Results for 'apperception'

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  1. The Principles of Apperception.Corey W. Dyck - 2017 - In Udo Thiel & Giuseppe Motta (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 32-46.
    In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.
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  2. From Agency to Apperception: Through Kinaesthesia to Cognition and Creation.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2008 - Ethics and Information Technology 10 (4):255-264.
    My aim in this paper is to go some way towards showing that the maintenance of hard and fast dichotomies, like those between mind and body, and the real and the virtual, is untenable, and that technological advance cannot occur with being cognisant of its reciprocal ethical implications. In their place I will present a softer enactivist ontology through which I examine the nature of our engagement with technology in general and with virtual realities in particular. This softer ontology is (...)
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  3. “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but (...)
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  4. On Strawson on Kantian Apperception.Dennis Schulting - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):257-271.
    a revised version of the published version is uploaded here.
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  5. Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):59-84.
    Abstract: My aim is to reconstruct Kant's argument for the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. I reconstruct Kant's argument in stages, first showing why thinking should be conceived as an activity of synthesis (as opposed to attention), and then showing why the unity or coherence of a subject's representations should depend upon an a priori synthesis. The guiding thread of my account is Kant's conception of enlightenment: as I suggest, the philosophy of mind advanced in the Deduction (...)
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  6. Apperceptive Patterning: Artefaction, Extensional Beliefs and Cognitive Scaffolding.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History 16 (1):125-178.
    In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This (...)
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  7. Apperception and Object. Comments on Mario Caimi's Reading of the B-Deduction.Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - Revista de Estudios Kantianos:xx-xx.
    I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).
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  8. The Function of Derivation and the Derivation of Functions: A Review of Schulting’s Kant’s Deduction and Apperception[REVIEW]Corey W. Dyck - 2014 - Studi Kantiani:13-19.
    In this review essay, I raise three principal concerns relating to Schulting’s project of deriving the categories from apperception as elaborated in his recent book Kant’s Deduction and Apperception (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). First, I claim that Schulting overlooks a key ambiguity relating to ‘ableiten’ and which contrasts with his strictly logical understanding of that term. Second, I dispute on textual and philosophical grounds Schulting’s characterization of the subject’s consciousness of its own identity in terms of the analytic unity (...)
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  9.  79
    Kant and Sellars on the Unity of Apperception.David Landy - manuscript
    That Wilfrid Sellars claims that the framework of persons is not a descriptive framework, but a normative one is about as well known as any claim that he makes. This claim is at the core of the famous demand for a synoptic image that closes, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” makes its appearance at key moments in the grand argument of, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” and is the capstone of Sellars’ engagement with Kant in, Science and (...)
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  10. Gap? What Gap?—On the Unity of Apperception and the Necessary Application of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Udo Thiel & Giuseppe Motta (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 89-113.
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  11. Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the (...)
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  12. How to Solve the Knowability Paradox with Transcendental Epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.
    A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view by providing for a (...)
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  13. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. (...)
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  14.  46
    Comentarios sobre los significados de la apercepción trascendental en la deducción trascendental de las categorías, de Inmanuel Kant.Gladys L. Portuondo - 2003 - Dikaiosyne 9.
    Resumen El presente trabajo aborda el entramado de condiciones en virtud de las cuales Kant muestra la posibilidad del conocimiento objetivo; esto es, la posibilidad de la ciencia, en tanto estructura trascendental cuya articulación, referida a la apercepción, convierte a ésta última en clave para descifrar(describir) los límites del entendimiento. En este sentido, se muestra el significado de la apercepción trascendental para interpretar la filosofía de Kant en términos de una filosofía de la posibilidad, en la que el tema de (...)
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  15.  51
    G. W. Leibniz apperseptiosta.Markku Roinila - 2001 - Ajatus 58:91-105.
    This paper discusses Leibniz's views on apperception, especially in the context of this pseudo-dialogue with John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. I emphasize the role of attention in the process of becoming conscious of a perception.
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  16. Kant, the Transcendental Designation of I, and the Direct Reference Theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity (...)
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  17.  79
    Transcendental Conditions, Schematism, and Naturalizing Kant’s “I Think”.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Estudos Kantianos 9 (1):121-162.
    Considering how Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception could be “naturalized,” this paper seeks to liberate the Kantian theory of experience from any foundationalist renderings that blur the lines between the empirical and transcendental, without compromising Kant’s attempt to investigate how the invariant structures of experience condition and supply rules for our knowledge of the world. This paper begins with an overview of the Transcendental Deduction’s apperceptive “I think.” We then consider Sellars’ Myth of Jones and Sellars’ notion of noumenal (...)
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  18. The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79).Dennis Schulting - manuscript
    In the context of a critique of James Conant’s (2016) important new reading of the main argument of the Deduction, I present my current, most detailed interpretation of the well-known Leitfaden passage at A79, which in my view has been misinterpreted by a host of prominent readers. The Leitfaden passage is crucial to understanding the argument of, not just the so-called Metaphysical Deduction, but also the Transcendental Deduction. This new account expands and improves upon the account of the Leitfaden I (...)
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  19. Kant's Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction.Ian Proops - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2):209-229.
    This essay partly builds on and partly criticizes a striking idea of Dieter Henrich. Henrich argues that Kant's distinction in the first Critique between the question of fact (quid facti) and the question of law (quid juris) provides clues to the argumentative structure of a philosophical "Deduction". Henrich suggests that the unity of apperception plays a role analogous to a legal factum. By contrast, I argue, first, that the question of fact in the first Critique is settled by the (...)
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  20. Transparency of Mind: The Contributions of Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley to the Genesis of the Modern Subject.Gary Hatfield - 2011 - In Hubertus Busche (ed.), Departure for Modern Europe: A Handbook of Early Modern Philosophy (1400-1700). Felix Meiner Verlag. pp. 361–375.
    The chapter focuses on attributions of the transparency of thought to early modern figures, most notably Descartes. Many recent philosophers assume that Descartes believed the mind to be “transparent”: since all mental states are conscious, we are therefore aware of them all, and indeed incorrigibly know them all. Descartes, and Berkeley too, do make statements that seem to endorse both aspects of the transparency theses (awareness of all mental states; incorrigibility). However, they also make systematic theoretical statements that directly countenance (...)
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  21.  77
    Kant on de Se.Luca Forgione - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlino, Germania: De Gruyter. pp. 3779-3786.
    Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of (...)
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  22. Reflection, Enlightenment, and the Significance of Spontaneity in Kant.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):981-1010.
    Existing interpretations of Kant’s appeal to the spontaneity of the mind focus almost exclusively on the discussion of pure apperception in the Transcendental Deduction. The risk of such a strategy lies in the considerable degree of abstraction at which the argument of the Deduction is carried out: existing interpretations fail to reconnect adequately with any ground-level perspective on our cognitive lives. This paper works in the opposite direction. Drawing on Kant’s suggestion that the most basic picture we can have (...)
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  23. Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at (...)
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  24. Kant, Neo‐Kantians, and Transcendental Subjectivity.Charlotte Baumann - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):595-616.
    This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment. The second part explicates transcendental (...)
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  25.  85
    Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self.James R. O’Shea - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):619-625.
    At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. In these remarks I suggest (...)
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  26.  28
    Brandom's Leibniz.Zachary Gartenberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (1):73-102.
    I discuss an objection by Margaret Wilson against Robert Brandom’s interpretation of Leibniz’s account of perceptual distinctness. According to Brandom, Leibniz holds that (i) the relative distinctness of a perception is a function of its inferentially articulated content and (ii) apperception, or awareness, is explicable in terms of degrees of perceptual distinctness. Wilson alleges that Brandom confuses ‘external deducibility’ from a perceptual state of a monad to the existence of properties in the world, with ‘internally accessible content’ for the (...)
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  27. Max Scheler's Critical Theory: The Idea of Critical Phenomenology.Eric J. Mohr - 2014 - Dissertation, Duquesne University
    I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. The (...)
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  28.  49
    Transcendental Anticipation: A Reconsideration of Husserl’s Type and Kant’s Schemata.Emiliano Diaz - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (1):1-23.
    In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...)
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  29. Kant and the I as Subject.Luca Forgione - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 117-128.
    In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences (§§ 1-3), avoiding any (...)
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  30. Interpersonal Affective Echoing.Albert A. Johnstone - 2016 - In Undine Eberlein (ed.), Intercorporeity, Movement and Tacit Knowledge. Bielefeld, Germany: transcript Verlag. pp. 33-49.
    This essay explores the nature of the most rudimentary form of empathy, interpersonal affective echoing, and attempts to give a cogent assessment of the roles it may play in human interactions. As an investigative background, it briefly sketches phenomenological findings with respect to feelings, to non-linguistic cognition, and to the analogical apperception of others. It then offers a phenomenological account of the basic structures of the experience of echoing another person’s feelings in a face-to-face situation. It also notes how (...)
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  31. On Heisenberg's Notion of a Closed Theory (2013).Francois-Igor Pris - manuscript
    I claim that Heisenberg’s notion of a closed theory and its analysis by Erhard Scheibe fit well with the philosophy of later Wittgenstein or its generalization. The notion of a closed theory corresponds to the notions of a form of life and rule/concept. I suggest the possibility of reconciling the views of Heisenberg, Dirac, and Bohr about inter-theoretical relations within a rational naturalistic pragmatism à la Wittgenstein and Robert Brandom’s analytic interpretation of Kantian synthetic unity of apperception. In particular, (...)
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  32. Kant on Perception, Experience and Judgements Thereof.Banafsheh Beizaei - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):347-371.
    It is commonly thought that the distinction between subjectively valid judgements of perception and objectively valid judgements of experience in the Prolegomena is not consistent with the account of judgement Kant offers in the B Deduction, according to which a judgement is ‘nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception’. Contrary to this view, I argue that the Prolegomena distinction maps closely onto that drawn between the mathematical and dynamical principles in the (...)
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  33. Béatrice Longuenesse and Ned Block Vide Kant.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Cosmos and History 17 (1):405-452.
    Understanding, for Kant, does not intuit, and intuition—which involves empirical information, i.e., sense-data—does not entail thinking. What is crucial to Kant’s famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty is the idea that we have no knowledge unless we combine concepts with intuition. Although concepts and intuition are radically separated mental powers, without a way of bringing them together (i.e., synthesis) there is no knowledge for Kant. Thus Kant’s metaphysical-scientific dualism: (scientific) knowledge is limited (...)
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  34. On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Subjectivism in the Transcendental Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London: Palgrave. pp. 341-370.
    In this chapter, I expound Hegel’s critique of Kant, which he first and most elaborately presented in his early essay Faith and Knowledge (1802), by focusing on the criticism that Hegel levelled against Kant’s (supposedly) arbitrary subjectivism about the categories. This relates to the restriction thesis of Kant’s transcendental idealism: categorially governed empirical knowledge only applies to appearances, not to things in themselves, and so does not reach objective reality, according to Hegel. Hegel claims that this restriction of knowledge to (...)
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  35. The Logic and Topology of Kant's Temporal Continuum.Riccardo Pinosio & Michiel van Lambalgen - manuscript
    In this article we provide a mathematical model of Kant?s temporal continuum that satisfies the (not obviously consistent) synthetic a priori principles for time that Kant lists in the Critique of pure Reason (CPR), the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS), the Opus Postumum and the notes and frag- ments published after his death. The continuum so obtained has some affinities with the Brouwerian continuum, but it also has ‘infinitesimal intervals’ consisting of nilpotent infinitesimals, which capture Kant’s theory of rest (...)
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  36.  90
    Practical Action – First Critique Foundations.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2010 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 495-538.
    Both European and Anglo-American philosophical traditions of Kant scholarship draw a sharp distinction between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophies. They cite KrV, A 14.23 –28; KrV, A 15.01– 09; KrV, B 28.22 – 28; KrV, B 29.01 –12 as evidence that the analyses of intuition, understanding and reason proffered in the first Critique apply to cognition only, and therefore do not significantly illuminate his analyses of inclination, desire, or respect for the moral law in the Groundwork, second Critique, Metaphysics of (...)
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  37. Selfhood and Relationality.Jacqueline Mariña - 2017 - In Joel Rasmussen, Judith Wolfe & Johannes Zachhuber (eds.), Oxford Handbook for Nineteenth Century Christian Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 127-142.
    Nineteenth century Christian thought about self and relationality was stamped by the reception of Kant’s groundbreaking revision to the Cartesian cogito. For René Descartes (1596-1650), the self is a thinking thing (res cogitans), a simple substance retaining its unity and identity over time. For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, consciousness is not a substance but an ongoing activity having a double constitution, or two moments: first, the original activity of consciousness, what Kant would call original apperception, and (...)
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  38. Wie kann die transzendentale Apperzeption ›gehaltvoll‹ werden bzw. die Rezeptivität spontan?Patrick Grüneberg - 2009 - Fichte-Studien 33:49-63.
    Das natürlich vorkommende Phänomen, das den Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung ausmacht, ist das empirische Bewußtsein. Betrachtet man die Inhalte des menschlichen, empirischen Bewußtseins, dann fällt auf, daß diese grundsätzlich in zwei Klassen aufgeteilt werden können: Zum einen gibt es spontane Vorstellungen, die der Willkür des empirischen Subjekts unterliegen, etwa Phantasien, Pläne, (Handlungs)entscheidungen oder Spekulationen. Zum anderen hat das Subjekt räumlich und zeitlich strukturierte Vorstellungen, die ihm derart gegeben sind, daß es sich intentional auf Gegenstände und Prozesse innerer und äußerer Wahrnehmung (...)
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  39. Review of the International Conference “Leibniz's Metaphysics and Phenomenology of Virtuality” 20–21 June 2012, Kaunas, Lithuania.Igor Zaitsev - 2012 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 1 (2):289-296.
    The analysis of Leibniz’s heritage and phenomenology of virtuality in the title of this conference do not exhaust the whole variety of topics, but rather are the poles between which the discussion has been developing. Monadology of Leibniz became the place of concurrence of absolute identity and unique ecstatic that gave rise to a specific discourse of virtuality.
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  40.  82
    Kant on Self-Consciousness as Self-Limitation.Addison Ellis - 2020 - Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 5.
    I argue that, for Kant, there is a point at which the notions of self-consciousness and self-limitation become one. I proceed by spelling out a logical progression of forms of self-consciousness in Kant’s philosophy, where at each stage we locate the limits of the capacity in question and ask what it takes to know those limits. After briefly sketching a notion of self-consciousness available even to the animal, we look at whether there could be a notion of self-consciousness available to (...)
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  41. Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity Between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (10):307-338.
    Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...)
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  42. Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. 257-293.
    In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction (...)
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  43. 3. The Quid Juris.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - In Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. De Gruyter. pp. 28-62.
    What is the Quid Juris in Kant's Deduction? Chapter 3 from my book on the Deduction (Kant's Deduction From Apperception) provides an answer to that question, and also contains an extensive discussion of the relevant literature on this topic (Henrich, Proops, Seeberg & Longuenesse).
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  44.  39
    Transcendental Idealism F.S.Frances Rosemary Shaw - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Auckland
    This paper presents an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories, based primarily on the “two-step” argument of the B deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. I undertake to show that Kant’s distinction between the “pure forms of intuition” and “pure formal intuition” is successful in its attempt to prove that all sensible intuitions presuppose the a priori categories, in a way which is compatible, I claim, with Kant’s statements (in the Aesthetic and elsewhere) that sensible intuition (...)
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