Results for 'no-self'

999 found
Order:
  1. The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge: Why Philosophers are Not Entitled to Their Beliefs.János Tőzsér - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Philosophy begins and ends in disagreement. Philosophers disagree among themselves in innumerable ways, and this pervasive and permanent dissent is a sign of their inability to solve philosophical problems and establish substantive truths. This raises the question: What should I do with my philosophical beliefs in light of philosophy's epistemic failure? In this open-access book, János Tozsér develops four possible answers into comprehensive metaphilosophical visions and argues that we cannot find peace either by committing ourselves to one of these visions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. The No Self View and the Meaning of Life.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (2):419-438.
    Several philosophers, both in Buddhist and Western philosophy, claim that the self does not exist. The no-self view may, at first glance, appear to be a reason to believe that life is meaningless. In the present article, I argue indirectly in favor of the no-self view by showing that it does not entail that life is meaningless. I then examine Buddhism and argue, further, that the no-self view may even be construed as partially grounding an account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3. Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism: An Epistemic Analysis.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Imagine a character, Mary Analogue, who has a complete theoretical knowledge of her subject matter: the illusory nature of self. Suppose that when presenting her paper on no self at a conference she suffers stage-fright – a reaction that implies she is under an illusion of the very self whose existence she denies. Might there be something defective about her knowledge of no self? The Buddhist tradition would claim that Mary Analogue, despite her theoretical omniscience, lacks (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  4. Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility.Rick Repetti - 2012 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 19:130-197.
    A critical review of Charles Goodman's view about Buddhism and free will to the effect that Buddhism is hard determinist, basically because he thinks Buddhist causation is definitively deterministic, and he thinks determinism is definitively incompatible with free will, but especially because he thinks Buddhism is equally definitively clear on the non-existence of a self, from which he concludes there cannot be an autonomous self.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5. No Self?: A Look at a Buddhist Argument.William F. Vallicella - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):453-466.
    Central to Buddhist thought and practice is the anattā doctrine. In its unrestricted form the doctrine amounts to the claim that nothing at all possesses self-nature. This article examines an early Buddhist argument for the doctrine. The argument, roughly, is that (i) if anything were a self, it would be both unchanging and self-determining; (ii) nothing has both of these properties; therefore, (iii) nothing is a self. The thesis of this article is that, despite the appearance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions.Jan Westerhoff - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):812-815.
    Amongst its many other merits this collection of essays demonstrates the growing maturity of the study of the Indian philosophical tradition. Much of the good scholarship done on non-Western, and in particular on Indian philosophy over the last decades has attempted to show that these texts hailing from east of Suez contain interesting and sophisticated discussions in their own right, discussions that have to be understood against the Ancient Indian intellectual and cultural context rather than evaluated by how closely they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Insight and the no‐self in deep brain stimulation.Laura Specker Sullivan - 2018 - Bioethics 33 (4):487-494.
    Ethical analyses of the effects of neural interventions commonly focus on changes to personality and behavior, interpreting these changes in terms of authenticity and identity. These phenomena have led to debate among ethicists about the meaning of these terms for ethical analysis of such interventions. While these theoretical approaches have different criteria for ethical significance, they agree that patients’ reports are concerning because a sense of self is valuable. In this paper, I question this assumption. I propose that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. Review: No Morality, No Self, by James Doyle. [REVIEW]Katharina Nieswandt - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):102-106.
    James Doyle’s book is provocative and timely. It is an important contribution to the current wave of Anscombe scholarship, and it offers valuable insights into general metaethical ques­tions, such as: In what senses might morality be “unintelligible”? Or: To what extent does a divine law ethics rest on practical reason? Here, I do not want to summarize the many ad­mirable features of Doyle’s book. I will instead focus on his two main theses, of which I re­main unconvinced.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. A Mindful Bypassing: Mindfulness, Trauma and the Buddhist Theory of No-Self.Julien Tempone-Wiltshire & Traill Dowie - 2024 - Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies 23 (1):149-174.
    This article examines the Buddhist idea of anātman, ‘no- self ’ and pudgala, ‘the person’ in relation to the notion of ‘self ’ emerging from contemporary cognitive science. The Buddhist no-self doctrine is enriched by the cognitive scientist’s understanding of the multiple facets of selfhood, or structures of experience, and the causative action of a functional self in the world. A proper understanding of the Buddhist concepts of anātman and pudgala proves critical to mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Freedom of the Will and No-Self in Buddhism.Pujarini Das & Vineet Sahu - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (1):121-138.
    The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. 'I' am a Fiction: An Analysis of the No-self Theories.Vineet Sahu - 2012 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1-2):117-128.
    The pronoun ‘I’ refers to myself from the first-person perspective and a person (me) from the third person perspective. Essentially there is something common between the two perspectives taken: ‘I’ from the first person perspective refers to ‘self’; from the third person perspective refers to a ‘person’. Now ‘self’ and ‘person’ signify the same concept. ‘Self’ is a term used in context of first-person statements and ‘person’ is a term used in third person contexts. Both the terms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Community of No-Self: The Ethical-Existential Structure of Community in Watsuji Tetsurō and Jean-Luc Nancy.Anton Luis Sevilla - 2012 - In Applied Ethics: Theories, Methods and Cases. Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy. pp. 48-61.
    This paper is an analysis of one theoretical facet of the problem of Buddhist participation in closed nationalist discourses: the essential relationship between the dislocation of subjectivity (or the emptying of ego) and the formation of communities (such as a nation-state or a Volk). Through this, I hope to explore the effects disciplines of subjectivity (including Buddhism) might have on socio-political formations (such as closed nationalism or imperialism). In order to do so, I will compare two key works in which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. The Ethics of Interconnectedness: Charles Taylor, No-Self, and Buddhism.Ashwani Kumar Peetush - 2018 - In Gordon F. Davis (ed.), Ethics Without Self, Dharma Without Atman: Western and Buddhist Philosophical Traditions in Dialogue. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 235-251.
    My aim in this paper is to chart what I see as parallels between the ontology of self in Charles Taylor’s work and that of various Buddhist ‘no-self’ views, along with parallels between Taylor’s commitment to reviving republican ideas and some aspects of Buddhist ethics. I see key resemblances and overlaps at the level of metaphysics as well as ethics. For Taylor, the sorts of atomistic accounts of self that have come to be accepted as natural and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism by James Doyle. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):176-177.
    James Doyle’s book interprets and defends the arguments of G. E. M. Anscombe’s essays “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person.” Though both essays are widely cited, Doyle argues that in each instance Anscombe’s readers have missed the force of her arguments, which, when properly understood, are able to withstand the common objections to them.Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” is commonly read as arguing that talk of moral obligation, permission etc., once had a legitimate place within conceptual frameworks that included the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Can the Chariot Take Us to the Land of No Self?William F. Vallicella - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:29-33.
    This paper examines a famous argument for the Buddhist doctrine of anatta ("no self) according to which nothing possesses self-nature or substantial reality. The argument unfolds during a debate between the monk Nagasena and King Milinda (Menandros). Nagasena's challenge to the King is that he demonstrate the substantial reality of the chariot in which he arrived at their meeting when said chariot is (i) not identical to any one of its proper parts, (ii) not identical to the mereological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  66
    “Confucius, Aristotle, and a New `Right’ to Connect China to the West: What Concepts of `Self’ and `Right’ We Might Have without the Christian Notion of Original Sin?” Self or No-Self? The Debate about Selflessness and the Sense of Self, ed. Ingolf U. Dalferth. 269-299. (DOI: 10.1628/978-3-16-155355-4).Sinkwan Cheng (ed.) - 2017 - Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
    Concepts of “self” and “right” in three civilizations: primarily Confucian and ancient Greek, with references to Aristotle’s medieval Christian commentators; Uses the classical Greek and Chinese traditions’ common incompatibility with modern liberal notion of “right” to explore the commonalities between them, and on that basis endeavors to connect the East to the West with a “right” that could better harmonize the self with society, right with duty, and negative with positive freedom.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Self-location is no problem for conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
    How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  18. No Masters Above: Testing Five Arguments for Self-Employment.Inigo González-Ricoy & Jahel Queralt - 2021 - In Keith Breen (ed.), The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work: Whither Work? Routledge.
    Despite renewed interest in work, philosophers have largely ignored self-employment. This neglect is surprising, not just because self-employment was central to classic philosophizing about work, but also given that half of the global workforce today, including one in seven workers in OECD countries, are self-employed. We start off by offering a definition of self-employment, one that accounts for its various forms while avoiding misclassifying dependent self-employed workers as independent contractors, and by mapping the barriers to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. No Last Resort: Pitting the Right to Die Against the Right to Medical Self-Determination.Michael Cholbi - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):143-157.
    Many participants in debates about the morality of assisted dying maintain that individuals may only turn to assisted dying as a ‘last resort’, i.e., that a patient ought to be eligible for assisted dying only after she has exhausted certain treatment or care options. Here I argue that this last resort condition is unjustified, that it is in fact wrong to require patients to exhaust a prescribed slate of treatment or care options before being eligible for assisted dying. The last (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. We Don't Need No Noumena? Freedom Through Rational Self-Cultivation in Kant.Louise R. Chapman - 2016 - Pli 1 (Special Volume: Self-Cultivation):55-69.
    In this paper I argue that we find in Kant a more plausible alternative to his transcendental conception of freedom. In the Metaphysics of Morals in particular, we find a naturalistic conception of freedom premised upon a theory of rational self-cultivation. The motivation for a naturalising reading of Kant is two-fold. On the one hand, a naturalistic conception of freedom avoids the charges levelled against Kant’s 'panicky metaphysics', which both forces us to accept an ontologically extravagant picture of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Vows Without a Self.Kevin Berryman, Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (20):1-20.
    Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅgha. However, the prominence of vows (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Self-control, Attention, and How to live without Special Motivational Powers.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In M. Brent & Lisa Miracchi (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. Routledge. pp. 272-300.
    It has been argued that the explanation of self-control requires positing special motivational powers. Some think that we need will-power as an irreducible mental faculty; others that we need to think of the active self as a dedicated and depletable pool of psychic energy or – in today more respectable terminology – mental resources; finally, there is the idea that self-control requires postulating a deep division between reason and passion – a deliberative and an emotional motivational system. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. Self-fulfilling Prophecy in Practical and Automated Prediction.Owen C. King & Mayli Mertens - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (1):127-152.
    A self-fulfilling prophecy is, roughly, a prediction that brings about its own truth. Although true predictions are hard to fault, self-fulfilling prophecies are often regarded with suspicion. In this article, we vindicate this suspicion by explaining what self-fulfilling prophecies are and what is problematic about them, paying special attention to how their problems are exacerbated through automated prediction. Our descriptive account of self-fulfilling prophecies articulates the four elements that define them. Based on this account, we begin (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Non-Self and Ethics: Kantian and Buddhist Themes.Emer O'Hagan - 2018 - In Davis Gordon (ed.), Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman: Western and Buddhist Philosophical Traditions in Dialogue. Springer. pp. 145-159.
    After distinguishing between a metaphysical and a contemplative strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine, I argue that the latter allows for the illumination of significant and under-discussed Kantian affinities with Buddhist views of the self and moral psychology. Unlike its metaphysical counterpart, the contemplative strategy interpretation, understands the doctrine of no-self as a technique of perception, undertaken from the practical standpoint of action. I argue that if we think of the contemplative strategy version of the no-self (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. A Jangada do Self: Usos Soteriológicos do Eu e do Não-Eu no Buddhismo Antigo.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2019 - Paralellus 10 (24):279-294.
    O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Quantum no-go theorems and consciousness.Danko Georgiev - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (4):683-695.
    Our conscious minds exist in the Universe, therefore they should be identified with physical states that are subject to physical laws. In classical theories of mind, the mental states are identified with brain states that satisfy the deterministic laws of classical mechanics. This approach, however, leads to insurmountable paradoxes such as epiphenomenal minds and illusionary free will. Alternatively, one may identify mental states with quantum states realized within the brain and try to resolve the above paradoxes using the standard Hilbert (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. No Being Sure of Myself.Derek Lam - manuscript
    It’s intuitive to think that an intentional action requires that the agent knows that she’s doing so. In light of some apparent counterexamples, Setiya suggests that this intuitive insight is better captured in terms of credence: performing an intentional action requires the agent to have a higher credence that she’s doing so than she would have otherwise. I argue that there is no such thing as an agent’s credence for what she’s doing. After distinguishing this thesis from an idea some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Self as the Personal Scapegoat of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism: A Comparative Analysis and Treatise on the Universal Manifestation of the Christ Figure.Asher Zachman - manuscript
    In this paper, I elucidate the scapegoat construct and its necessary psychological presence within theistic and atheistic variations of the narrative self, as well as the Chinese and Japanese variations of the Buddhist no-self, and enumerate the ritual processes undertaken by these practitioners to create, banish, and sacrifice their respective motifs of applied blame. I attempt to substantiate the inward and outward transcendent manifestations of this construct as the identifying qualities of the Christ figure, and the harmful external (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-Deception.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (2):203-226.
    Wright’s judgement-dependent account of intention is an attempt to show that truths about a subject’s intentions can be viewed as constituted by the subject’s own best judgements about those intentions. The judgements are considered to be best if they are formed under certain cognitively optimal conditions, which mainly include the subject’s conceptual competence, attentiveness to the questions about what the intentions are, and lack of any material self-deception. Offering a substantive, non-trivial specification of the no-self-deception condition is one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Virtue, self-mastery, and the autocracy of practical reason.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2014 - In Lara Denis & Oliver Sensen (eds.), Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-238.
    As analysis of Kant’s account of virtue in the Lectures on Ethics shows that Kant thinks of virtue as a form of moral self-mastery or self-command that represents a model of self-governance he compares to an autocracy. In light of the fact that the very concept of virtue presupposes struggle and conflict, Kant insists that virtue is distinct from holiness and that any ideal of moral perfection that overlooks the fact that morality is always difficult for us (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Self-Knowledge and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 1998 - In Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. CSLI Publications. pp. 333-349.
    In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge by showing that an argument for incompatibilism from switching scenarios fails. Given the inclusion theory of self-knowledge, the hypothesis according to which I am having twater thoughts while thinking that I have water thoughts simply isn't a (entertainable) possibility. When I am on Earth thinking earthian concepts, I cannot believe that I am thinking that twater is wet for I don't have the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32. No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.
    Conciliationism is the family of views that rationality requires agents to reduce confidence or suspend belief in p when acknowledged epistemic peers (i.e. agents who are (approximately) equally well-informed and intellectually capable) disagree about p. While Conciliationism is prima facie plausible, some have argued that Conciliationism is not an adequate theory of peer disagreement because it is self-undermining. Responses to this challenge can be put into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: the Solution Responses which deny Conciliationism is (...)-undermining and attempt to provide arguments which demonstrate this; and the Skeptical Responses which accept that Conciliationism is self-undermining but attempt to mitigate this result by arguing this is either impermanent and/or not very worrisome. I argue that, by Conciliationism’s own lights, both kinds of responses (almost certainly) fail to save Conciliationism from being self-undermining. Thus, Conciliationism is (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining. This result is significant because it demonstrates that Conciliationism is likely hopeless: there is likely nothing that can save Conciliationism from this challenge. I further argue that Conciliationism, like any view, should be abandoned if it is (almost certainly) hopeless. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Self‐Motion and Cognition: Plato's Theory of the Soul.Douglas R. Campbell - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):523-544.
    I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation, and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian discrimination (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34. Self-Employment and Independence.Iñigo González-Ricoy - 2023 - In Julian David Jonker & Grant J. Rozeboom (eds.), Working as Equals: Relational Egalitarianism and the Workplace. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Self-employment merits protection and promotion, we often hear, because it confers independence from a boss. But what, if anything, is wrong with having a boss? On one of the two views that this chapter inspects, being under the power of a boss is objectionable as such, no matter how suitably checked this power may be, for it undermines workers’ agency. On a second view, which republican theorists favor, what is objectionable is subjection not to the power of a boss (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Radical enactivism and self-knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (141):723-743.
    ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. A self-consistent opponent-colors theory.Tal Hendel - manuscript
    Hering’s opponent-colors theory suggests that our color sensations are produced by three mechanisms: a red–green mechanism, a yellow–blue mechanism, and a white–black mechanism. The first two mechanisms give rise to our sensations of hued colors; the third mechanism gives rise to our sensations of hueless colors. Noticeably, whereas the pair of colors produced by each of the hued mechanisms do not mix to yield a phenomenal intermediate (i.e., there are no greenish reds, reddish greens, yellowish blues, or bluish yellows), the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. The skill of self-control.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6251-6273.
    Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  39. One self: The logic of experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.
    Imagine that you and a duplicate of yourself are lying unconscious, next to each other, about to undergo a complete step-by-step exchange of bits of your bodies. It certainly seems that at no stage in this exchange of bits will you have thereby switched places with your duplicate. Yet it also seems that the end-result, with all the bits exchanged, will be essentially that of the two of you having switched places. Where will you awaken? I claim that one and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  40. The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self from the Personal Level.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. One Self per Customer? From Disunified Agency to Disunified Self.David Lumsden & Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):314-335.
    The notion of an agent and the notion of a self are connected, for agency is one role played by the self. Millgram argues for a disunity thesis of agency on the basis of extreme incommensurability across some major life events. We propose a similar negative thesis about the self, that it is composed of relatively independent threads reflecting the different roles and different mind-sets of the person's life. Our understanding of those threads is based on theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self.Christian Coseru - 2019 - In Manidipa Sen (ed.), Problem of the Self: Consciousness, Subjectivity, and the Other. New Delhi, India: Aatar Books. pp. 46–64.
    It is generally agreed that consciousness is a somewhat slippery term. However, more narrowly defined as 'phenomenal consciousness' it captures at least three essential features or aspects: subjective experience (the notion that what we are primarily conscious of are experiences), subjective knowledge (that feature of our awareness that gives consciousness its distinctive reflexive character), and phenomenal contrast (the phenomenality of awareness, absence of which makes consciousness intractable) (cf. Siewert 1998). If Buddhist accounts of consciousness are built, as it is claimed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
    I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  44. Self- Deprecation and the Habit of Laughter.Camille Atkinson - 2015 - Florida Philosophical Review 15 (1):19-36.
    My objective here is to give an account of self-deprecating humor—examining what works, what doesn't, and why—and to reflect on the significance of the audience response. More specifically, I will be focusing not only on the purpose or intention behind self-deprecating jokes, but considering how their consequences might render them successful or unsuccessful. For example, under what circumstances does self-deprecation tend to put listeners at ease, and when is this type of humor more likely to put people (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail.George Bealer - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can be defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction of ontologically prior realizations. Ideological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only be defined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of their interaction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argument establishes: ontological functionalism is mistaken because its proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations into the contents of self-consciousness; ideological functionalism is the only viable alternative for functionalists. Michael (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. Space and Self-Awareness.John Louis Schwenkler - 2009 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    How should we think about the role of visual spatial awareness in perception and perceptual knowledge? A common view, which finds a characteristic expression in Kant but has an intellectual heritage reaching back farther than that, is that an account of spatial awareness is fundamental to a theory of experience because spatiality is the defining characteristic of “outer sense”, of our perceptual awareness of how things are in the parts of the world that surround us. A natural counterpart to this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Self-Employment and the Brute Force Concern (2023).Klier David - manuscript
    The brute force concern suggests that self-employment is favorable because being wage-employed entails following directives from an outside source. Gonzalez-Ricoy suggests that there are other instances where following an outside source is favorable, and thus, the brute force concern is no concern at all. In this article, I suggest there to be a difference between those outside directives that are favorable, and wage-employment directives from an employer.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Temporal Dynamism and the Persisting Stable Self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes, and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self.Miri Albahari - 2006 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    We spend our lives protecting an elusive self - but does the self actually exist? Drawing on literature from Western philosophy, neuroscience and Buddhism (interpreted), the author argues that there is no self. The self - as unified owner and thinker of thoughts - is an illusion created by two tiers. A tier of naturally unified consciousness (notably absent in standard bundle-theory accounts) merges with a tier of desire-driven thoughts and emotions to yield the impression of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  50. Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā.Miri Albahari - 2002 - Asian Philosophy 12 (1):5-20.
    Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anatt?). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (?tman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of ?tman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
1 — 50 / 999