Using a novel enumeration task, we examined the encoding of spatial information during subitizing. Observers were shown masked presentations of randomly-placed discs on a screen and were required to mark the perceived locations of these discs on a subsequent blank screen. This provided a measure of recall for object locations and an indirect measure of display numerosity. Observers were tested on three stimulus durations and eight numerosities. Enumeration performance was high for displays containing up to six discs—a higher subitizing range (...) than reported in previous studies. Error in the location data was measured as the distance between corresponding stimulus and response discs. Overall, location errors increased in magnitude with larger numerosities and shorter display durations. When errors were computed as disc distance from display centroid, results suggest a compressed representation by observers. Additionally, enumeration and localization accuracy increased with display regularity. (shrink)

Aspetti filosofico-matematici dei celebri paradossi di Zenone di Elea.

This book has three principle aims: to show that neither vision nor mental imagery involves the creation or inspection of picture-like mental representations; to defend the claim that our visual processes are, in significant part, cognitively impenetrable; and to develop a theory of “visual indexes”. In what follows, I assess Pylyshyn’s success in realising each of these aims in turn. I focus primarily on his arguments against “picture theories” of vision and mental imagery, to which approximately half the book is (...) devoted. I argue that Pylyshyn adopts an unnecessarily restricted interpretation of what it would be for mental representations to be picture-like, and that this leads him prematurely to reject the possibility of explaining the introspective evidence concerning the nature of mental imagery. (shrink)

Ahlak ve ahlaki değerler insanın varoluşuyla başlayan bir olgudur. Ahlak, insanın yaşamını devam ettirmesi için gereklidir. Ahlâki değerlerden uzak bir ferd düşünülemeyeceği gibi, milletler ve toplumlar da düşünülemez. Ahlâkî değerler insanları ister istemez kuşatır ve yaşamın idamesini sağlar. İnsan varlığının yaşam koşullarını bu denli etkileyen bir olguyu tez konusu seçmemdeki amacı, özelde Stoa Ahlakı’nı, genelde ise ahlak felsefesini araştırmak ve ahlak olgusunu anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmaktır. Stoa Okulu milattan önce üç yüzlü yıllarda Kıbrıslı Zenon’un (335-264) öncülüğünden kurulmuştur. Kıbrıslı Zenon (...) insan için en önemli olanın ahlak olduğunu ve ahlak felsefesi (etik) yapmanın felsefenin en temel sorunu olduğunu vurguluyordu. Ahlak felsefesi dışındaki diğer bilimler ahlak felsefesi (etik) yapmak için gereklidir. Zenon’dan sonra gelen filozoflar da aynı çizgiyi takip etmişlerdir. Onun bu felsefi düşüncesi Stoa Okulu’nun son filozofu olan Roma İmparatoru Marcus Aurelius Antoninus’a (121-180) kadar sürdü. Ahlâkın üzerinde bu denli çok durmuş olan bu felsefî anlayışın ahlâkının ne olduğunu anlamak için, dikkate alınması gerektiğini düşünmekteyim. İnceleme konum olan “Stoa Okulu’nda Felsefe ve Ahlak” yukarıda belirttiğim hususa değinen bir çalışmadır. Bu çalışmamın ilk bölümünde Stoa Okulu’nun tarihi gelişimini, temel görüşlerini ve diğer felsefî akımlarla etkileşimini anlattım. Bunu yapmamdaki amacım, Stoa’nın ahlâk anlayışını açıklamaya bir ön hazırlık teşkil etmesiydi. İkinci bölümde ahlak felsefesi ve ahlâk felsefesi yönünden Stoa’yı etkileyen filozoflara değindim. Üçüncü bölümde ise, bütün bunlardan faydalanarak Stoa ahlâkı üzerinde durdum. Son bölümde, fatalizm- kadercilik kavramları çerçevesinde, Stoa fatalizmine ve İslam kaderciliğine değindim. Bu bölüm özellikle Fatalizm ve kadercilik kavramlarının karıştırılması ve birbirinin yerine kullanılması açısından önemliydi. Buna elimden geldiği kadar açıklık getirmeye çalıştım. (shrink)

The host of SUSY(supersymmetry) based string theories is considered. Superstrings are comprehended as possible candidates on Quantum Gravity basic objects. It is argued that superstring theories constitute mainly mathematical progress and can reconcile general relativity with quantum field theory at best. Yet they cannot provide the genuine synthesis. Superstring unification of all the four forces at hand is a formal one . It is contended that genesis and proliferation of superstrings can better be described not by philosophy of science models (...) but in terms of modern sociology of science. The formal character of gravity and quantum fields fusion and the lack of experimental verification make the transition to superstring theories ad hoc in Lakatosian standards. Possible way of explanation is proposed based on social interests conception of Andrew Pickering. -/- Key words: superstrings, unification, Kaluza-Klein, sociology of science . (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct and discuss Antonio Rubio (1546-1615)’s theory of the composition of the continuum, as set out in his Tractatus de compositione continui, a part of his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, published in 1605 but rewritten in 1606. Here I attempt especially to show that Rubio’s is a significant case of Scholastic overlapping between Aristotle’s theory of infinitely divisible parts and indivisibilism or ‘Zenonism’, i.e. the theory that allows for indivisibles, extensionless points, lines, and surfaces, which (...) are supposed to take part in the composition of the continuum. Even if such a syncretic tendency was, in many different ways, already developing in the medieval period and then at the end of the sixteenth century, Rubio’s position is indeed peculiar. He maintains that indivisibles are real and actual, infinite in act, really distinct from each other, and that, although they indwell in substance, indivisibles do not contribute directly to the constitution of the continuum. In this reconstruction, I emphasize notably Rubio’s usage of mereological notions like those of part, whole, completeness and incompleteness. (shrink)

Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be (...) direct and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism. (shrink)

Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, (...) a new approach is sketched. The alternative view introduces representational contents to explain perceptual individuation. After arguing that those contents are not satisfactional, it is concluded that there is room for a third view of reference fixing that does not fit into the singularist/descriptivist dichotomy. (shrink)

L’espace-vide est définit par Einstein comme substantiel et de densité d’énergie non nulle. Dans les premiers instants de l’univers, c’est cette substance espace-vide qui est apparue conjointement avec la grandeur temps, qui de ce fait doit présenter un lien de nature avec elle. Quel qu’est pu être le processus ayant conduit à la matérialisation des particules élémentaires, celles-ci ont été extraites de cette substance vide et procèdent donc d’une même nature. Ainsi la structure interne d’une particule composée de matière et (...) d’une charge électrique doit présenter une organisation prenant en compte cette origine unique. Il apparait ainsi logique de penser, en s’appuyant sur les travaux de Kaluza, que les charges électriques et la matière sont une seule et unique grandeur mais animée de dynamiques différentes dans des espaces différents à trois ou quatre dimensions spatiales. (shrink)

Since the early eighties, computationalism in the study of the mind has been “under attack” by several critics of the so-called “classic” or “symbolic” approaches in AI and cognitive science. Computationalism was generically identified with such approaches. For example, it was identified with both Allen Newell and Herbert Simon’s Physical Symbol System Hypothesis and Jerry Fodor’s theory of Language of Thought, usually without taking into account the fact ,that such approaches are very different as to their methods and aims. (...) class='Hi'>Zenon Pylyshyn, in his influential book Computation and Cognition, claimed that both Newell and Fodor deeply influenced his ideas on cognition as computation. This probably added to the confusion, as many people still consider Pylyshyn’s book as paradigmatic of the computational approach in the study of the mind. Since then, cognitive scientists, AI researchers and also philosophers of the mind have been asked to take sides on different “paradigms” that have from time to time been proposed as opponents of (classic or symbolic) computationalism. Examples of such oppositions are: -/- computationalism vs. connectionism, computationalism vs. dynamical systems, computationalism vs. situated and embodied cognition, computationalism vs. behavioural and evolutionary robotics. -/- Our preliminary claim in section 1 is that computationalism should not be identified with what we would call the “paradigm (based on the metaphor) of the computer” (in the following, PoC). PoC is the (rather vague) statement that the mind functions “as a digital computer”. Actually, PoC is a restrictive version of computationalism, and nobody ever seriously upheld it, except in some rough versions of the computational approach and in some popular discussions about it. Usually, PoC is used as a straw man in many arguments against computationalism. In section 1 we look in some detail at PoC’s claims and argue that computationalism cannot be identified with PoC. In section 2 we point out that certain anticomputationalist arguments are based on this misleading identification. In section 3 we suggest that the view of the levels of explanation proposed by David Marr could clarify certain points of the debate on computationalism. In section 4 we touch on a controversial issue, namely the possibility of developing a notion of analog computation, similar to the notion of digital computation. A short conclusion follows in section 5. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct and discuss Antonio Rubio (1546-1615)’s theory of the composition of the continuum, as set out in his Tractatus de compositione continui, a part of his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, published in 1605 but rewritten in 1606. Here I attempt especially to show that Rubio’s is a significant case of Scholastic overlapping between Aristotle’s theory of infinitely divisible parts and indivisibilism or ‘Zenonism’, i.e. the theory that allows for indivisibles, extensionless points, lines, and surfaces, which (...) are supposed to take part in the composition of the continuum. Even if such a syncretic tendency was, in many different ways, already developing in the medieval period and then at the end of the sixteenth century, Rubio’s position is indeed peculiar. He maintains that indivisibles are real and actual, infinite in act, really distinct from each other, and that, although they indwell in substance, indivisibles do not contribute directly to the constitution of the continuum. In this reconstruction I emphasize notably Rubio’s usage of mereological notions like those of part, whole, completeness and incompleteness. (shrink)

Plusieurs théories unificatrices ont été proposées. Une grande unification implique l'existence d'une force électronucléaire. La dernière étape de l'unification nécessiterait une théorie qui inclue à la fois la mécanique quantique et la gravité par la relativité générale (« la théorie finale »). Après 1990, certains physiciens considèrent que la théorie M à 11 dimensions, souvent identifiée à l'une des cinq théories des supercordes perturbateurs, ou parfois à la supergravité à supersymétrie maximale supersymétrique à 11 dimensions, est la théorie finale. L'idée (...) de la théorie M s'inspire des idées de la théorie de Kaluza-Klein, dans laquelle il a été constaté que l'utilisation d'un espace-temps à 5 dimensions pour la relativité générale (une des dimensions étant petite) est vue, du point de vue à 4 dimensions, comme la relativité générale habituelle avec l'électrodynamique de Maxwell. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30364.62084. (shrink)

In this short paper, I outline four philosophical arguments concerning the objects we perceive. These arguments build up to the conclusion that the objects of perceptual experience are material objects. I then show that the first three of these arguments parallel important psychological positions in vision science. Thus, (1) the notion of object used in Logical Atomism resembles the concept as it is defined in the Feature Integration Theory of Treisman and Gelade (1980). But (2) Frank Jackson's (1975) Many-Property Problem (...) leads to a substrate-quality structure for visual experience that corresponds to the structure of attended experience in Feature Integration Theory. A third philosophical argument (3) concerns the perception of movement. This argument culminates in the proposition that perceptual features are seen as belonging to material objects. There is a close resemblance between these objects and those of Zenon Pylyshyn's (1980) FINSTs. Finally, (4) I argue that material objects are the only substrates of multimodal perceptual experience. Perceptual psychology has yet to investigate this structure. (shrink)

Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...) I suggest that visual experience, unlike thought, is directly penetrated only by practical non-propositional knowledge. I specify this weak cognitive penetrability in anti-representational terms. In particular, I suggest that the dependence of visual content on practical non-propositional knowledge should be conceived as a rational non-inferential relation, for it is in this way that we can account for the distinctive content of visual experience. (shrink)

Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...) I suggest that visual experience, unlike thought, is directly penetrated only by practical non-propositional knowledge. I specify this weak cognitive penetrability in anti-representational terms. In particular, I suggest that the dependence of visual content on practical non-propositional knowledge should be conceived as a rational non-inferential relation, for it is in this way that we can account for the distinctive content of visual experience. (shrink)

It is taken for granted that the explanation of the Universe’s space-time dimension belongs to the host of the arguments that exhibit the superiority of modern (inflationary) cosmology over the standard model. In the present paper some doubts are expressed . They are based upon the fact superstring theory is too formal to represent genuine unification of general relativity and quantum field theory. Neveretheless, the fact cannot exclude the opportunity that in future the superstring theory can become more physical. Hence (...) this paper does not aim to query neither string cosmology, nor superstring theory; it asks for “tolerance in the matters cosmological”. It advices the researchers not to dwell on the common way of unification and to take into consideration the other ways as well. (shrink)

Relativistic quantum theories are equipped with a background Minkowski spacetime and non-relativistic quantum theories with a Galilean space-time. Traditional investigations have distinguished their distinct space-time structures and have examined ways in which relativistic theories become sufficiently like Galilean theories in a low velocity approximation or limit. A different way to look at their relationship is to see that both kinds of theories are special cases of a certain five-dimensional generalization involving no limiting procedures or approximations. When one compares them, striking (...) features emerge that bear on philosophical questions, including the ontological status of the wave function and time reversal invariance. (shrink)