The recent political developments in the Philippines require a reevaluation of the nature of the State under the Rodrigo Duterte regime. Just years ago, scholars illustrated the regime of Duterte to be a populist, illiberal, or authoritarian one. But since then, and especially during the pandemic, a lot of things have changed. In this paper, I will argue that Duterte’s regime is a fascist one. Unlike how Walden Bello characterized Duterte as a fascist original, a characterization laden with theoretical inconsistencies (...) and practical difficulties, I will develop a concept of fascism proper to the neoliberal and semi-colonial conditions of the Philippines. I will likewise trace the rise, development, and stabilization of the regime’s fascism. The discussion will be supported and illuminated by some illustrative examples taken from the experience of the mass movement in Cebu. (shrink)

The term 'fascism' continues to be very much in currency in Philippines society. To the Filipino people, its meaning is often drawn from pained memory of wholesale deprivation of democratic rights and large-scale human rights abuses. Yet, to many, the fear of fascism has still to give way to a deeper understanding of this menace. This may hold true even among those belonging to the progressive movement. One Marxist philosopher and theoretician who gave extended treatment of the issues (...) surrounding the character and conditions giving rise to fascism was Nicos Poulantzas, whose theory is employed here to interrogate the debates about fascism in the post-Marcos Philippines context. (shrink)

While it is clear what those attracted to fascism today are against, it is less clear what they are for. Not in the sense of how they want to remake society—this is usually clear enough. What is less clear is the fundamental values that are driving their desire to create a different kind of order. Compounding this difficulty, too many liberals are stubbornly sticking to some conventional beliefs: that human nature is as liberals think it is, not something that (...) is fundamentally disputed; that facts are what liberals think they are, even if some people choose to ignore them; and that everybody is pursuing basically the same conception of the good, even if some of them are deluded as to where we are now and how to get where we want to go. -/- But this move to the right is not being driven simply by mistakes; it is a principled move, backed by a coherent, consistent, and historically well-sourced value system, even if this value system is perverse. Fascism has its own conception of the moral subject; of the need for a rigid social hierarchy of men; of the nature of individual rights; and of the importance of purity in blood, soil, and ideology. It believes in the unity of the people, the leader, and the state; it embraces very different and (to liberals) often disturbing moral ends; and it employs starkly different rules of social interaction. And it believes, in the end, that this all leads to the greatest expression of democracy ever invented. (shrink)

Contemporary fascism is an understudied phenomenon in Latin America. As a contribution to this understudied area, this article analyzes the evolution of fascist thought in Peru from its interwar history to the twenty-first century. Following Roger Griffin’s influential ‘new consensus’ approach to fascism studies based on a fascist minimum, this study explores Peruvian fascism and will argue that fascism developed new expressions in the years after 1945. It will develop the terms ‘neo-fascism’ and ‘post-fascism’, (...) based on Griffin’s fascist minimum, to clarify the nature of the fascist movements to be analyzed. It will conclude that historically Peruvian fascism was exemplified by the Partido Unión Revolucionaria [Revolutionary Union Party], while in the postwar period, it took two parallel directions: the uniquely Peruvian neo-fascism of Acción Legionaria [Legionary Action] and the ethnocacerist or Andean post-fascism of Antauro Humala. (shrink)

Heidegger's ontological theories, his observations about liberalism and fascism, and his evaluation of Being are three premises of an argument for fascism. The ontological premise is that integrated wholes and instruments or objects of will are ontologically superior, as Being and Time suggests in discussing Being‐a‐whole and using tools. The social premise is that fascist societies are wholes integrated by dictatorial will, while liberal societies are looser aggregates of free individuals, as Heidegger describes in his 1930s seminars. The (...) evaluative premise, shared with the medieval tradition and expressed in his notebook remarks about war, is that ontological superiority makes things better. The conclusion that fascism is better than liberalism should be rejected along with the evaluative premise. (shrink)

Conservative critics have united in attacking James Cameron’s newest blockbuster Avatar for its “liberal” political message. But underneath all of the manifest liberalism of Avatar there is also a latent message. In his valorization of the organic, primal, interconnectedness of Na’vi culture and his denigration of the mechanical, modern, disconnectedness of human culture, Cameron runs very close to advocating a form of fascism. -/- In this paper I describe the overarching philosophical perspective of fascism, and then I draw (...) on the work of Jay Y. Gonen, who, in his book The Roots of Nazi Psychology, has distilled Hitler’s foundational ideological values to nine basic principles. I demonstrate how greatly these principles overlap with the ideals that Cameron attributes to the culture of the Na’vi in his film Avatar. (shrink)

This is an attempt to clarify the nature of extreme, or complete, “wokeness” in its modern sense. The central thesis is that it is an inverted form of fascism, and thereby even worse than some of its critics assume. In fact, it is far worse than ordinary fascism whether or not it is correct to see it as an inverted form. As this is a thesis, it is not a definition. Therefore, this thesis could certainly be mistaken. But (...) if it is, then sound criticisms of the explanation would be needed to refute it. (shrink)

The paper explores the philosophical foundations and historical context of Fascism, tracing its roots from ancient idealist thought to its practical implementation in the 20th century. It examines the progression of ideas from Heraclitus’ doctrine of change to Plato’s Theory of Forms, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and Hegel’s Absolute Idealism, culminating in Giovanni Gentile’s Actual Idealism. Gentile’s philosophy, which emphasizes the collective will and the subordination of individual desires to the state, serves as the intellectual basis for fascism.

In his late lectures, Foucault developed the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, a courage to speak the truth in the face of danger. While not entirely uncritical of the notion, Foucault seemed to find something of an ideal in the political and aesthetic ideal of franc-parler, of speaking freely and courageously. Simultaneously, the post-1968 political valorized the ideal of parrhesia, or “speaking truth to power”: parrhesia seemed inherently progressive, the sole preserve of the left. But a cursory inspection of the (...) annals of Nazism and fascism shows that these movements also aligned themselves with parrhesiastical modes of expression. The fragmented, disparate strands of today’s neo-fascist revival, too, are closely imbricated with the notion of speaking valiantly in the face of supposed orthodoxies: in many ways, the preeminent parrhesiasts today are found on the neo-fascist side. This points to an essential weakness in the concept of parrhesia, particularly in terms of its value and valence as a strategy for the political left. Perhaps it matters less how we speak—being caught up in language games—than what policies and programs we enact. Žižek’s plea for a renewed dogmatic orthodoxy and Chesterton’s criticism of heresy offer ways out of the parrhesiastical trap. (shrink)

No USA president in history has received as much opposition as Donald Trump has from all three components of the Establishment, namely the financial establishment, the political establishment and the corporate media establishment. The election of Donald Trump to the office of presidency is marked with dozens of historical first events that are anything but lackluster, yet a bleak picture of Fascism has been painted to describe Trump. This is an extraordinary piece of disinformation, as no modern president has (...) been more consistent in plainly saying what he will do regarding US military and geopolitical goals, both outside and in office. This, even though his stated position is clearly opposite to the wishes of the dominant cabal, supported by both parties, and to US foreign policy since WWII. USA history is not very long, but Trump presidency and his inaugural speech marked a historic starting point for this 'democracy'. Every sentence of Donald J. Trump's inaugural speech was a departure from diplomacy. Knowing what diplomacy actually means, it's a great step toward transparency. It is the best thing that happened in US political history. It is no surprise the Media established completely flipped, the political establishment gasped, and the financial establishment started to conspire a different strategy (George Soros declaring he wants Trump presidency to fail). In the mean time, the typically apolitical science and technology establishment declared Trump completely unfit for the office that he has just been elected to. Trump’s inaugural speech that contained phrases like, "It's time to remember that old wisdom our soldiers will never forget, that whether we are black or brown or white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots", was in sharp contrast to how Abraham Lincoln viewed America, when he said, "I, as much as any other man, stand in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race… I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races." Trump’s embrace of humanity and righteousness was reminiscent of Prophet Muhammad’s last sermon at the pilgrimage, where he said over 1400 years, "An Arab is no better than a non-Arab, and a non-Arab is no better than an Arab; a red man is no better than a black man and a black man is no better than a red man – except if it is in terms of piety." Yet, Trump took oath of office swearing on the bible used by Abraham Lincoln. In this two-part paper, the key research question answered is what Trump presidency stands for. In answering this question, the first part deconstructs some of the dominant theories of Fascism. Then, a delinearized history is constructed in order to understand how democracy, as applied in USA, has an inevitable outcome of achieving the same goals as a Fascist regime. The concept of religious extremism, including “Islamic terrorism” or “radical Islam” is also discussed with relevance to ‘war on terror’. The history of US presidency then shows that the office of presidency is used as a tool to advance a Fascist agenda, albeit being packaged as USA exceptionalism. The ground is set for part 2 that analyses the rise of Trump and the demise of DNC integrity, followed by deconstruction of various allegations against Trump. (shrink)

In this paper, I interrogate the question of how aesthetics might be used in terms of an antifascist project. The exposition includes two main steps. First, drawing on the work of Umberto Eco and Sven Reichardt, I introduce a perspective on fascism, in which I identify its character as synthetico-paradoxical. Then, I utilize Jacques Rancière’s conception of aesthetics as politics to show how a decentralized understanding of what makes good art can disrupt fascism by appealing to the sense (...) of re-recognition of the individual political subject. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the global emergence of populist political formations, leading certain scholars to term our present age the “age of populism” and some politicians, such as Hungary’s current prime minister Viktor Orbán, to proclaim that “the era of liberal democracy is over”. Contemporary forms of populism are characterized by ‘us’ (often ‘the people’ in an ethnic or communal sense) versus ‘them’ (usually liberal elites, the establishment, minorities, or immigrants) forms of binary thinking. For some, the rise of contemporary (...) populism inherently represents the resurgence of forms of reactionary populist nationalism, ranging from the ‘radical’ to the ‘extreme’ right, and the revitalization of forms of ideology that may be termed ‘neo-fascist’. The great challenge for contemporary democracies is that, in contrast to dictators who seize power via coups, the aforementioned political movements come to power via the ballot box. In light of the revitalization of such political formations, the current special issue serves to critically investigate contemporary forms of far-right populism and fascism in the Global South. Many contributors cast a critical perspective upon the political dimensions of the current proliferation of extreme forms of reactionary politics and the social conditions that gave rise, and are in the process of giving rise, to such movements. Other contributors explore the historical and theoretical roots of current forms of far-right populism and fascism (FRP/F), critical engagement with present-day problems that are resultant of their preponderance, as well as analyses of the cultural forces and tendencies that have led to, and are leading to, their contemporary ascendance. Some contributors also consider the question of whether it is possible to develop a general theory of FRP/F in contemporary society, present inquiries into the future development of FRP/F, or investigate opportunities for opposition to FRP/F in the present context. (shrink)

In 1994, Duverger spoke of a second type of fascism, to which he added a third for the future. This one would be based on spectacle, image, and the projection of myths of success. We are living in strange times, in which we no longer know how to place groups and ideas, we get lost in details, we establish classifications that make it harder for us to understand social phenomena. A shocking time in which the word “fascist” has become (...) so trivialised that it has almost lost all interest and meaning. If the range of regimes is so diverse, if we do not know what we are dealing with, what can we do? And yet fascism remains one of the great contemporary ideologies, the most recent and the most difficult to understand. Historically, it has been the cause of terrible genocides. (shrink)

The Semitic myth of a savior/messiah has played a prominent metaphorical role in the socio-political history of the West. In the period of the Holy Roman Empire, the Christian God played the role of the Messiah. In the period of capitalist modernity, Reason played the same role, of course with the help of God, suitably reshaped by theology (the science of God). God and Reason conspired against Nature and the humans branded as pagans. This created innumerable problems and Fascism (...) and Communism emerged as reactions against that. After the defeat of fascism and the collapse of the Soviet model of Communism, there arose a new world order with the World Market as the new messiah. This paper posits that in each of these periods, the ethos has been largely dictated by the messiah and that the new messiah, World Market, has caused the rise of the new socio-cultural phenomenon, called post-truth. The emergence of Fascism in many parts of the world, including India, is mainly caused by the resultant widespread cynicism. Jacque Lacan’s ideas are substantially borrowed to develop the conceptual tools for the analysis. (shrink)

AI-powered technology can both promote accuracy and hide the standards of measurement and circulation of information. It can also produce models that are opaque and hard to access. As such, the new paradigm of AI asks to pounder about societal values and sets of priorities we want to promote, especially as these technologies are further deployed in times of warfare. The systemic tracking of people’s life and the opaqueness of the models designate a new paradigm in the formation of truth, (...) as censorship is enabled on a new scale. (shrink)

The orange hand is waving frantically broh. Ought we to jump into the river or not? Stay tuned for a collection of thoughts riddled with noetic contradictions and repurposed political anxiety. Resist in whatever way presents itself to you broh. Then abide.

This is a review of the first volume of Herbert Marcuse's collected works. Highlights include correspondence with Heidegger, who refuses to repudiate the Nazis.

In “Modern Abstract Sacrifice in Robespierre’s Terror and Hitler’s Holocaust,” I use Hegel’s analysis of Robespierre’s Terror in the Phenomenology and Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the Nazi Holocaust in the Dialectic of Enlightenment to identify what I term “modern abstract sacrifice” as the dominant kind of instrumental destruction that took place during these nation-building mass-sacrifices. As I show, these events relied upon a justificatory instrumental logic—a sacrificial story—even if that sacrificial story broke down or was abandoned in practice, in (...) which case the destruction became indiscriminate rather than targeted. First, I analyze Hegel’s critique of the Reign of Terror, which he sees as a product of the immediate identity of the general will and the individual will: the revolutionaries collapsed the will of all and the will of each, rendering individuality as such logically impossible. As a result, all individuals became objects of suspicion worthy of sacrifice by guillotine, for the sake of guaranteeing the triumph of the state based on reason. Next, I analyze Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the fascist sacrifice of the Jewish people using their political-economic and pathological theories of antisemitism. Adorno and Horkheimer see fascist antisemitism as a manifestation of the logic of substitution, operative in both liberal capitalist ideology—in which the Jewish people represent the forces of capital, obsolete pre-modern tradition, and statelessness—as well as fascist ideology—in which the Jewish people represent the metaphysical forces of evil and “negativity as such.” Finally, I assert that the principal commonality between modern abstract sacrifice in the Terror and the Holocaust is the fact that the victims were all reduced to exchangeable representatives of an abstract category, in spite of the fact that their unique identities were indispensable for the ideological justification of these mass-sacrifices. (shrink)

Drawing on Furio Jesi’s 1979 book "Cultura di destra" [Right Wing Culture], this article sketches a preliminary genealogy of fascist accelerationism, a distinct current of white supremacist militancy responsible for a considerable number of North American mass murder events over the span of four decades. After positioning Jesi’s theory of fascist violence within the broader methodological turn of his late period work, the article proceeds to outline three key features of right-wing thought: a language of wordless ideas, a funerary religion (...) of exemplary deaths, and a repertoire of militant yet militarily "useless" tasks. Resisting the tendency either to over- or under-politicize these deadly events, Jesi’s analysis instead allows us recognize the operation of a mythological machine that animates white supremacist mass murders over the past half century. The aim of this article is to trace the genesis and mutation of this machine, with particular emphasis on the period from 1975 to the present. (shrink)

With what modes of mentality can we build a visceral, subjective sense of being in some specific mass-political society? Theorists and political cultivators standardly call upon the imagination – the kind prompted by symbols and rituals, for example. Could perception ever play such a role? I argue that it can, but that perceptions of mass-political publics come with costs of cruelty and illusion that neither democratic theorists nor participants should be willing to pay. The clearest examples of such perceptions are (...) found in fascist political culture. My discussion aims to illuminate what it is about publics, perception, and democracy that makes this so. -/- . (shrink)

On the 17th of May 2020, the Albanian National Theatre in Tirana was demolished overnight, in the days of the first major lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The theatre was built in 1939, when the Italian military occupation of the Albanian territory was officially established, after decades of increasing influence on the local economy by the fascist regime. That day was the climax of a two-year-long protest against its demolition by local associations, and international organisations. This event demonstrates the (...) importance of debating on the contested material and immaterial traces that the Italian presence in Albania left behind, culminating with a military occupation during WWII. This text surveys the exhibitions, curated or organised by Italian institutions, with the aim of tracing the evolution of the colonial narrative from fascist propaganda to contemporary initiatives. Starting in the 1920s, the Italian Ministero delle Colonie opened trade exhibitions, ethnographic displays, political and recreational events. During the occupation, Albania was featured in the Mostra Triennale delle Terre Italiane d'Oltremare (1940) and many other venues up to recent shows in Tirana. The first exhibitions were essential devices to support Italian territorial claims, built on the argument of an alleged Mediterranean tradition of the area, reunited once again under the “Roman” identity flag. The political-ideological nature of the artistic productions, the biased historical discourses around the myth of Roman origins, and the aesthetics employed in such events formed a strong narration that lasted much longer than the military presence on the territory. Taking this case as an example, we will see how exhibitions were instrumental to the authoritarian regime in the identity-building process; how contested narratives can be twisted in the contemporary political debate; and to what degree this heritage can be considered a shared legacy by both parties, the coloniser and the colonised. (shrink)

This paper tries to address the ethical question of Nazism from the point of view of social relations. That implies linking the fulfilment of the fascist ideology with its economic conditions. In this sense, the main proposal is to highlight that, crimes such as those committed by the Nazi regime, are not only possible based on a monstrous bureaucratic formation but also from a permissive dynamic of production and exchange. However, the relative autonomy that we can claim over the ideological (...) factor of the phenomenon faces severe limits. In the "National-socialist" case, those limits are the declining demand, the increase in government debt and the inhibition of the productive investment of capital. It is as if Evil incarnated only at the cost of eroding its conditions of possibility. (shrink)

A brief presentation of life, activity and publications of an Italian philosopher, the founder with Guido Calogero of the Liberal-Socialist movement under the Fascist regime and the theorist of non-violence and omnicracy as the key ideas for a new left, beyond reformism and third-International state-socialism.

Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson’s Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson’s change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically (...) fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth. (shrink)

This review highlights how fascism and populism qua, popular culture feeds each other. Hannah Arendt's introduction too is commented upon.

Theories and ideas have consequences, like actions do. As a rule, we hold people responsible for their actions. In a similar way, we should reasonably hold intellectuals responsible for their theories and ideas. Among the aims of this paper is to consider whether the fact that Nietzsche’s thought was distorted and manipulated by Fascist and Nazi ideologues is a sufficient condition for releasing Nietzsche from all responsibility for the crimes that were partly justified through the appeal to his philosophy.

The objective is to analyse the cultural, social and political conditions of a decisive period of Japan’s modernity known by the slogan of “overcoming modernity” (kindai no chokoku). This slogan is the title of a colloquium, which took place in Tokyo in July 1942, eight months after Pearl Harbour, and associated influential and respected intellectuals. This colloquium and slogan signalled a deep and pervasive cultural, political and societal syndrome, conducive in the case of Japan to fascism and ultra-nationalism. But (...) this syndrome is not an experience unique to Japan. It is observed in every modern society, as a step in ofits past but also present evolution. This syndrome signals therefore an ambiguous and highly dangerous period. It expresses the collective experience of a society at a given moment. This experience conditions its relation to the past, its understanding of theits present situationand also the capacity of individuals and groups to respond to theiris present situation. TBut this collective experience is expressed in metaphysics subjective experience and inter-subjective bond reinforcing a community under intense pressure. In Japan, “oOvercoming modernity” expressed a deep disenchantment with toward modernizsation’s effects and sequels, along with grea deep individual anxiety and collective confusion. The case of Japan provides us with a unique knowledge of a major societal syndrome. The goal is to construct a theory capable of identifying today similar periods of deep political and cultural instability in nations like China, France, Russia and others, with the goal to analyse these cases and evaluate the resulting risks and potential responses. (shrink)

În ciuda faptului că nu contribuie la ordonarea cunoașterii actuale despre fascism, ci dimpotrivă, creează confuzie, lucrarea Madeleinei Albright are unele merite incontestabile. Primul dintre ele este capacitatea de a simplifica, într-o naraţiune scurtă, ușor de parcurs, ideile și faptele liderilor fasciști interbelici. Începând cu capitolul al doilea și până la cel de-al cincilea, istorisirea ar putea să fie folosită ca un foarte accesibil, viu și instructiv rezumat istoric pentru studenţi. Cu certitudine, experienţa profesorală a autoarei în învăţământul politic (...) american a ajutat-o să ajungă la acest nivel excepţional de persuasiune didactică. În al doilea rând, focalizându-și descrierile asupra personalităţii liderilor mai mult decât asupra fenomenelor social-economice, efectul imediat al lecturii este acela de a te face să reflectezi la cât de mult contează orgoliul și ambiţiile personale în alegerea drumului spre fascism. Portretele pe care cartea le schiţează sugerează că nu politician fascist modest și delăsător pur și simplu nu poate exista, așadar transmite cititorilor o intuiţie interesantă în sine. De asemenea, deși face destul de multe afirmaţii îndoielnice, Albright nu se abţine să enunţe unele adevăruri pe care politicienii de obicei le ocolesc. De exemplu, admiraţia lui Winston Churchill faţă de membrii cuplului fascist italo-german este ilustrată cu citate atât în capitolul despre ascensiunea lui Mussolini (p. 25), cât și în cel despre dobândirea puterii de către Hitler (p. 52). Este descris destul de clar și felul în care anticomunismul elitei liberale și conservatoare a contribuit decisiv la succesul politic al celor doi. În fine, cartea arată indirect cât de diferită este încercarea de a defini un fascist de aceea de a defini fascismul și că fascismul este mai mult decât suma credinţelor și acţiunilor adepţilor lui. (shrink)

This paper takes a critical examination at selected works by 20th century philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. I argue that, far from arcane, distant, inaccessible concepts, the selected Marxist ideas presented in their immanent critiques provide priceless insight into how fascism, in all forms, permeates every stretch of society. Understanding how these events occur, called micro- and macro-fascism, and how they are mediated through our beliefs and desires, can allow for us to resist transcendent theories of desire (...) and modes and politics, and towards a mode of immanence, one that is always critiquing itself, and always resisting fascism. (shrink)

This article proposes the thesis that archeofuturism is a postmodern project of the International Alt-Right (IAR). By postmodern project we mean that: i) it is a project for a time after modernity; and ii) it is a project that, due to its content, can be classified as related to the ideas against modernity called postmodernism. As it is part of the IAR, archeofuturism is also a project of a fascist or far-right nature. To prove our thesis, we will first analyze (...) the Archefouturism developed by the French political scientist Guillaume Faye, a member of the IAR. Then what is IAR will be defined and its relationship with postmodernism will be evidenced. Finally, based on that connection called reactionary postmodernism, the existence of other archeofuturists theses that combine fascist rhetoric with postmodernism will be proposed. (shrink)

In this thesis, I explore themes and concerns that have arisen in my art practice, namely the relationship between landscape, monstrosity, and subjectivity. The tropes scar and form refer to features analogous in the subject and in the land which take on different specific meanings throughout the project, but in general terms, I relate them to trauma as a defining force. I suggest that monsters can be understood as embodying attitudes to time (a cause of trauma): those being fixity, which (...) is resistant to temporality; and flux, which embraces temporality. Consequently, I define these categories and their opposition, presenting arguments for both monsters of fixity and flux monsters. I examine the construction of false universals of ‘England’ (categories of fixity) in representations of landscape and how they come to dominate the picturing of Britain more generally, alongside a mode I refer to as dynamic-fatalism, which examines the polemics and aesthetics of Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957). In this regard, I look at Lewis’s monstrous Tyro and its role in eliciting dehumanisation as a defining value in conceptions of a stratified society. Emphasis on creative practices and representations related to England serve to dissolve ‘proto-fascistic’ fantasies of a heroic, mono-cultural, and pure base for nation, dependent on categories of fixity. I suggest these values are instead understood as patrician, sexist, class-based, and racially biased. Given that landscape constructions are constitutive of our engagement with landscape, I conclude with a proposal for better ‘analogues’ of nature in the form of virescent space (a category of flux). I argue that virescent space is a phenomenon that sees the monster take on a specific role concerning the subject, one I define in relation to a wilderness destination in the poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (c.1370). (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that the digital noosphere of the World Wide Web and its users, the borderless move of virtually all resources of the planet, and the consequent globalization of most aspects of national politics, economy, and culture, along with the increasing difficulty of controlling the related high-tech military conflicts, human-made environmental crises, and the abnormal migrations of abused people now make it inevitable to leave behind the competitive international chaos rooted in humankind’s animal past and turn (...) to the cooperative social spirit recommended by Aristotle, Lao Tzu, Jesus, Dante, H. G. Wells, Martin Luther King Jr., John Lennon, Nicholas Hagger, and others to finally translate their aspirations into actions via establishing the Government of Earth for the decent and free. The paper presents a five-step, 15-year, ~$25B plan to start this process. That this plan has nothing to do with the Godless work of secret societies, the authoritarian urges of renewed fascism or the political absurdities of Marxism-Leninism it is relayed by the envisioned Intercontinental Education System of the outlined Government of Earth to teach every child on the planet—via a new community of digitally linked extraordinary teachers—for the beauty of lifelong learning, tolerance, duty, honor, free cooperation, and artful communication for divine missions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Habgood-Coote : 1033–1065) I argued that we should abandon ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, on the grounds that these terms do not have stable public meanings, are unnecessary, and function as vehicles for propaganda. Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson, and Rachel Sterken and Étienne Brown : 144–154) have raised worries about my case for abandonment, recommending that we continue using ‘fake news’. In this paper, I respond to these worries. I distinguish more clearly between theoretical and political reasons for abandoning (...) a term, assemble more evidence that ‘fake news’ is a nonsense term, and respond to the worries raised by Pepp, Michaelson and Sterken, and Brown. I close by considering the prospects for anti-fascist and anti-authoritarian conceptual engineering. (shrink)

This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary nor fascist. Second, it (...) specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy (in particular towards popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy) that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core (populist ideology) turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism (properly specified) can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal (purely electoral) as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious (liberal) conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population. (shrink)

This book examines the artistic policies of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) during the early post-war years (1944-1951), after the defeat of Fascism in Europe and the outbreak of the Cold War. It brings together theoretical debates on artists’ political engagement and an extensive critical apparatus, providing the reader with an historical framework for wider reflections on the relationship between art and politics.

Friedrich Nietzsche was among the figures from the history of nineteenth century philosophy that, perhaps surprisingly, some of the Vienna Circle’s members had presented as one of their predecessors. While, primarily for political reasons, most Anglophone figures in the history of analytic philosophy had taken a dim view of Nietzsche, the Vienna Circle’s leader Moritz Schlick admired and praised Nietzsche, rejecting what he saw as a misinterpretation of Nietzsche as a militarist or proto-fascist. Schlick, Frank, Neurath, and Carnap were in (...) different ways committed to the view that Nietzsche made a significant contribution to the overcoming of metaphysics. Some of these philosophers praised the intimate connection Nietzsche drew between his philosophical outlook and empirical studies in psychology and physiology. In his 1912 lectures on Nietzsche, Schlick maintained that Nietzsche overcame an initial Schopenhauerian metaphysical-artistic phase in his thinking, and subsequently remained a positivist until his last writings. Frank and Neurath made the weaker claim that Nietzsche contributed to the development of a positivistic or scientific conception of the world. Schlick and Frank took a further step in seeing the mature Nietzsche as an Enlightenment thinker. (shrink)

Kining papel mobatbat sa lima ka mga mahinungdanong kabilin ni Jose Maria Sison nga mao ang mga mosunod: una, pagpaduso sa usa ka anti-rebisyonistang baroganan; ikaduha, pagpalambo sa teorya sa malanatong gubat sa katawhan ni Mao Zedong; ikatulo, pagpa-asdang sa Marxistang panglantaw mahitungod sa hisgotanang kalinaw; ikaupat, paghatag og Marxistang sukaranan sa tinuhuan o relihiyon isip pwersa sa katilingbanong kausaban; ug ikalima, ang pagpatin-aw sa papel sa burukrata kapitalismo isip tungtungan sa pasismo. Tumong niining papel ang padayong pagpahiluna ni Sison (...) isip usa ka importanteng teyorista dili lamang sa Pilipinas kon dili hasta sa tibuok kalibotan, hilabi na sa Pangkalibotanong Habagatan. Samtang ubay-ubay na ang mga nanag-unang pagtuon kabahin sa kamahinungdanon ni Jose Maria Sison isip Pilipinong Marxista ug makinasodnong iskolar, kini nga papel buot mosumpay sa mga pagtuon hilabi na human sa pagpanaw ni Sison niadtong Disyembre 2022. -/- This paper will argue the five important legacies of Jose Maria Sison. The five legacies are: first, the upholding of an anti- revisionist standpoint; second, the development of the Maoist theory of a protracted people’s war; third, the advancement of a Marxist view on the peace talks; fourth, the promotion of a Marxist view of faith or religion as a force for social change; and fifth, the clarification of bureaucrat capitalism as a basis of fascism. The paper aims to further position Sison as an important theorist not only in the Philippines but also the world over, especially in the Global South. While there are many previous studies concerning Sison as a Marxist and nationalist scholar, this paper furthers existing literature especially in the context after Sison’s death last December 2022. (shrink)

A surprising feature of the White Rose anti-Nazi resistance pamphlets is their appeal to a foundational classical Chinese text, the Laozi (otherwise known as the Daodejing), to buttress their critique of fascism and authoritarianism. I argue that from the perspective of a 1942 educated readership, the act of quoting the Laozi functioned as a subtle and pointed nod to anti-fascist intellectuals in pre-war Germany, many of whom had interpreted the Laozi as an anti-authoritarian and pacifist text. To a sympathetic (...) reader, the Laozi therefore constituted an apt reference point for critiquing National Socialism. I then introduce a complication for this wartime reading of the Laozi from the perspective of its ambiguous reception in ancient Chinese political thought. I more specifically discuss an ancient line of interpretation of the Laozi that points in the direction of authoritarianism — in stark tension with the White Rose message of passive resistance and popular revolt. (shrink)

To better navigate social interactions, we routinely (consciously or unconsciously) categorize people based on their distinctive features. One important way we do this is by ascribing political orientations to them. For example, based on certain behavioral cues, we might perceive someone as politically liberal, progressive, conservative, libertarian, Marxist, anarchist, or fascist. Although such ascriptions may appear to be mere descriptions, I argue that they can have deeper, regulative effects on their targets, potentially politicizing and polarizing them in ways that remain (...) underexplored in research on political polarization. To capture this dynamic, I introduce the notion of ‘politicizing mindshaping,’ distinguish it from other types of politicization, and review evidence suggesting that politicizing mindshaping is likely common. Finally, I contend that the pernicious effects of politicizing mindshaping may currently be significantly underestimated. This is because, unlike in many other cases of social labeling, negativity in political labeling is, to some extent, widely tolerated – even encouraged – and largely unconstrained by social norms in democratic countries. (shrink)

One of the most historically recent and damaging blows to the reputation of utopianism came from its association with the totalitarian regimes of Hitler’s Third Reich and Mussolini’s Fascist party in World War II and the prewar era. Being an apologist for utopianism, it seemed to some, was tantamount to being an apologist for Nazism and all of its concomitant horrors. The fantasy principle of utopia was viewed as irretrievably bound up with the irrationalism of modern dictatorship. While these conclusions (...) are somewhat understandable given the broad strokes that definitions of utopia are typically painted with, I will show in this paper that the link between the mythos of fascism and the constructs of utopianism results from an unfortunate conflation at the theoretical level. The irrationalism of any mass ethos and the rationalism of the thoughtful utopian planner are, indeed, completely at odds with each other. I arrive at this conclusion via an analysis of the concepts of myth and narrative, and the relationships these have with the concept of utopia. (shrink)

The controversy that between 1908 and 1912 saw Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile opposed, on one side, and Federigo Enriques, on the other, did not actually have a conclusive episode, but its end was perceived, for its results on culture, on society and teaching in Italy, as a "defeat" of Enriques. A more careful examination of the events and of the historical context in which it took place seems, however, to clearly demonstrate that we can speak not of a personal (...) defeat of the great mathematician from Livorno, but rather of a defeat of the commendable attempts at cultural and social modernization of Italy in an international perspective, of which Enriques was not the only actor but certainly the most exposed. Such intentions were crushed by the myopic provincial conservatism of the Italian neo-idealism, favored by the fascist regime, concerned only with affirming in the world an alleged autarkic national cultural superiority, based on the traditional literary-humanistic culture, ignoring the progress of the new technical-scientific thought, placed in an international context. Sunto_ La polemica che dal 1908 al 1912 vide contrapposti da una parte Benedetto Croce e Giovanni Gentile e dall’altra Federigo Enriques non ebbe, in realtà, un episodio conclusivo, ma la sua fine è stata percepita, per i suoi esiti sulla cultura, sulla società e sull’insegnamento in Italia, come una “sconfitta” dell’Enriques. Un esame più attento delle vicende e del contesto storico nel quale si svolse sembra, invece, dimostrare chiaramente di poter parlare non di una sconfitta personale del grande matematico livornese, quanto piuttosto di una sconfitta dei lodevoli tentativi di ammodernamento culturale e sociale dell’Italia in una prospettiva internazionale, di cui Enriques non fu l’unico attore ma sicuramente quello più esposto. Tali propositi furono schiacciati dal miope conservatorismo provinciale del neoidealismo italiano, favorito dal regime fascista, preoccupato unicamente di affermare nel mondo una pretesa superiorità culturale nazionale autarchica, basata sulla tradizionale cultura letterario-umanistica, ignorando il progresso del nuovo pensiero tecnico-scientifico, per sua natura, invece, inserito in un contesto internazionale. (shrink)

"Populism" has long been a dirty word. To some, it suggests the tyranny of the mob, to others, a xenophobic nativism. It is sometimes considered conducive to (if not simply identical to) fascism. In this timely book, Walter Horn acquits populism by "distilling" it, in order to finally give the people the power to govern themselves, free from constraints imposed either by conservatives (or libertarians) on the right or liberals (or Marxists) on the left. Beginning with explanations of what (...) it means to vote and what makes one society better off than another, Horn progresses to issues involving what makes for fair aggregation and appropriate, deliberative representation. From suggesting solutions to contemporary problems like gerrymandering, immigration control, and campaign finance, to offering answers to age-old questions like why dissenters should want to obey the majority and who should have the right to vote in various elections, Horn, using his new theory of "CHOICE Voluntarism," provides solutions to some of the most perplexing problems in the history of democratic theory. -/- The Introduction and first chapter can now be read free at Amazon. (shrink)

The land ethic, established by Aldo Leopold and systematically theorised by J. B. Callicott, has deeply influenced modern environmentalism. Despite its influence, Callicottian land ethic has been criticised for having fascist implications, a concern that Callicott has attempted to address. However, there is insufficient philosophical scrutiny of whether it can indeed avoid undesirable implications when applied to the interhuman realm. In this paper, I argue that Callicottian land ethic entails moral conservatism when evaluating socio-political reforms by overestimating the negative impacts (...) of such changes. It also exhibits insufficient concern for human rights due to its strongly collectivist assumption. Though these aspects are not overtly fascist, they do pose significant ethical concerns. To address these issues, I examine Roberta Millstein’s interpretation of Leopold’s work, which provides a promising alternative theorisation of the land ethic by recognising the moral significance of individuals alongside collectives. Nevertheless, further theoretical refinement to Millsteinian land ethic is still needed to fully circumvent the conservative implications, and I propose potential strategies to do so. Such strategies will help ensure that the land ethic aligns with contemporary ethical standards while preserving its pioneering ecocentric perspective. (shrink)

In 1950 Adorno et al .'s The Authoritarian Personality study warned that American society contained a minority of individuals whose characters made them prone to become fascists in certain circumstances and that this was a danger common to contemporary industrial society. After early acclaim critics argued that the main threat came from left-wing authoritarian individuals. But research in several countries failed to establish their existence. We trace and evaluate this debate, largely defending the original research. Subsequent argument suggested that the (...) concept of authoritarianism was becoming outdated in post-industrial society, a view that we strongly challenge. While defending the diagnosis and purpose of the original research, we conclude by endorsing the argument that authoritarianism is better described in terms of attitude rather than personality. This gives a clearer psychological description of political movements of the far right and offers more direct measures for their reduction. (shrink)

This paper sets out to defend human genetic engineering with a new bioethical approach, post-humanism, combined with a radical democratic political framework. Arguments for the restriction of human genetic engineering, and specifically germ-line enhancement, are reviewed. Arguments are divided into those which are fundamental matters of faith, or "bio-Luddite" arguments, and those which can be addressed through public policy, or "gene-angst" arguments.The four bio-Luddite concerns addressed are: Medicine Makes People Sick; There are Sacred Limits of the Natural Order; Technologies Always (...) Serve Ruling Interests; The Genome is Too Complicated to Engineer. I argue that these are matters of faith that one either accepts or rejects, and that I reject.The non-fundamentalist or pragmatic concerns I discuss are: Fascist Applications; The Value of Genetic Diversity; The Geneticization of Life; Genetic Discrimination and Confidentiality; Systematically Bad Decisions by Parents; Discrimination Against the Disabled; Unequal Access; The Decline of Social Solidarity. I conclude that all these concerns can be adequately addressed through a proactive regulative framework administered by a liberal democratic state. Therefore, even germ-line genetic enhancement should eventually made available since the potential benefits greatly outweigh the potential risks. (shrink)

Years before his death, Romualdo Abulad made himself controversial, a controversy that was not so much on his positive contribution to philosophy as his apology for Duterte and his regime. In this paper, Abulad’s apology for Duterte will be discussed. The discussion will be framed from within Abulad’s concept of the post-Machiavelli. This concept was earlier developed by Abulad in a chapter of a book co-authored by Alfredo Co. I argue that his concept of the post-Machiavelli is based on a (...) privileging of The Prince and a reading that is subtly anti-Machiavellian. I further argue that the ethics of the post-Machiavelli, one that is guided by the philosophical compass of postmodernism, provided the ideological support for Duterte and his regime as it is both obscurantist and empty. The ethics of the post-Machiavelli obscures the politics of the regime by way of the ethics of the good. In doing so it legitimizes the political via the ethical. Here, the coupling or intersection of the political and the ethical provided an ideological support of the former by way of the abstract resources of the latter. However, I assert that ethics and politics ought to be decoupled. The ethics of the post-Machiavelli is likewise empty. Such an emptiness allows, at least in the level of theory, a liberal openness and accommodation to virtually any version of (a future) order, including that of fascism. (shrink)

American History X (hereafter AHX) has been accused by numerous critics of a morally dangerous cinematic seduction: using stylish cinematography, editing, and sound, the film manipulates the viewer through glamorizing an immoral and hate-filled neo-nazi protagonist. In addition, there’s the disturbing fact that the film seems to accomplish this manipulation through methods commonly grouped under the category of “fascist aesthetics.” More specifically, AHX promotes its neo-nazi hero through the use of several filmic techniques made famous by Nazi propagandist Leni Riefenstahl. (...) Now most critics admit that, in the end, the film claims to denounce racism and attempts to show us the conversion of the protagonist to the path of righteousness, but they complain that nonetheless the film (perhaps unintentionally) ends up implicitly promoting the immoral worldview it rather superficially professes to reject in its final act. This charge of hypocrisy is connected to another worry: the moral conversion in the film is said to fall flat because the intellectual resources on display to support the character’s racism are not counterbalanced by equally explicit (but superior) arguments for the anti-racist position ultimately embraced by the character. In other words, just as the devil is said to get all the good lines in Milton’s Paradise Lost, in AHX the racists get all the arguments. This has been taken to be a morally problematic flaw of the film. Critics lament that Derek’s conversion seems to result not from relevant logical inferences and valid rational argumentation but from overly simplistic and arguably egoistic insights (e.g., “has anything you've done made your life better?”) combined, perhaps, with a hackneyed cliché (in prison, one of his best friends is a black person!) In this paper I’ll attempt to rebut these charges and defend the film as a powerful, and powerfully moral, work of art. I’ll be suggesting that the seductive techniques employed allow for many viewers a degree of sympathy towards the protagonist that is crucial, both for making that character’s more horrific actions especially unsettling, and also for making his eventual conversion plausible and ultimately compelling. I’ll also argue that the manner in which his conversion is presented is in fact subtler than many critics have allowed: Derek’s transformation is not artificial or implausible but is depicted as resulting from a cumulative series of emotionally powerful life events and personal engagements. It is certainly true that it is not represented in the way some would seemingly have preferred, i.e. as straightforwardly resulting from a process of gradual intellectual improvement in Derek’s reasoning on questions of race and politics. However, I’ll argue that the decidedly emotional basis of his moral evolution is both refreshingly realistic and no hindrance to accepting his conversion as rational. Finally, properly understanding the legitimacy of the emotional foundations of much moral thought will also allow us to appreciate the ways in which our initial worries about this film’s (not insignificant) ability to persuade viewers through the engagement of emotions need not, in itself, be seen as a barrier to endorsing the film as a morally praiseworthy work. (shrink)

The illiberals uphold democracy as a political form devoid of liberal values. The “illiberal democracy” repositions liberalism in the past, and by doing so it also frequently uses a language indistinguishable from that of the left critique of “global neoliberalism.” European leaders of this stripe were staunch supporters of Donald Trump. One of their intellectual figureheads is the French philosopher and journalist, often identified as fascist, Alain de Benoist, who, in his latest book, _Contre le libéralisme_, mobilizes Marx next to (...) the likes of Julius Evola and Alexandr Dugin in virtue of a takedown of global (neo)liberalism. It is never an easy task to paint this entire picture, in its rich complexity, to my leftwing North American friends and colleagues because they too have long despised “liberalism,” a supposed ethos rather than a political doctrine itself. Certainly, liberal political theories have been subject to their critique as well; however, in such discussions too, I have noticed, the target is essentially the presumed ethos rather than the argument of liberalism. The ethos is habitually identified in rhetorical tropes that betray a bourgeois reason – spontaneously equated with liberal – whereas the “academic discussion” comes down to some references to the famous critiques from the 1990s of Kant’s autonomous reason and also to economic reductionism. I am speaking of personal exchanges here and cannot quote, but I mention them to illustrate conversations that might be familiar to the reader as well. (shrink)