Results for 'artificial moral agency'

977 found
Order:
  1. A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi & Christian Munthe - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):195-218.
    This paper proposes a methodological redirection of the philosophical debate on artificial moral agency in view of increasingly pressing practical needs due to technological development. This “normative approach” suggests abandoning theoretical discussions about what conditions may hold for moral agency and to what extent these may be met by artificial entities such as AI systems and robots. Instead, the debate should focus on how and to what extent such entities should be included in human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  2. ETHICA EX MACHINA. Exploring artificial moral agency or the possibility of computable ethics.Rodrigo Sanz - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (2):223-239.
    Since the automation revolution of our technological era, diverse machines or robots have gradually begun to reconfigure our lives. With this expansion, it seems that those machines are now faced with a new challenge: more autonomous decision-making involving life or death consequences. This paper explores the philosophical possibility of artificial moral agency through the following question: could a machine obtain the cognitive capacities needed to be a moral agent? In this regard, I propose to expose, under (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Varieties of Artificial Moral Agency and the New Control Problem.Marcus Arvan - 2022 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (42):225-256.
    This paper presents a new trilemma with respect to resolving the control and alignment problems in machine ethics. Section 1 outlines three possible types of artificial moral agents (AMAs): (1) 'Inhuman AMAs' programmed to learn or execute moral rules or principles without understanding them in anything like the way that we do; (2) 'Better-Human AMAs' programmed to learn, execute, and understand moral rules or principles somewhat like we do, but correcting for various sources of human (...) error; and (3) 'Human-Like AMAs' programmed to understand and apply moral values in broadly the same way that we do, with a human-like moral psychology. Sections 2–4 then argue that each type of AMA generates unique control and alignment problems that have not been fully appreciated. Section 2 argues that Inhuman AMAs are likely to behave in inhumane ways that pose serious existential risks. Section 3 then contends that Better-Human AMAs run a serious risk of magnifying some sources of human moral error by reducing or eliminating others. Section 4 then argues that Human-Like AMAs would not only likely reproduce human moral failures, but also plausibly be highly intelligent, conscious beings with interests and wills of their own who should therefore be entitled to similar moral rights and freedoms as us. This generates what I call the New Control Problem: ensuring that humans and Human-Like AMAs exert a morally appropriate amount of control over each other. Finally, Section 5 argues that resolving the New Control Problem would, at a minimum, plausibly require ensuring what Hume and Rawls term ‘circumstances of justice’ between humans and Human-Like AMAs. But, I argue, there are grounds for thinking this will be profoundly difficult to achieve. I thus conclude on a skeptical note. Different approaches to developing ‘safe, ethical AI’ generate subtly different control and alignment problems that we do not currently know how to adequately resolve, and which may or may not be ultimately surmountable. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.Riya Manna & Rajakishore Nath - 2021 - Problemos 100:139-151.
    This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence. Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    Can nonhuman animals and artificial intelligence (AI) entities be attributed moral agency? The general assumption in the philosophical literature is that moral agency applies exclusively to humans since they alone possess free will or capacities required for deliberate reflection. Consequently, only humans have been taken to be eligible for ascriptions of moral responsibility in terms of, for instance, blame or praise, moral criticism, or attributions of vice and virtue. Animals and machines may cause (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Moral Encounters of the Artificial Kind: Towards a non-anthropocentric account of machine moral agency.Fabio Tollon - 2019 - Dissertation, Stellenbosch University
    The aim of this thesis is to advance a philosophically justifiable account of Artificial Moral Agency (AMA). Concerns about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI) traditionally turn on questions of whether these systems are deserving of moral concern (i.e. if they are moral patients) or whether they can be sources of moral action (i.e. if they are moral agents). On the Organic View of Ethical Status, being a moral patient (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Moral Agency in Artificial Intelligence (Robots).Saleh Gorbanian - 2020 - Ethical Reflections, 1 (1):11-32.
    Growing technological advances in intelligent artifacts and bitter experiences of the past have emphasized the need to use and operate ethics in this field. Accordingly, it is vital to discuss the ethical integrity of having intelligent artifacts. Concerning the method of gathering materials, the current study uses library and documentary research followed by attribution style. Moreover, descriptive analysis is employed in order to analyze data. Explaining and criticizing the opposing views in this field and reviewing the related literature, it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents.Marija Kušić & Petar Nurkić - 2019 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (32):27-49.
    Abstract: Artificial Morality is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that centres around the idea of creating artificial moral agents, or AMAs, by implementing moral competence in artificial systems. AMAs are ought to be autonomous agents capable of socially correct judgements and ethically functional behaviour. This request for moral machines comes from the changes in everyday practice, where artificial systems are being frequently used in a variety of situations from home help and elderly care (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Moral Agents or Mindless Machines? A Critical Appraisal of Agency in Artificial Systems.Fabio Tollon - 2019 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 4 (63):9-23.
    In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of Johnson and Noorman’s (2014) three conceptualizations of the agential roles artificial systems can play. I argue that two of these conceptions are unproblematic: that of causally efficacious agency and “acting for” or surrogate agency. Their third conception, that of “autonomous agency,” however, is one I have reservations about. The authors point out that there are two ways in which the term “autonomy” can be used: there is, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Philosophical Signposts for Artificial Moral Agent Frameworks.Robert James M. Boyles - 2017 - Suri 6 (2):92–109.
    This article focuses on a particular issue under machine ethics—that is, the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. Machine ethics is a branch of artificial intelligence that looks into the moral status of artificial agents. Artificial moral agents, on the other hand, are artificial autonomous agents that possess moral value, as well as certain rights and responsibilities. This paper demonstrates that attempts to fully develop a theory that could possibly account for the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Manufacturing Morality A general theory of moral agency grounding computational implementations: the ACTWith model.Jeffrey White - 2013 - In Computational Intelligence. Nova Publications. pp. 1-65.
    The ultimate goal of research into computational intelligence is the construction of a fully embodied and fully autonomous artificial agent. This ultimate artificial agent must not only be able to act, but it must be able to act morally. In order to realize this goal, a number of challenges must be met, and a number of questions must be answered, the upshot being that, in doing so, the form of agency to which we must aim in developing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.
    The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  13. The Prospect of a Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence: Agency and Value Alignment.Montemayor Carlos - 2023
    In this open access book, Carlos Montemayor illuminates the development of artificial intelligence (AI) by examining our drive to live a dignified life. -/- He uses the notions of agency and attention to consider our pursuit of what is important. His method shows how the best way to guarantee value alignment between humans and potentially intelligent machines is through attention routines that satisfy similar needs. Setting out a theoretical framework for AI Montemayor acknowledges its legal, moral, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Understanding Artificial Agency.Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Do androids dream of normative endorsement? On the fallibility of artificial moral agents.Frodo Podschwadek - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):325-339.
    The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make them autonomous moral agents. Some authors have even claimed that one of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents. From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  16. Kantian Notion of freedom and Autonomy of Artificial Agency.Manas Sahu - 2021 - Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias 23:136-149.
    The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, invites an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Human Goals Are Constitutive of Agency in Artificial Intelligence.Elena Popa - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1731-1750.
    The question whether AI systems have agency is gaining increasing importance in discussions of responsibility for AI behavior. This paper argues that an approach to artificial agency needs to be teleological, and consider the role of human goals in particular if it is to adequately address the issue of responsibility. I will defend the view that while AI systems can be viewed as autonomous in the sense of identifying or pursuing goals, they rely on human goals and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  18. The Morality of Artificial Friends in Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun.Jakob Stenseke - 2022 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 5.
    Can artificial entities be worthy of moral considerations? Can they be artificial moral agents (AMAs), capable of telling the difference between good and evil? In this essay, I explore both questions—i.e., whether and to what extent artificial entities can have a moral status (“the machine question”) and moral agency (“the AMA question”)—in light of Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2021 novel Klara and the Sun. I do so by juxtaposing two prominent approaches to machine morality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Action and Agency in Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Critique.Justin Nnaemeka Onyeukaziri - 2023 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 24 (1):73-90.
    The objective of this work is to explore the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension employed in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Risk Imposition by Artificial Agents: The Moral Proxy Problem.Johanna Thoma - 2022 - In Silja Voeneky, Philipp Kellmeyer, Oliver Mueller & Wolfram Burgard (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Responsible Artificial Intelligence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
    Where artificial agents are not liable to be ascribed true moral agency and responsibility in their own right, we can understand them as acting as proxies for human agents, as making decisions on their behalf. What I call the ‘Moral Proxy Problem’ arises because it is often not clear for whom a specific artificial agent is acting as a moral proxy. In particular, we need to decide whether artificial agents should be acting as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Artificial agents: responsibility & control gaps.Herman Veluwenkamp & Frank Hindriks - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present moral risks, often leading to harm or ethical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.Vincent C. Müller - 2021 - In Anthony Elliott (ed.), The Routledge Social Science Handbook of Ai. Routledge. pp. 122-137.
    Artificial intelligence (AI) is a digital technology that will be of major importance for the development of humanity in the near future. AI has raised fundamental questions about what we should do with such systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve and how we can control these. - After the background to the field (1), this article introduces the main debates (2), first on ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e. tools made (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.Vincent C. Müller - 2020 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. pp. 1-70.
    Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are digital technologies that will have significant impact on the development of humanity in the near future. They have raised fundamental questions about what we should do with these systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve, and how we can control these. - After the Introduction to the field (§1), the main themes (§2) of this article are: Ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e., tools made and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  24. The Heart of an AI: Agency, Moral Sense, and Friendship.Evandro Barbosa & Thaís Alves Costa - 2024 - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):01-16.
    The article presents an analysis centered on the emotional lapses of artificial intelligence (AI) and the influence of these lapses on two critical aspects. Firstly, the article explores the ontological impact of emotional lapses, elucidating how they hinder AI’s capacity to develop a moral sense. The absence of a moral emotion, such as sympathy, creates a barrier for machines to grasp and ethically respond to specific situations. This raises fundamental questions about machines’ ability to act as (...) agents in the same manner as human beings. Additionally, the article sheds light on the practical implications within human-machine relations and their effect on human friendships. The lack of friendliness or its equivalent in interactions with machines directly impacts the quality and depth of human relations. This concerningly suggests the potential replacement or compromise of genuine interpersonal connections due to limitations in human-machine interactions. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Ethics of Driving Automation. Artificial Agency and Human Values.Fabio Fossa - 2023 - Cham: Springer.
    This book offers a systematic and thorough philosophical analysis of the ways in which driving automation crosses path with ethical values. Upon introducing the different forms of driving automation and examining their relation to human autonomy, it provides readers with in-depth reflections on safety, privacy, moral judgment, control, responsibility, sustainability, and other ethical issues. Driving is undoubtedly a moral activity as a human act. Transferring it to artificial agents such as connected and automated vehicles necessarily raises many (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. Artificial Agency and the Game of Semantic Extension.Fossa Fabio - 2021 - Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 46 (4):440-457.
    Artificial agents are commonly described by using words that traditionally belong to the semantic field of organisms, particularly of animal and human life. I call this phenomenon the game of semantic extension. However, the semantic extension of words as crucial as “autonomous”, “intelligent”, “creative”, “moral”, and so on, is often perceived as unsatisfactory, which is signalled with the extensive use of inverted commas or other syntactical cues. Such practice, in turn, has provoked harsh criticism that usually refers back (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Moral difference between humans and robots: paternalism and human-relative reason.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (4):1533-1543.
    According to some philosophers, if moral agency is understood in behaviourist terms, robots could become moral agents that are as good as or even better than humans. Given the behaviourist conception, it is natural to think that there is no interesting moral difference between robots and humans in terms of moral agency (call it the _equivalence thesis_). However, such moral differences exist: based on Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitude and Scanlon’s relational account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Attention, Moral Skill, and Algorithmic Recommendation.Nick Schuster & Seth Lazar - 2024 - Philosophical Studies.
    Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While recommender systems could in principle enhance our moral agency by enabling us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Artificial Evil and the Foundation of Computer Ethics.Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2001 - Springer Netherlands. Edited by Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders.
    Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil:moral (ME) and natural (NE). The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war,torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  30. (1 other version)Artificial evil and the foundation of computer ethics.L. Floridi & J. Sanders - 2000 - Etica E Politica 2 (2).
    Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil: moral and natural. The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war, torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  31. Moral zombies: why algorithms are not moral agents.Carissa Véliz - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (2):487-497.
    In philosophy of mind, zombies are imaginary creatures that are exact physical duplicates of conscious subjects but for whom there is no first-personal experience. Zombies are meant to show that physicalism—the theory that the universe is made up entirely out of physical components—is false. In this paper, I apply the zombie thought experiment to the realm of morality to assess whether moral agency is something independent from sentience. Algorithms, I argue, are a kind of functional moral zombie, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  32. When is a robot a moral agent.John P. Sullins - 2006 - International Review of Information Ethics 6 (12):23-30.
    In this paper Sullins argues that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is made between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in order to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is achieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of the machine. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  33. A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents.Robert James M. Boyles - 2018 - Kritike 12 (1):182–200.
    This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, which refers to machines capable of (...) reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about how the said concept could affect other important philosophical concepts. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Algorithms, Agency, and Respect for Persons.Alan Rubel, Clinton Castro & Adam Pham - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (3):547-572.
    Algorithmic systems and predictive analytics play an increasingly important role in various aspects of modern life. Scholarship on the moral ramifications of such systems is in its early stages, and much of it focuses on bias and harm. This paper argues that in understanding the moral salience of algorithmic systems it is essential to understand the relation between algorithms, autonomy, and agency. We draw on several recent cases in criminal sentencing and K–12 teacher evaluation to outline four (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  35. Agency Laundering and Information Technologies.Alan Rubel, Clinton Castro & Adam Pham - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):1017-1041.
    When agents insert technological systems into their decision-making processes, they can obscure moral responsibility for the results. This can give rise to a distinct moral wrong, which we call “agency laundering.” At root, agency laundering involves obfuscating one’s moral responsibility by enlisting a technology or process to take some action and letting it forestall others from demanding an account for bad outcomes that result. We argue that the concept of agency laundering helps in understanding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  36. Incorporating Ethics into Artificial Intelligence.Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):403-418.
    This article reviews the reasons scholars hold that driverless cars and many other AI equipped machines must be able to make ethical decisions, and the difficulties this approach faces. It then shows that cars have no moral agency, and that the term ‘autonomous’, commonly applied to these machines, is misleading, and leads to invalid conclusions about the ways these machines can be kept ethical. The article’s most important claim is that a significant part of the challenge posed by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  37. There Is No Agency Without Attention.Paul Bello & Will Bridewell - 2017 - AI Magazine 38 (4):27-33.
    For decades AI researchers have built agents that are capable of carrying out tasks that require human-level or human-like intelligence. During this time, questions of how these programs compared in kind to humans have surfaced and led to beneficial interdisciplinary discussions, but conceptual progress has been slower than technological progress. Within the past decade, the term agency has taken on new import as intelligent agents have become a noticeable part of our everyday lives. Research on autonomous vehicles and personal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. The rise of the robots and the crisis of moral patiency.John Danaher - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (1):129-136.
    This paper adds another argument to the rising tide of panic about robots and AI. The argument is intended to have broad civilization-level significance, but to involve less fanciful speculation about the likely future intelligence of machines than is common among many AI-doomsayers. The argument claims that the rise of the robots will create a crisis of moral patiency. That is to say, it will reduce the ability and willingness of humans to act in the world as responsible (...) agents, and thereby reduce them to moral patients. Since that ability and willingness is central to the value system in modern liberal democratic states, the crisis of moral patiency has a broad civilization-level significance: it threatens something that is foundational to and presupposed in much contemporary moral and political discourse. I defend this argument in three parts. I start with a brief analysis of an analogous argument made in pop culture. Though those arguments turn out to be hyperbolic and satirical, they do prove instructive as they illustrates a way in which the rise of robots could impact upon civilization, even when the robots themselves are neither malicious nor powerful enough to bring about our doom. I then introduce the argument from the crisis of moral patiency, defend its main premises and address objections. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  39. A way forward for responsibility in the age of AI.Dane Leigh Gogoshin - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.
    Whatever one makes of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility – e.g. whether it’s the case that we can have the latter without the former and, if so, what conditions must be met; whatever one thinks about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever meet such conditions, one still faces the following questions. What is the value of moral responsibility? If we take moral responsibility to be a matter of being a fitting target of moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Can humanoid robots be moral?Sanjit Chakraborty - 2018 - Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 18:49-60.
    The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on the outward practices (or ‘output,’ in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question that has initiated the extensive debate, i.e., ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the normative outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Is superintelligence necessarily moral?Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Numerous authors have expressed concern that advanced artificial intelligence (AI) poses an existential risk to humanity. These authors argue that we might build AI which is vastly intellectually superior to humans (a ‘superintelligence’), and which optimizes for goals that strike us as morally bad, or even irrational. Thus, this argument assumes that a superintelligence might have morally bad goals. However, according to some views, a superintelligence necessarily has morally adequate goals. This might be the case either because abilities for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility.Marc Champagne - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (3):448–454.
    Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgasm” betokens an orgasm.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Can Humanoid Robots be Moral?Sanjit Chakraborty - 2018 - Ethics in Science, Environment and Politics 18:49-60.
    The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on the outward practices (or ‘output’, in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question that has initiated extensive debate, i.e. ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the normative outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and creativity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. On a Possible Basis for Metaphysical Self-development in Natural and Artificial Systems.Jeffrey White - 2022 - Filozofia i Nauka. Studia Filozoficzne I Interdyscyplinarne 10:71-100.
    Recent research into the nature of self in artificial and biological systems raises interest in a uniquely determining immutable sense of self, a “metaphysical ‘I’” associated with inviolable personal values and moral convictions that remain constant in the face of environmental change, distinguished from an object “me” that changes with its environment. Complementary research portrays processes associated with self as multimodal routines selectively enacted on the basis of contextual cues informing predictive self or world models, with the notion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. The emergence of “truth machines”?: Artificial intelligence approaches to lie detection.Jo Ann Oravec - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (1):1-10.
    This article analyzes emerging artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced lie detection systems from ethical and human resource (HR) management perspectives. I show how these AI enhancements transform lie detection, followed with analyses as to how the changes can lead to moral problems. Specifically, I examine how these applications of AI introduce human rights issues of fairness, mental privacy, and bias and outline the implications of these changes for HR management. The changes that AI is making to lie detection are altering (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Mind the Gap: Autonomous Systems, the Responsibility Gap, and Moral Entanglement.Trystan S. Goetze - 2022 - Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT ’22).
    When a computer system causes harm, who is responsible? This question has renewed significance given the proliferation of autonomous systems enabled by modern artificial intelligence techniques. At the root of this problem is a philosophical difficulty known in the literature as the responsibility gap. That is to say, because of the causal distance between the designers of autonomous systems and the eventual outcomes of those systems, the dilution of agency within the large and complex teams that design autonomous (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. rethinking machine ethics in the era of ubiquitous technology.Jeffrey White (ed.) - 2015 - Hershey, PA, USA: IGI.
    Table of Contents Foreword .................................................................................................... ......................................... xiv Preface .................................................................................................... .............................................. xv Acknowledgment .................................................................................................... .......................... xxiii Section 1 On the Cusp: Critical Appraisals of a Growing Dependency on Intelligent Machines Chapter 1 Algorithms versus Hive Minds and the Fate of Democracy ................................................................... 1 Rick Searle, IEET, USA Chapter 2 We Can Make Anything: Should We? .................................................................................................. 15 Chris Bateman, University of Bolton, UK Chapter 3 Grounding Machine Ethics within the Natural System ........................................................................ 30 Jared Gassen, JMG Advising, USA Nak Young Seong, Independent Scholar, South (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Christianity, science, and three phases of being human.Bruce R. Reichenbach - 2021 - Zygon 56 (1):96-117.
    The alleged conflict between religion and science most pointedly focuses on what it is to be human. Western philosophical thought regarding this has progressed through three broad stages: mind/body dualism, Neo-Darwinism, and most recently strong artificial intelligence (AI). I trace these views with respect to their relation to Christian views of humans, suggesting that while the first two might be compatible with Christian thought, strong AI presents serious challenges to a Christian understanding of personhood, including our freedom to choose, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Dubito Ergo Sum: Exploring AI Ethics.Viktor Dörfler & Giles Cuthbert - 2024 - Hicss 57: Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Honolulu, Hi.
    We paraphrase Descartes’ famous dictum in the area of AI ethics where the “I doubt and therefore I am” is suggested as a necessary aspect of morality. Therefore AI, which cannot doubt itself, cannot possess moral agency. Of course, this is not the end of the story. We explore various aspects of the human mind that substantially differ from AI, which includes the sensory grounding of our knowing, the act of understanding, and the significance of being able to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions.Anna Strasser - 2021 - AI and Ethics.
    Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 977