a cultural evolutionary model of progressive and regressive moral change on which a key factor driving moral progress is social and democratic integration. (shrink)

The distinction between the body schema and the body image has become the stock in trade of much recent work in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. Yet little is known about the interactions between these two types of body representations. We need to account not only for their dissociations in rare cases, but also for their convergence most of the time. Indeed in our everyday life the body we perceive does not conflict with the body we act with. Are the body (...) image and the body schema then somehow reshaping each other or are they relatively independent and do they only happen to be congruent? On the basis of the study of bodily hallucinations, we consider which model can best account for the body schema/body image interactions. (shrink)

Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We (...) argue that this debate can be understood as answering two metaphysical questions. Yet prominent voices within the debate have assumed that there is a tight relationship between these two questions such that one question can be answered via the other. We defend an alternative ‘wide’ view, whereby mentality is understood as constituted by wide social and cultural factors. Our wide view entails that the two metaphysical questions are separate and should be kept distinct. This suggests that active externalism as understood by prominent voices within that debate requires dissolution, rather than solution. However, if the debate were instead understood as only focusing on the second of the two questions, then there could be a possible future for this debate. (shrink)

REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do non-contentful (...) behaviours give rise to contentful behaviours? In this paper, I show how REC can tackle a certain understanding of this question. I argue that if REC were to endorse claims made by the later Wittgenstein, then REC could deny that there is any (synchronous) gap in our intelligent behaviour. (shrink)

This paper will defend the claim that, under certain circumstances, the material vehicles responsible for an agent’s conscious experience can be partly constituted by processes outside the agent’s body. In other words, the consciousness of the agent can extend. This claim will be supported by the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) example of the artist and their sketchpad (Clark 2001, 2003). It will be argued that if this example is one of EMT, then this example also supports an argument for consciousness (...) extension. Clark (2009) rejects claims of consciousness extension. This paper will challenge Clark and argue that he fails to show that the material vehicles responsible for consciousness must be internal to the agent. (shrink)

La presente publicación de Víctor Samuel Rivera reúne diez ensayos, escritos entre los años 2014 y 2017, cuyo foco son las democracias capitalistas liberales, según las llama el autor. Estamos, por consiguiente, ante un trabajo decididamente actual que nos coloca frente a dos evidencias. La primera es que el objeto de estudio ofrece retos singulares, pues se trata de reflexionar acerca del mismo flujo histórico que enmarca nuestras condiciones de saber y fija nuestros horizontes de sentido. La segunda sería que (...) Rivera, al acometer la indagación de un presente vivo, se ha lanzado a articular ideas de primera mano. Nos encontramos, así, ante una apuesta del pensar, justamente aquello que se le pide, en su grado máximo, a la filosofía. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie famously argued that a commitment to non-existent objective values permeates ordinary moral thought and discourse. According to a standard interpretation, Mackie construed this commitment as a universal and indeed essential feature of moral judgments. In this paper I argue that we should rather ascribe to Mackie a form of semantic pluralism, according to which not all moral judgments involve the commitment to objective values. This interpretation not only makes better sense of what Mackie actually says, but also (...) renders his error theory immune to a powerful objection. (shrink)

In this article I give a unified account of three phenomena: bullshit, pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy. My aims are partly conceptual, partly evaluative. Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's seminal analysis of bullshit, I give an account of the three phenomena and of how they are related, and I use this account to explain what is bad about all three. More specifically, I argue that what is defective about pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy is precisely that they are special cases of bullshit. Apart from raising (...) interesting philosophical issues, gaining a clearer understanding of these phenomena is also of practical importance, in that it bears on how best to tackle the threat that they pose. (shrink)

I argue that people are sometimes justified in participating in unjust wars. I consider a range of reasons why war might be unjust, including the cause which it is fought for, whether it is proportionate, and whether it wrongly uses resources that could help others in dire need. These considerations sometimes make fighting in the war unjust, but sometimes not. In developing these claims, I focus especially on the 2003 Iraq war.

A core tenet of metanormative non-naturalism is that genuine or robust normativity—i.e., the kind of normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements, and perhaps also of prudential, epistemic and even aesthetic requirements—is metaphysically special in a way that rules out naturalist analyses or reductions; on the non-naturalist view, the normative is sui generis and metaphysically discontinuous with the natural. Non-naturalists agree, however, that the normative is modally as well as explanatorily dependent on the natural. These two commitments—discontinuity and dependence—at least (...) initially pull in opposite directions, and one of the central challenges to non-naturalism is how to reconcile them. In this paper I spell out the most pressing version of this discontinuity problem, as I propose to call it, and I go on to offer a novel solution. Drawing on the ideology of reasons-firstism, I formulate an account of normative explanation which reconciles the two commitments, and I argue that competing accounts either do not solve the problem or are implausible on independent grounds. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to assess biological naturalism in light of the adaptationist debate. Searle is famous for explicity pursuing a biological foundation for his theory of consciousness. However, evolutionary biology receives little attention in his work, which results in crucial theoretical confusions over adaptationism. In this paper, we will propose two theses concerning Searle's approach to consciousness in the context of the adaptationist debate. First, Searle's attack on adaptationism only applies to its naive version, failing to touch (...) any of the more sophisticated versions of adaptationism, especially the empirical one. Second, despite his attack, in the end Searle embraces empirical adaptationism about consciousness. Howsoever, Searle's empirical foundation for his thesis that the evolutionary advantage of consciousness lies in a greater power of discrimination faces a serious problem of generalization regarding non-human animals. (shrink)

In the ancient world, the Greeks believed that all great insights came from one of nine muses, divine sisters who brought inspiration to mere mortals. In the modern world, few people still believe in the muses, but we all still love to hear stories of sudden inspiration. Like Newton and the apple, or Archimedes and the bathtub (both another type of myth), we’re eager to hear and to share stories about flashes of insight. But what does it take to be (...) actually creative? How to have such a flash insight? Turns out, there is real science behind "aha moments." We prefer to call it “intuilytics.”. (shrink)

1. Over the last 50 years or so, and especially over the last few decades, the U.S. and many other societies have undergone a large, rapid, and broad decline in anti-gay attitudes. The magnitude, s...

In the present paper, these authors argue on actual reasons why Hilbert’s axiomatic program to unify gravitation theory and electromagnetism failed completely. An outline of plausible resolution of this problem is given here, based on: a) Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, b) Newton’s aether stream model. And in another paper we will present our calculation of receding Moon from Earth based on such a matter creation hypothesis. More experiments and observations are called to verify this new hypothesis, albeit it is inspired from (...) Newton’s theory himself. (shrink)

In a rather old paper, Mario Liu described a hydrodynamic Maxwell equations. While he also discussed potential implications of these new approaches to superconductors, such a discussion of electrodynamics of superconductors is made only after Tajmar’s paper. Therefore, in this paper we present for the first time a derivation of fluidic Maxwell-Proca equations. The name of fluidic Maxwell-Proca is proposed because the equations were based on modifying Maxwell-Proca and Hirsch’s theory of electrodynamics of superconductor. It is hoped that this paper (...) may stimulate further investigations and experiments in superconductor. It may be expected to have some impact to cosmology modeling too, for instance we consider a hypothetical argument that photon mass can be origin of gravitation. Then, after combining with the so-called chiral modification of Maxwell equations (after Spröessig), then we consider chiral Maxwell-Proca equations as possible alternative of gravitation theory. Such a hypothesis has never considered in literature to the best of our knowledge. (shrink)

Sensorimotor Theory is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following (...) three claims. First, that appeals to cognitive access fail to answer the absolute gap question. Second, that SMT can be read in a way that rejects the gap question. Third, that if proponents of SMT are prepared to read SMT in a way that rejects the absolute gap question, then they can also reject the claim that cognitive access is needed to explain experience. (shrink)

In some recent papers (G. ‘t Hooft and others), it has been argued that quantum mechanics can arise from classical cellular automata. Nonetheless, G. Shpenkov has proved that the classical wave equation makes it possible to derive a periodic table of elements, which is very close to Mendeleyev’s one, and describe also other phenomena related to the structure of molecules. Hence the classical wave equation complements Schrödinger’s equation, which implies the appearance of a cellular automaton molecular model starting from classical (...) wave equation. The other studies show that the microworld is constituted as a tessellation of primary topological balls. The tessellattice becomes the origin of a submicrospic mechanics in which a quantum system is subdivided to two subsystems: the particle and its inerton cloud, which appears due to the interaction of the moving particle with oncoming cells of the tessellattice. The particle and its inerton cloud periodically change the momentum and hence move like a wave. The new approach allows us to correlate the Klein-Gordon equation with the deformation coat that is formed in the tessellatice around the particle. The submicroscopic approach shows that the source of any type of wave movements including the Klein-Gordon, Schrödinger, and classical wave equations is hidden in the tessellattice and its basic exciations – inertons, carriers of mass and inert properies of matter. We also discuss possible correspondence with Konrad Zuse’s calculating space. (shrink)

Despite its enormous practical success, many physicists and philosophers alike agree that the quantum theory is full of contradictions and paradoxes which are difficult to solve consistently. Even after 90 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the so-called quantum measurement problem can be defined as follows: the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity (...) being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is: how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed? Among some alternatives to resolve the above QM measurement problem, a very counterintuitive one was suggested by Hugh Everett in his 1955 Princeton dissertation, which was subsequently called the Many-Worlds Interpretation of QM (MWI). In this paper we will not discuss all possible scenarios to solve the measurement problem, but we will only shortly discuss Everett’s MWI, because it has led to heated debates on possibility of multiverses, beyond the Universe we live in. We also discuss two alternatives against MWI proposal: (a) the so-called scale symmetry theory, (b) the Maxwell-Dirac isomorphism. In last section, we also discuss shortly MWI hypothesis from philosophical perspective. (shrink)

This text tries to give some initial scopes for a constructivist approach to political philosophy and social organization based on the fact of friendship; particularly in the greeting taken as an event of friendship. The mere greeting, the most basic approach to empathy, would be the happening of a world, of a whole world characterized by its demand to be, to be realized and preserved. This requirement would come from an unfathomable archaic background, which would be accessible in the idea (...) of ​​the number of friends. It is an aporia that shows both the open, but not infinite, character of a reference group based on the tenderness of something common. (shrink)

Sabine Hossenfelder’s recent book “Lost in Math” has attracted numerous responses, including by notable physicists such as Frank Wilczek. In this article we focus on Wilczek’s remark on that book, in particular on the perils of postempirical science. We also discuss shortly multiverse hypothesis from philosophical perspective. In last section, we offer a resolution from the perspective of Neutrosophic Logic on this problem of classical tension between mathematics and experience approach to physics, which seems to cause the stagnation of modern (...) physics. (shrink)

This review investigates the potential of non-orientable topology as a fundamental framework for understanding the Poincaré conjecture and its implications across various scientific disciplines. Integrating insights from Dokuchaev (2020), Rapoport, Christianto, Chandra, Smarandache (under review), and other pioneering works, this article explores the theoretical foundations linking non-orientable spaces to resolving the Poincaré conjecture and its broader implications in theoretical physics, geology, cosmology, and biology.

Non-naturalists about normativity hold that there are instantiable normative properties which are metaphysically discontinuous with natural properties. One of the central challenges to non-naturalism is how to reconcile this discontinuity with the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Drawing on J. L. Mackie’s seminal but highly compressed discussion in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, this paper argues that the supervenience challenge as usually conceived is merely a symptom of a more fundamental challenge in the vicinity.

This paper is intended to be a follow-up to our previous paper with title: "Reinterpreting Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius: On the antirealism tendency in modern physics." We will give more background for our propositions in the previous paper. Our message here is quite simple: allow us to remind fellow physicists and cosmologists to become more aware of Berkeley-idealism tendency, which can lead us to so many distractions instead of bringing us closer to the truth. We observe that much of the (...) progress of modern physics in the last few decades only makes us as confused as before, but at a much higher level. In the last section, we will give some examples of how we can do something better than existing practice of physics in the past. (shrink)

It is known that most existing cosmology models do not include rotation, with few exceptions such as rotating Bianchi and rotating Godel metrics. Therefore in this paper we aim to discuss four possible ways to model rotating universe, including Nurgaliev’s Ermakov-type equation. It is our hope that the new proposed method can be verified with observations, in order to open new possibilities of more realistic nonlinear cosmology models.

In the same spirit with the theme of last issue of this SGJ journal (“Ongoing creation”), this paper shortly reviews a plausible mechanism from Aether to become ordinary matter from the perspective of Neutrosophic Logic. We also discuss two other possible applications of Neutrosophic Logic, including a resolution of conflicting paradigms in medicine. We hope that some ideas as outlined herein will be proved useful in the near future.

Solitude, is being with other without the other, is being with other, among the masses. Has de integrality of personhood something to loss with social contact? We believe not, we need war words and deeds.

In the present paper we discuss: a) how Hilbert’s unification program failed completely, and b) we outline a new electron model based on Helmholtz’s electron vortex and Kolmogorov theory of turbulence. Novelty aspect: we discuss among other things, electron capture event, and von Karman vortex street. We also discuss a new model of origination of charge and matter. This paper is a sequel to a preceding paper on similar theme.

El artículo presenta el panorama entero de las ideas políticas del notorio conservador peruano Monseñor Bartolomé Herrera. Se trata por vez primera de un estudio exhaustivo de las redes conceptuales y filosóficas de su peculiar concepción del republicanismo, que se califica aquí de “reaccionario”. Luego de incluirlo en su contexto en la historia de las ideas en la polémica entre liberales y conservadores, el texto sostiene que, aparte de sus influencias neoconservadoras restauracionistas, Herrera, considerado hasta hoy un conservador liberal, habría (...) sido más bien un consumidor militante –pero encubierto- del pensamiento reaccionario del Conde De Maistre, el Vizconde de Bonald y, más particularmente, de Agustín Barruel, fuente reaccionaria descuidada por los especialistas en el pensamiento político peruano. Herrera habría sido un tipo peculiar de republicano: Un republicano reaccionario. Aunque de manera simulada y escondiendo sus fuentes, el Obispo de Arequipa, en tono análogo al Valdegamas de 1848, habría desarrollado una concepción anticontractualista y antiliberal de la república peruana desde una teología política contrarrevolucionaria. (shrink)

Resumen: La presente contribución gira en torno al significado del atentado terrorista del 11 de septiembre de 2001 para la hermenéutica filosófica, en particular la de Gianni Vattimo. El turinés gestó en sus textos de entre 2006 y 2014 una versión nueva de la hermenéutica que se basa en la experiencia de este acontecimiento. Esta nueva hermenéutica estaría atenta al conflicto y a las transformaciones sociales y tendría por núcleo la noción de “evento”, Sin embargo, Vattimo mismo no ofrece una (...) definición operativa adecuada del término. Ante esto, propongo incorporar a la tradición hermenéutica conceptos como “evento” y “milagro”, acuñados por Joseph de Maistre. Se trata de una propuesta de “maistrianización” de la hermenéutica para hacer de ella un discurso viable y fructífero en un mundo violento e inestable. (shrink)

José Ignacio Moreno es uno de los fundadores de la independencia del Perú. En calidad de tal acompañó el proyecto del General rioplatense José de San Martín de transformar en 1822 la monarquía peruana en un reino independiente. Pero, a diferencia de la multitud de sus contemporáneos, la historiografía apenas lo presenta como un circunstante en la epopeya de la emancipación, de quien no se conserva ni un retrato. El motivo es la extraña adherencia de este personaje a las ideas (...) del ultramontanismo y su temprana cercanía con la obra del contrarrevolucionario francés Joseph de Maistre. Un discurso monárquico extremista en 1822 lo colocaría como el fundador involuntario del Perú como República. (shrink)

To emphasize what we have outlined in a preceding paper, we consider the following: that human consciousness model should take into consideration “spirit” role, i.e. the mind-body-spirit as integral aspect, which view is neglected in the so-called Freudian mental model. In this paper, we consider two approaches to cancer treatment derived from such an integral triune view of human consciousness, including (a) healing frequency approach as advised by Royal Rife and David Hawkins, and also (b) relational therapy, based on recent (...) research on the healing role of love and compassion. (shrink)