There have been several recent defenses of biocentric individualism, the position that all living beings have at least some moral standing, simply insofar as they are alive. I develop a virtue-based version of biocentric individualism, focusing on a virtue of reverence for life. In so doing, I attempt to show that such a virtuebased approach allows us to avoid common objections to biocentric individualism, based on its supposed impracticability (or, on the other hand, its emptiness).

Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Schweitzer end up defending radically similar, yet critically opposed conclusions about the human animal and its place in nature, particularly with regard to the ethical awareness that does or does not follow from this situatedness. Arthur Schopenhauer’s notion of the will accounts for their similar foundational assumptions. But what accounts for the fact that their shared desire to affirm the will to life leads to fundamentally opposed ethical conclusions? What keeps Schweitzer’s ascetic ethic of (...) class='Hi'>reverence for life from evolving into Nietzsche’s anti-ascetic vision of a second innocence beyond good and evil? We argue that situating the notion of reverence for life within an environmental virtue ethics, as one environmental virtue among many, aiming at ecological conversion, better articulates and motivates the disposition demanded by the ethics of reverence for life. (shrink)

The theories of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker arise from an existential and psychological analysis of the death terror/anxiety deep in the unconscious of every human. Becker details how this anxiety governs the ideologies and behaviors of our species—something now confirmed by thousands of experiments performed by psychologists engaged in contemporary terror management theory (TMT). Humans manage their anxiety through what Becker terms “hero systems”—concepts, beliefs, and myths we create to give us a sense of significance and meaning during, and even (...) beyond our mortal lives. Today, many dominant economic, technological, and religious hero systems seek to confirm our significance by denying that we are—like all other species—animals who must exist in a decaying, mortal body. Becker shows how this attempt to deny our “creatureliness” (basic biological nature) causes humans to stand against the natural world we are embedded in, leading to an assault on the planet and nonhuman animals. As a result, Becker believed pacifism was the only hero system capable of keeping humankind from destroying itself and the earth. Pacifism is the precursor to the more encompassing ethical concept of “reverence for life,” advocated by Dr. Albert Schweitzer. By respecting the will-to-live in all sentient beings, reverence for life transcends concern for humans alone and extends moral and physical safeguards to life as such. Confronting the fact that humans are increasingly alienated from their commodified world and their own being, reverence for life stands as a vital solution to many of our modern problems. And following contemporary TMT research, reverencing life can also expand one’s self-esteem, which research shows lowers death anxiety, reduces aggression, and offers authentic meaning to life itself. (shrink)

This article explains and defends reverence as a cardinal ethical value in the Western philosophical tradition, which was considered an underpinning value in ancient society, and it then gradually declined over time. Many contemporary Western philosophers embark on respect rather than reverence. Reverence and respect are not the same. Reverence is all-inclusive, while respect is limited. Reverence values the genuine person, while respect may flatter a powerful arrogant person. Reverence is a cardinal moral and (...) political value necessary for decent politics, education, law, economics, and religion. Reverence is not only essential for becoming a perfect human person but also for instituting a good society. To expound the notion of reverence in the Western tradition, I select four significant Western intellectuals: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and Paul Woodruff. Goethe posits a tripartite account of reverence: reverence for God, Earth, and human beings. Russell argues for reverence in politics and education. Schweitzer not only developed his account of reverence but also lived his life according to it. Schweitzer declares that his life is his argument, which is reverence for life, life in all its forms. Woodruff intends to revive the notion of reverence in global politics and ethics. So, the article examines the accounts of reverence posited by Goethe, Russell, Schweitzer, and Woodruff and defends its role as a cardinal moral and political value vital for politics, education, and religion for acquiring the common good in the world. (shrink)

Victoria Davion in “Itch Scratching, Patio Building, and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited” takes biocentric individualism to task, focusing in particular on my paper, “Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue.” Davion levels a wide-range of criticisms, and concludes that we humans would be better off putting biocentric individualism aside to focus on more important issues and positions. Worries raised by Davion can be defended by elaborating on the position laid out in the original paper, including a (...) background normative theory appealing to hypothetical virtuous ideal observers, upon which the position is drawn. Many of her criticisms appear to arise out of misreading or ignoring what is explicitly argued. When these misconstruals are corrected, it becomes clear that there is still space for a viable virtue of reverence for life. (shrink)

I explore the place of manners in the moral life, particularly with regard to their role in virtue education and in expressing virtue. The approach developed here is Aristotelian and Confucian in character. I identify and discuss three crucial functions of good manners: (1) they help social life to go well; (2) they often involve ways of showing respect or reverence for that which is respect-worthy or reverence-worthy; and (3) they ennoble our animal nature via an (...) acquired second nature. In light of this account I also discuss how concerns about arbitrariness, oppressiveness, and dishonesty with respect to manners can be overcome. (shrink)

This article explains and examines the ethical implications of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy for human development and global peace. The article addresses the problem of whether Kant’s philosophy advances human development and global peace. I argue that Kant’s philosophy promotes human development and global peace. The argument is based on the following premises: Kant’s moral philosophy supports reverence for humanity. Reverence for humanity promotes the cultivation of human potential, such as rationality. Kant considers rationality a property par excellence in (...) human persons, making them superior to other animals; so, rationality is a guiding principle that makes human persons worthy of reverence. Rationality helps resolve conflicts among people in a society. Moreover, Kant’s political philosophy promotes cooperation among states, eventually leading to global peace. Peace and human development depend on each other: human development develops positive peace, and negative peace augments human development. Kant’s ethics of reverence for humanity promotes positive peace, while his politics of cosmopolitan rights creates negative peace among states. Negative peace is the absence of violence, while positive peace refers to activities affirming life. In general, Kant’s moral and political philosophy is characteristically rational and cosmopolitan, which strives to cultivate natural capacities among human persons across the states, which enhances human development and global peace. In the arena of qualitative research, this article uses the method of empirically informed philosophical analysis to examine journal papers, scholarly books, proceedings of conferences, and congresses. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that benevolence is not the whole of the moral life, but it is not as widely appreciated that benevolence is an irreducible part of that life. This paper argues that Kantian efforts to characterize benevolence, or something like it, in terms of reverence for rational agency fall short. Such reverence, while credibly an important part of the moral life, is no more the whole of it than benevolence.

As with so many mystics, Alexis karpouzos intuitively know the oneness of cosmic creation and historic humanity as part of all that is and all there isn't. So, the originality of Alexis Karpouzos thought is that it crosses the most diverse fields, the most opposing philosophies, to unite them into an often contradictory and broken whole. Marx and Heidegger, Nietzsche, Freud and Heraclitus, poets and political theorists all come together in the same distance and the same unusual proximity. Alexis karpouzos (...) use Pre-Socratics philosophy and generally the ancient Greek philosophy, as well as the pre-philosophical thinking of The Upanishads, the Vedas and Buddhism in India, of Lao Tzu, of Zen Buddhism and the Taoist tradition in China, of the Arab mystics and poets, with their metaphysical religiosity as the metaphysical basis for the interpretation and understanding of the world and existence. At the same time the ancient metaphysics is connect with Hegel’s dialectical ontology and with the modern thinking of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, and others as the interpretive context for understanding the central problems of the technical and scientific world during his time. Novalis, Hölderlin, Rimbaud, Whitman, Eliot and others show the dreamy nature of existence, the transcendence of the Cosmos, welcome the infinity. For Alexis karpouzos the combination of ancient and modern thought creates the holistic experience of universal space-time and the consciousness of the unity. The poetic thought of Alexis karpouzos is a expressions of soul's inner experiences, expression of universality. The inspiring visual images and the symbolic use of language offer a description of elevating experiences of consciousness, a glimpse of higher worlds. The philosophy of Alexis karpouzos speak to the human experience from a universal perspective, transcending all religions, cultural and national boundaries. Using vivid images and a direct language that speaks to the heart, his philosophy evokes a sense of deep communication with the collective unconscious, a sense of connection to all the creatures of the world, compassion for others, admiration for the beauty of nature, reverence for all life, and an abiding faith in the invisible touch of world. Alexis karpouzos thoughts are often terse and paradoxical, challenging us to to break out of the box of limiting beliefs and see things from a new perspective. Above all, Alexis karpouzos continually calls to us to wake up and explore the mysteries within our own selves, i.e the mysteries of universe. (shrink)

This piece continues ideas developed in my essay, Mind Matters, through responding to the critique of that essay by Peter K. Manning. Manning cannot conceive that human conduct involves full-bodied semiosis rather than disembodied conceptualism, and that the study of human signification requires a full-bodied understanding. The ancient Greek root phren, basis for the concept of phronesis, is rooted in the heart-lungs-solar plexus basis of bodily awareness, and provides a metaphor for a discussion of bio-developmental, biosemiotic capacities as crucial for (...) human culture. Manning’s use of Wittgenstein is contrasted with the outlook of Charles Peirce. The intense attunement to and reverence for animals and plants in hunter-gatherer peoples is more than some conceptual collective representations system or interaction order or psychological belief system, explainable by Durkheim or Goffman, or Jung’s universal structure of the “collective unconscious,” or by neural net theory. It exemplifies how those peoples are in real learning relationships to the instinctive intelligence of their habitats, deep learning expressed not only in trial-and-error experience but also in the sense of wonder, communicated in ritual life. Mind is found literally in those transactions, not in isolate brains or disembodied conceptualism. (shrink)

Religion is an organized collection of beliefs, cultural systems and world view that relate humanity to spirituality and sometimes also with moral values. It may be said that it is a belief in and reverence for a supernatural power or powers regarded as creator and governor of the universe. Many religions have narratives, symbols and sacred history and traditions that are intended to give a meaning of life or to explain the origin of the life and the (...) universe. They tend to drive morality, ethics, faith and religious laws and or preferred a lifestyle from their ideas about the cosmos and human nature. But in the present world religious faiths are treated like a brand. The process of branding involved in creating a unique name and image for a product in the consumers' mind, mainly through advertising campaigns with a consistent theme. Branding aims to establish a significant and differentiated presence in the market that attracts and retains loyal customers. In a society overrun by commercial clutter, religion has become yet another product sold in the consumer marketplace, and faiths of all kinds must compete with a myriad of more entertaining and more convenient leisure activities. (shrink)

This paper compares the naturalistic interpretations of religion offered by the Chinese Confucian philosopher Xunzi (c. 310-219 BCE) and the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952), and shows how each philosopher reconceived the nature of religious life in fundamentally non-supernatural, ethical, and therapeutic terms. While acknowledging that there are important differences between their respective views—especially on such matters as the nature and scope of ethical knowledge, the nature of ethics, and what form an ideal society will take—and that their (...) views were furthermore shaped by very different historical and cultural contexts, the paper argues that both philosophers nevertheless took this naturalized, ethical and therapeutic conception of religion to be the correct and more profound way to understand religious life, and the best way to develop an appropriate sense of oneness with and reverence for the social and natural worlds that we inhabit. For both Xunzi and Dewey, in short, religious attitudes, experiences, and practices are valuable not because they put us into proper relations with something supernatural, but rather because of their capacity to orient and enrich our lives at both the individual and social levels and put us into proper relations with other human beings and the natural world. Overall, the paper argues that a comparative study of Xunzi’s and Dewey’s interpretations of religion not only reveals features of their thought that we might otherwise miss, but also helps us to better understand the range of possible forms that a naturalistic interpretation of religion can take. (shrink)

Guru Nanak holds a prominent position among the pioneers of Period of Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries) and occupies a unique place amongst the spiritual leaders, preceptors, reformers and saints of India. His teachings have universal appeal and are good for all ages. The impact of his teachings on the Indian society has been incredible. He travelled far and wide to dispense his message of love, peace, devotion to God, social justice, religious toleration and universal brotherhood. He was a great (...) thinker, a wonderful mystic and a distinguished social reformer. He was a revolutionary prophet, a litterateur of high caliber and a person of extraordinary foresight. In addition to all this Guru Nanak was a man with a great love and reverence for Kudrat (Nature). Guru Nanak’s teachings and several incidents of his life confirms this fact. In this article, the concept of Kudrat (Nature) as enunciated by Guru Nanak in his hymns is described. (shrink)

This article explains Muhammad Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity and determines how it fits with Islamic ethics. The cardinal goal of Islamic ethics is reverence for humanity. The Arabic expression ‘Islam’ means ‘peace’. The cardinal claim of Islamic ethics is that human beings deserve reverence because they are created with the best conformation. The Arabic phrase Ahsan al-Taqweem refers to the best conformation, which means a wide range of unique physical, metaphysical, moral, aesthetic and cognitive potentials. (...) From a broader perspective, Islamic ethics foster reverence for humanity based on three primary moral and political values: equality, freedom, and fraternity. Drawing on the Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that all human beings are worthy of reverence irrespective of their racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic disparities because of their distinctive potentials, such as creativity, freedom, and knowledge. These potentials are preordained in human beings by birth. To develop these potentials, Iqbal posits his theory of egohood which fosters unique individuality. Under certain conditions, such as individual-society relationships, freedom, equality, and fraternity, Iqbal insists on developing these potentials to acquire the status of a perfect human. According to Iqbal, a perfect human is a God’s vicegerent on earth, who collaborates with Him in creation. Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity emancipates human beings from poverty, war, violence, humiliation, discrimination, exploitation, hatred, and destruction. Yet, Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity furnishes human beings with prosperity, peace, self-respect, equality, dignity, friendship, fraternity, and survival on earth. Thus, Iqbal’s ethics of reverence for humanity is consistent with Islam’s ethics of reverence for humanity. (shrink)

Philosophy for Life is a bold call for the practice of philosophy in our everyday lives. Philosopher and writer Rupert Read explores a series of important and often provocative contemporary political and cultural issues from a philosophical perspective, arguing that philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but a practice, a vantage point from which life should be analysed and, more importantly, acted upon. -/- Philosophy for Life is a personal journey that explores four key areas of (...) society today: Politics, Religion, Art, and the Environment. Taking tangible examples from modern politics, from climate change to the war on terror, and culture, from Peter Jackson's Lord of the Rings film trilogy to the poetry of T.S. Eliot, Read shows that philosophy is already an active part of today's world. This captivating and timely book offers a philosophical response to some of the key questions facing today's society and encourages us to use philosophy as a kind of therapy. Philosophy for Life shows that we can improve our perspective on the world and our place in it by doing philosophy everyday. (shrink)

We give a mechanism for how awareness could (indeed *must*) continue after death.

I begin by constructing a religio-philosophical argument informed by ideas salient in the African tradition for thinking that we should express gratitude to God for having been giving a dignity-conferring life-force, after which I defend the argument from value-theoretic criticisms (I set aside metaphysical issues altogether). For example, I respond to the objections that having an inherent dignity is not a benefit of a sort warranting gratitude and that those with bad lives have no reason to be grateful. I (...) conclude roughly that, while those with unavoidably bad lives indeed have some reason to be disappointed about the quality of their life, that is compatible with there also being some reason for them to express gratitude for their dignified life-force. I conclude the chapter by considering the prospects for secularizing the African rationale. (shrink)

Many religious thinkers hold the immortality requirement, the view that immortality of some kind is necessary for life to have meaning. After clarifying the nature of the immortality requirement, this essay examines three central arguments for it. The article establishes that existing versions of these arguments fail to entail the immortality requirement. The essay then reconstructs the arguments, and it shows that once they do plausibly support the immortality requirement, they equally support the God-centred requirement, the view that God's (...) existence is a necessary condition for life to be meaningful. The paper concludes by explaining why we should expect any argument for the immortality requirement also to constitute an argument for the God-centred requirement. (shrink)

A mechanism for life after death is given.

In this special issue we will investigate, from the perspective of agricultural ethics the potential to develop a Responsible Research and Innovation approach to agriculture, and the limitations to such an enterprise. RRI is an emerging field in the European research and innovation policy context that aims to balance economic, socio-cultural and environmental aspects in innovation processes. Because technological innovations can contribute significantly to the solution of societal challenges like climate change or food security, but can also have negative societal (...) consequences, it is assumed that social and ethical aspects should be considered during the R&I process. For this reason, the emerging concept of RRI calls for ethical reflection on the nature, scope and applicability of responsibility and innovation in innovation practices in general, and the way social–ethical issues can be applied and addressed in agriculture. (shrink)

The cicada catcher focuses as much on technique as he does on outcomes. In response to Confucius’ question, he articulates in detail the learning he has undertaken to develop techniques at each level of competence. This chapter explains the connection between the cicada catcher’s development of technique and his orientation toward outcomes. It uses details in this story to contribute to recent discussions in epistemology on the cultivation of technique.

“Two things are constant, but one remains true. Changes and challenges are inevitable, but God is man’s hope to win them.” (Pentang, 2022).

Does one’s love for a particular person, when it is pure, also constitute a love of life? The significance of speaking about leading a passionate life, I submit, is found in the spontaneous, embodied character of opening up to and finding meaning in one’s life rather than in heightened fleeting feelings or experiences of meaning that help one forget life’s meaninglessness. I contrast this view with Simone Weil’s suspicion that our passionate attachment to another person is (...) an obstacle to attending to him or her from the distance proper to love and friendship. From that perspective it appears as if the meaning with which personal love endows life is mostly illusory, including the loss of meaning characteristic of grief. I question whether Weil’s view should be seen as an unconditional, though for most unattainable, ideal of love, or if it is rather expressive of a rejection of one of the central features of love: the vulnerability that ensues from the recognition that when we love there are times where we stand in need of the other’s love to be able to embrace life as meaningful. (shrink)

This article explores the meeting of two approaches towards philosophy and education: the philosophy for children approach advocated by Lipman and others, and Schmid’s philosophical concept of Lebenskunst. Schmid explores the concept of the beautiful or good life by asking what is necessary for each individual to be able to develop their own art of living and which aspects of life are significant when shaping a good and beautiful life. One element of Schmid’s theory is the practical (...) application of philosophy through the notions of Bildung, reflection, prudence and practical wisdom, as well as the requirement for each individual to take responsibility for actively shaping their life as an artwork. In this sense, each person is the artist responsible for living their own beautiful life. We argue that there are useful parallels between Schmid’s concept of the art of living and P4C, such as the ideal of a holistic philosophy that is “lived.” The pragmatic approach of P4C focuses on the embodied learner who practices critical, caring and creative thinking. Both P4C and Schmid’s theory are reminiscent of the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom, which allows for an approach to an education for life that prepares students to develop their own art of living. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s name has become almost synonymous with militant atheism. Born into a pious Christian family, this son of a Lutheran pastor declared himself the Antichrist. But could this have been yet another of his masks of hardness? Nietzsche rarely revealed his innermost self in the published writings, and this can be gleaned mainly from his private letters and the accounts of friends. These sources bring to light the philosopher’s inner struggle with his own, deeply religious nature.Losing his father at a (...) young age was a calamity from which Nietzsche never recovered, and I argue that his famous thought-image “God is dead” was a transfiguration of the painful memory of this loss. In this essay, I trace Nietzsche’s tortuous path from an ardent devotee of God to a vociferous critic of Christianity, a path that was punctuated with veiled longings for a loving deity. Deep in his heart, he remained faithful to Christian ideals. Rather like Cordelia, the only truly loving daughter of King Lear, Nietzsche refused to utter words of intense affection and reverence, as these had been blatantly devalued and corrupted. Instead, he adopted a mask of a wrongdoer and a blasphemer who took not the punishment but the guilt.Nietzsche’s attitude to religion is discussed from the perspective of his life, his personality, and his mental condition. The discussion draws on psychoanalytical concepts of Freud, Erikson, Winnicott and Kohut. This is not an exclusive reading, but complementary to other studies in this field. (shrink)

Satisfaction or contentment is deficient in our intelligent world, for entropy is at its prodigality accompanying the egoistic human mind. The lesser beings are content with what is provided, seem more beholden of being created, rather than the selfish unsatisfied human, whose desire to gain has no limit leaving the body unsatisfied to deteriorate thy own soul and its existence and of the others. The cause of entropy is human intelligence and the falsified superiority of human consciousness that leaves the (...) body unsatisfied and the soul to writhe; for it creates a resistance in the flow of consciousness that makes the human loose its value of life and all that resides within. Egoism enhances superiority promotes an indestructible feeling; denies consciousness that flows within and across the system; a loss of revere to the cosmic bridge of consciousness that links the body, mind and soul to the universe. Satisfaction can be gotten when one clearly differentiates the subjectivity from the objectivity of consciousness; for the subjectivity of consciousness cannot be taken for granted over its trailing objectivity that ceaselessly deceives. (shrink)

According to some critics, if biology is a kind of reverse engineering for the nature, it is quite poorly prepared for the task. Thus, the issue is more likely with its ontology. Multiple hypotheses and conjectures found in papers on methodological issues claim that living systems should be viewed as complex networks of signal-transmitting paths, both neural and non-neural, that feature modularity and feedback circuits and are prone to emergent properties and increasing complexity. If so, we are on the eve (...) of a new stage in computer models development where not only computers are used to emulate life, but life itself is construed as a complex network of interacting natural computers. (shrink)

This paper argues that challenges that are grand in scope such as "lifelong health and wellbeing", "climate action", or "food security" cannot be addressed through scientific research only. Indeed scientific research could inhibit addressing such challenges if scientific analysis constrains the multiple possible understandings of these challenges into already available scientific categories and concepts without translating between these and everyday concerns. This argument builds on work in philosophy of science and race to postulate a process through which non-scientific notions become (...) part of science. My aim is to make this process available to scrutiny: what I call founding everyday ideas in science is both culturally and epistemologically conditioned. Founding transforms a common idea into one or more scientifically relevant ones, which can be articulated into descriptively thicker and evaluatively deflated terms and enable operationalisation and measurement. The risk of founding however is that it can invisibilise or exclude from realms of scientific scrutiny interpretations that are deemed irrelevant, uninteresting or nonsensical in the domain in question-but which may remain salient for addressing grand-in-scope challenges. The paper considers concepts of "wellbeing" in development economics versus in gerontology to illustrate this process. (shrink)

The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) is an argument put forward by proponents of theism, in which they attempt to make a case from Bayesian inference, that the [apparently] fine tuned constants of our universe is more likely given a theistic hypothesis, than a naturalistic one. Some naturalists argue that this is not the case given the Multiverse (MV) hypothesis (that our universe is one of a plurality in a broader multiverse). The MV hypothesis is rejected by theists who argue it commits (...) what Ian Hacking (1987) referred to as “the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. In this paper I will attempt to demonstrate [what I perceive as] the errors in logic made by theists first in positing that a life-permitting universe (LPU) is improbable under the naturalistic-single-universe (NSU) hypothesis, and subsequently the errors in arguing that the MV hypothesis commits what Ian Hacking (1987) referred to as “the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. First, I will attempt to demonstrate why an LPU is not improbable under the NSU. Second, I will attempt to demonstrate that if we ascribe a probability value to our LPU, we can directly infer either an MV or the existence of “Deeper Laws” (Barnes, 2020) from that probability value. (shrink)

The film A Serious Man cinematically deconstructs the life of a mid-twentieth century, mid-western American physics professor named Larry Gopnik. As it happens, Larry is up for tenure with a wife who is about to leave him, an unemployed brother who sleeps on his couch, and two self-obsessed teenage children. The film presents a Job-like theodicy in which the mysteries of quantum physics are haunted both by questions of good and evil as well as the spectre of an un-named (...) God, reverently referred to as Hashem. The following paper examines the broader set of philosophical, theological and ethical concerns which arise from the film’s themes, using it to illustrate those concerns. Just as Newtonian physics underwrote Kant’s evocation of the image of starry skies above and moral law within, quantum physics underwrites a new set of ethical anxieties, which the film narrates as a key facet of contemporary western culture’s postmodern re-enchantment. Although some, such as Slavoj Zizek, see this as a positively charged opportunity to rethink metaphysics and ethics, the film leaves the audience with more sinister conclusions. (shrink)

Both Millikan’s brand of naturalistic analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology have held on to teleological notions, despite their being out of favor in mainstream Western philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Both traditions have recognized the need for teleology in order to adequately account for intentionality, the need to adequately account for intentionality in order to adequately account for meaning, and the need for an adequate theory of meaning in order to precisely and consistently describe the world and (...) class='Hi'>life. The stark differences between their accounts of these fundamental concepts stem from radically different conceptions of the world, the natural and life. I argue that Millikan’s teleosemantic approach relies on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience—for the reality of lived human life. In contrast to Millikan’s account, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology situates teleology as a function of reason and first-personal experience, part of an extended account of intentionality and meaning according to which the full range of our making sense of the world is conceived as a rational activity that is itself a part of that world, and not an unnatural activity to be separated from it. While Husserl’s account of these issues is indeed symptomatic of what Millikan calls “meaning rationalism,” I argue that it is immune to the sorts of problems she claims will plague any such account, since these problems arise only against the background of a set of presuppositions about intentionality that Husserl does not share. Husserl’s position can itself be understood to be within the bounds of a suitably liberal conception of naturalism, and interpreting him in this way it has the added benefit—contra Millikan—of not divorcing teleology from reason, the latter construed as our first-personal striving to make sense of the world as we experience it—of life. (shrink)

This dissertation addresses the ontological significance of poetry in the thought of Martin Heidegger. It gives an account of both his earlier and later thinking. The central argument of the dissertation is that poetry, as conceptualised by Heidegger, is beneficial and necessary for the living of an authentic life. The poetry of T. S Eliot features as a sustaining voice throughout the dissertation to validate Heidegger's ideas and also to demonstrate some interesting similarities in their ideas. Chapter one demonstrates (...) how effectively certain concepts from Heidegger's 'Being and Time' can be applied in an analysis of T.S. Eliots celebrated poem 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock'. The reading involves concepts such as angst, authenticity, inauthenticity, the they and idle talk as they appear in 'Being and Time' and then relates these to aspects of T.S Eliot's poem. Chapter two is an exegesis of Heideggers essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in order to understand the meaning of poetry as he describes it. The essay centres on the interpretation of a painting by Vincent van Gogh, and what the experience of the painting reveals to someone authentically engaging with the artwork. Heidegger attempts to establish what the essence of a thing is (the artwork as thing), for the 'origin' of the artwork resides in its 'thingliness'. He creates an important distinction between equipment and the artwork, as well as earth and the world in order to justify the unique, originary position that the artwork occupies. This leads Heidegger to create a new understanding of poetry (which is expanded to encompass all art forms) and to emphasise the importance of the human agent in both the creation and preservation of the artwork. Chapter three is an exploration of language in both the Heidegger of 'Being and Time' and the later Heidegger's thought. The aim is to explore the ontological effect that Heidegger's conception of language has for our existence. He places language within a primordial role arguing that it is not us who speak language, but language that speaks us. This conception has important consequences for our relationship with Being, and the way in which we understand our existence. The final chapter unifies the various themes of the dissertation into a cohesive argument. The chapter begins with a discussion on the meaning of our existence following the later Heidegger. This is nothing less than the guardianship of Being which can only be understood in its relation to our dwelling within the fourfold. In conclusion it is through the measure of the language of poetry that we can realise the possibility of authentic dwelling. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the conceptualization of the contemporary Sami struggles for life and land. In doing so, I conduct a philosophical investigation of the emerging concept of “green colonialism.” The former president of the Sami parliament in Norway, Aili Keskitalo, has in multiple occasions invoked the term “green colonialism” to describe the contemporary implementation of wind power plants on Sami reindeer herding land. When considering Sami narratives and lived experiences and processes of meaning (...) making among Sami reindeer herders affected by the implementation of green energy in Norway, the Sami express that their voices are not being heard and that they are not taken equally into account in the decision-making processes concerning the parks. In this thesis, I answer two questions: “What is green colonialism?” and “What is wrong with green colonialism?” I argue that green colonialism is colonialism. (shrink)

Bhaktāmara Stotra is the magnum opus composition of Ācārya Mānatunga (circa 7th century CE). Bhaktāmara Stotra eulogizes the supreme attributes of Lord Ādinātha, the first Tīrthaṅkara. This is perhaps the most well-known adoration of Lord Jina that is not only recited but memorized, with great devotion and reverence, by a large number of people among the Jaina community, Digambara and Śvetāmbara. It is believed that the worthy soul accumulates enormous propitiousness by reading Bhaktāmara Stotra with devotion. Hundreds of thousands (...) of instances, ancient and recent, must have come to light where people claimed to have benefitted miraculously by the recitation of and reflection on this sacred composition. This slim volume is a useful reference text for international readers. It will be of interest not only to Hindi-loving scholars but also to those looking for an authentic English rendering of Bhaktāmara Stotra. Besides the transliteration in English of the original Sanskrit verse, the meaning of each verse has been given both in Hindi and English languages. The Preface of the book contains, besides other useful information, a synopsis of the concept of empirical (vyavahāra) time (kāla), and a brief life-story of Lord Ādinātha, the first Tīrthaṅkara, as expounded in the Scripture. (shrink)

Kalyāņamandira Stotra (Pārśvanātha Stotra) is the magnum opus composition of Ācārya Kumudacandra (circa 12th century VS). Kalyāņamandira Stotra eulogizes the supreme attributes of Lord Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara. This is perhaps the most well-known adoration of Lord Pārśvanātha that is not only recited but memorized, with great devotion and reverence, by many among the Jaina community, both Digambara and Śvetāmbara. The worthy soul is believed to accumulate enormous propitiousness by reading Kalyāņamandira Stotra with devotion. Many claim to have benefitted (...) miraculously from the recitation of and reflection on this sacred composition. This slim volume is a useful reference text for international readers. It will be of interest not only to the Hindi-loving scholars but also to those looking for an authentic English rendering of Kalyāņamandira Stotra. Besides other useful information, the book’s Preface contains a brief life story of Lord Pārśvanātha, as expounded in the Scripture. The interesting and eye-opening sequence of the enmity carried forward by various incarnations of Kamaṭha (finally, Śambara deva) against his then-younger brother Marubhūti (finally, Lord Pārśvanātha), is also provided in a tabular form. (shrink)

The attempt to define life has gained new momentum in the wake of novel fields such as synthetic biology, astrobiology, and artificial life. In a series of articles, Cleland, Chyba, and Machery claim that definitions of life seek to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of life—something that such definitions cannot, and should not do. We argue that this criticism is largely unwarranted. Cleland, Chyba, and Machery approach definitions of life as classifying (...) devices, thereby neglecting their other epistemic roles. We identify within the discussions of the nature and origin of life three other types of definitions: theoretical, transdisciplinary, and diagnostic definitions. The primary aim of these definitions is not to distinguish life from nonlife, although they can also be used for classificatory purposes. We focus on the definitions of life within the budding field of astrobiology, paying particular attention to transdisciplinary definitions, and diagnostic definitions in the search for biosignatures from other planets. (shrink)

Offers an original interpretation of Plato’s Laws and a new account of its enduring importance. Ballingall argues that the republican regime conceived in the Laws is built on "reverence," an archaic virtue governing emotions of self-assessment—particularly awe and shame. Ballingall demonstrates how learning to feel these emotions in the right way, at the right time, and for the right things is the necessary basis for the rule of law conceived in the dialogue. The Laws remains surprisingly neglected in the (...) scholarly literature, although this is changing. The cynical populisms haunting liberal democracies are focusing new attention on the “characterological” basis of constitutional government and Plato’s Laws remains an indispensable resource on this question, especially when we attend to the theme of reverence at its core. (shrink)

In this article I argue for the thesis that Alexander's main argument, in Ethical Problems I, is an attempt to block the implication drawn by the Stoics and other ancient philosophers from the double potential of use exhibited by human life, a life that can be either well or badly lived. Alexander wants to resist the thought that this double potential of use allows the Stoics to infer that human life, in itself, or by its own nature, (...) is neither good nor bad. Furthermore, I shall argue that Alexander's main argument establishes that human life, despite exhibiting a double potential of use, is by its own nature or intrinsically good. Finally, given that this is not a conclusion that the Stoics are likely to accept, I shall also contend that the argument should be regarded as conducted for the most part in foro interno, as a way of persuading the Peripatetics themselves of the falsity of the Indifference Implication, precisely because of the risk that such an implication be derived from their own theoretical framework. (shrink)

Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual's status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one's own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health (...) problems who are generally considered clear cases. -/- While a cognitive capacities approach may turn out to be generally feasible, that particular cognitive capacity is not. In the course of this discussion I address two conceptual issues, the first regarding what it means to 'value ones life' and the second regarding what conditions must obtain for something to count as a capacity. These conceptual issues, when resolved pursuant to this account of moral status, lead the account to exclude individuals with major depressive disorder, i.e. deny that it is morally wrong to kill such individuals based on their moral status. I then argue that this is a decisive reason to reject this particular cognitive capacity as implicated in moral status. (shrink)

This text answers the question, posed by the editor, on the philosophical and social issues resulting from the synthetic assembly of a modified bacterial genome that was introduced in an existing bacterial species (M.mycoides)and so it was claimed to represent the first ever kind of synthetic life produced by human manipulation.

Looking to Scripture through the eyes of contemporary medical experience, I analyze the meaning of the criteria used for determining death, specifically in the light of Jesus’ final moments and the resurrection of the Shunammite’s son in 2 Kings, chapter 4. I argue that four theses are consistent with, and informed by, these passages that can help guide Christian belief and decision-making about how death is determined in the clinical context: (1) death is neither permanent nor irreversible; (2) something like (...) the “brain dead” state is, at best, a confounding state that requires one to “pace and pray” or let go; (3) that the case for determining death by neurologic criteria depends on the “working togetherness” of the body's parts for the sake of impacting its environment; and (4) that the practice of neurologically-based death determination is a response to the problem of disaggregation of the human form into its organ systems that modern critical care medicine makes possible. I end with advice about how Christians might approach the debates over the law and practice even if they cannot come to a consensus. (shrink)

The article explores the concept of ‘life’ via processual ontology, contrasting the approaches of substance and processual ontologies, and investigates the link between ontological assumptions and sociopolitical discourses, stating that the predominant substance ontologies also promote an objectifying and anthropocentric framework in sociopolitical discourses and ethical approaches. Arguing for a necessary shift in the ontological conceptualization of life to enable environmentally-minded ethics for the future, the article explores the tie between the sociopolitical discourses embedded in a worldview that (...) is grounded in substance ontology and ethical frameworks. Whilst affirming this tie, this study also explicates the limitations and potential feasibility of a processual understanding of life, in the context of the existential disposition of the self-alienated lived-body self that is ontologically predisposed to objectification as a necessary pre-condition to human self-awareness. (shrink)

The need for global values in a globalised world is combined with the need for contextual identity. New nationalisms, protectionisms and fundamentalisms are mixed with a globalised pluralistic relativism. Are global values threatened by particular values? Find answers within the 32 articles of this book. In each of the articles the authors, who are all in one way or another linked to Globethics.net, writing from one of four continents, focus and develop on a particular value or virtue in a specific (...) geographic, cultural or religious context. Many of them also give an input to the understanding of the value-basis of the UN-Sustainable Development Goals SDGs and give orientation for “values-driven leadership”, a key vision and mission of Globethics.net. (shrink)

Where humans can manipulate and integrate the information they receive in subtle and ever changing ways from context to context, computers need structured and context-free background information of a sort which ontologies can help to provide. A domain ontology captures the stable, highly general and commonly accepted core knowledge for an application domain. The domain at issue here is that of the life sciences, in particular molecular biology and bioinformatics. Contemporary life science research includes components drawn from physics, (...) chemistry, mathematics, medicine and many other areas, and all of these dimensions, as well as fundamental philosophical issues, must be taken into account in the construction of a domain ontology. Here we describe the basic features of domain ontologies in the life sciences and show how they can be used. (shrink)

We live longing for a utopia. However, we live in increasingly dystopian times. Whenever we imagine possible futures, a continuity of human progress in the direction of greater scientific-technological development comes to mind. We are completely certain that the reason that brought us current modern science and technology will lead us to this utopia, to a promising future. There is an association as intimate as it is indubitable between future, progress, technoscience and utopia. Isn't it time to question this undisputed (...) certainty? Is it true that reason, progress, science, technology and utopia will lead us to a healthy future for man and nature? Isn't it time to open our eyes and mind to see things differently? Isn't it time to stop frantically producing in pursuit of progress and take a rest to think? There is a fundamental and radical difference between reason and thinking. This book proposes a journey through the worlds of science fiction, utopianism, socialism, communism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, existentialism, Zen Buddhism, art, medievalism, alchemy, science, technology and philosophy. This book proposes to abandon the utopian-dystopian reason to embrace the eutopian life, a new mode of existence in which man needs to regain his rootedness with Earth to be able to think again and live in harmony with himself and nature. (shrink)

This article discusses an anomaly in the English law of reproductive liability: that is, an inconsistency between the law’s approach to wrongful life claims and its approach to cases of negligent selection of gametes or embryos in infertility treatments (the selection cases). The article begins with an account of the legal position, which brings into view the relevant inconsistency: while the law treats wrongful life claims as non- actionable, it recognises a cause of action in the selection cases, (...) although the selection cases bear a relevant resemblance to wrongful life claims. The article then considers arguments that may be invoked in an attempt to reconcile the above two strands of the law. Three of these counterarguments consist in attempts to distinguish the selection cases from wrongful life claims. It is argued that these attempts fail to reveal a valid basis for treating these situations differently. A fourth possible counterargument levels against the present analysis a charge of reductio ad absurdum. It is shown that this argument suffers from a fundamental flaw caused by confusion between different senses of the term “identity”. Finally, the article discusses possible changes to the legal position that could rectify the problem. It argues that one of these changes, which focuses on legal redress for violation of personal autonomy, is particularly apt to resolve the problem at hand, but also highlights the need for further inquiry into the broader implications of introducing this form of redress into the law of torts. (shrink)

The manufacturing industry is evolving rapidly, becoming more complex, more interconnected, and more geographically distributed. Competitive pressure and diversity of consumer demand are driving manufacturing companies to rely more and more on improved knowledge management practices. As a result, multiple software systems are being created to support the integration of data across the product life cycle. Unfortunately, these systems manifest a low degree of interoperability, and this creates problems, for instance when different enterprises or different branches of an enterprise (...) interact. Common ontologies (consensus-based controlled vocabularies) have proved themselves in various domains as a valuable tool for solving such problems. In this paper, we present a consensus-based Additive Manufacturing Ontology (AMO) and illustrate its application in promoting re-usability in the field of dentistry product manufacturing. (shrink)