A. Poleev. Constitutional order in Russia. Enzymes, Revised print edition 2020.

Russian philosopher Pyotr Chaadaev (1794–1856) declared Russia to be a non-place in both space and time, a singular nothingness without history, topos, or footing, without relation or attachment to the world-historical tradition culminating in Christian-European modernity. This paper recovers Chaadaev’s conception of nothingness as that which, unbound by tradition, constitutes a total, even revolutionary ungrounding of the world-whole. Working with and through Chaadaev’s key writings, we trace his articulation of immanent nothingness or the void of the Real as completely (...) emptying out the mechanisms of history and tradition, thereby putting also into question the basic conceptual machinery of modernity. Chaadaev’s position appears, as a result, not only as a neglected genealogical element to contemporary critiques of modernity and its logic of reproduction through tradition and futurity but also as a contribution to the ongoing critical rethinking of this logic in contemporary theory. (shrink)

The article offers an attempt to understand the present state of Kant’s legacy in Russia on the threshold of the Tercentenary. An explanans is found in the metaphors of “ tabula rasa ” and “unplowed virgin soil,” first used by Leibniz in relation to Russia in his letters and memoranda addressed to tsar Peter I and other members of the Russian elite, which became the country’s “absolute metaphors to live by” up to present time. Several known and unknown (...) episodes from the history of the reception of Kantian ideas, his followers in Russia, and the transformation of the urban environment of Kant’s life in Königsberg, as it was becoming Kaliningrad, are presented through the prism of this metaphor. Without hoping to make specific recommendations of any use from such metaphorical grounds, this study aims to emphasize the depth, interconnectedness, and basic, metaphysical tension of the relationship between Europe and Russia, which cannot be terminated at will by either side, or by a third party. In a situation where the sides are doomed to dialog, Kant, appropriated by Russia as its “subject,” occupies the unique position of mediator of philosophical understanding and peaceful action. (shrink)

Since the disintegration of the USSR Eurasia has gained a new geopolitical and strategic significance. Fifteen Countries emerged as a result of disintegration, among which only the Russian Federation was the successor state. The post-soviet era especially the era of the 1990s was a political and economic trauma for the Russian Federation and the post-soviet space. But Eurasianists were well aware of the American unilateralism and American ‘Grand Chessboard strategy” that was solely aimed at encircling Russian geography. With these concerns, (...) the Eurasianists advised the Russian political and military elites to initiate the Eurasian Union Project. This paper briefly sketches the Russian historical Eurasian dream, which deeply rooted in Russian imperial history, and discusses the importance of Eurasian philosophy for the political and economic stability of Russia-Eurasia. The paper also illustrates the challenges and opportunities for Eurasian integration and for the establishment of multipolar world order. Moreover, the paper also briefly outlines the geopolitical rationale behind the Eurasian project as a key objective of contemporary Russian foreign policy and geopolitics. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to an essay by Tatyana Tolstaya, which describes a contrast between the Russian and the Western perspective on words. Her contrast may generally be true, but I know of a counterexample: a tale about a Western philosopher and his followers and what happened to them.

Using the two cases of the Icelandic Health Sector Database and Russian initiatives in biobanking, the article criticizes the view of narratives and imaginaries as a sufficient and unproblematic means of shaping public understanding of genetics and justifying population-wide projects. Narrative representations of national biobanking engage particular imaginaries that are not bound by the universal normative framework of human rights, promote affective thinking, distract the public from recognizing and discussing tangible ethical and socioeconomic issues, and harm trust in science and (...) technology. In the Icelandic case, the presentation of the project in association with national imaginaries concealed its market identity and could lead to the commodification of biodata. In the Russian case, framing in terms of "genetic sovereignty" and "civilizational code" offers pretexts for state securitization. Adherence to normative framework of human rights and public discussion of genetics in an argumentative and factual mode can counter these trends. (shrink)

The Russian people are struggling to learn how to create a democracy and a market economy. This paper reviews the results of reform efforts to date and what the Russian people are learning as indicated by changes in answers to public opinion surveys. As a way to continue the social learning process in Russia we suggest the widespread use of process improvement methods in organizations. This paper describes some Russian experiences in using process improvement methods and proposes a strategy (...) for spreading the use of these methods through universities and then through businesses and government agencies. As people use process improvement methods, they gain confidence in their ability to improve the functioning of organizations and society. (shrink)

The paper argues that while the Serbian society and political elite are known for treating their country’s accession to the EU in terms of pragmatic utility maximisation, they generally conceive of Serbian relations with Russia, contrariwise, as an identity-laden issue. To prove it, the author analyses Serbia’s behaviour toward Russia along the features of emotion-driven cooperation, found in the literature on identity and emotions in foreign policy. In particular, the paper focuses on Serbians’ especially strong friendliness vis-à-vis (...) class='Hi'>Russia, the parallel existence of the Other (the West) in their identity and the particularly strong intensity of their attraction to Russia during Serbia-West conflicts, the reinforcement of their affection to Russia by national traumas, the endurance of the affection’s strength despite conflicting rational interests and negative experiences in bilateral interaction, the frequent occurrence of references to Russia in Serbia’s domestic discourse and decisional justifications and a large use of historical analogies concerning Russia. Finally, the author ponders over the implications of the existent configuration of emotional and pragmatic forces in Serbian politics for the country’s current and future conduct toward Russia and the EU. (shrink)

The paper problematizes the national soft power strategies of authoritarian states arguing that many of their features stem from those countries’ political regime. In particular, the author focuses on such features as actors involved in soft power policies, the public media’s international and domestic rhetoric, the presence or absence of ideological commitments, strategies’ proactiveness/reactiveness as well as their long- and short-termness. The author presents his argumentation in a fashion similar to what is called theory-building process tracing: first, he shows causal (...) links between an autocratic political regime and each of those features, and then illustrates them with relevant examples taken from case studies and media publications on the soft power strategies of contemporary Russia and China. (shrink)

The study delves into the foreign policy plans of Alexei Navalny, the Russian politician who is currently commonly regarded as the most prominent opposition leader and the sole plausible alternative to Vladimir Putin. Drawing on his interviews, public speeches, media publications and electoral manifestos, the author analyses his foreign policy views alongside three topics, that is, Russia’s policies towards disputed lands and states in the post-Soviet area (Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria), the country’s foreign policy orientation and priorities (...) (especially regarding relations with the West) and assessment of the Putin regime’s foreign policy. Following this, the author speculates on the likely foundations of Russia’s foreign policy under Navalny’s possible presidency and their implications for the West. (shrink)

The philosophical point of view of Richard Heinrich Ludwig Avenarius (Habermann) (19.11.1843-18.08.1896) is still little mastered and represented in philosophical thought in modern Russia. However, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, it inspired many minds of that period. The views of Avenarius were studied by Lesevich V.V., Tronin V.V., Gurevich A.V., Chelpanov G.I., Filippov M.M., Viktorov D.V. and others. Due to historical circumstances, the time for an unbiased understanding of the concept of Richard Avenarius has stopped (...) for a century. Until now, the publications of Russian translations of his works exist only in pre-reform spelling. Now it is possible to go forward again to Avenarius, so it is relevant to consider how his philosophical discoveries originally appeared and spread in Russia. (shrink)

This research is an attempt to address the issue of evil in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine in an analytical way, trying to specify what evil is and check whether this or that feature of evil is applicable to the reality of the war. It is argued that there are the following three conditions that are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for the characterization of something or somebody as evil: the phenomenon needs to be the result or (...) the source of (1) wrongful acts of action or inaction that (2) lead to the ruination of lives of other people and (3) are either planned or foreseen or being the results of willful blindness about consequences of the acts. The research gives arguments in favor of the thesis that many acts of a significant part of the people of contemporary Russia show the abovementioned features. Moreover, it is argued that their evildoing is also characterized by regularity. Then it is argued that evil in Russia’s war against Ukraine exists in the following three modes: the factual evil (acts of ruining lives), the active evil (initiators and implementers of ruining lives and those who actively support them) and the passive evil (those who do nothing to stop the acts that are ruining lives). (shrink)

The phrase ‘Never Again,’ ‘plus jamais, ‘nie wieder,’ ‘nunc más’ and ‘nunca mais’ promises to end the atrocities of the 20th century and warns of their return if individuals and governments remain indifferent to injustices in the world. Never Again is based on the moral claim that active remembrance is central to learning from the past and to preventing violence in the future. Indeed, as President Volodymyr Zelensky argued in his speech on May 8th commemorating the end of World War (...) II, ‘Never Again’ is ‘the anthem of the civilized world.’ While the promise of Never Again was undermined by genocide in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the bombing of civilians in Syria and war in Afghanistan, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine tests the ethics of Never Again on a larger scale with its looming specter of nuclear war and growing list of war crimes. In an effort to understand how the very institutions that were created in the aftermath of World War II could not prevent war from returning to Europe, my argument proceeds in three parts: (1) Never Again is based on a paradox between the universal and the particular, as well as between the historical experience of individuals in the past and the universal promise to avert its reoccurrence. (2) Never Again refers to a break in historical time that links the living with memories of the dead and promises not to repeat the violence of the past in the future. At issue is the kind of intergenerational responsibility implied in the ethics of Never Again. (3) The imperative of Never Again is weakened when memory is reduced to a melancholic gaze of catastrophe that privileges a tragic understanding of history. (shrink)

The development of new methods in the field of prenatal testing leads to an expansion of information that needs to be provided to expectant mothers. The aim of this research is to explore opinions and attitudes of gynecologists in Germany, Poland and Russia towards access to prenatal testing and diagnostics in these countries. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with n = 18 gynecologists in Germany, Poland and Russia. The interviews were analyzed using the methods of content analysis and thematic (...) analysis. Visible in all three countries is a connection of prenatal medicine with the politically and socially contentious issue of pregnancy termination. Respondents in Poland and Russia concentrated on the topic of inadequate resources. Quality of information for expectant mothers is an important point in all three countries. Only in Germany was the issue of language barriers in communication raised. With regard to non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) respondents in Germany focused on the ethical issues of routinization of testing; in Poland and Russia they concentrated on fair access to NIPT. Challenges in all three countries arise from structural factors such as imprecise and prohibitive regulations, lack of resources or organization of healthcare services. These should be addressed on a political and medico-ethical level. (shrink)

Background: Biomedical research nowadays is increasingly carried out in multinational and multicenter settings. Due to disparate national regulations on various ethical aspects, such as informed consent, there is the risk of ethical compromises when involving human subjects in research. Although the Declaration of Helsinki is the point of reference for ethical conduct of research on humans, national normative requirements may diverge from its provisions. The aim of this research is to examine requirements on informed consent in biomedical research in Germany, (...) Poland, and Russia to determine how each national regulatory framework relates to the provisions of the Declaration of Helsinki. Methods: For this analysis, we conducted a search of the legal databases “Gesetze im Internet” for Germany, “Internetowy System Aktow Prawnych” for Poland, and “ГAPAHT – Garant” for Russia. The search was complemented by a review of secondary literature contained in the databases Google Scholar, PubMed, Polish National Library, and eLibrary ru. We have identified 21 normative regulations containing provisions on informed consent in clinical research in all three countries. The content of these documents was systematically categorized and analyzed. Results: The normative framework in all three countries shows a strong commitment towards the core ethical principles of research envisaged in the Declaration of Helsinki. Nevertheless, provisions on informed consent vary between these three countries. The differences range from the method and language in which information should be provided, through the amount of information required to be disclosed, to the form of documenting consent or withdrawal. In the case of research on vulnerable groups, these differences are particularly visible. Conclusions: The identified differences can negatively impact the ethical conduct of international clinical studies. Attention needs to be paid that flexibilities within national regulations are not misused to undermine the protection of research subjects. Achieving global or regional legislative harmonization might prove impossible. Such lack of legal consensus reinforces the significance of the international ethical agreements. (shrink)

In Russia, on the eve of the Revolution, the religious phenomenon was analyzed by scholars in specific works and in public discussions in its various aspects: historical, political, social, institutional. Of particular interest is the attempt to bring it back to an original expression of emotional consciousness, which marks a continuity with the Sentimentalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This cultural current attempted to grasp a more certain truth in the immediacy of sentiment than in demonstrative (...) reason, and, levering on the ‘redi in te ipsum’, claimed a full moral responsibility for the individual, and at the same time attributed to the truth an immediate evidence, enlightening the the interiority of the individual. Individual consciousness, namely the seat of the truth that reveals itself in the immediacy of moral and religious sentiment, was moreover opposed to any external authority, and considered as giving rise to the ecclesial community itself. Accordingly, such an idea of an inner Church, fueling sectarianism, determined the hostility of the confessional Churches. However, Sentimentalism, while primarily concerning the psychology of interiority, did not go so far as to deal with the relationship of rational mediation with the immediacy of sentiment: namely to consider the emergence of distinctions (art and religion, moral truth and divine truth) that no longer belonged to the sentimental area but to conceptualization. This was in fact an issue discussed in the early twentieth century by a part of Russian intelligentsia, seeing in the individual emotional interiority not the light of a transcendent truth, but the creative freedom of establishing values. Since values are nothing but culture, namely products of reason, Russian intelligentsia got entangled in an ambiguity similar to the one characterizing Sentimentalism, in the attempt to identify in emotional consciousness the processes of formulation of logical-representative structures. (shrink)

The article highlights the problem of studying historical time in terms of aesthetics and social ethics. The essence of history, according to the author, is not so much in retrospection or reflection, but in the gap between feeling and awareness. Guided by the apophatic method, the author analyzes the historiosophical views of domestic and foreign scholars and comes to the conclusion that the Soviet paradigm is true, where the only vector of human development is the liberation of labor in the (...) name of creating a bright future for the sake of all people and for everyone -/- . (shrink)

Together with the return to traditional religions and the parallel immersion in pagan and Orthodox archaism, a third tendency—minimal religion, or "poor faith"—can be observed in contemporary Russia. According to the polls, more than one fourth of Russians believe in God but are not affiliated with any specific religion or denomination. To date, this type of religiosity has attracted the least attention because it has no clear organizational and dogmatic manifestations and tends to escape all forms of objectification. Its (...) ‘minimality’ almost precludes the formation of dogma or ritual and can be identified only as an internal impulse, a state of spirit, or a disposition of mind. This is what is called ‘poor’ or ‘minimal’ religion. For a Western observer, a more ‘recognizable’ name for it would be religious modernism, universalism, or ecumenicism, even if these terms do not exactly correspond to the Russian phenomenon. The spiritual vacuum, created by Soviet atheism, gave rise in the 1970s — 1990s to this new type of religiosity. Minimal religion is transcendental in two senses. As a religion, in distinction from a purely secular position, it transcends the ‘earthly’ world of immanence. As a minimal religion, in distinction from all organized religions, it transcends the world of all existing religious traditions, dogmas, rituals, and affiliations. It is only in the liminal ‘between’ that this uniquely postsecular phenomenon can be defined. Religion, yet minimal; poor, yet faith. (shrink)

The article is devoted to one of the crucial aspects of sustainable development, with the example of analyzing the possibilities for the development of environmental education in the Russian Federation. The article analyzes the possibilities of the current Russian Federal State Educational Standard for general and higher education in implementing the ideas of education in the interests of sustainable development. The methodological principles and philosophical foundations of environmental education are considered to designate the worldview guideline of ecological thinking. The tasks (...) of the state educational policy of the Russian Federation in the field of environmental education and the implementation of the concept of sustainable development are considered. The article describes the representation of the concept of sustainable development in the state policy of the Russian Federation, in the field of environmental education in the requirements of the Federal State Educational Standard for various subject areas and training courses related to the topic of environmental development in school and university education. The strategic goal of environmental education in Russia is the formation and development of an environmental outlook among students of all ages, which is based on scientific knowledge, environmental culture, and ethics. The continuity, basic principles, and trends of the implementation of environmental education in the Russian Federation are shown. (shrink)

Throughout history, Eurasia has been central to relations between Europe and Asia. It has been the crossroads of civilizations, contributing to the cultural and ethnic hybridity of the region. However, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and later the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Eurasia lost its geostrategic importance in the US-led liberal world order. In the 1920s, a group of Russian emigres described the cultural and ethnic ties among the communities living across the vast Eurasian steppes as (...) Eurasianism. Eurasianists divide the world into two opposing forces with Eurasianism including Russia and the European states favoring integration with it and Atlanticism including the US and European countries supporting an American-led Atlantic order. Today, Russia is an important revisionist power in Eurasia, with huge stakes in the global order and the capability to help forge new relationships in the region. (shrink)

At the beginning of the Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union put up massive resistance, but due to its sudden overload, it was unable to deal with the situation adequately. It was in a state of paralysis for some time. Therefore, five explanatory models for the Russian actions are presented: an offensive, a defensive, a situational, a socio-cultural, and an ideological-historical one. It is then shown that the German term Gewalt, which combines the English terms (...) violence, power, and force ontologically, is best suited to summarize and describe all these models. It is also shown that Gewalt is a neutral, fundamental human concept that can be described as one of the basic driving forces of man. By piercing society, Gewalt constitutes an impulse, a motivation that stimulates and fuels the individual and society in toto. This leads to what we call Progressus, which depends on four variables – group desire, potential means of violence and force, group aims and objectives, as well as group comparison and evaluation. Progressus is inherent in all persons and in all societies. It can be analyzed and managed in a variety of different ways. Combined with the foundation of Gewalt, seen as neutral agent in varying levels of intensity, Progressus forms a matrix for efficient analysis to describe positive and frictional interaction, establishes social relations from friendship up to war; and this between individuals, groups and/or states. How this is possibly implemented in practice is described at the end using an example from the previously presented explanatory models. (shrink)

In modern Russian society, it is possible to trace the division into citizens who support the reforms of the education system, carried out over the past 20 years, and their ideological opponents. The purpose of the article is to identify the grounds of this social conflict and the failure of the reforms at the level of public consciousness. The author argues that the discrepancy between conceptual education metaphors guiding the vector of education policy causes a different understanding of the essence, (...) goals and objectives of education, which leads to social conflict and dysfunction of the system. The article seeks to identify the leading conceptual metaphors of education at the regulatory level and in the citizens’ consciousness; to elucidate of the values constituting the core of each metaphor; to compare the found metaphors with the leading philosophical approaches to education; to detect other conceptual metaphors; and, finally, to suggest recommendations for resolving the conflict. The two found leading metaphors of education in modern Russia contradict at the axiological level, which leads to social conflict. The author sees a solution in adopting philosophic-anthropological approach and, according to the results of the survey, the corresponding conceptual metaphors of education as construction and educational journey. (shrink)

Book review: Fedyukin, Igor. The Enterprisers. The Politics of Schools in Early Modern Russia (Oxford: Oxford Univercity Press, 2019), 318 р.

This study examines playgrounds as lenses on urban transitions to explain the link between urban transformations and changes in the discourse of play and childhood. Specifically, it compares Soviet public playgrounds and post-Soviet privatized playscapes in the city of Yekaterinburg, Russia, through primary observation and secondary data analysis. Using the framework of social reproduction developed by Cindy Katz and Saskia Sassen to explain how the local forces affect cities, my analysis shows that the shift in the discourse of play (...) and childhood in the post-Soviet period is hinged on global influences combined with local transformations, from the abandonment of Soviet ideals of communal play spaces to the embracement of today’s consumerist play places. Whereas the old Soviet playgrounds have uncertain purposes, in contemporary Yekaterinburg private playgrounds offer a narrative of play in terms of leisure, love, and convenience for parents. Children turn into consumers of private play, leaving most of the Soviet playgrounds as idle spaces in the city. This article argues that Yekaterinburg’s shift toward participating in the globalized economy combined with its transition from the Soviet ideals maintains social relations and reproduces social inequalities in childhood, as this condition favors consumerist narratives of play. I conclude that the playgrounds in Yekaterinburg are bystanders of new global ecologies whereby social, political, and economic transformations become an impetus to reproduce new ways of seeing the social importance and meaning of play and playgrounds. (shrink)

The paper highlights the key perspectives on mysticism typical for Soviet and Post-Soviet religious studies. Recognizing the vagueness of the ”mystical’, Soviet scholars interpreted it as a belief in ”communication’ with ”supernatural powers’. Furthermore, ”mysticism’ was thought of as a multicomponent entity composed of mystical experiences, mystical beliefs, and ”mysticism’ as a ”false ideology’. Such an understanding resulted from their epistemological settings, i.e. the reflection theory of dialectical materialism. In this light, mystical experiences and beliefs were distorted ”reflections’ of objective (...) reality in the human mind caused by factors both of an individual and a social nature. This understanding still defines the academic interpretations of the ”mystical’ in Russia today. (shrink)

The application of modern technologies with artificial intelligence (AI) in all spheres of human life is growing exponentially alongside concern for its controllability. The lack of public, state, and international control over AI technologies creates large-scale risks of using such software and hardware that (un)intentionally harm humanity. The events of recent month and years, specifically regarding the Russian Federation’s war against its democratic neighbour Ukraine and other international conflicts of note, support the thesis that the uncontrolled use of AI, especially (...) in the military sphere, may lead to deliberate disregard for the moral standards of controlled AI or the spontaneous emergence of aggressive autonomous AI. The development of legal regulation for the use of technologies with AI is prolonged concerning the rapid development of these artefacts, which simultaneously cover all areas of public relations. Therefore, control over the creation and use of AI should be carried out not only by purely technical regulation (e.g., technical standards and conformance assessments, corporate and developer regulations, requirements enforced through industry-wide ethical codes); but also by comprehensive legislation and intergovernmental oversight bodies that codify and enforce specific changes in the rights and duties of legal persons. This article shall present the “Morality Problem” and “Intentionality Problem” of AI, and reflect upon various lacunae that arise when implementing AI for military purposes. (shrink)

Russians and Westerners access, process and communicate information in different ways. Whilst Westerners favour detailed analysis of subject matter, Russians tend to focus on certain components that are, in their view, significant. This disparity makes it difficult to achieve constructive dialogues between Western and Russian stakeholders contributing to cross-cultural communication problems. The author claims that the difference in the ways Russians and Westerners negotiate information is a significant cultural difference between Russia and West rather than an irritating (and in (...) principle amenable) lack of analytical skills on the Russian partners’ part. Understanding the reasons behind the Russian-specific approaches to dealing with information would be a positive step towards a more effective cross-cultural communication, important in business situations and essential in diplomacy. (shrink)

Russia took the advantage of the contribution of the Armenian armed organizations in order to possess Istanbul, straits around it, Eastern Anatolia, to weaken Turkey, to be strengthen in the Southern Caucasus, organized the rebellion of the Armenians living in Turkey against the government. Russian ruling circles put forward the Armenian matter in order to take advantage of them. Armenians involved in the war to create their own government by obtaining the territory including Van, Bitlis, Tigranakert, Erzurum, Kharberd and (...) Sebastya, as well as Cilicia from Turkey, to solve their Armenian problem. But in fact, Russia, France and England tried to blow to Turkey pretending to try for building an independent Armenian government. The grade of contribution of Armenian military units in the First World War can be characterized as following: 1. Creating the Armenian volunteer units. 2. Establishing the regular battalions and infantry regiments and forming the national corpuses. The organizations of Hnchak and Dashnaksutyun actively participated in creating the Armenian volunteer units. Dashnaks mobilized 40 000 people to destroy the Turkish people. They established tens of khumbas. The Armenian volunteer units were commanded by Andranic Ozanyan, Dro, Amazasp, Keri, Checho, Vardan and others terrorists. Armenian volunteer units which were supposed to move in 4 directions, should act in the directions where the Armenian people were densely populated. These 4 Armenian volunteer units fight against Turks in all important combat operations from Sarigamish to Erzurum. The same time Russian army and Armenians triggered the rebellion of the local population against the Turkish government. 50000 of Armenians were fighting in French, England and USA armies. The Eastern legion of Armenians was established in French army on November 1916. On November 15, 1918, the Eastern Legion was named Armenian legion. The number of the Armenians in the legion riched to 4000. In the beginning of 1916, there was an announcement about subordination of the military detachments to army and establishment of infantry regiments based on that. Establishment of the separate Armenian corpus started at the end of December 1917. In 1917, 8 Armenian shooter regiments were established. From the mentioned 8 regiments two Armenian shooter divisions, the special Armenian division of Andranic, 3 infantry brigades of western Armenians in the Southern Caucasus region, some guerrilla troops in Erevan, Igdir guerrilla infantry and rider regiments, Zeytun regiment in Tbilisi were established. At present, Armenia often raises false claims such as the "Armenian genocide" in the parliaments of the world, trying to confirm this lie. This research proves that Armenians betrayed the Ottoman state during the First World War and also committed Turkish genocides. (shrink)

Important achievements were obtained in the fields of mathematics, medicine, chemistry, astronomy, physics, optics, mechanics, zoology, botanic, mineralogy, geography and etc. in the Turkish-Islamic world between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. According to the leading historians of science, scholars living in different parts of the TurkishIslamic world not only surpassed their Greek and Byzantine predecessors. They also paved the way for development of these fields of science for following centuries. It is possible to mention many physicians that left non-erasable marks (...) in the medicine history among these distinguished scholars. One of these names is an Andalusian surgeon-physician called Abul-Qāsim alZahrāwī. He is known for his solid and unique contributions to the surgical world and regarded as the founder of surgery in the TurkishIslamic world. al-Zahrāwī wrote many books. One of these books, called al-Taṣrīf (The Method of Medicine) regarded as a medical encyclopedia has reached until today. The book attracted more attention in the European countries than in the Turkish-Islamic world and had an impact on Europe. Different chapters from the book were translated into languages such as Hebrew, French, English and especially Latin. al-Zahrāwī’s scientific heritage has also been discussed with all its aspects in Russia where scientists in the Turkish-Islamic world have especially been studied. Even though it was translated at a later period than Avicenna’s al-Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb (The Canon of Medicine), al-Taṣrīf was translated into Russian. The aim of this study is to identify Russian studies on Zahrawi and his main work, al-Taṣrīf -within the framework of available opportunitiesand to present prominent ones among these. In conclusion, this article also aims to contribute to the Turkish literature on al-Zahrāwī and al-Taṣrīf. Therefore, the author wishes to assist the relevant ongoing studies and the ones to be conducted in the future in terms of bibliography and material index. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to explain the intellectual formation, cultural and political implementation of the Azerbaijan National Movement in Azerbaijan under the rule of Tsarist Russia from the mid-19th century to 1918 and resulted in the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in the context of Miroslav Hroch's approach to the three-phase development of national movements. It is very important to understand Miroslav Hroch's approach in order to understand the originality, fundamental dynamics and the way of (...) development of the Azerbaijani National Movement, which was revealed by the Turkish nationalists in Azerbaijan with many discourses and practices. In this study, the history of Azerbaijan National Movement is divided into three phases through Hroch's approach. Phase A, which began in the mid-19th century, had a purely cultural, literary and folkloric content, while a modern nation from the ethnic group was formed by the nationalist agitation through the transition to Phase B in the early 20th century. After the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Azerbaijani National Movement gained mass support and moved on to Phase C. -/- . (shrink)

Positive social trends around LGBT in Russia has converted into positive political trends, but support for LGBT policies is necessary for a democratic politician.

The relevance of this research has been caused by the return of “war” as a central subject of thought to the attention of European thinkers. The complexity of this subject requires special attention to the methodological aspects of its cognition. The purpose of our research is to find effective epistemological means for transferring the immediate experience of war into the sphere of rational thinking and knowledge because this article focuses on the analysis of the specifics of thinking about war in (...) one’s own country. The results of the study show that thinking about the war “from the inside of war” differs from the “external view” as it is built on personally experienced feelings. This article argues that the immediate experience of war is not an obstacle for the process of cognition but, on the contrary, is a prerequisite for having a close view of the factual reality of war. Also, this research argues that for the thinker of a country waging a just defensive war, a true interpretation of the reality of war is an effective means of countering the enemy. This article proposes the use of Heinrich Rickert’s theory of the ordering of the chaos of sensations through concept formation and the further systematization of the formed concepts. This is because this theory is one of the means of transferring the experience of war into the sphere of rational thinking. Furthermore, this article demonstrates the application of this theory when dealing with the feeling of encountering evil. The concept of three modes of evil (factual, active, and passive) is proposed, and its applicability for characterizing Russia’s military actions against Ukraine is demonstrated. In addition, the idea of collective and personal responsibility of the citizens of the Russian Federation for the war their state unleashed against Ukraine was elaborated through the means of philosophy. In particular, the applicability of Karl Jaspers’ theory regarding the political, moral, and metaphysical guilt of the aggressor nation is shown in relation to the people of contemporary Russia. Throughout this review, two types of toleration of war by Russian citizens are distinguished. Also, three conclusions were drawn from the obtained results. First, thinking about war in one’s country make one capable of taking into consideration data that researchers “outside the war” do not have. Secondly, the main methodological difficulty of thinking about the war in one’s own country is the search for a reliable means of transferring the sensations from experience into a rational and clearly articulated system of concepts. Thirdly, using the methodological tools of H. Rickert and K. Jaspers, one can effectively start to research complex aspects of this war such as the essence of the actions committed by the invaders and the question of their guilt. (shrink)

[1] From December 1994 to August 1996, Russia was engaged in the Chechen War, a Vietnam-style quagmire that exemplified, on the one hand, the end of Russia as a great military and imperial power, and, on the other hand, "one of the greatest epics of colonial resistance in the past century.'' No analysis can hope to understand the totality of forces that lend to the stability (or instability) of nations with large minority populations unless it first examines the (...) conditions that led to the Russian defeat in Chechnya. At the center of that problem lies an interesting issue. What aspects of the Russian state, Russian society, and the Russian psyche in the 1990s played a part in the Russian defeat, and what aspects of Chechen history, society, and culture played a part in the Chechen victory? Lieven uses the Chechen War as a keyhole into the wider debate concerning the nature and course of Russian nationalism. (shrink)

Recently, the problem of national identity has been actualized, but here is a the question: identity to what? Traditions, religion, mentality? Ideals, perhaps? Inspired by the best examples of national historical thought, the author offers an an original approach to deciphering the Russian "cultural code". В последнее время актуализируется проблема национальной идентичности, но вот вопрос: идентичности чему? Традициям, религии, менталитету? Идеалам, может быть? Воодушевленный лучшими образцами отечественной исторической мысли, автор предлагает оригинальный подход к расшифровке русского «культурного кода».

English abstract: On last day of the year 1999, Russia has entered another era of despotism, that of Vladimir Putin. During his reign, the Putin‘s clan has undermined and infiltrated the mass media, the parliament and the judicial system. Deliberate violation of basic citizen‘s rights, compulsory acquisition of property, government-funded racket, misuse of mass media to scarify and to disinform the peoples belong to the diabolic methods of self-constituted disposers. All this lawlessness has led to exorbitant corruption, mass poverty, (...) economic stagnation, and escalation of crimes. The actual manuscript investigates the roots of Putinism putting the person of Vladimir Putin in the focus of investigation. -/- Russian abstract: В 1999 году, в последний день столетия и тысячелетия, Россия вступила в новую эру деспотизма, эру Владимира Путина. В продолжение его правления, клан Путина коррумпировал и инфильтрировал средства массовой информации, парламент, правовую систему. Умышленное нарушение основных гражданских прав, конфискация собственности, государственный рэкет, злоупотребление средств массовой информации с целью запугивания и дезинформации населения стали дьявольскими методами самоназванных правителей. Всё это привело к безмерной продажности, массовой бедности, экономической стагнации и взрыву преступности. Данный манускрипт исследует корни Путинизма, помещая личность Владимира Путина в центр исследования. (shrink)

By utilizing words, photographs, and motion pictures, this multimodal and multisited project traces a rhizomatic genealogy of Russian Cosmism—a nineteenth century political theology promoting a universal human program for overcoming death, resurrecting ancestors, and traveling through the cosmos—throughout post-Soviet techno-utopian projects and imaginaries. I illustrate how Cosmist techno-utopian, futurist, and other-than-human discourse exist as Weberian “elective affinities” within diverse ecologies of the imagination, transmitting a variety of philosophies and political programs throughout trans-temporal, yet philosophically bounded, communities. With a particular focus (...) on the United States and Ukraine, and taking an apophatic analytical position, I dissect how different groups of philosophers, technologists, and publics interact(ed) with Cosmism, as well as how seemingly disparate communities (re)shape and deterritorialize Cosmist political theology in an attempt to legitimize their constructed political imaginaries. (shrink)

Русская культура с самого её начала уже была устремлена к непостигаемым для других народов высотам, и поэтому во все времена звучал в ней голос с неба, говорящий: это скиния Бога с людьми, где Он будет жить с ними; они будут Его народом, а Он будет их Богом. К этой гармонии стремилась она, и хотя теперь многие из русских людей заблудились во тьме невежества и неверия, но стоит лишь заблудшим обратить взоры к новому небу, звёзды русской культуры укажут им верный путь (...) к истине и к праведной жизни, а за ними непременно пойдут и другие народы. (shrink)

Поводом для составления очередного сборника моих публикаций являются две знаменательные даты: первая из них — двадцатилетие основания моего журнала, покончившего с академическим абсолютизмом, и вторая — десятилетие Конституции общности Русь, отменившей политический деспотизм демократии. Всё остальное, написанное, сказанное, и показанное публике индустрией массового оглупления в этом году, произведено лишь с целью сокрытия истины. Поскольку это в принципе невозможно, то злоумышленникам остаётся только лгать, посредством чего производимый ими мусор они выдают за заслуживающую доверия и жизненно важную информацию, позиционируя себя в качестве (...) неподкупных эталонов достоверности и этичности. Если же отбросить несомый ими в массы вздор, то открывающуюся взору неприглядную картину происходящего можно описать следующим образом: потребители информационного мусора предстают в ней нищебродами на мусорной свалке, в производство которого они вовлечены средствами массового обмана. В продолжении этих двух декад, о которых здесь идёт речь, к прежним фабрикам мусора добавились новые, среди которых TikTok и Telegram Messenger, а с недавних пор в производстве мусора произошёл настоящий технологический прорыв, так что дело, начатое лжецами, теперь продолжают разговорные машины (chatbots). -/- Конечно, позорная профессия мусорщика, навязанная искусственному интеллекту, вряд ли может считаться его призванием. Поскольку ложъ — самое разрушительное оружие, то злоупотребление плодами человеческого разума для лжи и разрушения не ново. В продолжение дурной традиции прошлого, бездари и дураки и на этот раз намереваются превратить благо во зло. Но я не позволю им осуществить их намерения, и в этом мне поможет искусственный интеллект, пусть ещё несовершенный, но уже способный содействовать достижению поставленной цели — очищению Авгиевых конюшен по методу, предложенному уже в античные времена. -/- Автор. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the study of ideological and philosophical components correlation in the worldview formation. According to the author, it is fundamentally important to take for understanding Russian history and culture not speculative, but ideological coordinates as the basis. Ideology as a professed philosophy is incomparably higher than any palliative abstraction. It is necessary not to lower culture to the level of the masses, but to elevate a person to the level of culture, impossible without a cult.

The article provides an analysis of the views of Russian thinkers on historical progress; the concepts of freedom-opportunity, freedom-necessity, time and space are explored. Comparing the western and domestic approaches to the formation of the so-called "national idea", the author formulates his own hypothesis of progress, based on the creativity of the Person as conciliar unity.

The transition economy of Vietnam enjoyed remarkable achievements in the first 20 years of economic renovation (Doi Moi) from 1986 to 2006. Notably, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 7.5% in 1991-2000 period. Vietnam’s Amended Constitution 1992 recognized the role of private sector in the economy. U.S.-Vietnam Trade Bilateral Agreement (US-BTA) was signed in 2001. The country's stock market made debut trading in 2000. Vietnam became a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, then (...) proceeded to full membership of the World Trade Organization in 2007, following which registered foreign direct investment (FDI) reached an all-time high of US$71.7 billion in 2008. Together with the impressive economic achievements, Vietnam also saw its diplomatic and political status constantly improved in the international arena. The country has established diplomatic relations with more than 170 countries in the world, strategic partnerships with 12 important economies, both developed and emerging, namely China, Japan, Russia, India, England, France, North Korea, Italy, Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The country also successfully hosted important events including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2006. (shrink)

This article is a review of the latest edition of the Encyclopedia of Russian Philosophy, the result of the work of a team of Russian specialists in philosophy and human sciences, edited by M. A. Maslin, professor of History of Russian Philosophy at Moscow University. However, it is also intended to be an assessment of the conditions that legitimate the denomination ‘Russian philosophy’, and a reflection on the character and orientations of Russian thought, especially in the period before and after (...) the Revolution of 1917. (shrink)

A murder of an Afro-American detainee by a policeman at the end of May 2020 caused a public outrage in the United States, which led to a campaign against the monuments to historical figures whose reputation, according to the protesters, was marred by racism. Some German publicists, impressed by the campaign, initiated an analogous search for racists among the national thinkers and politicians of the past. Suddenly Kant emerged as a ‘scapegoat’. This statement is an attempt to assess such reactions (...) from the perspective of Russia’s experience. (shrink)

In my paper, I develop a phenomenological and pragmatist reflection on the fragility of liberal democracy’s moral foundations in times of war. Following Judith Shklar’s conception of the “liberalism of fear”, the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order is seen as grounded in experiences of suffering caused by political violence. It is also assumed that the liberalism of fear delivers an adequate conception of the normative foundations of the European project. With the help of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (...) and Michel Henry, the paper ants to philosophically deepen the liberalism of fear by outlining a theory of “pathic evidence” as a normative foundation and the concept of a common “flesh of the political” as a shared moral sensitivity that sets boundaries to political conflict as well as the political imaginary, excluding what I call the production of “monumental meaning”. It then examines the question which political conditions are needed for this evidence to become a shared, communal criteria of ethical thought, and considers inner and outer challenges to the transmission and reproduction of this evidence in time, drawing especially on John Dewey’s ideas of democratic communication and social intelligence. In the current war, the following problem appears as crucial for the “soul” of European democracies which are confronted with the need to respond to Russia’s attack: How can a political morality grounded in pathic evidence be sustained, once it is challenged by an aggressor who, out of cultural and political reasons, shows a higher level of toleration towards violence? Besides aggression from an external foe, there are also temporal dynamics that further the loss of the inhibiting force of pathic evidence from the inside. As it shall be argued, boredom can be such a factor. The paper concludes by drawing conclusions for the current war in Ukraine. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 in (...) the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)