The complexity definition has appeared during analysis of visual structures perception. The binary model of visual impacts finding was essential here for a possibility of the general (abstract) research. The Abstract Complexity Definition is one of the research results. The definition meets intuitive complexity criterion and could be a common surface for all existing definitins of complexity.

Today, the binary understanding of reality is increasingly significant. It is also the starting point for many theoretical considerations (mainly in the area of digital physics) describing the structure of the universe. What is lacking is an experimental confirmation of the binary nature of reality. This article proposes an idea for an experiment that possibly would confirm the following hypothesis: Electromagnetic waves in the form of binary signals of appropriate complexity and other parameters are capable of creating observable, material objects. (...) Also suggested is the use of an Abstract Complexity Definition (derived from aesthetic field), presented in the Supplementary Material section. (shrink)

Mówiąc o historii frazeologii języka niemieckiego, należy wyróżnić dwie zasadnicze fazy. Pierwsza z nich to odległy okres sięgający jeszcze XVII w., kiedy to w centrum zainteresowania badaczy stały paremia. Na tym etapie określanie zainteresowania frazeologizmami terminem dyscyplina byłoby nieco na wyrost. Autorzy tego okresu ograniczali się bowiem do inwentaryzacji funkcjonujących w języku przysłów. W tym miejscu należy wspomnieć takie nazwiska, jak Peters czy Schottel, których prace ze względu na jakość zasługują na szczególne uznanie. Do wieku XIX nie doszło do przełomu (...) w badaniach nad frazeologizmami. Jedynym godnym uwagi jest fakt, że pojawia się termin idiomatyczność, jedna z głównych cech związków frazeologicznych, wprowadzony przez Paula. Zaowocowało to pracami, których autorzy starali się w oparciu o to kryterium dokonywać podziału zespołów wyrazowych Jednak ich zainteresowanie dalekie było jeszcze od szczegółowej analizy, a skupiało się wyłącznie na inwentaryzacji. Dopiero wiek XX za sprawą pracy Traité de stilistique franęaise Bally’ego przyniósł przełom w badaniach frazeologizmów i stworzył fundamenty, na których powstała nowa dziedzina językoznawstwa. Choć początkowo praca nie spotkała się z większym zainteresowaniem, to w latach trzydziestych i czterdziestych minionego wieku znalazła uznanie radzieckich badaczy. To dzięki takim językoznawcom, jak Vinogradov czy Černyševa nastąpił istny renesans badań związków frazeologicznych, który ostatecznie doprowadził tam do wykrystalizowania się w latach czterdziestych XX w. frazeologii jako uznanej dyscypliny językoznawstwa. Osiągnięcia radzieckiej frazeologii przeniosła na grunt niemieckiej lingwistyki Ruth Klappenbach pod koniec lat sześćdziesiątych XX w. W roku 1970 Irina Černyševa opublikowała szczegółową pracę, poświęconą niemieckiej frazeologii. Powstałe później publikacje takich autorów, jak Koller, Pilz, Burger czy Fleischer, stały się żelaznym kanonem frazeologii języka niemieckiego i na stałe ugruntowały pozycję nowej dyscypliny. Kolejne publikacje autorów z całego świata, mające często charakter interdyscyplinarny, ukazują wciąż nowe kierunki badań frazeologizmów. Tym samym stanowią one nieoceniony wkład w dalszy rozwój niemieckiej frazeologii. (shrink)

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it (...) difficult to prove that higher-order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality. (shrink)

The anti-reductionist character of the recent philosophy of biology and the dynamic development of the science of emergent properties prove that the time is ripe to reintroduce the thought of Aristotle, the first advocate of a “top-down” approach in life-sciences, back into the science/philosophy debate. His philosophy of nature provides profound insights particularly in the context of the contemporary science of evolution, which is still struggling with the questions of form, teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes. However, (...) although Aristotle is referenced in the evolutionary debate, a thorough analysis of his theory of hylomorphism and the classical principle of causality which he proposes is still needed in this exchange. Such is the main concern of the first part of the present article which shows Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance as an open system, ready to incorporate new hypothesis of modern and contemporary science. The second part begins with the historical exploration of the trajectory from Darwin to Darwinism regarded as a metaphysical position. This exploration leads to an inquiry into the central topics of the present debate in the philosophy of evolutionary biology. It shows that Aristotle’s understanding of species, teleology, and chance – in the context of his fourfold notion of causality – has a considerable explanatory power which may enhance our understanding of the nature of evolutionary processes. This fact may inspire, in turn, a retrieval of the classical theology of divine action, based on Aristotelian metaphysics, in the science/theology dialogue. The aim of the present article is to prepare a philosophical ground for such project. (shrink)

The two main features of this thesis are (i) an account of contextualized (context indexed) counterfactuals, and (ii) a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles. Experience tells us that the truth of the counterfactual is contingent on what is meant by the antecedent, which in turn rests on what context is assumed to underlie its reading (intended meaning). On most conditional analyses, only the world of evaluation and the antecedent determine which worlds are relevant to determining the truth of a conditional, and (...) consequently what its truth value is. But that results in the underlying context being fixed, when evaluating distinct counterfactuals with the same antecedent on any single occasion, even when the context underlying the evaluation of each counterfactual may vary. Alternative approaches go some of the way toward resolving this inadequacy by appealing to a difference in the consequents associated with counterfactuals with the same antecedent. That is, in addition to the world of evaluation and the antecedent, the consequent contributes to the counterfactual’s evaluation. But these alternative approaches nevertheless give a single, determinate truth value to any single conditional (same antecedent and consequent), despite the possibility that this value may vary with context. My reply to these shortcomings (chapter 4) takes the form of an analysis of a language that makes appropriate explicit access to the intended context available. That is, I give an account of a contextualized counterfactual of the form ‘In context C: If it were the case that … , then it would be the case that …’. Although my proposal is largely based on Lewis’ (1973, 1981) analyses of counterfactuals (the logic VW and its ordering semantics), it does not require that any particular logic of counterfactuals should serve as its basis – rather, it is a general prescription for contextualizing a conditional language. The advantage of working with ordering semantics stems from existing results (which I apply and develop) concerning the properties of ordering frames that facilitate fashioning and implementing a notion of contextual information preservation. Analyses of counterfactuals, such as Lewis’ (1973), that cash out the truth of counterfactuals in terms of the corresponding material conditional’s truth at possible worlds result in all counterpossibles being evaluated as vacuously true. This is because antecedents of counterpossibles are not true at any possible world, by definition. Such vacuist analyses have already been identified and challenged by a number of authors. I join this critical front, and drawing on existing proposals, I develop an impossible world semantics for a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles (chapter 5), by modifying the same system and semantics that serve the basis of the contextualized account offered in chapter 4, i.e. Lewis’ (1986) ordering semantics for the logic VW. I critically evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of key conditions on the ordering of worlds on the extended domain and show that there is a sense in which all of Lewis’ analysis of mere counterfactuals can be preserved, whilst offering an analysis of counterpossibles that meets our intuitions. The first part of chapter 1 consists of an outline of the usefulness of impossible worlds across philosophical analyses and logic. That outline in conjunction with a critical evaluation of Lewis’ logical arguments in favour of vacuism in chapter 2, and his marvellous mountain argument against impossible worlds in chapter 3, serves to motivate and justify the impossible world semantics for counterpossibles proposed in chapter 5. The second part of chapter 1 discusses the limitations that various conditional logics face when tasked to give an adequate treatment of the influence of context. That introductory discussion in conjunction with an overview of conditional logics and their various semantics in chapter 2 – which includes an in-depth exposition of Stalnaker-Lewis similarity semantics for counterfactuals – serves as the motivation and conceptual basis for the contextualized account of counterfactuals proposed in chapter 4. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that the role of context cannot be ignored in the analysis of conditionals, and counterfactuals in particular. On truth conditional accounts involving possible worlds semantics, conditionals have been analysed as expressions of relative necessity: “If A, then B” is true at some world w if B is true at all the A-worlds deemed relevant to the evaluation of the conditional at w. A drawback of this approach is that for the evaluation of conditionals with the same (...) antecedents at some world, the same worlds are deemed as relevant for all occasions of utterance. But surely this is inadequate, if shifts of contexts between occasions are to be accounted for. Both the linguistic and logical implications of this defect are discussed, and in order to overcome it a modification of David Lewis’ ordering semantics for counterfactuals is developed for a modified language. I follow Lewis by letting contexts determine comparative similarity assignments, and show that the addition of syntactic context parameters (context indices) to the language gives the freedom required to switch between sets of relevant antecedent worlds from occasion to occasion by choosing the corresponding similarity assignment accordingly. Thus an account that extends Lewis’ analysis of a language containing a single counterfactual connective > to a language containing infinitely many counterfactual connectives >_c, each indexed by a different context name c, overcomes the limitations of traditional analyses. Finally it is also shown that these traditional accounts can be recovered from the modified account if certain contextual restrictions are in place. -/- . (shrink)

I analyse three most interesting and extensive approaches to theoretical models: classical ones—proposed by Peter Achinstein and Michael Redhead, and the rela-tively rareanalysed approach of Ryszard Wójcicki, belonging to a later phase of his research where he gave up applyingthe conceptual apparatus of logical semantics. I take into consideration the approaches to theoretical models in which they are qualified as models representing the reality. That is why I omit Max Black’s and Mary Hesse’s concepts of such models, as those two (...) concepts belong to the analogue model group if we consider the main function of the model of a given class as its classification criterion. My main focus is on theoretical models with representative functions as these very models and, in a broader context, the question of representation. (shrink)

Can Contemporary Science Inspire Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Causality? The cooperation between natural science, philosophy, and theology in an analysis of the causal structure and co-dependency of entities in the universe seems to be both legitimate and expected. It turns out, however, that in practice it oftentimes raises some tensions, questions and difficulties, leading to the development of alternative and in a sense competitive models of causality and of God’s action in the world. What is more, the attitude of (...) natural sciences since modernity, concentrated on gaining knowledge about natural phenomena to predict and control them, without trying to determine the nature of their ultimate causes, Humean criticism and rejection of the concept of causality as such, and concentration of analytic philosophers on the description of what accompanies phenomena classified as causal, leaving aside the question of the metaphysical status of causes and effects – they all seem to make impossible an interaction and mutual reference of contemporary science, philosophy, and theology in their reflection on the topic of causation. The main goal of this article is to defend the thesis about the possible and actual influence of scientific analysis of cause and effect relationships on the philosophical and theological reflection on causation, not only in the Middle Ages and Modernity, but also in contemporary thought. The presentation of the latest positions in the debate on divine action in the natural world will be followed by an argument in favor of the relevance of the model developed by philosophers and theologians representing the Thomistic school. (shrink)

In the article the models which are reconstructed in the philosophy of science from the praxis of science are divided into two main types: 1) analogue and metaphor-based models and 2) representational models. I examine functions of the models of both the types, and demonstrate that the models of type 1) are used in science as instruments of acquiring new knowledge on the basis of a knowledge accepted earlier; and models of type 2) are used to create cognitive “images” of (...) reality. I demonstrate that in the philosophy of science the problem areas generated by two functions of models are entirely isolated one from another. Whereas they are non-separably linked one to another. I postulate the necessity of linking them in one unified conception of models, and then in one conception of science. Therefore such a conception of models is needed which will explain how models play two functions simultaneously, i.e. how they function in the context of discovery and how they rep-resent reality. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is to present a reinterpretation of Karl Popper’'s position on the methodological and sociopolitical views of Karl Marx. In spite of the weaknesses of the Popper’'s critique of the achievements of Marx, special attention will be focused on the explanation of contradictions within the epistemological position of the former. This will be of great importance in the context of the analysis of Marx’s historicism, and will also help undermine the coherence view of the founder (...) of falsi
cationism. Additionally, this newly developed perspective will serve as a starting point for evaluation of Marx’s intellectual output, as well as conceptions that refer to him. (shrink)

Hylomorphism and related to it classical concept of the human soul—understood as a substantial form of the human being—are traditionally supported and commented on by the followers of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought, both in its classical and contemporary approach. At the same time, hylomorphism has recently found a new group of followers, coming from the circles of analytic metaphysics, unrelated to the classical school of thought. This article strives to answer the question of the relation of the new, analytic versions of (...) hylomorphism to its classical definition. Moreover, it also analyzes their application in the debate concerning the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind, as well as the question of their reference to the concept of the human soul. It seems that the mereological and structural reinterpretation of the material and the formal causes departs considerably from the classical definition of hylomorphism. Moreover, the suggestion of William Jaworski – who argues in favor of the new hylomorphism in the mind-body debate – to define mental phenomena as “structured manifestations of powers” belonging to the parts of human body, not only raises some serious metaphysical concerns, but also seems to leave no “space” for the classical concept of human soul. These difficulties notwithstanding, one should appreciate an attempt of the proponents of the new analytic hylomorphism at finding an alternative to the extreme positions of substance or property dualism and eliminative or reductionist materialism in the contemporary discussion concerning the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Many enthusiasts of theistic evolution willingly accept Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causes, to describe theologically “the mechanics” of evolutionary transformism. However, their description of the character of secondary causes in relation to God’s creative action oftentimes lacks precision. To some extent, the situation within the Thomistic camp is similar when it comes to specifying the exact nature of secondary and instrumental causes at work in evolution. Is it right to ascribe all causation in evolution to creatures—acting as secondary (...) and instrumental causes? Is there any space for a more direct divine action in evolutionary transitions? This article offers a new model of explaining the complexity of the causal nexus in the origin of new biological species, including the human species, analyzed in reference to both the immanent and transcendent orders of causation. (shrink)

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas assumes the reality of the evolution of species. Their systems of thought, however, remain open to the new data, offering an essential contribution to the ongoing debate between scientific, philosophical, and theological aspects of the theory of evolution. After discussing some key issues of substance metaphysics in its encounter with the theory of evolution (hylomorphism, transformism of species, teleology, chance, the principle of proportionate causation), I present a Thomistic response to its major hypotheses. Concerning the philosophy (...) of Aquinas, I trace what might be seen as a preliminary description of natural selection in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Turning toward theology, besides addressing the topics that were referred to in the past—such as: Aquinas’ reading of Genesis, his account of creation as dependence in being, secondary and instrumental causality, and univocal/equivocal predication of God—I bring into discussion Thomas’ concept of the perfection of the universe, which has been virtually unused in this context. (shrink)

Panentheism has recently become a widely accepted and appreciated concept among scholars in the science-theology dialogue, and its theological repercussions have been discussed to great extent. Yet, there remains to be studied in more detail the notion of the philosophical foundations of the term. A prominent gap in our understanding of these foundations is the potential similarity between the metaphysics of Hegel and Whitehead, their understanding of the transcendence and immanence of God, and their respective versions of panentheism. In this (...) article, I present a critical reflection on the possible resemblance between process thought and Hegelian metaphysics and philosophy of God. In the last section I refer to those who use panentheism within the science-theology dialogue. I try to specify which of the two versions of panentheism, that of Hegel or Whitehead, is more popular among those scholars. (shrink)

The anti-reductionist character of the recent philosophy of biology and the dynamic development of the science of emergent properties prove that the time is ripe to reintroduce the thought of Aristotle, the first advocate of a “top-down” approach in life-sciences, back into the science/philosophy debate. His philosophy of nature provides profound insights particularly in the context of the contemporary science of evolution, which is still struggling with the questions of form species), teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes. (...) However although Aristotle is referenced in the evolutionary debate, a thorough analysis of his theory of hylomorphism and the classical principle of causality which he proposes is still needed in this exchange. Such is the main concern of the first part of the present article which shows Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance as an open system, ready to incorporate new hypothesis of modern and contemporary science. The second part begins with the historical exploration of the trajectory from Darwin to Darwinism regarded as a metaphysical position. This exploration leads to an inquiry into the central topics of the present debate in the philosophy of evolutionary biology. It shows that Aristotle’s understanding of species teleology and chance – in the context of his fourfold notion of causality – has a considerable explanatory power which may enhance our understanding of the nature of evolutionary processes. This fact may inspire, in turn, a retrieval of the classical theology of divine action, based on Aristotelian metaphysics, in the science/theology dialogue. The aim of the present article is to prepare a philosophical ground for such project. (shrink)

The paper is a part of the project of retrieving C.B. Macpherson’s thesis of possessive individualism and his contribution to investigations about democratic theory and the “Western political ontology” valuable especially in today’s context of expansion, crisis and – arguably – subsequent, experienced today, revival of the project of “neoliberal democracy”. The aim of my paper is to present theory of possessive individualism as the missing center of critical theory of democracy. The task is conducted through a brief reconstruction of (...) Macpherson’s investigations into the history of liberal doctrine and argumentation about the continuing validity and firmness of this approach despite its alleged “definitive refutation” in contemporary historiography of modern social and political thought. (shrink)

Stanisław Lem, a philosopher and futurologist, in his many works devoted much attention to the condition of human and the relation between human and technology. He coined the term ‘autoevolution’ in the course of forecasting unlimited technological augmentation of human abilities. Nowadays, the term may be associated with the conceptions presented by transhumanism, a 20th-century-born philosophical movement which advocates radical transformation of Homo sapiens by means of the achievements of scientific and technological progress. Lem’s attitude towards such a transformation of (...) human is complicated yet ultimately critical due to the fact that it poses a threat to human culture as such. The phenomenon of autoevolution undermines existing values and raises a question of authenticity of a future posthuman. We examine dependence between technology and culture, present Lem’s conception of autoevolution and his philosophy of culture, then we sketch a post-metaphysical dispute about authenticity, and finally show that Lem’s thought belongs to one of the arguing sides. (shrink)

Startery Podlaskiej Gospodarki. Analiza Gospodarczych Obszarów Wzrostu I Innowacji Województwa Podlaskiego: Sektor Rehabilitacji Geriatrycznej (Podlasie Economy Starters. Analysis of Economic Growth and Innovation Areas of Podlaskie: Geriatric Rehabilitat Bogusław Plawgo, Magdalena Klimczuk, Mariusz Citkowski, Marta Juchnicka & Andrzej Klimczuk Wojewódzki Urz¸Ad Pracy W Białymstoku (2009) .

Introducir un recorrido a través de la historia y la teoría propia de la filosofía dela economía es una tarea del todo ambiciosa, sin embargo, Mariusz Maziarz lo lleva adelante en esta obra, que se puede considerar un manual actualizado de la filosofía de la economía y, en particular, de la epistemología de la economía. Aun-que no es un libro de historia del pensamiento económico ni de historia de la filosofía de las ciencias, sino más bien una iniciación ordenada (...) a los problemas de la epistemología de la economía, ellos se fundan en la filosofía de la ciencia y están atravesados por cuestiones y debates históricos. Quizás algo de eso sea aquello que Maziarz quiere desenredar en este texto. (shrink)