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  1. added 2017-12-12
    Switching to the Rubber Hand.S. L. Yeh & Timothy Joseph Lane - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift (...)
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  2. added 2017-07-30
    From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
    When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here (...)
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  3. added 2017-04-19
    Socially Extending the Mind Through Social Affordances.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - forthcoming - In Steven Gouveia & Manuel Curado (eds.), Automata's Inner Movie: Science and Philosophy of Mind. Vernon Press.
    The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...)
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  4. added 2017-03-17
    Digestion, Habit, and Being at Home: Hegel and the Gut as Ambiguous Other.Jane Dryden - 2016 - PhaenEx 11 (2):1-22.
    Recent work in the philosophy of biology argues that we must rethink the biological individual beyond the boundary of the species, given that a key part of our essential functioning is carried out by the bacteria in our intestines in a way that challenges any strictly genetic account of what is involved for the biological human. The gut is a kind of ambiguous other within our understanding of ourselves, particularly when we also consider the status of gastro-intestinal disorders. Hegel offers (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-12
    Timing Disownership Experiences in the Rubber Hand Illusion.Lane Timothy, Yeh Su-Ling, Tseng Phil & Chang An-Yi - 2017 - Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 2 (4).
    Some investigators of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have suggested that when standard RHI induction procedures are employed, if the rubber hand is experienced by participants as owned, their corresponding biological hands are experienced as disowned. Others have demurred: drawing upon a variety of experimental data and conceptual considerations, they infer that experience of the RHI might include the experience of a supernumerary limb, but that experienced disownership of biological hands does not occur. Indeed, some investigators even categorically deny that (...)
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  6. added 2016-09-02
    Attention in Bodily Awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
    The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can (...)
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  7. added 2016-02-29
    Levinasian Reflections on Somaticity and the Ethical Self.Joel Krueger - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):603 – 626.
    In this article, I attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to several key terms and foundational claims that make up Levinas's body-based conception of ethics. Additionally, I explore ways that Levinas's arguments about the somatic basis of subjectivity and ethical relatedness receive support from recent empirical research. The paper proceeds in this way: First, I clarify Levinas's use of the terms “sensibility”, “subjectivity”, and “proximity” in Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence . Next, I argue for an interpretation of Levinas's (...)
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  8. added 2016-02-11
    Touching Voids: On the Varieties of Absence Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):355-366.
    Seeing one’s laptop to be missing, hearing silence and smelling fresh air; these are all examples of perceptual experiences of absences. In this paper I discuss an example of absence perception in the tactual sense modality, that of tactually perceiving a tooth to be absent in one’s mouth, following its extraction. Various features of the example challenge two recently-developed theories of absence perception: Farennikova’s memory-perception mismatch theory and Martin and Dockic’s meta-cognitive theory. I speculate that the mechanism underlying the experience (...)
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  9. added 2015-12-04
    Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to (...)
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  10. added 2014-04-02
    Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity.Alison Stone - unknown
    In this book Alison Stone develops a feminist approach to maternal subjectivity. Stone argues that in the West the self has often been understood in opposition to the maternal body, so that one must separate oneself from the mother and maternal care-givers on whom one depended in childhood to become a self or, in modernity, an autonomous subject. These assumptions make it difficult to be a mother and a subject, an autonomous creator of meaning. Insofar as mothers nonetheless strive to (...)
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  11. added 2014-03-10
    Dimensions of Bodily Subjectivity.D. Legrand, T. Grünbaum & J. Krueger - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):279-283.
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  12. added 2013-02-25
    What Reason Could There Be to Believe in Pre-Reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness.Adrian Alsmith - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social environment in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Press.
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  13. added 2012-10-24
    Résistance Et Existence [Resistence and Existence].Olivier Massin - 2011 - Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
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  14. added 2012-08-02
    How It Feels to Be Alive: Moods, Background Orientations, and Existential Feelings.Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. de Gruyter.
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  15. added 2011-03-16
    Evolution as Connecting First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives of Consciousness (2008).Christophe Menant - 2008 - Dissertation,
    First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point (...)
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