What does it mean to treat people as equals when the legacies of feudalism, religious persecution, authoritarian and oligarchic government have shaped the landscape within which we must construct something better? This question has come to dominate much constitutional practice as well as philosophical inquiry in the past 50 years. The combination of Second Wave Feminism with the continuing struggle for racial equality in the 1970s brought into sharp relief the variety of ways in which people can be treated (...) unequally, while respecting the formalities of constitutional government. Most obviously, the content of laws can mistreat them by wrongfully assuming that they are either threats to others, or that, like children, they need to be protected from harm through paternalistic limitations on their freedom of action. Or, as those concerned with class inequality have long noted, formal equality can create legal requirements, permissions, and prohibitions whose burdens fall predictably, and often solely, on groups who are already marginalised, and most in need of state protection. (Kairys, David 1990) Above all, what these two great political movements made plain, is that a concern for group inequality and, specifically, group injustice must figure in the formulation and adjudication of individual rights, if legal protections for equality are adequately to combat the causes of inequality. Getting to grips with that challenge, it became obvious, required going beyond the familiar analyses of inequality inherited from Liberalism and Marxism, given the many different ways in which people can be equal or unequal.(Hackett and Haslanger 2006, 3 - 15) In the first part of this chapter, I will seek to illustrate these claims, by focusing on efforts to reframe the theory and practice of constitutional equality given demands for sexual and racial equality. I will then show that analytic philosophy has also come to recognise the various non-reducible dimensions of equality in ways that reinforce the claims of critical legal theory, even as philosophers highlight their disconcerting consequences. If equality has multiple irreducible dimensions, conflicts between the legitimate demands of equality are unavoidable features of law and politics, even in the best possible world, and are likely to be particularly painful when set against a background of historical injustice. The chapter concludes with the challenges to democratic constitutionalism, and the scope for constructive responses to those challenges, which the rapprochement between critical and analytic thinking on equality suggests. (shrink)

The Universal Law of Balance: Preventing Poverty, Conflict, War, and the Misinterpretation of Religious Teachings -/- Introduction -/- Human civilization has long struggled with poverty, conflict, war, and social inequality, despite advancements in science, technology, and economic development. The root cause of these persistent problems is not simply a lack of resources but systemic imbalances caused by wrong decision-making—decisions based on false information, greed, corruption, short-term thinking, and rigid belief systems. -/- Among the most significant contributors to global imbalance is (...) religious misinterpretation and dogmatism. While the original teachings of religious founders often emphasized compassion, justice, and balance, their followers have frequently misinterpreted or distorted these teachings to justify violence, inequality, oppression, and resistance to progress. These flawed interpretations have created religious conflicts, economic injustices, and social divisions, violating the universal law of balance in nature—a principle that states that all systems must function in harmony to sustain stability and well-being. -/- If humanity had applied the universal law of balance in interpreting religious teachings, the world could have prevented not only poverty and war but also the destructive consequences of religious extremism and dogma. -/- The Role of Correct Information in Decision-Making and the Misinterpretation of Religious Teachings -/- A major reason why poverty, war, and inequality persist is because societies have made decisions based on false, incomplete, or manipulated information. This is especially true in religion, where followers often misinterpret sacred texts to serve their own interests. Instead of following the true wisdom of religious founders, many religious leaders and followers have: -/- 1. Used scripture to justify oppression and discrimination → Even though the original religious figures preached equality and compassion, followers have twisted their words to promote sexism, racism, and class divisions. -/- 2. Blocked scientific progress → Some religious groups have resisted new discoveries because they mistakenly believe these contradict their scriptures. -/- 3. Promoted violence in the name of religion → While most religious founders preached peace, their teachings have been misused to justify wars, crusades, and acts of terrorism. -/- 4. Created economic injustice → Some religious institutions accumulate wealth and power while their followers remain poor, violating the moral principles of their own faith. -/- 5. Suppressed education and critical thinking → Many religious movements have discouraged questioning even when evidence contradicts traditional beliefs. -/- If religious followers had correctly interpreted their holy books through the lens of balance, reason, and universal ethics, many historical conflicts and injustices could have been prevented. -/- How Misinterpretation of Religious Teachings Leads to Imbalances That Cause Poverty, Conflict, and War -/- 1. Economic Imbalance: Religious Dogma Justifies Wealth Inequality -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious followers have claimed that wealth is a sign of divine favor, allowing religious institutions and elites to accumulate extreme wealth while keeping followers poor. -/- Effect: Economic inequality leads to mass poverty and social unrest. -/- Example: The Catholic Church in medieval Europe amassed enormous wealth while peasants suffered under a feudal system, leading to revolts like the Protestant Reformation (1517). -/- True Teaching: Jesus Christ preached humility and care for the poor, yet many Christian leaders built lavish palaces and charged the poor for religious services. -/- 2. Resource Imbalance: Religious Wars Over Land and Holy Sites -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some followers believe that their religion grants them exclusive rights over certain lands, leading to violent conflicts. -/- Effect: Wars, ethnic cleansing, and mass displacement of populations. -/- Example: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is fueled by religious claims over land, causing decades of suffering. -/- True Teaching: Prophets from both Judaism and Islam emphasized justice and peace, yet their followers fight over holy sites instead of coexisting peacefully. -/- 3. Population Imbalance: Opposition to Birth Control Causes Overpopulation -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious leaders claim that contraception is against God’s will, leading to uncontrolled population growth in poor countries. -/- Effect: Overpopulation strains resources, causing poverty, unemployment, and hunger. -/- Example: The Catholic Church opposed birth control in the Philippines, contributing to extreme poverty and slum overcrowding. -/- True Teaching: Jesus and Muhammad both emphasized responsibility and caring for one’s family, which would logically include planning for sustainable family sizes. -/- 4. Educational Imbalance: Religious Suppression of Knowledge Slows Progress -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious groups believe that questioning religious texts is sinful, preventing scientific discovery. -/- Effect: Societies remain ignorant, uneducated, and technologically behind. -/- Example: The Catholic Church banned Galileo’s heliocentric model, delaying the progress of astronomy. -/- True Teaching: The Quran and the Bible both encourage seeking knowledge, but many followers have rejected modern science. -/- 5. Religious Conflicts and Wars: Justification of Violence in the Name of God -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some extremists believe that holy war is necessary to defend their faith, leading to centuries of religious violence. -/- Effect: Millions of people killed in religious conflicts throughout history. -/- Example: The Crusades (1095-1291) were wars between Christians and Muslims over the Holy Land, causing immense suffering. -/- True Teaching: Jesus and Muhammad both taught that war should only be a last resort for self-defense, not for conquest. -/- 6. Political Imbalance: Religious Control of Governments Leads to Oppression -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some believe that governments should be ruled by religious laws, leading to oppressive theocracies. -/- Effect: Suppression of freedom, human rights violations, and authoritarian rule. -/- Example: Iran’s Islamic Revolution (1979) led to a theocratic government that limits women’s rights and free speech. -/- True Teaching: The Prophet Muhammad and Moses both acted as leaders of justice, not as dictators imposing harsh religious law. -/- 7. Labor Imbalance: Religious Justification of Slavery and Exploitation -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious texts were misused to justify slavery and forced labor. -/- Effect: Exploitation, generational poverty, and racial oppression. -/- Example: The Atlantic slave trade was justified using Christian teachings, keeping millions in brutal conditions. -/- True Teaching: Many religious leaders, including Moses, fought against oppression, yet their followers used scripture to do the opposite. -/- How the Universal Law of Balance Could Have Prevented Religious Misinterpretation and Its Consequences -/- If humanity had applied the universal law of balance, societies would have: -/- 1. Interpreted religious texts through reason, ethics, and balance instead of blind obedience. -/- 2. Separated religious teachings from governance and law to ensure fairness for all. -/- 3. Prioritized education and scientific knowledge while respecting religious faith. -/- 4. Prevented religious wars by promoting tolerance and coexistence. -/- 5. Encouraged responsible population planning instead of strict opposition to contraception. -/- 6. Fought against economic and social inequality instead of justifying it through religion. -/- Conclusion -/- Poverty, war, and inequality are not caused by religion itself, but by the flawed interpretation of religious teachings by followers. Had humanity followed the universal law of balance, religious principles would have been applied with wisdom, reason, and fairness, creating a world with economic justice, scientific progress, and peaceful coexistence. The past cannot be changed, but the future can still be reshaped by prioritizing truth, reason, and balance. Only by rejecting dogmatic extremism and restoring balance can we create a world free from poverty, conflict, and oppression. -/- . (shrink)

The Brown vs. Board of Education decision’s central affirmation, “separate is inherently unequal,”(the “inherency statement”) is literally false—separate facilities, for different racial groups, can be equal, even if they are often not. The inherency statement has contributed to confusion about integration, (educational) equality, and the relation between them. (1) Schools with one-race-dominant demographics(“separated”) are not necessarily “Segregated” (in the Jim Crow Segregation sense). The forms of racial injustice and subordination involved in separated schools are not necessarily of the (...) same moral character and severity as those of Segregated schools. (2) The Brown decision did not make clear that what was being declared unconstitutional and in violation of the “equal protection of the laws” was precisely the white supremacist system of Segregation itself, in its educational manifestation. (The 1967 Loving v. Virginia decision did so). Separation is “inherently” unequal only within a Segregation system, where the separation reflects a socially recognized stigmatization and assault on the dignity of one group (3) The inherency statement falsely implies that all-Black or all-Indigenous (and thus “separate”) educational institutions cannot be excellent. (4) The existence of an “egalitarian pluralist” tradition, especially in African-American educational thought(but present in different forms within Indigenous, Latine, and Asian American educational traditions), which promotes both equality and separation, is unrecognized as a normative framework in Brown and in subsequent school separation/integration cases. (5) By its misleading touting of integration as the linchpin of equality, the inherency statement masks the vital role of outside-of-school factors, especially concerning students’ socio-economic background, that hinder the achievement of such equality, and closes out an inquiry into what would be required to bring about equality in light of those conditions. The inherency statement implies this because it says we already know that separation is the cause of inequality and integration its remedy. (6) The inherency statement expresses a failure to recognize that integration can be educationally valuable for reasons other than its (alleged or actual) links to equality, in particular as a distinctly favorable setting for civic education that prepares students for life and participation in a multiracial democracy. (The Court recognized the civic importance of education itself, but not specifically of the integrated form of education they mandated.). (shrink)

Cosmopolis A Review of Cosmopolitics -/- 2015/3-4 -/- Editorial Dominique de Courcelles & Paul Ghils -/- This issue addresses the general concept of “spirituality” as it appears in various cultural contexts and timeframes, through contrasting ideological views. Without necessarily going back to artistic and religious remains of primitive men, which unquestionably show pursuits beyond the biophysical dimension and illustrate practices seeking to unveil the hidden significance of life and death, the following papers deal with a number of interpretations covering a (...) wide field extending from belief to theory, from emotions to concepts, from the wisdom of personal experience to the most sophisticated doctrines. Spirit and spirituality are indeed many-faceted notions. They may refer to the intricate world of the interacting spirits which inhabit living beings in animistic traditions, without excluding a “grand force” linking human beings within a dynamic whole on which their very existence rely . They also bear upon more atomistic and either/or approaches of Western philosophy, which have become embodied in Cartesian dualism against a monotheist background, to the point of freezing the essence of individuals and culminating in the extreme individualism that characterizes our contemporaries. However, this equally refers to the opposite conception of materialism, across times and cultures, from ancient India and Greece (Cārvāka, originally known as Lokāyata, or some Buddhist doctrines for the former, Democritus or Lucretius for the latter) to more contemporary materialistic schools, whether modern or postmodern. -/- The following papers look at the contrasting forms of the philosophy and spirit of the human factor set into a whole, with no artificial disjoint between the psychical and the physical levels, as Wittgenstein put it: “And how can a body have a soul?”. This approach is not unrelated to the notion of anthropocene examined in a recent issue of Cosmopolis, with provides another comprehensive framework open to a spiritual life emerging from the very environment that generated it. -/- *** The first section of this issue was edited by Dominique de Courcelles, director at the National French Research Centre (CNRS), whom we wish to thank for collecting relevant studies relating to the religious and political questions, with a view to focusing on the war of ideas inevitably waged behind images, concepts and perceptions, taking an asymmetrical approach. To the extent that they are mindful of global/local interactions and include representations, opinions and beliefs, such disciplines as philosophy, philology, history and social sciences can provide useful studies accounting for new practices in geopolitics and a fair diplomacy. -/- In her introduction, Dominique de Courcelles first poses the question of how the religious and political spheres interrelate, with their corresponding religious demands and humanistic values. She then suggests that the right question today may be breaking with the philosophy of human rights concerned with the defense of human beings against the hazards of arbitrary politics or the instrumental use of religion, in favour of a fair philosophy of humankind, a new humanism. This would consist in recognizing a common loyalty of all towards one interhuman, not only interstate community, to protect it from both the autonomy demanded by individuals and the instrumental use of minorities. -/- Considering the fact of diversity, so important today in terms of both politics and religion, Abdelhai Azarkan looks at the conditions under which tolerance could obtain the double status of right and duty. He revisits to two philosophers, John Locke and Voltaire, who thought about it from the historical reality of religious wars. The former made tolerance into a right, basing his analysis on the political-legal level, while the latter saw tolerance as a duty, from an analysis based on ethical-political criteria. -/- Mathieu Guidère examines what he calls semantic denominationalism, a term which implies religious attributes and identities, whichever national loyalties or personal belonging they may have at the same time. Since the early 2000s, thie phenomenon has expanded tremendously, compounded by the “war on terror” and the over media-oriented terrorist actions. Denominational expressions act as formal names for ordinary and high-profile players in domestic and foreign policies of democratic states. These systems reveal a receding secularization, while the powerful comeback of religious identities signals the failure of nation-states and the weakening of the humanist spirit. -/- Barbara De Poli retraces the history of a contemporary jihadism claiming its Islamic essence and asserting the truth of genuine coranic principles via the war on infidels, with a view to restoring the Caliphate. After defining the term jihad, she shows that even if this contemporary jiadism is spreading in the Muslim world, it radically departs from Islamic law and the received use of the term jihad, in so far as it is rooted in the early radical thinking of Islamic ideologues in the 20th century, starting with with Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. This current has been fueled by by international conflicts since the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, in which the so-called Western countries bear a major responsibility. -/- Abderrazak Sayadi starts from the Tunisian experience to ask the question of humanist values and democracy within the relationships between the religious and political spheres. As a historian of religion, he is brought to demystify certain islamic principles and to paying attention to the reform of law, seeing the separation of religion and politics as a precondition to a successful democratic gamble and the establishment of a renewed humanism. -/- Dominique de Courcelles reminds us that getting a better knowledge of narrations and words makes it possible to better understand how logical and rhetorical thinking works for those who wage an asymetriccal war, re-enchanting and mystifying the world to better take control. As soon as 1932, an exchange of letters between Einstein and Freud made it clear that, in order to free man from fatality and war, education understood as culture was fundamental. Such illustrations as the exécution of Oussama ben Laden and the Caliph’s speech in Mossoul show that a premiminary analysis of images and words is essential to a fair diplomacy conducted by people from civil society, whose culture and wisdom allow justice and force to speak together and better resist war. -/- Marcel Boisard thinks that on the day the guns fall silent, exhausted by war, we will not return to the state borders that have prevailed for a century as an outcome of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. It is time to prepare the “day after”, which will be a huge challenge. To this end, a summit of Middle-East nations is urgently needed to globally decide the fate of those peoples. On the condition that we know who the enemy is and accept to name it, to understand the history of the countries, groups and alliances, and to question any false or self-interested sense of certainty. -/- *** In the second section, Paul Schafer provides the author’s experiences to explain how culture, from the artistic to the biological, has the power to to open the doors to spirituality, from the inner self to the global environment. He asks himself whether a relative permanence of spirituality can arise from the specific moments that characterize it. Laurent Ledoux synthesizes the conclusion of a symposium held on 22 January 2015 on the links between philosophy and management, on the basis of the spiritual dimension conceived as “natural” and the answers it may suggest to the issues that face the organizations in a “contemporaniversal” world. Jacques Rifflet makes that question in a secular perspective, based on the wellsprings of personal commitment before it can be caught by any religious creed or scientific theory. In this sense spirituality, in alliance with reason, both inspires human consciousness and illuminates its destiny. Sami Aldeeb asks himself whether Islam can be reconciled with human rights. Caught between the belief in an absolute and final Word descended from the sky, and evidence showing that any religion is the creation of a given culture and a society situated in time and space, the Makkan and … contexts et médinois call for differentiated, if not opposite answers and exegeses. Bernard Carmona provides the outline of a dialogical framework, which is known to be a feature of debates between the various philosophical schools of classical India, exemplified here by the transdisciplinary perspective of debates within a Buddhist context. *** The articles not focused on the previous topic include a study by Landry Signé on China’s strategy, competing with the United States to control African resources. The author deals with the specific case of China’s rapprochement with Southern Sudan since Sudan was broken up. In the last paper, Goran Fejić and Rada Iveković, return to the essential role that women should play, and comments upon the role of some international legal instruments related in particular to the elimination of all forms of discrimination. The perspective is transnational and transethnic and is based on secular criteria, as regards nation-building and more generally society-building. Considering the persistence of widespread violence, whether in times of armed conflict or in times of peace, the question remains whether it is possible to fully implement rights and justice instruments. (shrink)

The Indifference to Extreme Poverty and Homelessness: Causes, Solutions, and Society’s Role -/- Introduction -/- Despite global economic advancements, extreme poverty and homelessness remain widespread issues. While the ultra-rich often appear indifferent to these struggles, indifference is not exclusive to them—many middle-class and working-class individuals also overlook poverty. To fully understand this issue, it is crucial to examine the root causes of poverty and homelessness and explore the role of governments in providing solutions. This essay delves into the psychological and (...) systemic reasons for widespread indifference, the true causes of poverty and homelessness, and what governments can do to create lasting solutions. -/- The Root Causes of Poverty and Homelessness -/- 1. Lack of Affordable Housing -/- One of the leading causes of homelessness is the high cost of housing. In many cities, housing prices have skyrocketed while wages have stagnated. Gentrification and real estate speculation have also pushed low-income individuals out of their homes. -/- For example, in cities like San Francisco and New York, rent prices are so high that even full-time workers struggle to afford housing. Many people live paycheck to paycheck, and one financial setback—such as a medical emergency—can leave them homeless. -/- 2. Unemployment and Underemployment -/- A stable job is the foundation of financial security. However, many people either struggle to find work or are employed in low-wage jobs that do not cover basic living expenses. Automation, outsourcing, and economic downturns have made job security increasingly fragile. -/- For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, millions lost their jobs. Without sufficient savings or government support, many were forced onto the streets. -/- 3. Mental Illness and Lack of Healthcare -/- Mental health disorders are a significant factor in homelessness. Many individuals with untreated conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or severe depression find it difficult to maintain employment and stable housing. -/- In countries without universal healthcare, accessing mental health services is expensive, leaving many without the treatment they need. For example, in the United States, an estimated 25% of homeless individuals suffer from severe mental illnesses, yet few have access to adequate medical care. -/- 4. Substance Abuse and Addiction -/- While substance abuse is often seen as a cause of homelessness, it is more accurately a symptom of deeper issues, such as trauma, mental illness, or economic hardship. Addiction can make it difficult for individuals to maintain employment and housing. -/- Governments that criminalize addiction rather than treat it as a health issue contribute to the cycle of poverty and homelessness. Countries like Portugal, which have focused on rehabilitation rather than punishment, have seen declines in homelessness and drug-related deaths. -/- 5. Systemic Racism and Discrimination -/- Racial and ethnic minorities often face structural barriers that increase their risk of poverty and homelessness. Discriminatory hiring practices, unequal access to education, and historical injustices have created persistent economic disparities. -/- For example, in the U.S., Black Americans make up 40% of the homeless population, despite being only 13% of the total population. Similar disparities exist in other countries due to centuries of racial and economic oppression. -/- 6. Domestic Violence and Family Breakdown -/- For many women and children, homelessness is a direct result of escaping domestic abuse. When victims flee abusive relationships, they often have nowhere to go, leading them to seek shelter in unsafe environments or on the streets. -/- Governments with insufficient support systems for domestic violence victims contribute to this crisis. Shelters are often underfunded, and housing assistance is difficult to access. -/- 7. Insufficient Social Safety Nets -/- Many governments lack adequate social safety nets, such as affordable housing programs, unemployment benefits, and accessible healthcare. Without these support systems, individuals experiencing financial crises quickly fall into homelessness. -/- Countries with strong welfare states, such as Finland, have significantly lower homelessness rates than those with weak social support systems. Finland’s “Housing First” policy, which provides permanent housing to the homeless without preconditions, has nearly eliminated chronic homelessness. -/- Why Governments Must Take Action -/- While individual charity is helpful, long-term solutions to poverty and homelessness require government intervention. Here are the most effective policies governments can implement to combat these issues: -/- 1. Implement Affordable Housing Programs -/- Governments should increase investments in affordable housing by: -/- Expanding public housing projects -/- Regulating rent increases to prevent exploitation -/- Providing tax incentives for developers who build low-income housing -/- Example: Singapore’s government heavily invests in public housing, with over 80% of its citizens living in government-subsidized apartments, reducing homelessness rates to near zero. -/- 2. Raise Minimum Wages and Ensure Job Security -/- Governments must ensure that working individuals can afford basic living expenses by: -/- Raising the minimum wage to match the cost of living -/- Encouraging businesses to provide full-time, stable employment -/- Offering job training and re-skilling programs for unemployed workers -/- Example: Denmark has high minimum wages and strong labor protections, resulting in lower poverty rates despite high living costs. -/- 3. Provide Universal Healthcare, Including Mental Health Services -/- Healthcare access is essential in preventing homelessness. Governments should: -/- Offer free or affordable healthcare, especially for mental illness treatment -/- Increase funding for mental health facilities -/- Decriminalize drug addiction and invest in rehabilitation centers -/- Example: Portugal’s drug decriminalization program has led to a significant decrease in homelessness and addiction-related deaths. -/- 4. Expand Social Safety Nets -/- Countries with stronger social programs experience lower homelessness rates. Governments should: -/- Provide emergency financial assistance to prevent evictions -/- Offer “Housing First” programs that provide permanent housing before requiring treatment or employment -/- Increase funding for domestic violence shelters and support services -/- Example: Finland’s Housing First policy has been so successful that it has nearly eliminated chronic homelessness, proving that stable housing is the foundation for solving poverty. -/- 5. Address Racial and Economic Discrimination -/- To reduce systemic inequality, governments must: -/- Enforce anti-discrimination laws in employment and housing -/- Improve education and job opportunities for marginalized communities -/- Ensure that public resources are distributed equitably -/- Example: Canada’s Indigenous housing programs aim to address the historical marginalization of Indigenous populations by investing in culturally appropriate housing and social services. -/- 6. Invest in Education and Job Training -/- Breaking the cycle of poverty starts with education. Governments should: -/- Provide free or low-cost higher education and vocational training -/- Offer financial assistance to low-income students -/- Ensure equal access to quality education for all socioeconomic groups -/- Example: Germany provides tuition-free university education, making higher education accessible to all citizens, reducing long-term poverty. -/- Conclusion -/- While billionaires and corporations often receive criticism for their indifference to extreme poverty, the reality is that indifference exists at all levels of society. Many middle-class and working-class individuals also overlook poverty due to psychological distancing, economic fears, and societal conditioning. However, the real root causes of homelessness and poverty—such as a lack of affordable housing, inadequate wages, poor healthcare, and systemic discrimination—are problems that only government policies can effectively solve. -/- Countries that have successfully reduced homelessness, such as Finland, Portugal, and Singapore, have done so through comprehensive government interventions rather than relying on charity alone. If more governments worldwide adopt similar policies, we can move toward a future where poverty and homelessness are not inevitable but preventable. -/- Ultimately, solving poverty is not just about redistributing wealth but about redesigning systems to ensure economic fairness, social justice, and dignity for all. -/- . (shrink)

In the literature on transitional justice, there is disagreement about whether countries like the United States can be characterized as transitional societies. Though it is widely recognized that transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and reparations can be used by Global North nations to address racial injustice, some consider societies to be transitional only when they are undergoing a formal democratic regime change. We conceptualize the political situation of low-income Black communities under the U.S. imprisonment and policing regime (...) in terms of three criteria for identifying transitional contexts: normalized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural inequality, and the failure of the rule of law. That these criteria are met, however, does not necessarily mean that a transition is taking place. Drawing on the American political development and abolition democracy literatures, we discuss what it would mean for the United States to transition out of its present imprisonment and policing regime. A transitional justice perspective shows the importance of not only pushing for truth and reparation, but for an actual transition. (shrink)

Marriage and divorce are among the issues that have received attention in Ancient Iranian law, and the reason for this is that the issue of marriage has been of special importance in Zoroastrianism. In doing so, Ancient Iranian law, which is based on this tradition, has paid special attention to this issue. Further, the issue of a woman's ownership of her property and what she gets from her husband during marriage, as well as her ownership of property after divorce, is (...) one of the branches of these two issues. The basic question of the study is whether women have authority in the topics of marriage and divorce, as well as the property or not? To answer this question, we have first examined two introductions (equal rights of men and women and free will) and after explaining these two concepts in the Zoroastrianism and the Ancient Iranian Law, we have explained marriage and divorce in the tradition of Ancient Iran. Last but not least, the issue of women's ownership during marriage and after divorce has been investigated. -/- . (shrink)

Why Are Some Countries Rich While Others Remain Poor? -/- The economic disparity between rich and poor countries has been a persistent issue throughout history. While some nations have achieved immense wealth and prosperity, others continue to struggle with poverty. Understanding the reasons behind this divide requires an examination of historical, geographical, economic, political, and social factors. This essay explores the key reasons why many countries are rich while a few remain poor. -/- 1. Historical Factors -/- History plays a (...) crucial role in shaping a nation’s economic status. Many poor countries today were former colonies that suffered from resource exploitation and underdevelopment. European colonial powers extracted wealth from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, leaving many of these nations with weak institutions and economies upon gaining independence. In contrast, countries that industrialized early, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, established strong economies that continue to thrive today. -/- The Industrial Revolution provided a major economic advantage to early adopters, enabling them to develop infrastructure, create jobs, and expand global trade. Meanwhile, countries that missed out on early industrialization, such as many in sub-Saharan Africa, were left behind. -/- 2. Geographical Factors -/- Geography also significantly influences a country’s wealth. Nations with abundant natural resources, such as oil (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Norway) or minerals (e.g., Australia, Canada), have the potential to generate immense wealth. However, having natural resources alone does not guarantee prosperity. For example, countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo have rich mineral deposits but remain poor due to corruption and conflict. -/- Climate and agriculture also play a role. Many rich countries have temperate climates that support large-scale farming, while tropical nations struggle with unpredictable weather, soil depletion, and diseases such as malaria. Countries with difficult terrain, such as landlocked nations or those with deserts, often face challenges in trade and infrastructure development. -/- 3. Economic Systems and Policies -/- The economic policies adopted by a country can determine its success or failure. Market economies that promote free trade, entrepreneurship, and investment tend to prosper. Countries with strong property rights and competitive markets attract both domestic and foreign investments, leading to innovation and growth. Examples include the United States, Japan, and South Korea. -/- On the other hand, nations with excessive government control over the economy, high taxes, and restrictions on trade often struggle. Command economies, such as North Korea, have failed to generate sustainable growth due to rigid economic structures and limited incentives for businesses. Additionally, some poor countries rely too much on a single industry or export, making them vulnerable to economic downturns. -/- 4. Political and Institutional Factors -/- Political stability and strong institutions are critical for economic success. Countries with effective governments, the rule of law, and low corruption create an environment where businesses can thrive. Switzerland and Singapore, for instance, have strong governance systems that encourage investment and innovation. -/- In contrast, many poor nations suffer from political instability, corruption, and weak institutions. Governments in countries like Venezuela and Sudan mismanage resources, leading to economic collapse. War and conflict also hinder development by destroying infrastructure and discouraging investment. -/- 5. Education and Human Capital -/- A well-educated population is essential for economic growth. Rich countries invest heavily in education, ensuring that their citizens acquire the skills needed for high-paying jobs and technological advancements. Nations like Finland and South Korea have strong education systems that contribute to their economic success. -/- Conversely, many poor countries struggle with low literacy rates, limited access to education, and brain drain—where skilled workers migrate to wealthier nations in search of better opportunities. Without a skilled workforce, economic progress becomes difficult. -/- 6. Trade and Globalization -/- Access to international markets is another key factor in determining a country’s wealth. Wealthy nations benefit from global trade, exporting high-value products and services. Countries like Germany and China have built strong economies through manufacturing and exports. -/- On the other hand, some poor countries face trade restrictions, tariffs, and economic dependency on a single export, making them vulnerable to price fluctuations. Additionally, reliance on foreign aid can sometimes create a cycle of dependency rather than fostering self-sufficiency. -/- 7. Demographics and Population Growth -/- Population growth can be both a blessing and a challenge. Rich countries tend to have balanced population growth, allowing for sustainable economic expansion. Countries like Canada and Sweden manage their populations well through immigration and social policies. -/- However, many poor nations experience rapid population growth without corresponding economic development. Overpopulation strains resources, leads to high unemployment, and makes it difficult for governments to provide education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Countries like Nigeria and Bangladesh struggle with these challenges. -/- 8. Cultural and Social Factors -/- Cultural attitudes toward work, productivity, and governance also shape a nation’s economic success. Societies that value innovation, discipline, and economic planning tend to prosper. Countries like Japan and Germany emphasize efficiency and technological progress, contributing to their wealth. -/- Additionally, gender equality and economic inclusion play a role in national prosperity. Countries that empower women and minorities to participate in the workforce experience higher economic growth. In contrast, societies with restrictive social norms often limit their economic potential. -/- Conclusion -/- The wealth disparity between nations is not due to a single factor but a combination of historical, geographical, economic, political, and social influences. While rich countries benefit from strong institutions, innovation, and stable governance, poor nations often struggle with corruption, weak infrastructure, and rapid population growth. However, with the right policies—such as investing in education, strengthening institutions, and promoting economic diversification—poorer countries can improve their economic standing. By understanding these factors, nations can work toward closing the gap and ensuring a more balanced global economy. -/- . (shrink)

Tolerance is part of the self-definition of democratic societies, one of the major foundations underlying secular democracy’s sometimes unstated and always ambivalent claim to represent a higher form of civilisation. The transformation of tolerance from a type of indulgence to a type of virtue is explained in part by what it does. It helps to preserve peace in societies with a high level of ethnic and religious diversity, and it has also played an important part in eliminating the injustices that (...) religious and racial minorities suffered when Western societies were more homogenous. Historically, intolerance has extended in extreme cases to persecution, segregation, violence and mass-murder. In more “normal” situations it has usually meant denial of civil and political rights and unequal treatment at law. A fair and decent society is obliged to address this injustice, not least by state and judicial action against groups which refuse to respect the freedom and rights of other people. Problems arise, however, when even groups which respect the freedom and rights of others, such as the Christian churches, are accused of discrimination and treated as intolerant for observing legitimate distinctions; for properly exercising a preference; and for defending the rights of others. In these cases the concept of intolerance, understood as a refusal to respect the rights of others, has been extended to encompass something which is not a form of intolerance at all; namely, the right we all have to refuse to validate choices with which we disagree. (shrink)

According to Corey Brettschneider, we can protect freedom of religion and promote equality, by distinguishing religious groups’ claims to freedom of expression and association from their claims to financial and verbal support from the state. I am very sympathetic to this position, which fits well with my own views of democratic rights and duties, and with the importance of recognizing the scope for political choice which democratic politics offers to governments and to citizens. This room for political choice, I believe, (...) is necessary if people are to have any chance of reconciling the conflicting moral and political obligations they are likely to face, however idealized our conception of democracy or morality. Granted that no amount of personal and political choice will ever guarantee that we do not encounter tragic choices, and painfully conflicting moral demands, it is an important feature of democracy – or so I believe – that its rights reflect the importance of mitigating these conflicts so that people are able, as a rule, to act as they ought, so that they do not experience their moral sentiments, beliefs and capacities simply as grounds for recrimination, alienation and despair. I therefore believe that democracies have good reason not to force the consciences of the undemocratic and the intolerant, where it is possible to accommodate such people without threatening the rights of others. However, the fact that I share many of Brettschneider’s intuitions and beliefs does not mean that I share them all. In particular, I find his conception of democracy unduly narrow, and unduly based on a rather idealized conception of the American constitution which is unlikely to appeal to those whose conceptions of democracy are more republican, more socialist, more pragmatic and more international than his. I have explained these worries elsewhere and drawn out some of their implications for his arguments about privacy and judicial review. There is no need to repeat them here. I will also set to one side my worries about his uninflected, overly abstract and rather reified characterization of the State, in the hope that others will discuss this and that, in the end, a more nuanced conception of the State and a more lively appreciation of the conflicting people, institutions, histories and norms which make up most states, will prove consistent with his arguments. Finally, I do not propose to enter into a detailed discussion of the difficulties of Brettschneider’s overly abstract and reified conception of State ‘speech’ and ‘expression’ which, while motivated by the language of American constitutionalism, appears to cover pretty much anything a government might do, from raising and spending taxes, to accepting judicial interpretations of contested constitutional provisions, or to affirmatively pronouncing on the goals that will animate its legislative agenda and its aspirations for citizen’s lives. Again, while I would have wished for a more nuanced and analytical discussion of so central a concept as ‘expression’ and, in particular, expression by ‘the State’, I am uncertain that anything fundamental in Brettschneider’s account of citizen rights and duties would be altered in the process. Instead, then, I want to focus on points in Brettschneider’s argument that intrigue, and sometimes puzzle, me the most and where issues of nuance and clarification might make a substantial difference to our views of equality and religious freedom. (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of the edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and (...) manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable. The first group of articles attempts to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of the theoretical delusions that are universal. In the next group, I show how these insights apply by reviewing some books in philosophy and psychology. Next I review books on science and religion and finally provide reviews and articles showing how understanding of both science and philosophy gives insight into the tragic delusions destroying the world. People believe that society can be saved by science, religion and politics, so I provide some suggestions as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two ii systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model. The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions. iii It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s futures. Many of the articles describe the ‘digital delusions’, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System 1, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Also for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor. Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences. The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Hi-tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems iv resulting from unrestrained motherhood, and of course it is neither profitable nor politically correct (and now with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) to be honest about it. The last section describes various versions of the ‘altruism delusion’ that we are selected for cooperation, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics). Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems. I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1. Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection). Many accept the delusion that we are selected for cooperation with people generally (group selection or altruism) and not just our immediate relatives (kin selection or inclusive fitness), so I spend some time in the essays of the last section demolishing this fantasy. One thing rarely mentioned by the group selectionists is the fact that, even were ‘group selection’ possible, selfishness is at least as likely (probably far more likely in most contexts) to be group selected for as altruism. Just try to find examples of true altruism in nature –the fact that we can’t (which we know is not possible if we understand evolution) tells us that its apparent presence in humans is an artefact of modern life concealing the facts, and that it can no more be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). One does not really need science or mathematics to grasp this – it is crushingly obvious that an v organism cannot be selected for behavior that decreases the frequency of its own genes in the next generation. One might also benefit from considering a phenomenon never (in my experience) mentioned by group selectionists -- cancer. No group has as much in common as the (originally) genetically identical cells in our own bodies-a 100 trillion cell clone-- but we are all born with thousands and perhaps millions of cells that have already taken the first step on the path to cancer and generate millions to billions of cancer cells in our life. If we did not die of other things first, we (and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all die of cancer. Only a massive and hugely complex mechanism built into our genome that represses or derepresses trillions of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates billions of cells a second, keeps the majority of us alive long enough to reproduce. One might take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring society for any kind of entity on any planet in any universe is only a dream, and that no being or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ of physics that are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that inclusive fitness is a law of physics. The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind. In the 20th century an even more evil notion arose—that humans are born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges. Thus, every day the population increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc. And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive must be taken from those already alive. Their lives diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways. Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception. There cannot be human rights without human wrongs. It cannot be more obvious, but one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood. America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses about 2% of it’s topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of it’s food growing capacity will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a vi nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. The popular notions supported by the Democratic Party and Third World Supremacists are that Democracy, Diversity, Equality and Social Justice will produce a Utopia in America and the world, but it is clear as crystal that they unavoidably foster selfishness and divisiveness and are producing collapse. Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”. The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there. Even the attempt to do this is already bankrupting America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. -/- My writings are available as paperbacks and Kindles on Amazon. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) 2nd printing with corrections (Feb 2018) ASIN B0711R5LGX -/- Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) ASIN B07CQVWV9C -/- . (shrink)

Archytas of Tarentum, a contemporary and associate of Plato, was a famous Pythagorean, mathematician, and statesman of Tarentum. Although his works are lost and most of the fragments attributed to him were composed in later eras, they nevertheless contain valuable information about his thought. In particular, the fragments of On Law and Justice are likely based on a work by the early Peripatetic biographer Aristoxenus of Tarentum. The fragments touch on key themes of early Greek ethics, including: written and unwritten (...) laws; freedom and self-sufficiency; moderation of the emotions and cultivation of virtues; equality and the competence of the majority to participate in government; criticism of “rule by an individual”; a theory of the ideal “mixed constitution”; distributive and corrective justice and punishment, and of the rule of law. The fragments also contain one of the only positive accounts of democracy in ancient Greek philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between victims’ stories and normativity. As a contribution to understanding how the stories of those who have been abused or oppressed can advance moral understanding, catalyze moral innovation, and guide social change, this paper focuses on narrative as a variegated form of representation and asks whether personal narratives of victimization play any distinctive role in human rights discourse. In view of the fact that a number of prominent students of narrative build normativity into their accounts, (...) it might seem obvious that there is a connection between victims’ stories and moral insight. However, the category of victims’ stories spans an enormous variety of texts – private diaries, memoirs written for publication, interviews with journalists or social scientists, depositions prepared by human rights workers, stories shared with like-minded activists or with support groups, stories told to medical professionals, and testimony in courts, truth commissions and asylum hearings, to mention just some of the possibilities. The different contexts of elicitation and the different rules governing expression in these sites should make us wary of ready generalizations about the nature of victims’ narratives. Moreover, I doubt that existing explications of the way in which norms figure in narratives yield satisfactory theories of the contribution victims’ stories can make to discovering and defending just policies and practices. I consider two of the most prominent accounts of the relation between narrative and normativity. For different reasons, the account Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner present in their work on narrative and law and the account Hayden White presents in his work on narrative and history fail to appreciate the capacity of victims’ stories of abuse to advance understanding of and increase respect for human rights. In defense of the value of victims’ stories, I propose an account of the relation between normativity and a salient type of victim’s narrative that seems especially resistant to integration into human rights discourse. -/- . (shrink)

Structural injustice exists when the influence of social structure exposes some groups of people to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned power to others. It has been argued that the responsibility for addressing structural injustices should be shared among those participating in the social structure and can only be discharged through collective action; however, the proper form of collective action does not happen easily. To address structural injustice effectively, we need to gain clarity on the practical challenges that (...) are involved and explore possible means of implementing shared responsibility. This chapter thus aims to contribute to the study of addressing structural injustice in the following two ways. First, building on previous studies, I categorize three forms of practical challenges that have been encountered by existing proposals for discharging shared responsibility for structural injustice. Second, I offer an alternative proposal, which I will refer to as the deliberative mini-public proposal, and argue that it has the potential to mobilize structural change and better overcome the identified practical challenges. (shrink)

Blind Obedience: A Double-Edged Sword -/- Introduction -/- Blind obedience refers to unquestioning compliance with authority, where individuals follow orders or rules without critical thinking or moral evaluation. Throughout history, blind obedience has led to both progress and disaster. While obedience is necessary for maintaining order in societies, institutions, and organizations, blindly following authority without questioning its ethical implications can result in tragic consequences. -/- This essay explores the nature of blind obedience, its psychological roots, historical examples, its presence in (...) modern society, and the importance of critical thinking in preventing its dangers. By examining these aspects, we can better understand the balance between necessary obedience and the responsibility to challenge unethical commands. -/- The Psychology of Blind Obedience -/- Human beings are naturally inclined to obey authority. From childhood, people are taught to respect parents, teachers, and leaders, which helps maintain societal order. However, this conditioning can also suppress independent thought and personal moral judgment. -/- One of the most well-known psychological studies on obedience is Stanley Milgram’s experiment (1961). In this study, participants were instructed by an authority figure (a scientist) to administer electric shocks to another person (who was actually an actor and not harmed). Even as the “victim” screamed in pain, many participants continued delivering shocks simply because they were told to do so. The study demonstrated how ordinary individuals could commit harmful acts when instructed by an authority figure, proving that blind obedience is a powerful force that can override personal morality. -/- Another significant study is the Stanford Prison Experiment (1971), conducted by Philip Zimbardo. Participants were randomly assigned roles as either guards or prisoners in a simulated prison. The ”guards” quickly became abusive, using psychological and physical intimidation, while the “prisoners” became submissive. The experiment had to be stopped early due to the extreme behavior of the participants, showing how blind obedience to authority and roles can lead to cruelty and loss of moral reasoning. -/- Historical Examples of Blind Obedience -/- 1. Nazi Germany and the Holocaust -/- One of the most horrific examples of blind obedience occurred during World War II. Under Adolf Hitler’s rule, millions of ordinary citizens and soldiers followed orders that led to the mass genocide of Jews and other targeted groups. High-ranking officials like Adolf Eichmann, who played a major role in organizing the Holocaust, later defended their actions by claiming they were simply “following orders.” The Nuremberg Trials rejected this defense, emphasizing that individuals are responsible for their actions, even when acting under authority. -/- 2. The My Lai Massacre (Vietnam War, 1968) -/- During the Vietnam War, American soldiers carried out the My Lai Massacre, killing hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians, including women and children. Soldiers later justified their actions by stating they were following direct orders from their superiors. This event became a symbol of the dangers of military obedience without ethical consideration, leading to global condemnation and changes in military training regarding moral responsibility. -/- 3. The Jonestown Mass Suicide (1978) -/- The Jonestown Massacre is a chilling example of blind obedience within a cult. Jim Jones, leader of the Peoples Temple, manipulated over 900 of his followers into committing mass suicide by drinking cyanide-laced punch. Many obeyed without resistance, demonstrating how charismatic leaders can exploit blind obedience to maintain control, even to the point of self-destruction. -/- 4. The Spanish Inquisition -/- During the Spanish Inquisition (1478–1834), religious authorities ordered the persecution, torture, and execution of individuals accused of heresy. Many officials and citizens participated in these brutal acts simply because they were told it was their duty. Blind obedience to religious authority justified unimaginable cruelty in the name of faith. -/- Blind Obedience in Modern Society -/- Although history provides extreme examples, blind obedience continues to manifest in various ways today. -/- 1. In the Workplace -/- Many corporate scandals, such as the Enron financial fraud, occurred because employees blindly followed unethical directives from executives. Employees who question unethical policies may risk losing their jobs, making it difficult to resist orders from higher-ups. -/- 2. In Politics -/- Authoritarian governments thrive on blind obedience. In North Korea, citizens are forced to obey government propaganda without question, and those who dissent face severe punishment. In many cases, blind obedience to political leaders leads to oppression, censorship, and human rights violations. -/- 3. In Religion -/- Religious extremism often arises from blind obedience. Groups like ISIS and past events like the Crusades show how unquestioning faith can be manipulated to justify violence, terrorism, and oppression. While religion can promote morality, blind obedience can be dangerous when it discourages critical thinking. -/- 4. In Social Media and Misinformation -/- In the digital age, blind obedience appears in the form of misinformation and propaganda. Many people accept fake news, conspiracy theories, and political lies without fact-checking. This has led to real-world consequences, such as vaccine hesitancy, political division, and even violent riots based on false information. -/- The Dangers of Blind Obedience -/- 1. Loss of Personal Responsibility -/- Blind obedience allows individuals to shift responsibility for their actions onto authority figures. This leads to moral disengagement, where people justify harmful actions by saying they were just following orders. -/- 2. Suppression of Critical Thinking -/- When individuals do not question authority, they lose the ability to think independently. This weakens societies by allowing corrupt leaders, unethical policies, and harmful ideologies to spread unchecked. -/- 3. Violation of Human Rights -/- Many human rights violations throughout history, including genocide, slavery, and discrimination, occurred because individuals and societies accepted orders without questioning their morality. -/- The Importance of Critical Thinking -/- To prevent the dangers of blind obedience, individuals must develop critical thinking skills. This involves: -/- Questioning Authority: Instead of blindly following orders, people should ask whether commands are ethical and justified. -/- Encouraging Open Dialogue: Societies must promote free speech and debate to challenge oppressive or unethical ideas. -/- Teaching Ethical Decision-Making: Schools and workplaces should educate individuals on how to recognize and resist unethical commands. -/- Holding Leaders Accountable: Governments, corporations, and religious institutions must be held responsible for their actions, preventing the abuse of authority. -/- Conclusion -/- Blind obedience is a powerful but dangerous force. While obedience is sometimes necessary for maintaining order, unquestioning submission to authority has led to some of the greatest tragedies in human history. From the Holocaust to modern corporate scandals, the consequences of blind obedience highlight the need for critical thinking, ethical reasoning, and personal responsibility. -/- To build a just and moral society, individuals must learn to balance obedience with independent thought. Questioning authority does not mean rejecting all rules, but rather ensuring that decisions align with ethical principles. By fostering education, awareness, and critical thinking, we can prevent the dangers of blind obedience and create a world where people act not out of fear or habit, but out of reason and moral responsibility. -/- . (shrink)

Resisting Political Dynasties Through a Balanced Government System -/- Introduction -/- Political dynasties have long been a challenge to democratic governance. In many countries, elections are dominated by powerful families who pass leadership positions from one generation to the next. This results in imbalances in governance, where public offices are treated as family assets rather than platforms for serving the people. While democracy is meant to provide equal opportunities for leadership, political dynasties often manipulate institutions, control resources, and weaken competition (...) to maintain power. -/- To resist the rise of political dynasties, a government system must have strong institutional safeguards, an informed electorate, and mechanisms that promote meritocracy. The universal law of balance in nature, as proposed by Angelito Malicse, can serve as a guiding principle in designing a fair and just political system. This essay explores different government structures that can effectively prevent dynastic rule and ensure that leadership is based on competence, integrity, and public service rather than family name. -/- 1. The Parliamentary System with Strong Party Discipline -/- A parliamentary system is one of the most effective ways to prevent political dynasties because it shifts power from individual politicians to political parties. In this system, the government is formed by the party (or coalition) that wins the most seats in the legislature, and the head of government (Prime Minister) is chosen from among elected representatives. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Power is distributed among parties rather than families, making it harder for a single family to dominate. -/- Political parties have internal mechanisms to replace leaders based on performance, not inheritance. -/- Elections are party-based rather than personality-based, reducing the influence of political families. -/- Example: In the United Kingdom, despite having influential political families, the party system ensures leadership is based on party performance rather than personal legacy. Leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair rose to power based on their abilities, not family connections. -/- 2. Strict Anti-Dynasty Laws and Constitutional Safeguards -/- Some democracies have explicit laws that prevent political dynasties by restricting family members from holding multiple government positions simultaneously or consecutively. These laws limit the concentration of power within a single family and promote fair competition. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Prevents family monopolies over government positions. -/- Encourages new leaders to emerge from different backgrounds. -/- Example: Indonesia has anti-dynasty laws that restrict close relatives of sitting officials from running in the same region. This has prevented some powerful families from dominating local elections. -/- 3. Meritocratic Bureaucracy: A Technocratic Approach -/- In a meritocratic government, key decision-making roles are filled based on skills, experience, and qualifications, rather than political connections. This prevents political families from placing unqualified relatives in influential positions. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Ensures that government officials are competent and qualified. -/- Reduces nepotism and favoritism in appointments. -/- Example: Singapore’s governance model emphasizes meritocracy, where political leaders and civil servants are selected based on their competence, education, and leadership abilities. As a result, Singapore has one of the most efficient and corruption-free governments in the world. -/- 4. Proportional Representation Electoral System -/- A proportional representation (PR) system ensures that seats in the legislature are distributed based on the percentage of votes a party receives, rather than a winner-takes-all system. This creates a more diverse and representative government. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Limits family control by ensuring that power is shared among multiple political parties. -/- Encourages coalition governments, making it harder for a single family to dominate. -/- Example: Germany and the Netherlands use proportional representation, ensuring that elections are issue-based rather than family-based. This system has prevented the emergence of strong political dynasties in these countries. -/- 5. Direct Democracy and Citizen Participation -/- Some countries implement direct democracy mechanisms, such as referendums, recall elections, and citizen assemblies, allowing the public to influence political decisions directly. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Reduces reliance on political elites and families to make decisions. -/- Allows citizens to remove corrupt or ineffective leaders before their term ends. -/- Example: Switzerland has a strong tradition of direct democracy, where citizens frequently vote on key policies. This prevents long-term family dominance in politics because power remains in the hands of the people. -/- 6. Decentralized Federalism to Distribute Power -/- A federal system divides power between national and regional governments, preventing a central ruling class from controlling the entire country. In a decentralized government, each region has a degree of self-governance, reducing the influence of political families at the national level. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Prevents concentration of power at the national level. -/- Encourages local leadership development, giving new leaders opportunities to emerge. -/- Example: The United States has a federal system where state governments operate independently. While political dynasties exist, their power is limited to certain regions rather than national dominance. -/- 7. Holistic Education Based on the Universal Law of Balance -/- One of the most powerful ways to resist political dynasties is through education. A properly designed holistic educational system can reprogram societal thinking, teaching voters to select leaders based on merit rather than blind loyalty to political families. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Encourages voters to choose leaders based on competence rather than family ties. -/- Teaches the importance of balance in governance and why unchecked power leads to corruption. -/- Promotes critical thinking, ensuring that citizens are aware of the manipulation tactics used by dynastic politicians. -/- Example: Finland’s education system emphasizes critical thinking, civic responsibility, and political awareness, producing informed and independent-minded voters who are less likely to be influenced by political dynasties. -/- Conclusion: The Best System to Prevent Political Dynasties -/- The most effective way to resist political dynasties is through a combination of these systems: -/- 1. A parliamentary system that ensures leadership is party-driven rather than family-driven. -/- 2. Strict anti-dynasty laws that legally prevent family monopolies in government. -/- 3. A meritocratic bureaucracy that limits political appointments to qualified individuals. -/- 4. A proportional representation electoral system to ensure political diversity. -/- 5. A decentralized government where local leadership develops independently. -/- 6. A holistic education system based on the universal law of balance, empowering voters to make informed choices. -/- If properly implemented, these mechanisms can break the cycle of political dynasties and ensure that democracy remains fair, just, and balanced. By applying the universal law of balance in nature, governments can create a system where leadership is earned through merit and service, not inherited like a monarchy. The challenge now is for leaders, educators, and reformers to recognize these principles and push for systemic change. -/- . (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an application (...) of the results of the analysis conducted in the second part. The first part comprises four chapters. The first aims at revealing characteristics of human rights on the basis of an analysis of historical conditioning of the inter-national law of human rights and its development. The historical context displays the practical, vindicative, and critical character of the positive legal protection of human rights. Moreover, the process of change of positive human rights law is distinguished from the process of change of human rights as such. In the second chapter the content of human rights - a topic which is only auxiliary to the conducted analysis - is discussed. Basic typology and catalogues of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenants of Human Rights are presented. The review of the content of rights aims at a more precise limitation of the field of research. The examination shows a diversity of rights which poses a serious challenge to the coherence of every philosophical theory of human rights. In the third chapter, central in the first part, international law is analyzed with regard to the characteristics of rights and the foundations of them. The analysis of documents shows a number of solutions referring to the anthropological foundations of rights. The inherent dignity of the human person is the source of all human rights. Each human being is recognized as free, and endowed with both reason and conscience. In the propounded conception of man individuals are not rivals but create a community which is a condition for their development. International law characterizes the rights as universal, inherent, inalienable and inviolable. The reconstructed conception also comprises the following basic elements: on the level of the structure of rights, a recognition of their equality, interdependence, and comprehensiveness; in the grounding of these rights, a recognition of the anthropological foundations of law; in the conception of positive law, a recognition of the secondariness of the positive law of human rights to human rights themselves, and a recognition of human rights and justice as the basis for legal order; in the conception of state, a recognition of the well-being of the individual as the fundamental aim of actions undertaken by political institutions, and recogni¬tion of rights which form an impassable boundary to the power of the state, includ¬ing its legislative actions. The characterization of the international legal paradigm serving for the under¬standing of human rights is supplemented by analyses of the structure of their posi¬tive legal protection. Various meanings of the terms "right" and "freedom" are distinguished. Subjective right, as basic structure of the positive legal protection of human rights, is understood as a complex relation formed by various legal situations of the subject of a right which create a functional whole in respect of the subordi-nation of human person to its good. Subordinating person to a good proper for it, expressed usually in a proclamatory norm, is the central element of particular rights around which further elements aiming at the realization of this good are built. In the second part of the book a philosophical theory is developed which allows for the location of a coherent foundation for the presented characterization of human rights and their positive legal protection. This part consists of two chapters. The first includes a review of some - not entirely satisfactory - means of founding of human rights; the second presents philosophical conceptions of law and man which may form a basis for the constructed theory. The review of arguments contained in the first chapter does not aim at a detailed analysis of various specific ways of argumentation encountered in works on this subject but rather at a concise presentation of the main possible lines of argumentation. These analyses also serve to emphasize the positive solutions which are pro¬posed later and to underscore the explanatory power of the elaborated theory. This theory, retaining accurate intuitions contained in the presented types of argumenta¬tion, helps in avoiding their consequences which are difficult to reconcile with the reconstructed paradigm of human rights. Efforts to base human rights on the norms of international law rightly take into account the necessity of determining the content of the rights and their positive legal protection as a means for the realization of man's good. These attempts, how¬ever, do not properly take into account the inherent character of human rights, which are independent of positive law and provide grounds for applying specific legislative measures and not others. Founding human rights on freedom accurately points at the freedom of an indi¬vidual as a constitutive element of some rights; however, absolutization of freedom leads, to a loss of an important element of the contemporary paradigm of under¬standing human rights. This foundation undermines recognition of the fact that human rights may set limits to both the freedom of others and the freedom of the subject of rights itself. Additionally, attempts at the so-called axiological justification of human rights are discussed. This type of justification has a few variants depending on the as¬sumed conception of value. Subjectivistic conceptions have similar advantages and disadvantages to the conceptions basing human rights on freedom; objectivistic conceptions while providing for the universality of human rights place, the fundamental aim of human rights protection beyond the individual human being - in the idealistically existing world of values; finally, conceptions rooting values and human rights in culture, while accurately noting that human rights are learned through the medium of culture, place the source of human rights beyond a concrete individual - in culture and processes which take place in it - which leads to difficulties in finding a basis for the universality of rights. Furthermore, attempts to ground human rights in specific characteristics of the human being are presented. This type of approach points to an important problem of dependence of the content of rights on what man is. However, recognition of specific characteristics of a human being as an ontic foundation of the existence of rights poses a danger to their universality since one has to accept that it is not enough to be a man to be a subject of rights, but a man possessing specific charac¬teristics. The second chapter aims at outlining solutions worked out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a fuller understanding of his propositions selected elements of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy are presented. It was them who formulated the founda¬tions for reflection on law and justice in the ontological context. A qualification is made that Stoicism is not be analysed in depth. Although Thomas' concept of law was undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Stoic doctrine as well, it is not in this that one should look for the tools to understand the ontic foundations of human rights and law in general since the Stoic moral philosophy and philosophy of law were developed in the context of a theory of being which assumed monistic and pantheistic premises as foundations, leading to the recognition of a total subor¬dination of the human individual to a larger unity of which man is only a part. The analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's texts concentrates on problems of justice. Plato seems to be the first philosopher who reflected on the formula basic in the history of European thought: to render to each his due. It appears that justice as both a characteristic of man and his acts is understood in the perspective of that which is just, that which is a good for another man - the recipient of the act. The basis for determining what is just is the relation of correspondence between some¬one and something. While in the case of Plato this relation is based on something beyond its terms, namely on ideas, in the case of Aristotle the relation occurs on account of the elements of the relation itself. Something is just when it contributes to the develop¬ment of the recipient of an act realizing that which is just. At the same time, the realization of that which is just is a good for the agent. In the analysis of the just two types of relation are revealed: the relation of due-to-recipient occurring on account of the compatibility of that which is due, with the recipient of the act; and - a "superstructure" - a relation of obligation-of-subject occurring on account of the compatibility of the acting subject with the thing which should be done. The basis for being that which is due is formed by various potentialities of development of man - the recipient of agency; the basis of being that which is an obligation is the possibility of development of the subject of action. Aristotle distinguishes various types of freedom and points to the necessity of taking them into account in the discussion of justice. Among other things, as the core of man's freedom, he considers life for its own sake, which can be seen as his expression of the basic indices of the autotelic character of man - which is funda¬mental for later conceptions of dignity. The freedom which is described by him is not, however, inherent and inalienable; being free is conditioned by a factual possi¬bility of undertaking actions, which are not solely means to the realization of aims set by others. Thomas Aquinas takes over the Aristotelian research perspective both in his conception of man and of law. At the same time, however, he significantly enriches it. In anthropology he develops a conception of personal being. Drawing upon his distinction between existence ("that something is") and essence ("what something is"), he sees the basis for being a person in the dignity of personal being which is a certain way of existence of a rational being more perfect than that of non-personal beings. The person is a being which, by virtue of its act of existence, is individual¬ized in a specific way. It is an aim in itself. Expressing it in a negative way, one may say that it does not exist as a means for the realization of the aims of others and, in this sense, that it is free. As distinct from Aristotelian conclusions, being a person is not conditioned by the specific actions of a being. Dignity is inherent, based on that which is the foundation of the factual existence of every rational being. Although freedom requires that a being is rational, dignity still encompasses all being, all its properties and potentialities. Thus an act conforming with dignity has to take into account a whole human being. Among different types of that which is just, ius, the first place, from the point of view of understanding law, falls to "the just thing itself ("ipsa res justa"), which is right in the full meaning of the word. On the one hand, it is that which is due; on the other hand, it determines the way of acting in the utmost degree, since the course of every act is determined in the fullest extent by its aim. The content of ius may be determined both by elements independent of free decisions - ius naturale - and by free decisions taking into account the state of things - ius positivum. Recognition of the objective structure of being as the basis of law does not entail that it is possible or desirable to determine unequivocally "the only right" patterns of conduct. This concept is very well justified within the system proposed by Saint Thomas. Individualization of being is a significant element of the develop¬ment of a person as a person. It is attained by the realization of individual aims which are not unequivocally determined by circumstances and the nature common to all people. By virtue of free choices made in the sphere of that which is not by its nature unjust, the object of action becomes ius. Since in the realization of the person the individualization of human being is central, Aquinas clearly sees the need for the protection of the sphere of "dominion of will". This sphere itself constitutes ius naturale, something which is due to man independently of the acts of will. Therefore "law should forbid nothing which is not unjust" ("nihil debet lege prohiberi quod licite fieri potest", In 3 Sent., dist. 40, q. I, a. 1, 3). Besides the relation of due-to-recipient, ius also includes the relation of obligation-of-subject which is superimposed on the relation of due-to-recipient. As far as the ontic foundations of obligation are concerned, in explaining why man is subordinated to realization of the good of others, Aquinas generally follows Aristotle in accepting that this basis is the subordination to moral good - to actions conforming with the learned truth about reality. Aquinas' systemic solutions allow, however, to reach deeper and understand why moral development is also a development of the whole human being. This was difficult within Aristotle's system, since he was reluc¬tant to decide whether precedence should be given to intellectual or moral develop¬ment. The inclination to realise good of another appears to be a transcendental characteristic of being, based on its very existence. Morality understood as rational and free subordination to realize the good of another is a specifically personal way of the realization of this inclination. Thus just actions contribute to the actualization of being in the aspect of its existence and therefore to the actualization of being as a whole. Thomas' conception of natural law (lex naturalis) as participation in eternal law (lex aeterna), offers possibilities for grasping that which is just as something which is basically accessible cognition, independently of Revelation and independently of faith in God, and at the same time as something based in eternal law, understood as a design of God's wisdom. Eternal law, embracing all particular actions, is not, from the human perspective, accessible cognition directly. It is enacted in the struc-ture of the created being and - in case of human beings - in free choices taking this structure into account. In the concluding remarks, the results obtained earlier are applied directly to the contemporary conception of human rights. Human rights are understood in the first place as "just things" - concrete goods of man; as that which is due because of subordination, based on dignity, to the personal development of man. That which is just is understood as a relational - actual or potential - state of things, which exists by virtue of existing relations. Evaluations referring to that which is right are true when respective relations of due-to-recipient take place; norms of conduct are true when respective relations of obligation-of-subject take place. Examples of the application of the sketched theory outside the field of human rights are also presented. Procedural consequences of the developed theory are shown, such as the discrimination of two types of legislative procedures which differ significantly in the structure of argumentation: the first aims at recognition of that which is just independently of the will of the legislator, and the second, at making individual or collective "projects" of development compatible. Finally the possibilities of applying the theory to the increasingly important problems of the protection of the environment and the "rights" of animals are mentioned. The central issue is a philosophical conception of man and his freedom and a conception of law. It is also indispensable to turn to a general theory of being. The search for a comprehensive theory of human rights requires attention to the Abso¬lute Being - God - as well. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a conception of the Absolute Being is integral to philosophy of the systemic type -of which the present book is a piece. A conception of the Absolute Being is signifi¬cant for understanding all being, including, first of all, man as a personal being. Second, every theory of human rights which does not comprise the problem of the Absolute may be questioned as to whether solutions adopted in it do not lead, in consequence, to eliminating God from the perspective of the understanding of law. It is desirable that a philosophical theory should deal with this problem directly. A theory which eliminates God from the perspective of the understanding of rights will be unacceptable for all those who, for philosophical reasons or relying on faith, consider God as the author of inherent rights. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach to rights from the perspective of the Absolute Being should only be a possible extension of a philosophical approach which bases rights on something which is cognizable independently of the acceptance of the existence of God so that the theory is also acceptable for those who reject the existence of God or suspend their judgment on this subject. The pursued theory should therefore contain, on the one hand, reference to natural, faith-independent foundations of human rights, but on the other hand, point to a possible extension accounting for the Absolute Being. The analyses contained in this chapter have undoubtedly some historical value since they are based on source texts. Nevertheless, the use of these texts and not critical works was dictated, first of all, by a conviction that analyses embrace a given theory in the aspect selected by the interests of the researcher. Therefore to find out what past thinkers say on the subject characterized in the first part it is simpler to reach to the sources than to adopt the existing critical works. The pre¬sented reconstruction of Aquinas' views on philosophy of law incorporates proposi¬tions of supplementing and developing some of the ideas undertaken by him. Obligation to act in this and not an other way arises because human actions are subordinated to the conformity, on the one hand, of aims realized by these actions and, on the one hand, the order of being determining that which is favourable to man or destroys him. The content of the order of being is, on the one hand, determined by the structure of being independent from man's will and, on the other, by free decisions of man. (shrink)

Pregnant women and persons engaging in homosexual practices compose two groups that have been and still are amongst those most severely subjected to coercive restrictions regarding their own bodies. From an historical point of view, it is a recent and rare phenomenon that a woman’s right to abortion and a person’s right to engage in homosexual interactions are recognized. Although most Western liberal states currently do recognize these rights, they are under continuous assault from various political and religious movements. Moreover, (...) though liberal theories of justice typically defend women’s rights to abortion and people’s rights to homosexual activity, these theories often struggle to capture the fundamental ground for these rights. For example, it appears hard for the liberal to say why and when only the woman and not the embryo/fetus has rights and why the right to certain sexual practices is not on par with rights to other preferences. Contemporary liberal theories of justice, therefore, have a hard time identifying what distinguishes questions of abortion and sexual activities from other questions of right and thereby also have difficulty capturing the gravity of the wrongdoing involved in coercively restricting homosexual interactions and abortion as such. I argue that Kant’s theory of justice succeeds on both counts, because it can locate the fundamental ground for these rights in an understanding of the bodily integrity of the person. Just states will neither permit nor outlaw all abortions or sexual interactions, but rather will require all such laws to be reconcilable with the protection of each person’s right to freedom. (shrink)

As the title of the article suggests, “The Burqa Ban”: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations, the authors embark on a factually investigative as well as a reflective response. More precisely, they use The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a European Trend and Sending a National Message (published as a concurrent but separate article in this issue of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL) as a platform for further analysis and discussion of different perspectives. These (...) include case-law at the international level while focusing attention on recent rulings and judicial reasoning by the ECtHR and the ECJ; critical thought-experiments in religion, morality, human rights, and the democratic public space; a contextualized account of burqa-wearing interventions by federal and state governments and, moreover, various courts in the United States; and philosophical commentary and, in some instances, criticism of the Danish and/or European (French, etc.) approach. The different contributions have different aims. The section on case-law at the international level reports on those central judgments that, in effect, helped to pave the path for the Kingdom of Denmark’s burqa ban. Concerning the concurring judges at the ECtHR, the opinions served to uphold a preexisting ban and to grant a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities, thereby limiting the Court’s own review. -/- As regards to the ECJ, the legality of company rules that contain a policy of neutrality for the workplace was examined, with a similar outcome. The authors who discuss religion, morality, human rights and the democratic public space are endeavoring to, respectively, appeal to ethics as a testing stone for law and to both challenge and address several forms of “expressivist worry” in connection with face veils. In doing so, the authors ask a number of thought-provoking questions that hopefully will inspire public policymakers to careful analysis. While the section that is devoted to American perspectives highlights a comprehensive survey of political and legal responses to, in particular, full-face veils like the burqa, the relevant author also incorporates public perceptions and, in the course of examining these, draws a parallel to “the fate” of the hoodie. The constitutionality of burqa-wearing in America, so it also appears, is partially an open question, but differentiating between religious, political, or personal reasons is a de jure premise. Given that the Danish legislators who drafted law L 219 to ban burqa-wearing in public places rely on a reference to political Islam, they relegate religious and personal reasons to the private domain, thereby also adopting secularism as a premise. This is explored in the last author response of the article, more precisely, in an account of the underlying materialism that, in turn, is applied to Muslim women. If policymakers and legislators engaged in Thinking Things Through exercises, they could, as a minimum, avoid law-making strategies that are not in the spirit of the theory they themselves invoke, albeit tacitly. While the aim of, as it were, arresting culturally self-contradicting legislators is unique for the section in question, all the authors who contribute to the joint research project have one end-goal in common, namely to inform about important perspectives while at the same time opening up for parameters for (more) fruitful, constructive and (if need be) critical debate in the future. With this in mind, four recommendations are presented by the research director for the project. Legally, politically, socially and culturally, conflict-resolution should not translate the relationship between rulers and the ruled into a separation ideology, an instance of controllers versus the controlled. All things being equal, that is the objective limit for a democratic society. (shrink)

What does social justice require in contemporary societies? What are the requirements of social democracy? Who and where are the individuals and groups that can carry forward agendas for progressive social transformation? What are we to make of the so-called new social movements of the last thirty years? Is identity politics compatible with egalitarianism? Can cultural misrecognition and economic maldistribution be fought simultaneously? What of the heritage of Western Marxism is alive and dead? And how is current critical social theory (...) to approach these and other questions? Much of the most productive work done in recent social theory has revolved around such issues, in particular, around those concerning the relationship between the politics of recognition and the politics of distribution. After the intense theoretical focus over the last fifteen years or so on the issues of recognition politics—multiculturalism, multi-nationalism, identity politics, group-differentiated rights, the accommodation of difference, and so on—some social theorists have worried that attention has been diverted from important issues of distributive equality—systematic impoverishment, increasing material inequality, ‘structural’ unemployment, the growth of oligarchic power, global economic segmentation, and so on. While some critics seem to have adopted a blunt ‘it’s the economy, stupid’ line of criticism,1 others have attempted to develop an overarching, integrative theoretical framework adequate to the diverse issues concerning both economic and cultural justice. For example, Axel Honneth proposes that a suitably developed and normatively robust theory of intersubjective recognition can adequately integrate an analysis of apparently diverse contemporary struggles: those for a just division of labor and hence, a fair distribution of resources and opportunities, as well as those for a culture free of identity-deforming disrespect and denigration. (shrink)

This Paper claims that, contrary to the common assumption of Anglo-American jurists, collective rights are secondary to a analytically and experientially prior culture. Culture constitutes the identity and content of a collective right. The thrust of my Paper examines the disjunction between collective rights and the culture constituting a collective right. The clue to the disjuncture is that a collective right is assumed to be a rule or principle signified or represented in a written language. A rule (...) or principle is a concept. A culture, in contrast, is constituted from an experiential knowledge in an unwritten language. -/- I raise two contexts where a collective right cannot be identified without a consideration the analytically prior culture of the social group protected by a collective right: peremptory norms in international law and affirmative discrimination clauses in constitutional law. I then highlight a crucially important factor generating the unwritten language of a culture: namely, the collective memories of a group. Although a personal memory is experienced in a context-specific event, a member of a group absorbs its collective memory. The collective memory of the group exists before one is a member. Such a memory may defer to some event centuries earlier. The event may possess a mythic or even false character which cannot be verified except as a myth or historical falsity. One cannot be accepted as a member of a group without the group’s collective memory. Shared assumptions and expectations characterise a collective memory generating a culture. Such assumptions and expectations constitute meant objects. Meant objects are not posted by some source 2 external to the individual members. Meant objects are experienced. A jurist cannot analyze the signified collective rights without examining the social culture said to be represented by the boundary of the collective rights. One may be able to rationally justify a collective right in terms of its source, such as a basic constitutional text, the regularity of behaviour of lawyers and judges or some ultimate concept such as dignity. Such a rational justification, however, does not address why an individual is obligated to defer to the collective rights of an in-group in a state. One has to examine the social-cultural assumptions and expectations presupposed in the content of such collective rights in order to understand why the rights are obligatory. Such an examination dissolves the traditional boundary of legal knowledge which has excluded cultural phenomena generating the collective rights. (shrink)

What is the American rule of law? Is it a paradigm case of the strong constitutionalism concept of the rule of law or has it fallen short of its rule of law ambitions? -/- This open access book traces the promise and paradox of the American rule of law in three interwoven ways. -/- It focuses on explicating the ideals of the American rule of law by asking: how do we interpret its (...) history and the goals of its constitutional framers to see the rule of law ambitions its foundational institutions express? -/- It considers those constitutional institutions as inextricable from the problem of race in the United States and the tensions between the rule of law as a protector of property rights and the rule of law as a restrictor on arbitrary power and a guarantor of legal equality. In that context, it explores the distinctive role of Black liberation movements in developing the American rule of law. -/- Finally, it considers the extent to which the American rule of law is compromised at its frontiers, and the extent that those compromises undermine legal protections Americans enjoy in the interior. It asks how America reflects the legal contradictions of capitalism and empire outside its borders, and the impact of those contradictions on its external goals. (shrink)

Many commentators lament that American democracy is in crisis. It is becoming a system of minority rule, wherein a party with a minority of the nationwide vote can control the national government. Partisan gerrymandering in the House of Representatives fuels this crisis, as does the equal representation of small and large states in the Senate. But altering these features of the legislature would not end minority rule. Indeed, it has long been held that majority rule cannot (...) be guaranteed within any district system, as a minority of voters nationwide can be efficiently distributed such that a minority party wins a majority of districts by narrow margins. -/- This Article offers a way to save majority rule. Since the way a party can gain control of the legislature with a minority of the vote is to win a majority of districts by narrow margins of victory and lose a minority of districts by large margins of victory, the solution is to make margins matter. Hence, this Article proposes that we preserve electoral districts in which the candidate with the most votes wins, while making the weight of their vote in the legislature (a representative’s “legislative power”) a function of margins of victory. The first goal of this Article is to outline how this proposal, which I call “weighted voting by margin of victory” (WVMV), retains the democratic virtues of district systems while ending minority rule. This is the first basis for the democratic imperative to make margins matter. -/- There is, however, a second basis for that same imperative, which turns on the political equality of voters. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the democratic equality should be understood in terms of equal voting power (one person, one vote). But when margins of victory don’t matter, the power of a vote lies exclusively in its potential decisiveness. A vote that changes the margin of victory without changing the victor is “wasted”. But it is an electoral reality that votes in competitive districts are more likely to be decisive, and votes in uncompetitive districts are more likely to be wasted; as a result, candidates and parties are more responsive to some voters than others. So voters are not political equals. They do not have equal voting power, except in an empty formalistic sense. By contrast, WVMV gives votes a second type of power. The power of a vote is to potentially decide who wins and to actually change the legislative power of the victor. Each vote, in effect, transfers a unit of political power to a democratic representative. This “transference” power can be meaningfully equalized between voters. A voter in an uncompetitive district is far less likely to change who wins, but is equally able to change the margin of victory, such that their vote is no longer wasted. This gives candidates and parties a strong reason to be more equally responsive to all voters who can change the margins. Hence, there is a democratic imperative to make margins matter, in order to give voters a meaningfully equal form of voting power. -/- The final goal of this Article is to explain how we can implement WMVM in modern democracies, focusing on three particularly challenging cases: the U.S. Senate, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the U.S. House of Representatives. These cases are challenging for several reasons, the most pertinent of which turn on the ways we should understand margins of victory when electorates are of unequal sizes (as in the U.S. Senate) or are contested by more than two parties (as in the U.K.) or are conducted under different voting procedures (as in many districts in the U.S. House). I argue that WVMV should be considered feasible in such contexts, and hence offers a practical, rather than purely theoretical, alternative to the status quo. (shrink)

-/- The Present Defects of Humanity and the World: A Call for Balance and Understanding -/- Humanity stands at a critical juncture in history. While we have made remarkable advances in science, technology, and society, we are also facing unprecedented challenges that threaten both our survival and the well-being of the planet. These challenges are not merely the result of external forces but are deeply rooted in the defects of our systems, behaviors, and understanding of the natural world. To navigate (...) these challenges, we must address the underlying defects that persist in our world today. These defects, ranging from environmental degradation to social inequality, are manifestations of a larger imbalance in the way humanity interacts with the world and with itself. -/- 1. Disregard for the Natural Environment -/- One of the most glaring defects of humanity today is our continued disregard for the natural environment. Industrialization, urbanization, and the pursuit of short-term profits have led to the exploitation of natural resources at an unsustainable rate. Forests are being cleared, oceans are polluted, and species are being driven to extinction. The Earth’s ecosystems, which provide the foundation for life, are under threat, and the consequences of this damage are becoming more apparent each day. Climate change, rising sea levels, and extreme weather events are just a few of the symptoms of the imbalance humanity has created. This environmental degradation is not just a result of ignorance; it is a product of a deeper disconnection from the natural world and an inability to recognize the interconnectedness of all life. -/- To rectify this defect, humanity must recognize that the natural environment is not a limitless resource to be exploited, but a delicate system that requires respect and care. Sustainable practices must be prioritized, and a shift toward renewable energy, conservation, and responsible consumption is imperative. Furthermore, a new understanding of our place in the natural world must be cultivated, one that acknowledges the interdependence of all living things. -/- 2. Inequality and Social Injustice -/- Another significant defect plaguing humanity is the persistent inequality and social injustice that exists within and between societies. Across the globe, millions of people suffer from poverty, lack of access to education, inadequate healthcare, and social discrimination. Despite progress in certain areas, the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen, and the systems in place often perpetuate this divide rather than address it. Economic, racial, gender, and social inequalities are deeply entrenched in many societies, creating barriers that prevent individuals from reaching their full potential. -/- This inequality is not only a moral failing but also a practical one. When large portions of the population are marginalized, society as a whole suffers. Unequal access to resources and opportunities stifles innovation, fosters resentment, and creates social unrest. To address this defect, a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities must be prioritized. Education, healthcare, and economic opportunities should be made accessible to all, ensuring that every individual has the chance to contribute to the collective well-being of society. -/- 3. Ignorance and Misinformation -/- The rapid spread of misinformation and the general lack of critical thinking have become pervasive defects in modern society. In the age of information, people are exposed to vast amounts of data, yet many lack the tools to discern truth from falsehood. Misinformation, fueled by social media, political agendas, and sensationalism, distorts public perception and impedes rational decision-making. This creates confusion, division, and a general distrust in institutions and facts. -/- This ignorance is not limited to the consumption of information but also extends to an overall lack of understanding about the natural laws that govern life and society. The universal law of balance, for example, is often overlooked, leading to decisions that create imbalances in both individual lives and societal structures. To address this defect, education must be restructured to emphasize critical thinking, media literacy, and an understanding of the interconnectedness of all things. By fostering a society that values knowledge and wisdom, we can create an informed citizenry capable of making better decisions for the future. -/- 4. Disconnection from the Universal Laws -/- A deeper, more fundamental defect in humanity is our disconnection from the universal laws that govern the world. These laws, such as the law of balance, cause and effect, and interconnectedness, are the principles that regulate both the natural and social worlds. However, many individuals and societies are unaware of these laws or fail to understand their importance. As a result, decisions are made that violate these natural principles, leading to imbalances in both personal and collective realities. -/- For example, the law of balance suggests that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. When humanity acts in ways that harm the environment or exploit others, there will inevitably be consequences, such as climate change or social unrest. By understanding and respecting these natural laws, humanity can create a more harmonious relationship with the world. Education systems must be restructured to emphasize the importance of natural laws, as well as their practical applications in daily life. -/- 5. Uncontrolled Growth -/- The final major defect of humanity is the unchecked pursuit of growth, both economically and in terms of population. Economic systems around the world are based on the assumption that growth is perpetual, yet this is fundamentally unsustainable. As resources are depleted and ecosystems collapse, the notion of infinite growth becomes increasingly problematic. Similarly, population growth continues to strain the planet’s resources, creating pressure on food, water, and energy supplies. -/- This defect is compounded by a failure to address the long-term consequences of overpopulation and overconsumption. To mitigate this issue, a sustainable approach to growth must be adopted. This includes regulating economic growth to ensure it aligns with the planet’s ecological limits and encouraging sustainable practices in all areas of life. Population control measures, alongside better resource management, are essential for maintaining balance. -/- Conclusion: The Path to a Balanced Future -/- The defects of humanity and the world are deeply interconnected and rooted in our collective choices. However, these defects are not insurmountable. By recognizing the need for balance—whether in our relationship with the environment, with each other, or with the natural laws that govern life—we can begin to correct these imbalances and create a more sustainable, just, and harmonious world. This requires a fundamental shift in our thinking and our approach to education, governance, and society at large. By fostering a deeper understanding of the natural laws and integrating them into our systems, we can lay the foundation for a brighter future for humanity and the planet. -/- . (shrink)

Marx thinks that capitalism is exploitative, and that is a major basis for his objections to it. But what's wrong with exploitation, as Marx sees it? (The paper is exegetical in character: my object is to understand what Marx believed,) The received view, held by Norman Geras, G.A. Cohen, and others, is that Marx thought that capitalism was unjust, because in the crudest sense, capitalists robbed labor of property that was rightfully the workers' because the workers and not the capitalists (...) produced it. This view depends on a Labor Theory of Property (LTP), that property rights are based ultimately on having produced something. (A view oddly enough shared with the libertarian right, though the LTP is better support for egalitarian or socialist views; see my From Libertarianism to Egalitarianism, 18 Social Theory & Prac. 259-288 (1992).) -/- I show that the idea that Marx's objection to exploitation is based on injustice or LTP-grounded theft is mistaken. Marx's real objection to exploitation is based on unfreedom, that capitalist relations of production, he thinks, unnecessarily limit human freedom. In the first place Marx is quite clear that he vehemently rejects the concepts of justice, fairness, or rights as bourgeois ideology. It is true that he uses the language of "theft" on occasion, but either a literal interpretation of that language must be abandoned, or his consistent, life-long objection to rights- and justice talk must be given up. Second, the structure, indeed the point, of his analysis of the laws of motion of capitalism, is that capitalists make profits through exploitation of labor -- without cheating -- by the normal "legitimate" operation of the system. Other arguments make the same point. -/- The unfreedom or force-based view, though not necessarily my specific arguments advocated so far is shared by a minority of other writers, such as Nancy Holmstrom and Richard Arneson. What my paper offers that is novel, part from arguments for the foregoing that are different and better than those found elsewhere (although Holmstrom and Arneson are excellent), is an account of in detail of what Marx regards as the real problem with exploitation. -/- I analyze Marx's objection that capitalist exploitation causes unnecessary unfreedom by distinguishing and spelling out three different kinds of freedom that he invokes: classic negative freedom, or noninterference; positive freedom, understood as control over or access to the resources enabling one to exercise one's negative freedom; and "real" freedom, as he puts it, the ability to "give the law to oneself," to regulate one's own activities under rules chosen by oneself, to develop one's capacities by autonomous choice. This puts Marx in the tradition going back through Hegel and Kant to Rousseau, the first express advocate of this idea. The opposite of real freedom, the unfreedom due to lack of autonomy, is alienation. -/- I conclude by stating that I think that justice-based objections to exploitation that avoid Marx's objections to the concept are possible. I do not attempt to spell these out here. I take up that task in my subsequently published paper Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, and Justice, 17 Legal Stud.,128-168 (1997). -/- The present paper is related to and partly overlaps with my paper In Defense of Exploitation, 11 Econ. & Phil. 49-81 (1995), a critique of John Roemer's equality based account of the nature of exploitation and its wrongness. The research and writing of this paper was financially supported by the philosophy department of The Ohio State University. -/- Keywords: Exploitation, Justice, Unjustice, Theft, Labor Theory of Property, Marx, Freedom, Unfreedom, Rights, Fairness, Critique of Justice, Negative Freedom, Positive Freedom, Real Freedom, Alienation, G.A. Cohen, Norman Geras. (shrink)

How to Spot a Potentially Dangerous Future Leader -/- Leadership plays a critical role in shaping the future of societies, nations, and even the world. While great leaders bring stability, progress, and balance, dangerous leaders can lead to authoritarianism, oppression, and societal collapse. History has shown that early warning signs of destructive leadership are often ignored until it is too late. Understanding these warning signs can help prevent the rise of leaders who threaten human rights, democracy, and the well-being of (...) their people. This essay explores the key characteristics of a potentially dangerous future leader and how individuals and societies can recognize and respond to them. -/- 1. Extreme Authoritarian Traits -/- One of the most obvious signs of a dangerous leader is a strong inclination toward authoritarianism. Such individuals often seek to centralize power, dismantling institutions that limit their authority. They may show a disregard for the rule of law, manipulating or bypassing legal systems to consolidate their control. A dangerous leader is intolerant of dissent, using censorship, intimidation, or direct repression to silence critics. They often work to weaken checks and balances, eliminating opposition parties, controlling the judiciary, or suppressing the media. By doing so, they remove any obstacles to their absolute authority, creating a system that serves their personal interests rather than the public good. -/- 2. Manipulative and Deceptive Behavior -/- A potentially dangerous leader is highly skilled in deception and manipulation. They often use demagogic speech, relying on emotional appeals rather than facts to influence the masses. Fear-mongering is a common tactic, where they exaggerate threats—real or imagined—to justify their actions. Instead of taking responsibility, they shift blame to minorities, foreign nations, or political opponents, creating scapegoats to distract from their own failures. They may also engage in double standards, saying one thing in public while doing the opposite in private. This inconsistency erodes trust and fosters a culture of confusion and division. -/- 3. Dangerous Ideology and Policies -/- Another key warning sign is the promotion of divisive or extremist ideologies. Dangerous leaders thrive on division, creating an “us vs. them” mentality to justify discrimination or violence. They reject scientific reasoning and expert advice, favoring policies based on personal beliefs or populist rhetoric. This disregard for rationality can lead to disastrous consequences in areas such as healthcare, economics, and environmental policies. Additionally, they often propose radical solutions that ignore balance, promoting extreme nationalism, reckless economic policies, or aggressive military expansion. While such actions may gain short-term popularity, they often lead to long-term instability. -/- 4. Cult of Personality -/- Many dangerous leaders seek to establish a cult of personality, portraying themselves as infallible figures who are beyond criticism. They demand blind loyalty from followers, punishing those who question their decisions. Such leaders often rewrite history or distort reality to fit their narrative, creating propaganda that glorifies their achievements while erasing their failures. This cult-like following makes it difficult for people to see the leader’s flaws, as they become emotionally invested in their idealized image. In extreme cases, societies under such leaders begin to view dissent as betrayal, further deepening the leader’s grip on power. -/- 5. Disregard for Human Rights -/- A major red flag is the leader’s attitude toward human rights. Dangerous leaders often justify the suppression of freedoms in the name of national security, stability, or economic growth. They encourage violence, either through direct orders or by subtly endorsing extremist groups that act on their behalf. Journalists, activists, and opposition figures are often imprisoned or killed under their rule. The suppression of free speech and the persecution of minorities become normalized, as the leader consolidates power through fear and intimidation. -/- 6. Economic and Social Recklessness -/- While dangerous leaders may promise prosperity, their policies often prioritize short-term popularity over long-term stability. They may engage in reckless spending, unsustainable economic projects, or corruption to maintain loyalty among their supporters. Rather than promoting balance in governance, they focus on immediate gains that ultimately lead to financial crises or social unrest. Surrounding themselves with unqualified loyalists, they weaken institutions and reduce the efficiency of government operations. Over time, their failure to uphold the universal law of balance in nature leads to systemic collapse. -/- Conclusion -/- History has repeatedly shown the devastating consequences of dangerous leaders. From Adolf Hitler’s rise in Germany to authoritarian figures in modern times, societies have suffered greatly when warning signs were ignored. Recognizing these patterns early can help prevent future disasters. Education, critical thinking, and institutional safeguards are key to ensuring that power remains balanced and that leadership serves the people rather than personal ambition. By staying vigilant and promoting awareness, individuals and societies can prevent dangerous leaders from gaining power and ensure a future of stability, fairness, and progress. -/- . (shrink)

The Government System: The Foundation of Society’s Stability and Progress -/- Introduction -/- The government system is the most crucial social structure in any society, serving as the foundation for law, order, economic stability, and public welfare. A well-functioning government ensures that citizens live in a secure and prosperous environment, while a failing government leads to instability, poverty, and suffering. Throughout history, nations with strong governance have thrived, whereas those with weak or corrupt governments have struggled. This essay examines the (...) significance of government systems, emphasizing their role in law enforcement, economic development, security, public services, and crisis management, while also comparing examples of successful and failing governments worldwide. -/- The Role of government in Society -/- 1. Law and Order: Maintaining Stability and Justice -/- One of the primary responsibilities of the government is to establish and enforce laws that regulate behavior and maintain societal order. A strong legal system deters crime and ensures that justice prevails, fostering a safe and peaceful environment. -/- Example of Effective Governance: Singapore is widely regarded as one of the safest countries in the world due to its strict but fair legal system. The government enforces laws effectively, which has resulted in low crime rates and a high level of public trust in law enforcement. -/- Example of Weak Governance: In contrast, Somalia has struggled with lawlessness for decades. Due to a lack of central authority and widespread corruption, crime, terrorism, and piracy have flourished, making it one of the most dangerous places in the world. -/- 2. Economic Stability and Development -/- Governments play a crucial role in managing a nation’s economy through policies that regulate industries, control inflation, and promote sustainable growth. A well-managed economy leads to prosperity, while poor governance can result in economic collapse. -/- Example of Effective Governance: Switzerland has a highly stable economy, thanks to strong government policies, a well-regulated banking system, and a commitment to innovation. Its government ensures low unemployment, high wages, and economic resilience. -/- Example of Weak Governance: Venezuela, on the other hand, has faced economic disaster due to government mismanagement. Corrupt leadership, excessive reliance on oil revenues, and poor economic policies have led to hyperinflation, food shortages, and mass poverty. -/- 3. Protection and Security -/- A nation’s security depends on the strength of its government. Governments are responsible for maintaining military forces, police, and intelligence agencies to protect citizens from both internal and external threats. -/- Example of Effective Governance: Finland is one of the safest countries in the world due to its well-organized military and law enforcement agencies. The Finnish government prioritizes national security while upholding democratic values. -/- Example of Weak Governance: Afghanistan has faced decades of instability due to weak governance and persistent conflict. The government’s inability to maintain security has allowed terrorist groups to flourish, leading to widespread violence and displacement. -/- 4. Public Services and Infrastructure -/- Governments are responsible for providing essential services such as education, healthcare, transportation, and utilities. These services improve the quality of life and contribute to a nation’s overall development. -/- Example of Effective Governance: Norway is a global leader in social welfare, with high-quality healthcare and education systems. The government invests heavily in infrastructure, ensuring a high standard of living for its citizens. -/- Example of Weak Governance: Haiti, however, suffers from severe infrastructure deficiencies due to government corruption and neglect. The lack of investment in education, healthcare, and public utilities has led to extreme poverty and poor living conditions. -/- 5. Human Rights and Justice -/- A strong government upholds human rights, promotes equality, and ensures justice for all citizens. In democratic societies, governments protect freedom of speech, assembly, and expression, while authoritarian regimes often violate these principles. -/- Example of Effective Governance: Canada is known for its commitment to human rights and social justice. The Canadian government ensures equality through progressive policies, a fair judicial system, and protections for minorities. -/- Example of Weak Governance: North Korea, in contrast, is an authoritarian state where human rights abuses are widespread. Citizens have little personal freedom, and government control over their lives is absolute, leading to oppression and suffering. -/- 6. Political Stability and Leadership -/- Good leadership is essential for effective governance. Stable political systems enable national progress, while corruption and dictatorship often result in turmoil and suffering. -/- Example of Effective Governance: Germany, particularly under the leadership of Angela Merkel, has maintained political stability and economic strength. The German government’s transparency and efficiency have made it a model for democratic governance. -/- Example of Weak Governance: Zimbabwe, under Robert Mugabe’s rule, suffered from dictatorship, economic mismanagement, and political oppression. His government’s corruption led to hyperinflation and widespread poverty. -/- 7. Crisis Management and Public Welfare -/- Governments must be capable of handling national emergencies such as natural disasters, pandemics, and economic crises. A well-prepared government can save lives and maintain stability, while an ineffective government can worsen crises. -/- Example of Effective Governance: New Zealand’s government successfully managed the COVID-19 pandemic through decisive action, clear communication, and strong public health policies, minimizing infections and deaths. -/- Example of Weak Governance: Brazil’s inconsistent response to COVID-19 led to high infection rates and public confusion. The government’s lack of coordination resulted in severe economic and health consequences. -/- Conclusion -/- The government system is the most important social structure in the world, as it directly influences law enforcement, economic prosperity, security, public services, and crisis management. Countries with strong governance, such as Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Canada, and Germany, provide stability, safety, and development for their citizens. In contrast, nations with weak or corrupt governments, like Venezuela, Somalia, North Korea, and Zimbabwe, suffer from poverty, violence, and instability. A well-functioning government is essential for national success, and its leadership and policies determine whether a country thrives or fails. To ensure a prosperous future, societies must strive for transparent, efficient, and just governance that prioritizes the well-being of all citizens. -/- . (shrink)

Metaphysical considerations aside, today’s inheritors of the tradition of natural philosophy are primarily scientists. However, they are oblivious to the human factor involved in science and in seeing how political, religious, and other ideologies contaminate our visions of nature. In general, philosophers observe human (historical, sociological, and psychological) processes within the construction of theories, as well as in the development of scientific activity itself. -/- In our time, feminism—along with accompanying ideas of identity politics under the slogan “diversity, inclusion, equity”—has (...) emerged in science policies. The vast majority of scientists (including myself) are convinced that discrimination is reprehensible. We also believe that all individuals of any sex, race, ethnic group, or ideology should be valued in academia solely based on his or her merits and potential through equality programs. However, as I will show in this article, political indoctrination has inadmissibly undertaken the struggle for equality in academic institutions in Western countries. I argue here that universities and research institutes should be politically free (neutral) to encourage academic freedom. -/- One negative aspect of equality programs is that worldwide, scientists are harassed for expressing opinions related to the “gender” issue. This situation severely restricts scientists’ freedom of expression, even within the limits of the law. Codes of conduct extending beyond legal boundaries are examples of this issue. Scientists who express their views about “gender” are often harassed, bullied, and socially or academically excluded. Thus, we are witnessing a wave of proselytizing in research institutes and science-associated media. Today, there is widespread biased propaganda of “victimhood”. This propaganda proposes positive discrimination and increasing women’s participation in unnatural ways. It also bends the history of science by overvaluing the creations of forgotten women, offering lectures on indoctrination, organizing congresses on gender and science, and persecuting anyone who sees the subject differently. All of this covered by a multitude of associations that financially benefit from these discourses through succulent subsidies of public money. Apparently, feminism is no longer about fighting against discrimination. Instead, it is about imposing an ideology and giving more power to one group of people. Thus, we must ask whether the end justifies the means. (shrink)

Increased participation in public affairs by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops during the highly contentious 2012 Presidential election has seemingly brought the traditions of Catholic social teaching and socialism into a high profile conflict. While it is clear that President Obama is not what most academics would consider a “socialist,” modern discourse still presents what I argue is a false dichotomy- one can be either endorse natural law (especially of the Catholic variety) or socialism, but not both. While (...) my goal in this article is to refute the alleged incompatibility, not to determine its historical roots, some speculation about its origin may be illuminating. Recent work on religious identity in the United States suggests that Americans largely identify Christianity with the right wing of the American culture war. Additional research is required to fully grasp where this perception comes from, but one can venture several guesses: the rise of the “Christian Right” in Republican Party politics of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the concept of “social justice” being lampooned by Right-wing talk show hosts, and decades of a Catholic Church that firmly opposed Cold War-era Soviet Communism. The contrast between left-wing and right-wing thought on social issues (same-sex marriage, abortion, etc.) is very well documented and widely discussed. Differences between leftists and natural lawyers on economic issues, however, are more often assumed than argued for. Perhaps this is a matter of “guilt by association,” with those arguing that leftist social policy is at odds with natural law simply assuming that the same must be the case with leftist economic policy as well. Thus, natural law, long tied to Christianity throughout its history, is gratuitously appropriated by right-wing political ideology. Against this claim of incompatibility, I argue that one can rationally hold both socialism and natural law to be true. In his landmark Natural Law and Natural Rights, John Finnis offers what is arguably the twentieth century’s most complete theory of natural law. I will argue that the conception of socialism laid out by G.A. Cohen in hisWhy Not Socialism? is compatible with Finnis’s account of the human goods, and that natural lawyers can therefore reasonably endorse Cohen’s prescription for socialism. (shrink)

On 24 July 2022, the landmark decision Roe v. Wade (1973), that secured a right to abortion for decades, was overruled by the US Supreme Court. The Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organisation severely restricts access to legal abortion care in the USA, since it will give the states the power to ban abortion. It has been claimed that overruling Roe will have disproportionate impacts on women of color and that restricting access to abortion contributes to or (...) amounts to structural racism. In this paper, we consider whether restricting abortion access as a consequence of overruling Roe could be understood as discrimination against women of color (and women in general). We argue that banning abortion is indirectly discriminatory against women of color and directly (but neither indirectly, nor structurally) discriminatory against women in general. (shrink)

The practice of Emergency Management in Michigan raises anew the question of whose knowledge matters to whom and for what reasons, against the background of what projects, challenges, and systemic imperatives. In this paper, I offer a historical overview of state intervention laws across the United States, focusing specifically on Michigan’s Emergency Manager laws. I draw on recent analyses of these laws to develop an account of a phenomenon that I call epistemic redlining, which, I suggest, is a form of (...) group-based credibility discounting not readily countenanced by existing, ‘culprit-based’ accounts of epistemic injustice. I argue that epistemic redlining plays a crucial role in ongoing projects of racialized subordination and dispossession in Michigan, and that such discounting tends to have structural causes that can be difficult to identify and uproot. Contrary to the general thrust of recent work on the topic, I argue that epistemic redlining ought to be understood as a form of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state intervention in the economy.1 We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions, as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty: by giving someone the power to force others to serve one’s will by (...) threatening to inflict harm, in the absence of general rules of conduct. According to the logic of the argument, welfare-state provisions are not coercive insofar as they do not allow the identification and discriminatory treatment of individuals. By contrast, we claim that a structure of coercion is likely to emerge from the command-and-control nature of protectionist institutions and immigration restrictions currently advocated by the radical right. (shrink)

Drawing upon empirical studies of racial discrimination dating back to the 1940’s, the Movement for Black Lives platform calls for the abolition of capital punishment. Our purpose here is to defend the Movement’s call for death penalty abolition in terms congruent with its claim that the death penalty in the U.S. is a “racist practice” that “devalues Black lives.” We first sketch the jurisprudential history of race and capital punishment in the U.S., wherein courts have occasionally expressed worries about (...) racial injustice but have usually taken such evidence to warrant reform but not outright abolition. We argue that the racial discrimination at issue flows in significant part from implicit biases concerning race, criminality, and violence, which do not fit comfortably within the picture of racial bias advanced by the courts. The case for abolition, we contend, rests on Black Americans as a class (not merely those who interact with the criminal justice system as capital defendants or as murder victims) being subject to such bias and thereby not being accorded equal status under the law. (shrink)

Some provisions of the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are clearly important from the perspective of business ethics, particularly those calling for equal rights for women to employment and financial security. Some other provisions of CEDAW are equally as important for ethical business practices and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), but are frequently overlooked because of the presumption that they are not strictly business concerns: the rights of women to participation in public life, marriage, and (...) family rights; the rights of rural women to adequate living conditions; and general rights to equality. This chapter will discuss the conceptual commitments that underlie the assumption of a clear demarcation between work and life concerns, and examine the criticisms of this assumption made by feminism. It will, in particular, be interested in: -/- • The public/private distinction • The meaning of “work” or “labor” • The relationship between CSR and care ethics • Fostering a broader understanding of the family or familial relations • Examining the connection between fair wages and work/life integration -/- These discussions suggest that the ability for businesses worldwide to uphold the tenets of CEDAW is dependent upon a reconsideration of the character of the Ideal Worker and a nuanced understanding of the effects of workplace policies on the wider communities in which businesses operate. In particular, though work/life integration is not strictly speaking a “women’s issue,” the ethical and policy considerations addressed herein currently have disproportionately negative effects for women; thus, addressing them is crucial for achieving the aims of gender equality. (shrink)

The Relationship Between Oligarchy and Forms of Government -/- Introduction -/- Oligarchy, a system where a small group of individuals holds power, is a persistent phenomenon that can influence any form of government. While governments may be designed to serve the broader population, history shows that power often becomes concentrated among elites, whether they are political figures, business leaders, religious authorities, or military officials. This essay explores how oligarchy manifests in different forms of government, from democracy to dictatorship, and (...) examines its consequences on governance and society. -/- Oligarchy in Democratic and Republican Systems -/- Democracies and republics are based on principles of popular sovereignty and representative governance. However, these systems are not immune to oligarchic influences. In a democracy, political power should ideally be distributed among the people, with leaders elected through fair and competitive processes. Yet, in many modern democracies, wealthy elites, corporations, and political dynasties dominate elections and policy-making. This results in what some call a plutocracy, where economic power translates into political control. For example, in the United States, campaign financing and lobbying by powerful corporations and interest groups often shape legislative decisions, sometimes against the broader public interest. -/- In a republic, where elected representatives govern on behalf of the people, oligarchic tendencies emerge when a select few continuously hold power. Political families, such as the Bushes, Kennedys, or Gandhis, demonstrate how political influence can become hereditary, reducing competition and limiting diverse representation. Similarly, in some parliamentary systems, elite party members control candidate selection and policymaking, concentrating power within a small ruling class. -/- Oligarchy in Monarchical and Autocratic Systems -/- Monarchies, historically the rule of a single sovereign, often function alongside oligarchic structures. Even in absolute monarchies, the king or queen relies on noble families, military commanders, or religious leaders for governance. This small ruling class holds disproportionate power over economic resources and legal systems. In constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom, elected governments operate within democratic frameworks, but influential aristocratic and financial elites still wield significant influence. -/- Autocratic governments, including dictatorships, may appear as centralized systems where a single ruler holds complete authority. However, in practice, dictators rely on a ruling elite—whether military officers, secret police, or oligarchic business interests—to maintain control. In countries like North Korea, China, or Russia, a small group of elites close to the leader benefit from economic and political privileges, reinforcing an oligarchic structure within what is often perceived as an autocratic or communist regime. -/- Oligarchy in Communism and Theocracy -/- Communism, in theory, seeks to eliminate class divisions and establish a government that represents the working class. However, in many historical examples, communist states have developed into party-based oligarchies, where a small elite controls decision-making. The Soviet Union, for instance, was governed by the Politburo, a select group within the Communist Party that dictated policies, while the general population had little real influence. Similarly, in modern China, the Chinese Communist Party maintains a hierarchical power structure where only a small ruling elite makes key decisions. -/- In theocratic governments, where religious authorities govern based on religious laws, oligarchy emerges when a small group of clerics or religious leaders holds unchecked power. Iran, for example, is officially a theocratic republic, but real political authority is concentrated in the hands of a small group of clerics, particularly the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. Their influence extends over laws, elections, and economic policies, limiting public participation in governance. -/- Consequences of Oligarchy in Governance -/- Regardless of the type of government, oligarchy often leads to similar negative outcomes. These include: -/- 1. Corruption and Self-Interest – When power is concentrated in the hands of a few, decision-making tends to prioritize their personal interests rather than the well-being of the population. -/- 2. Economic Inequality – Oligarchies often result in wealth being concentrated among elites, leaving the majority of the population struggling economically. -/- 3. Suppression of Political Opposition – In oligarchic systems, opposing voices are often silenced through legal restrictions, media control, or even violence. -/- 4. Policy Manipulation – Laws and regulations may be designed to benefit the ruling class, whether through tax policies, land ownership laws, or corporate privileges. -/- Conclusion -/- Oligarchy is a persistent challenge that affects all forms of government. Whether in democracies, monarchies, dictatorships, or theocracies, power tends to become concentrated among a select few, reducing true representation and fairness. Recognizing and addressing oligarchic tendencies is crucial for maintaining balanced governance, ensuring economic fairness, and preserving the integrity of any political system. Societies that remain vigilant against oligarchic control can work towards a more equitable distribution of power and resources, preventing the erosion of democratic ideals and public trust. -/- . (shrink)

This paper reflects on representations of the convergence of Islam and feminism in light of the recent uprising of Iranian women. Most of the existing literature discussing Muslim women’s rights are locked in a dichotomy of approaches, one being prejudicial and the other apologetic. The prejudicial approach is a (neo-)Orientalist one. It understands Muslim societies as backward and their redemption in abandoning Islam and following the lead of the “West.” The apologetic approach is a multiculturalist one, advocating most prominently by (...) academic feminists based in Europe and United States. In trying to reclaim agency for Muslim women, this approach denies real oppressions happening in Muslim societies, and as a result of Islamic practices. Inspired by Iranian women’s fight for freedom, this paper challenges the aforementioned dichotomy, and instead calls for a third approach that begins with, and responds to, the lived experiences of women living in Muslim societies. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the many arguments and controversies concerning abortion. While it argues for ethical and legal positions on the issues, it focuses on how to think about the issues, not just what to think about them. It is an ideal resource to improve your understanding of what people think, why they think that and whether their (and your) arguments are good or bad, and why. It's ideal for classroom use, discussion groups, organizational learning, and personal reading. -/- (...) From the Preface -/- To many people, abortion is an issue for which discussions and debates are frustrating and fruitless: it seems like no progress will ever be made towards any understanding, much less resolution or even compromise. -/- Judgments like these, however, are premature because some basic techniques from critical thinking, such as carefully defining words and testing definitions, stating the full structure of arguments so each step of the reasoning can be examined, and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different explanations can help us make progress towards these goals. -/- When emotions run high, we sometimes need to step back and use a passion for calm, cool, critical thinking. This helps us better understand the positions and arguments of people who see things differently from us, as well as our own positions and arguments. And we can use critical thinking skills help to try to figure out which positions are best, in terms of being supported by good arguments: after all, we might have much to learn from other people, sometimes that our own views should change, for the better. -/- Here we use basic critical thinking skills to argue that abortion is typically not morally wrong. We begin with less morally-controversial claims: adults, children and babies are wrong to kill and wrong to kill, fundamentally, because they, we, are conscious, aware and have feelings. We argue that since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. -/- Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—which she has the right to—and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalizing actions that are not wrong. -/- In the course of arguing for these claims, we: 1. discuss how to best define abortion; 2. dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusions, instead of giving genuine reasons for them; 3. refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion, on all sides; explain why the most influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful; 4. provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong; 5. briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more. -/- This essay is not a “how to win an argument” piece or a tract or any kind of apologetics. It is not designed to help anyone “win” debates: everybody “wins” on this issue when we calmly and respectfully engage arguments with care, charity, honesty and humility. This book is merely a reasoned, systematic introduction to the issues that we hope models these skills and virtues. Its discussion should not be taken as absolute “proof” of anything: much more needs to be understood and carefully discussed—always. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In “Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy (...) might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.1 In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court’s subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon’s observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon’s condemnation of Harris. -/- This paper examines MacKinnon’s claims about the relationship of rights to privacy and equality in light of the reasoning in Harris and Bowers. When we contrast the Majority and Minority decisions in these cases, it shows, we can distinguish interpretations of the right to privacy that are consistent with sexual equality from those that are not. This is not simply because the two differ in their consequences – though they do - but because the former, unlike the latter, rely on empirical and normative assumptions that would justify sexual inequality whatever right they were used to interpret. So while I agree with MacKinnon that the Majority’s interpretation of the right to privacy in Harris is inconsistent with the equality of men and women, I show that there is no inherent inconsistency in valuing both privacy and equality, and no reason why we must chose to protect the one, rather than the other. Indeed, an examination of MacKinnon’s article, I suggest, can help us to see why rights to privacy can be part of a scheme of democratic rights, and how we might go about democratising the right to privacy in future. To avoid confusion I should emphasise that my arguments are of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. Thus, I will be ignoring the specifically legal and constitutional aspects of MacKinnon’s article, and of the Supreme Court decisions, in order to bring their philosophical significance into focus. -/- . (shrink)

This is a short introduction to a book symposium on Paul Gowder's recent book, _The Rule of Law in thee Real World_ (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book symposium will appear in the St. Luis University Law Journal, 62 St. Louis U. L.J., -- (2018), with commentaries on Gowder's book by colleen Murphy, Robin West, Chad Flanders, and Matthew Lister, along with replies by Paul Gowder.

Lisa Hill’s response to my critique of compulsory voting, like similar responses in print or in discussion, remind me how much a child of the ‘70s I am, and how far my beliefs and intuitions about politics have been shaped by the electoral conflicts, social movements and violence of that period. -/- But my perceptions of politics have also been profoundly shaped by my teachers, and fellow graduate students, at MIT. Theda Skocpol famously urged political scientists to ‘bring the state (...) back in’ to their analyses, and to recognise that political identities, interests and coalitions cannot be read off straightforwardly from people’s socio-economic position. In their different ways, this was the lesson that Suzanne Berger, Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen tried to teach us, emphasising the ways that political participation and conflict, themselves, can change people’s identities, their sense of what it is desirable and possible, and their ability to recognise, or oppose, the freedom and equality of others. -/- I do not therefore take it as self-evident that the poor and seemingly powerless should be politically apathetic, unwilling to vote, or incapable of imagining a political solution to at least some of the problems confronting them. Nor do I suppose that non-voters are all-of-a-piece, and that their shared interests are, inevitably, more significant, morally or politically, than those which divide them. Such assumptions seem mistaken in the case of voters, and I see no reason why they should be true of non-voters. The people we find in these categories are not predestined to be in one rather than the other; they do not always stay where they start off; and at an individual level, the reasons why people fall into one group, rather than another, are likely to be complex and sometimes unpredictable. -/- Above all I see nothing in a commitment to democratic government, understood realistically or in more idealistic terms, that requires us to treat raising turnout at national elections (once every four years or so) as of such moral or political importance that we should make it legally mandatory. Realistically, it is an open question how far the ballot box is, for most people, the path to empowerment – important though it is that people should have an equal right to vote and to stand as candidates at national elections. On a more idealistic view of democratic politics it is hard to avoid the thought that the importance of national elections to self-government, posited by proponents of compulsory voting, reflects an alienated and alienating view of democracy, in which the choice of our leaders becomes more important than the development and exercise of our own capacities to lead; and in which our awe at the power our leaders might wield is matched only by our inability to imagine less intimidating, distant and centralised forms of politics. -/- But before saying a little more about these points, and their significance for compulsory voting, I would like to dispel some misunderstandings or misrepresentations of my views in Hill’s essay. I do not believe socio-economic disparities in turnout are not worrying for democratic politics, nor do I believe that abstention is generally synonymous with consent. I do not assume that people have a right not to vote, but try to explain why moral and legal rights to abstain are an important part of democratic politics, including electoral politics. (shrink)

Peter Fitzpatrick’s writings prove once and for all that it is possible for a law professor to write in beautiful English. His work also proves once and for all that the dominating tradition of Anglo-American legal philosophy and of law teaching has been barking up the wrong tree: namely, that the philosopher and professional law teachers can understand justice as nested in empty forms, better known as rules, doctrines, principles, policies, and other standards. The more rigorous our analysis or (...) decomposition of the forms, we have believed, the more closely do we access the identity of laws. Justice has been assumed to be a matter of intellectually accessing such analysed forms. Fitzpatrick’s articles and books embody an implicit critique of the analytic view of law and of justice. My entry point into this critique is his preoccupation with Jacques Derrida’s theory of laws as universals and with Derrida’s theory of justice as an inaccessible immediacy or presence in context-specific or concrete experienced events. Each event is experienced in an official’s decision. Such a decision represents what Derrida, Fitzpatrick, and Hegel call ‘individuality’. -/- Derrida’s theory of law presents a conundrum. Derrida misses the possibility that law may exist by virtue of its content rather than its form. Derrida misses this possibility because, heavily influenced by Kant (in Derrida’s theory of law), Derrida associates law with universals. This is so because Kant (and Derrida) are preoccupied with the identity of what counts as a law (lois) rather than with a law’s legitimacy. A universal cannot exist unless it is legitimate, and it is legitimate, I claim, by virtue of its content. In his association of law with universals, Derrida presupposes that legal knowledge exists with reference to a territorial-like boundary. The forms are represented or signified by signs (signifiers) within a boundary of the ultimate form (the state, the nation, or humanity). This ultimate form as a universal, like the discrete rules or forms, lacks socially contingent content. A boundary separates knowable universals from the unknowable world on the exteriority of the boundary. The unknowable world is constituted by concrete events experienced in context-specific circumstances. In his legal theory Derrida hones in upon the decision as the experienced event. In a decision, one is present or immediate with the event. Derrida considers such immediacy as justice. The immediacy, however, can only be represented as a sign (sometimes called a signifier). The sign, in turn, represents an empty signified or form, according to Derrida. Because the immediacy remains a representation rather than a presentation of the experienced event, laws as universals cannot be just. The rupture between the inaccessible immediacy of a decision on the one hand and the represented empty forms on the other is critical to Derrida’s theory of law. -/- I claim that this rupture permeates Derrida’s writings about law because Derrida possesses a territorial-like sense of legal knowledge. I shall argue to this effect as follows. In the first section I shall explain the importance of Fitzpatrick’s exposure of the vacuity of the foundation of the system or structure of universals. In the second section I shall flesh out two elements of Derrida’s legal theory: law as form and the ipseity or concrete event that the form excludes from law. This takes me to the third section, where I shall elaborate how Derrida’s legal theory presupposes knowledge as territorial. I shall argue in the final section that this very sense of territorial knowledge prevents justice from accessing law and law from accessing justice. I conclude with the hint of a very different sense of law, one that draws from experiential knowledge in contradistinction to territorial knowledge. (shrink)

This article tries to show that commonplace economic, ethico-religious, anti-racist,and logical-consistency objections to public funding of abortions and abortion counseling for poor women are quite weak. By contrast, arguments appealing to basic human rights to freedom of speech, informed consent, protection from great harm, justice and equal protection under the law, strongly support public funding. Thus, refusing to provide abortions at public expense for women who cannot afford them is morally unacceptable and rationally unjustifiable, despite the opinions of former Presidents (...) Reagan and Bush, the more conservative members of the Supreme Court of the United States, the current Congress, and the majority of the American people. (shrink)

Modern Greece has established, following the end of the dictatorship in 1975, an institutional framework for basic labor rights that promotes gender equality following international and European treaties. In recent years, there has been a deterioration of working conditions in Greece, characterized by an increase in overtime hours even though there is a 120% increase in hourly pay for illegal overtime compared to 80% in the past. Additionally, daily working hours have been lengthened, and a six-day workweek has been introduced (...) despite government announcements on improving the country’s economic indicators. Furthermore, stereotypes and the gender pay gap continue to persist despite the existing legal framework. Keywords: labour rights, labour law, gender equality, treaties, working conditions. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that an account of security as a basic human right must incorporate moral security. Broadly speaking, a person possesses subjective moral security when she believes that her basic interests and welfare will be accorded moral recognition by others in her community and by social, political, and legal institutions in her society. She possesses objective moral security if, as a matter of fact, her interests and welfare are regarded by her society as morally important—for example, when (...) violent crimes against her being taken to warrant the same punishment and condemnation as equivalent crimes against others. Moral security, thus characterized, is an essential part of what it is to be secure as a human person, and any right to security must include it. In the first part of the paper I critique alternative narrower accounts of the right to security, before defending my account of moral security in Section 2. Section 3 explores how acts of racialized and gendered violence are attacks on the moral security of the victims and of all members of the groups to which the victims belong. Broader structural and institutional forms of racial and sexual discrimination further compound the impact of such acts on moral security. Understanding how racial and sexual discrimination and violence are attacks on moral security offers a new way of thinking about the scope and urgency of a state’s duty to combat racial and sexual discrimination, an issue I explore in the final section of the paper. -/- . (shrink)

The Best Form of Government for Power Transitions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. While some governments manage peaceful and stable transitions, others experience violent overthrows, civil wars, or political chaos. The key to a successful power transition lies in strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust in the system. Based on historical evidence, liberal democracies with strong institutions are the most effective at ensuring smooth transitions. (...) However, other forms of government can also maintain stability if they have well-defined mechanisms for succession. This essay examines various government types and their effectiveness in power transitions. -/- The Importance of Stable Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. The ability to ensure smooth leadership changes is crucial for long-term stability. Governments that fail in this aspect often face coups, revolutions, or national disintegration. The most effective power transitions depend on: -/- 1. Legitimacy – Leaders must be chosen through a process accepted by the people and elites. -/- 2. Strong Institutions – Independent branches of government ensure continuity regardless of leadership changes. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – Political elites should agree on a leader’s succession to prevent internal power struggles. -/- 4. Public Support – If the population believes in the process, transitions are peaceful. -/- 5. Military Neutrality – The armed forces should not interfere in leadership changes. -/- Different forms of government approach power transitions in distinct ways. Below, we analyze their effectiveness. -/- 1. Liberal Democracy: The Best Model for Peaceful Transitions -/- Definition: -/- Liberal democracies are systems where leaders are chosen through free and fair elections, with checks and balances to prevent authoritarian rule. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Elections Provide Legitimacy – Power changes peacefully through regular elections. ✔ Strong Institutions – Courts, legislatures, and the media help uphold the rule of law. ✔ Public Accountability – Leaders who lose elections step down without conflict. -/- Examples of Successful Power Transitions: -/- ✅ United States – Since 1789, despite crises like the Civil War and Great Depression, power transitions have remained constitutional. ✅ United Kingdom – The parliamentary system allows for smooth leadership changes without national instability. ✅ Germany (Post-WWII) – After democratic reforms, Germany has had peaceful transitions of power. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ Election Disputes Can Create Instability – Example: The U.S. Capitol Riot (2021) after a contested election. ❌ Weak Institutions in Young Democracies – Example: Kenya’s 2007 election disputes led to violence. -/- Best Democratic Model: -/- ✔ Parliamentary Democracies (e.g., UK, Canada, Germany) tend to have smoother transitions than presidential systems because: -/- Leadership changes occur within political parties, reducing external conflicts. -/- Votes of no confidence can remove leaders without revolutions or coups. -/- 2. Constitutional Monarchy: Stable If Institutions Are Strong -/- Definition: -/- A constitutional monarchy is a system where a king or queen serves as a symbolic head of state, while an elected government runs the country. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Monarchy Provides Stability – Kings and queens remain constant, reducing uncertainty. ✔ Elections Determine Political Leaders – The prime minister and parliament handle governance. ✔ Symbolic Unity – Monarchs can unify the country during crises. -/- Examples of Stable Monarchies: -/- ✅ United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Netherlands – Power transitions occur through democratic elections, while the monarchy remains a stabilizing force. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If the Monarch Becomes Politically Active, It Can Cause Crisis – Example: Thailand (2020s protests against the monarchy’s influence). ❌ If a Monarch Dies Unexpectedly, It Can Create Uncertainty – Example: Spain’s transition after Franco’s dictatorship (1975) depended on King Juan Carlos I to restore democracy. -/- Best Model for Monarchies: -/- ✔ Monarchies that Stay Neutral in Politics (e.g., UK, Sweden) prevent power struggles. -/- 3. One-Party States: Stable but Risky if a Leader Dies Unexpectedly -/- Definition: -/- One-party states are systems where only one political party governs, often without free elections. -/- Why It Can Have Stable Transitions: -/- ✔ Predictable Leadership Changes (if well-structured) – Leaders are often pre-selected within the ruling party. ✔ Less Election Conflict – No multi-party competition reduces disputes. ✔ Long-Term Policies – The government can plan policies without election cycles. -/- Examples of One-Party States with Stable Transitions: -/- ✅ China (Communist Party Rule) – Leaders were replaced every 10 years before Xi Jinping extended his rule. ✅ Vietnam (Communist Party) – The ruling party ensures orderly successions. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If a Leader Dies Suddenly, It Can Create Chaos – Example: North Korea after Kim Jong-il’s death (2011). ❌ If There’s No Clear Successor, Infighting Can Occur – Example: Soviet Union’s power struggles after Stalin’s death (1953). -/- Best Model for One-Party States: -/- ✔ China’s Model (Before 2018) – Leaders were pre-selected within the Communist Party, preventing instability. -/- 4. Absolute Monarchies and Dictatorships: The Most Unstable in Transitions -/- Definition: -/- A system where power is concentrated in one ruler or a small elite group, without elections. -/- Why Transitions Are Unstable: -/- ❌ No Clear Rules for Succession – Leaders often die or are overthrown, causing power struggles. ❌ Military Often Decides the Next Leader – Coups and instability occur frequently. ❌ If a Leader Becomes Too Powerful, No One Can Challenge Them – This leads to violent transitions. -/- Examples of Failed Transitions in Dictatorships: -/- ❌ Libya (Gaddafi Overthrown, 2011) – No clear succession plan led to a failed state. ❌ Soviet Union (After Stalin’s Death, 1953) – Power struggles created instability. ❌ Iraq (After Saddam Hussein, 2003) – No clear transition led to civil war. -/- Best Model for Dictatorships: -/- ✔ If a Dictatorship Must Exist, It Should Have a Clear Succession Plan – Example: Saudi Arabia has a royal succession council to avoid uncertainty. -/- Conclusion: Which Government Type is Best for Transitions? -/- 1️⃣ Best for Smooth Transitions: Liberal Democracies with Strong Institutions -/- Best Example: Parliamentary Systems (UK, Canada, Germany) – Leaders change peacefully without major conflicts. -/- 2️⃣ Good for Stability but Less Flexible: Constitutional Monarchies -/- Best Example: Japan, UK, Netherlands – Monarchs provide continuity, while governments change through elections. -/- 3️⃣ Stable but Risky: One-Party States -/- Best Example: China (Before 2018) – Internal party succession prevented chaos, but risk of dictatorship remains. -/- 4️⃣ Most Unstable: Dictatorships and Absolute Monarchies -/- Worst Example: Libya, Iraq, North Korea – Transitions are violent and unpredictable. -/- Ultimately, liberal democracies with strong institutions (especially parliamentary systems) are the best for stable power transitions. Dictatorships and absolute monarchies, on the other hand, often collapse violently when leaders die or are overthrown. By ensuring strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust, governments can create a system where leadership changes occur peacefully, securing long-term stability. -/- . (shrink)

The paper discusses different interpretations of Callicles and Thrasymachus’ positions. There are good reasons for interpreting Callicles as a critic of democracy and as an aristocratic political thinker whose political views are closer to Plato’s than is usually assumed. The paper argues that Callicles defends a natural right of the best citizens to rule over the crowd. However, in contrast to Plato, for Callicles the rule of the best should not aim at the common good but at their (...) personal advantage. The paper also discusses the view that Thrasymachus is just a sociologist of power who diagnoses what actually happens in politics (Henning Ottmann, Max Salomon). This interpretation is still current, and enables us to understand important aspects of legislation in contemporary democracies. Finally, the paper argues that there are reasons to understand Thrasymachus not only as a political realist, but, similar to Protagoras, as a moral sceptic. (shrink)

In this study, the starting point is the well-known physical laws applied to human social life. On the basis of natural laws human actions are considered and through the prism of physical laws such concepts as use and possession are defined. A parallel is drawn between such a representation of these concepts and those conflicting views that are available in the literature regarding the concept of property. To complete the definitions of use and possession nature is introduced as a fictitious (...) owner. And on this basis, the positive possibility of a theoretical solution to the problem of initial assignment is shown. Again, on the basis of physical laws, the fundamental concept of [human] needs is introduced. It is shown that the collision of people's needs on the same thing allows uniform classifying property defined in literature as the relationship between a person and a thing or as the relationship between people because of a thing. Considering the relationship between two human beings through needs and costs, as a natural necessity, people inevitably renounce their claims to possess and use certain things in favor of other people. It is shown that this refusal forms the right of those people in whose favor this refusal is carried out to possess and use things. The right of one is the refusal of all others to own and use the thing. It is shown that the right was ensured and will always be ensured by force. The use or threat of the use of force is something that can reliably ward off a person from the unbridled realization of his needs. In the process of the formation of mankind, nature itself forces people to organize into communities that can oppose their individual members and their associations with significantly greater power. The whole, as a rule, is stronger than its part. And it is society that can reliably ensure the exercise of rights for its members. Natural laws also make it possible to resolve, on the basis of the concept of law, as a renunciation of possession and use, the issue of belonging to what nature gives us. These are natural resources and the human body. It is shown that the human body should belong to the person himself, and the resources to all members of society equally. The affiliation of all other things produced by man can be unambiguously determined within the framework of contractual relations between members of society, their associations and society as a whole. Since the right of everyone is ensured by the society, and, therefore, by each member of the society individually, a necessary condition for membership is understanding and recognition of the rights of certain things to other members of the society. And this may be the main criterion for joining full members of society, as opposed to the commonly used age criterion, which works on the bulk of people, but gives failures in many special cases. A typical example of such cases is the deprivation or infringement of the rights of persons of full legal age, but committed acts that are called unlawful in society. As part of the research on ownership issues, ownership is considered. It is shown that the necessary tool for using the objects of co-ownership is the voting of co-owners. A special case of co-ownership, when all co-owners have equal shares in co-ownership, is indistinguishable from what is called democracy. It is shown that voting in general and democracy in particular, as procedures for aggregating preferences, can have a positive decision, in refutation of the universality of the conclusion of Arrow's theorem. (shrink)

While the image of the slave as the antithesis of the freeman is central to republican freedom, it is striking to note that slaves themselves have not contributed to how this condition is understood. The result is a one-sided conception of both freedom and slavery, which leaves republicanism unable to provide an equal and robust protection for historically outcast people. I draw on the work of Frederick Douglass – long overlooked as a significant contributor to republican theory – to show (...) one way why this is so. Focusing the American Revolution, the subsequent republican government established new political institutions to maintain the collective interests of the whole population. The political revolution was held in place by processes of public reason that reflected the values and ideas of the people that had rebelled. The black population, however, had not been part of this revolution. After emancipation, black Americans were required to accept terms of citizenship that had already been defined, leaving them socially dominated, subject to the prejudices and biases within the prevailing ideas of public discourse. Douglass argued that republican freedom under law is always dependent on a more fundamental revolution, that he calls a ‘radical revolution in thought’, in which the entire system of social norms and practices are reworked together by members of all constituent social groups – women and men, black and white, rich and poor – so that it reflects a genuinely collaborative achievement. Only then can we begin the republican project of contestatory freedom as independence or non-domination that today’s republicans take for granted. (shrink)