Civil and Political Rights

My aim in this chapter is to take the complexity of our histories of rights as seriously as the nature of rights themselves. Let me say immediately that the point is not to satisfy our sense of moral superiority by smugly pointing out the prejudices found in arguments made over three hundred years ago. We have more than our own share of problems and prejudices to deal with. Rather, in coming to grips with this history, and especially how early-modern political (...) theorists struggled with the extension and application of natural rights to the ‘New World’, we may learn something about our own struggles to extend human rights beyond the boundaries of the state system of which Grotius, Hobbes, Locke and Vattel were among the key intellectual architects. For Richard Tuck, the autonomous rights-bearing agent at the heart of liberal individualism is a product of seventeenth-century theorizing about the nature of the autonomous state acting in the international sphere. The sovereign individual is the ‘traditional cousin of the sovereign state’, argues Tuck, and especially the aggressive, violent, and minimally constrained relative described by Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Emer de Vattel. Thus the connection between liberalism and imperialism, on this reading, is not merely chronological or historical but metaphysical. The analogy between the sovereign state and the sovereign individual acting on the basis of their natural rights, constrained by the recognition of the basic rights of others (but not much more than that) represents an influential vision of liberal freedom. This minimalist account of freedom represents only one vision, however, and Tuck’s account of the pre-history of liberal rights has to be balanced against other conceptions, including more emancipatory ones. (shrink)

Devrions-nous remplacer les élections par des loteries ? Le célèbre livre de Bernard Manin sur le gouvernement représentatif a appris à beaucoup que les Grecs considéraient les élections comme un moyen aristocratique, et non démocratique, de sélectionner des personnes pour le pouvoir et l'autorité politique, en comparaison avec le tirage au sort, où chacun a une chance égale d'être sélectionné. (Manin 1997) Jusqu'à récemment, cependant, l'idée qu'un engagement envers la démocratie nécessite de remplacer les élections par le tirage au sort (...) a suscité peu d'intérêt parmi les philosophes politiques. (Blondiaux, 2008 ; Courant et Sintomer, 2019) Cela a maintenant changé. (Abizadeh 2020) ( A. Guerrero 2014) (A. Guerrero 2021b ; 2021a) (Landemore 2020) (Owen et Smith 2018) (P.-É. Vandamme et al. 2018). Cet article pose donc la question de savoir si le tirage au sort est plus démocratique que les élections et si, pour cette raison, nous devrions l’utiliser pour compléter ou remplacer les élections ? (shrink)

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)

There are two conceptions of ‘inclusion’ in play in this debate. 1. The traditional conception in sport: How does sport provide inclusion/exclusion? Through eligibility criteria. 2. The social justice conception: trans people must be included in all social endeavours/institutions, one of these being sport. In the latter ‘inclusion’ facilitates affirmation and validation of their gender identity. The question is: should sport take on this ‘social justice’ task?

Within the small body of philosophical work on strikes, to participate in a strike is commonly seen as to refuse to do the job while retaining one’s claim upon it. What is the relationship, though, between liberalism and the right to strike? This is our main question.

Economic disparities often translate into disparities in political influence, rendering political liberties less worthy to poor citizens than to wealthier ones. Concerned with this, Rawls advocated that a guarantee of the fair value of political liberties be included in the first principle of justice as fairness, with significant regulatory and distributive implications. He nonetheless supplied little examination of the content and grounding of such guarantee, which we here offer. After examining three uncompelling arguments in its favor, we complete a more (...) promising yet less explored argument that builds on the value of self-respect. We first inspect the conditions and duties that securing self-respect entails. We then look into how uneven allocations of the value of political liberties bear, expressively and due to the power imbalances they yield, on such conditions and duties. (shrink)

This article develops an intuitive idea of proportionality as a placeholder for a substantive conception of equality, and contrasts it with Ripstein’s ideas, as presented in an annual guest lecture to the Society of Applied Philosophy in 2016. It uses a discussion of racial profiling to illustrate the conceptual and normative differences between the two. The brief conclusion spells out my concern that talk of ‘proportionality’, though often helpful and, sometimes, necessary for moral reasoning, can end up concealing, rather than (...) illuminating, people’s claims to be treated as equals. (shrink)

examine the dominant conversations on cultural appropriation. The first part of the essay will examine the ideological configuration of what constitutes cultural appropriation (hereafter as CA) first, as the politics of the diaspora and second, within a normative understanding of culture and its diachronic contradictions. This will be followed by a critical reevaluation of our subject theme as primarily a discourse of power with multiple implications. Framed as a discourse of power, CA is equally exposed to ideological distortions, and its (...) critics becoming afflicted with the same virus they set out to cure in the first place. I am interested in the aspect of culture as a constant location of tensions and rupture, yet constitutive of core credential in the making of modern identity. I argue that the failure of dominant criticisms of cultural appropriation is precisely because they do not leave epistemic space for prior commitments: the internal variation of culture. If as critics have argued that CA enables cultural violence, we need to understand the epistemic space where cultural violence occurs in order to make a meaningful proposal for identity discourse and conversation. I will make a case for what may be termed multiple humanity (ies) as a way of transcending the homogenous claims imposed upon cultural memories. (shrink)

this paper argues that people are entitled to keep some true facts about themselves to themselves, should they so wish, as a sign of respect for their moral and political status, and in order to protect themselves from being used as a public example in order to educate or to entertain other people. The “outing” - or non-consensual public disclosure - of people’s health records or status, or their sexual behaviour or orientation is usually unjustified, even when its consequences seem (...) to be beneficial. Indeed, the paper claims, the reasons to reject outing, as inconsistent with democratic commitments to freedom and equality, are reasons to insist on the importance of privacy to freedom of expression. While a free press is of the utmost importance to democratic government, it is not identical with the free expression of individuals and, on occasion, the former may have to be constrained in order to protect the latter. [Barendt, 2007, 231]. Hence, the paper concludes, we should distinguish the claims of individuals to publish reports about their lives – even if this necessarily involves revealing the private lives of others – from journalistic claims to publish information about the sex lives of consenting adults. I will start by briefly situating my argument within a democratic approach to privacy, before using the “outing” of Oliver Sipple to examine people’s claims to privacy and their implications for freedom of expression and of the press. I will be assuming that some forms of privacy are legitimate, in order to focus more closely on the question of what information, if any, people may keep to themselves. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with the role of democracy in preventing terrorism, identifying and apprehending terrorists, and in minimizing and alleviating the damage created by terrorism.1 Specifically, it considers the role of democracy as a resource, not simply a limitation, on counterterrorism.2 I am mainly concerned with the ways in which counterterrorism is similar to more familiar forms of public policy, such as the prevention of crime or the promotion of economic prosperity, and so nothing that I say turns on (...) being able sharply to distinguish terrorism from other bad things that democracies have to face. I will not, then, address the extensive debate on the best way to define terrorism.3 However, I assume that terrorists characteristically seek to terrorize people in order to secure their particular ends. What forms that terror takes, what people terrorists seek to terrorize, and what ends terrorists seek to promote I assume to be indeterminate, open to change, and a matter for empirical investigation. However, I take it that the IRA, Baader Meinhoff, and the Red Brigade, as well as certain animal rights groups in the United Kingdom and certain anti-abortion groups in the United States, are examples of terrorist groups and individuals. In short, I will be assuming that terrorism is principally characterized by the choice of means to given ends, rather than by the ends themselves, and that it is the choice of means, rather than the favored ends, that makes terrorism so problematic from a democratic perspective. However good the goal, terrorizing a population—whether or not this involves killing the innocent—is morally wrong and, from a democratic perspective, an abuse of power over the lives of others. While the use of terror may indicate that the ends sought by terrorists are such that people cannot be expected to support them voluntarily, there is no justification for supposing that the ends of terrorism must be morally or politically unacceptable simply because the means are both. It is a staple of ordinary life—not merely of philosophical examples—that people are sometimes unjustified in the means they use in order to accomplish perfectly acceptable ends. So, the ends terrorists seek are, or might become, morally or politically acceptable without in any way altering our objections to the use of terror as a tool for promoting them. (shrink)

This paper examines the claims that moral objections to the patenting of human genes are misplaced and rest on confusions about what a patent is, or what is patented by a human gene patent. It shows that theese objections rest on too simple a conception of property rights, and the connections betwteen familiar moral objections to private property and moral objections to the patenting of human genes. Above all, the paper claims, objections to HGPs often reflect worries about the lack (...) of democratic oversight, accountability and participation involved in grants of intellectual property. The paper claims that we should take these worries seriously, whether or not we think HGPs immoral. (shrink)

This is an essay discussing how schools seem to be suppressing the Constitution and the very political philosophy of this country through the actions of their educators. I discuss how the Teleological designs of these institutions ultimately has changed.

I defend a neo-republican account of the right to have political rights. Neo-republican freedom from domination is a sufficient condition for the extension of political rights not only for permanent residents, but also for temporary residents, unauthorized migrants, and some expatriates. I argue for the advantages of the neo-republican account over the social membership account, the affected-interest account, the stakeholder account, and accounts based on the justification of state coercion.

Up to a certain age, young people are denied the right to vote. In this paper, it is argued that this general exclusion from democratic participation is unjustified and should be abandoned. After a short survey of some of the pedagogic, legal, and political arguments that have been brought forward to support a liberalisation of electoral law in favour of children, the essay presents a basic moral argument against any age limit with respect to voting rights. First of all, it (...) is argued that the right to vote is grounded in a fundamental claim of human beings to equal participation and, therefore, can be denied only for severe and cogent reasons. Subsequently, the essay purports to establish – and defends against objections – that there are no such reasons that sufficiently justify an age limit. The paper concludes with some remarks on practical consequences of the argument. (shrink)

Essay exploring the extent to which certain agreements between the police and informants are an affront (both procedurally and substantively) to basic tenets of the liberal tradition in legal and political philosophy.

In this article I use Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as a method for presenting a disclosing critique of aphonia as the loss of a political voice of one’s own. I claim that aphonia is a phenomenon that is qualitatively different from a lack of opportunities for democratic participation and a lack of the communicative capabilities required for effective political participation. I give examples from sociological literature on social exclusion and political apathy, and then diagnose them using Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of operative (...) intentionality and the lived body. A picture emerges of aphonia as the diminishing of the expressive modality of the lived body. This can lead to the inability to perceive oneself as a capable public speaker and the public realm as a welcoming field of possibilities for political engagement. I propose that democratic theory should consider the way that the negative social experiences of social marginalization can diminish, or even completely take away, the capability to authentically give a voice to one’s experiences in public on one’s own terms. I conclude with a call for grass-roots alternatives towards engendering political participation among marginalized groups through a “therapeutic” approach to political inclusion. (shrink)

Political actions by Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, and other climate activists often involve violations of legal regulations – such as compulsory education requirements or traffic laws – and have been criticized for this in the public sphere. In this essay, I defend the view that these violations of the law constitute a form of morally justified civil disobedience against climate policies. I first show that these actions satisfy the criteria of civil disobedience even on relatively strict conceptions of civil (...) disobedience. I then argue that they meet plausible justification conditions for civil disobedience because they are directed against serious and clear injustices, which legal means of influence have failed to remedy for decades. Finally, I reject the objection that civil disobedience against climate policy violates basic democratic principles because it claims authority to override democratically enacted agreements. When addressed to Fridays for Future activists, the objection misfires for the reason alone that these activists are largely minors that are excluded from democratic participation. Moreover, disobedience even by adult activists is justified by the existence of serious democratic deficits in our climate policies, especially since it can help to correct them. Such deficits include the lack of representation of the interests of people affected by climate change in the future and globally. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a puzzle for Rawlsians given an attractive way for them to approach defining an adult citizen.

Artykuł, choć traktuje głównie o statusie jednostki w realiach i myśli politycznej monarchii absolutnej doby Bodinusa i Pufendorfa, odnosi się – toutes proportions gardées – do następującej kwestii: Czy członków państw niedemokratycznych, pozbawionych pełni praw i wolności politycznych, można określać mianem obywateli? Krzysztof Trzciński, Odwrócenie perspektywy: poddany jako obywatel w monarchii absolutnej, czyli o wieloznaczności pojęć lub ich różnym rozumieniu, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 3/2004, s. 93-106.

Poprzez wieki ewolucji idei i instytucji obywatelstwa w Europie, płeć (obok wolności osobistej, wieku, pochodzenia, miejsca urodzenia, domicylu czy majętności ) należała do głównych kryteriów posiadania pełnoprawnego statusu obywatelskiego w państwie. Obywatelstwo aż do XX wieku miało charakter patriarchalny, jednak jego współczesna definicja implikuje równouprawnienie obu płci. Egalitaryzacja dostępu do pełnego obywatelstwa w nowożytnej Europie następowała wieloetapowo. Proces ten wiązał się ze zmianami mentalności społecznej i stopniowym znoszeniem prawnego upośledzenia kobiet w różnych dziedzinach życia.

Wywodzący się z Ghany, a tworzący w Stanach Zjednoczonych Kwasi Wiredu należy do grona najwybitniejszych współczesnych filozofów afrykańskich. W swych rozprawach politycznych obnaża wady demokracji liberalnej i postuluje, by demokracja w Afryce była budowana w oparciu o rodzime tradycje polityczne, które mają, w jego opinii, charakter demokratyczny. Wiredu negatywnie ocenia kondycję współczesnych demokracji liberalnych przede wszystkim z powodu charakteryzującej je dalece antagonistycznej praktyki uprawiania polityki, która kontrastuje z typową dla niektórych społeczeństw afrykańskich tradycją koncyliacyjną. Ghański filozof optuje za wykorzystaniem w (...) polityce afrykańskiej idei deliberacji (palaweru) oraz konsensualnego osiągania decyzji politycznych i proponuje zastąpienie partii politycznych działającymi na innych zasadach stowarzyszeniami politycznymi (political associations) oraz tworzenie rządu bez udziału partii politycznych. Proponowana przezeń koncepcja państwa pozapartyjnego (nonparty) jest atrakcyjna intelektualnie, ale rodzi liczne znaki zapytania. (shrink)

Legitymacja należy do kluczowych zagadnień myśli politycznej i jest nierozerwalnie powiązana między innymi z takimi terminami jak państwo, władza, obywatele, poddani, prawa i obowiązki. Pojęcie legitymacji jest niezwykle ważne i być może właśnie z tego powodu jego istota stanowi temat wielu dyskusji. W tym artykule nie będziemy jednak analizować sporów definicyjnych. Ograniczymy się do podejścia, jakie proponuje Roger Scruton, unikając przedstawienia ścisłej definicji. Termin ‘legitymacja’ określa, jego zdaniem, to samo, co pojęcia ‘prawomocność władzy’ bądź ‘prawowite panowanie’. Gdy rządzący dzierżą władzę (...) nie posiadając do tego uprawnienia, wówczas mówimy, że władza jest przez nich wykonywana bez legitymacji. Legitymacja dotyczy relacji między obywatelami (poddanymi) a władzą państwową lub – jak ma to miejsce na przykład w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej – lokalnym władztwem tradycyjnym. Pojęcie legitymacji odnosi się przede wszystkim do tak podstawowych zagadnień jak podporządkowanie się obywateli (poddanych) decyzji władz oraz prawo władzy państwowej (lub tradycyjnej) do ograniczania wolności obywateli (poddanych). Legitymacja była istotnym problemem politycznym na przestrzeni ludzkich dziejów i we wszystkich obszarach świata. Również i dziś stanowi aktualną kwestię. Władza we współczesnych państwach demokratycznych czerpie legitymację z woli elektoratu wyrażonej w wyborach. Nawet w takim wydawałoby się idealnym stanie rzeczy legitymacja niejednokrotnie stanowi przedmiot dyskusji. Seymour Martin Lipset pisze w tym kontekście o ‘szacunkowości’, czy też względności legitymacji i uważa, że ludzie w państwie uznają istniejący w nim system polityczny jako posiadający legitymację lub nie w zależności od tego, czy wartości systemu odpowiadają wartościom przez nich wyznawanym. I tak na przykład, gdy prezydentem demokratycznego państwa zostanie popierany przez nas kandydat, automatycznie uznajemy jego władzę za legitymowaną. Jeśli jednak wybory prezydenckie wygra osoba, której nie darzymy poparciem czy zaufaniem, wówczas zdarza się nam podważać jej legitymację, zwłaszcza gdy została wybrana na urząd w sytuacji niskiej frekwencji wyborczej. W państwach pokolonialnej Afryki problem legitymacji jest daleko bardziej skomplikowany niż w świecie zachodnim. Podczas gdy Max Weber wyróżnił trzy czyste typy prawomocnego panowania (legalne, tradycyjne i charyzmatyczne) w państwie, David Beetham uznał, że typologia ta jest nieadekwatna ze względu na różnorodność rodzajów władzy, które istniały w XX wieku. Pogląd Beethama odpowiada po części sytuacji w Afryce, gdzie w przypadku wielu pokolonialnych państw przetrwały różne lokalne systemy władzy przedkolonialnej (królestwa, sułtanaty, wodzostwa) o legitymacji tradycyjnej, przy jednoczesnym istnieniu na poziomie ogólnopaństwowym panowania legalnego lub quasi-legalnego, mniej lub bardziej zgodnego z państwowym porządkiem prawnym. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine epistocracy as a form of limiting the political agency of some citizens (by removing their political rights) and offer an internal critique of it. I will argue that epistocracy runs into a number of logical and epistemic problems in trying to define who should be the members of an epistocratic polity. Furthermore, I will argue that the argument for epistocracy cannot ignore unjust background conditions. I will also suggest that some of the problems epistocracy (...) attempts to correct can be solved in a more just way, while preserving democracy. (shrink)

Hussain claims that ethical consumers are subject to democratic requirements of morality, whereas ordinary price/quality consumers are exempt from these requirements. In this paper, we demonstrate that Hussain’s position is incoherent, does not follow from the arguments he offers for it, and entails a number of counterintuitive consequences.

Whatever the merits idealized liberal accounts of citizenship education may have in the seminar room, in this essay I argue that they are both unpersuasive and ineffectual. This is the case, because they are insufficiently attentive to the empirical realities, first (a) with respect to how real – versus imaginary – school systems function; and second, (b) with respect to the broader political context in which citizenship education policies are implemented. Because so much is already known about the former, I (...) devote more attention in this essay to the latter. (shrink)

Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...) trust on the formulation stage. It should also benefit from exploring the structuring effects of trust in organizations. Throughout this chapter, ways to extend current research on trust in organizations are suggested. The chapter also provides examples of relevant contributions where available. In order to capture organizational effects of trust, it is suggested that trust should be studied over longer time intervals, and include several referents of trust, spanning both horizontal and vertical relationships in the organization. (shrink)

Since Jürgen Habermas' speech for the Peace Price of the German Book Trade in October 2001, secular reason – personified by one of its main protagonists – has been able to debate with religion anew. For the purpose of an unbiased encounter between philosophy and religion, Habermas introduced the term “postsecular” back then in order to emphasize that this dialogue was inevitably necessary, all the more in the face of religiously motivated terrorism. Nonetheless, this willingness to debate was accompanied by (...) the conviction that secular reason itself, as a matter of fact, would be “ideologically neutral”. However, taking the necessity of accomplishing the confrontation with “world” (Weltbewältigung) seriously, the reflection on world view as a whole unveils its implied tasks of granting metaphysical and existential certainty (metaphysische Sicherheit), therefore resulting in the statement that there cannot be a neutral world view at all. Only dialogue as exchange of beliefs generates the general framework within which the discursive issues of world views are separated from their existential aspects, thus enabling a reasonably conducted debate without endangering the existential certainty of its participants. As a consequence, the neutrality of world views exclusively rests in dialogue and is no unique feature of secular reason at all. Eventually, this leads to the reconsideration of the conditions that must be given for an argument to be called “rational”. The article tries to point out that an argument in political contexts, whether given by a religious or a secular person, should only be acknowledged rational if it takes at least all living people – regardless of their group affiliations – into account. (shrink)

This study aims to identify various meanings of the expression (name) “dignity”, with particular emphasis on the meanings of this expression as it appears in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The meaning of the name “dignity” is the concept of dignity; in turn, the different concepts of dignity encompass dignity of particular types. Twelve different meanings of the expression “dignity” are indicated – twelve different concepts of dignity, and thus twelve types of dignity. Half of (...) them are meanings (concepts) that recognize dignity as something belonging to a human being as a subject of law. They were considered in the essay Godność jako właściwość osoby. Typy godności – propozycja systematyzacji [Dignity as a Quality of Person – a Proposed Systematisation]. This group of meanings includes three concepts of dignity which recognize dignity as something constitutive of being a person: (1) inherent dignity of the person, (2) dignity established by qualities specific to a thinking being, and (3) dignity as a historically emergent social status of all human beings. The second group of meanings, treating dignity as something with which the human being (the person) is endowed, includes concepts which encompass (4) personal dignity (honour and good reputation), (5) dignity as moral excellence, and (6) dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. -/- Dignity as an attribute of collective entities and dignity as an institutionally grounded attribute are a subject of this paper. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland speaks of (1) the dignity of the Nation, (2) the dignity of office or function, and (3) public dignity. The expression “the dignity of the Nation” can be understood in four different ways: (i) analogously to the understanding of dignity of the person, (ii) of personal dignity, (iii) of dignity as moral excellence, and (iv) of dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. The expression “dignity” when designating something institutionally grounded can designate (4) the dignity of social roles, (5) the dignity of a profession, and – specifically to the Polish language – (6) dignity meaning a surname. -/- The author argues that it is unacceptable to ascribe different concepts of dignity to the expression “dignity” appearing in a specific legal provision. (shrink)

"Dignity as a Quality of Person: Types of Dignity – a Proposed Systematisation" This study aims to identify various meanings of the expression (name) “dignity”, with particular emphasis on the meanings of the expression as it appears in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The meaning of the name “dignity” is the concept of dignity; in turn, the concept of dignity encompasses dignity of particular types. Twelve different meanings of the expression “dignity” are indicated – twelve (...) different concepts of dignity, and thus twelve types of dignity. Half of them are meanings (concepts) that recognize dignity as something belonging to a human being as a subject of law, and this essay is devoted to this group of meanings. This group of meanings includes three concepts of dignity which encompass dignity as something constitutive of being a person: (1) inherent dignity of the person, (2) dignity established by qualities specific to a thinking being, and (3) dignity as a historically emergent social status of all human beings. Only the first of these three concepts of dignity is adequate to the interpretation of the preamble and art. 30 of the Polish Constitution. The second group of meanings, treating dignity as something with which the human being is endowed, includes concepts which encompass (4) personal dignity (honour and good reputation), (5) dignity as moral excellence, and (6) dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. The other half of the meanings take dignity as something that belongs to something. These meanings will be considered in the forthcoming essay Godność jako cecha podmiotów zbiorowych i godność jako cecha ugruntowana instytucjonalnie. Typy godności – propozycja systematyzacji [Dignity as an Attribute of Collective Entities and Dignity as an Institutionally Grounded Attribute: Types of Dignity – a Proposed Systematisation]. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland speaks of (1) the dignity of the Nation, (2) the dignity of office or function, and (3) public dignity. The expression “dignity” when designating something belonging to something can also designate (4) the dignity of social status based on belonging to a social group, (5) the dignity of a profession, and – specifically to the Polish language – (6) dignity meaning a surname. The author argues that it is unacceptable to ascribe different concepts of dignity to the expression “dignity” appearing in a specific legal provision. STRESZCZENIE Opracowanie zmierza do identyfikacji różnych znaczeń wyrażenia (nazwy) „godność”, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem znaczeń tego wyrażenia występującego w tekście Konstytucji RP. Znaczeniem nazwy „godność” jest pojęcie godności; z kolei pojęcie godności ujmuje samą godność danego typu. Wskazanych zostaje dwanaście różnych znaczeń wyrażenia „godność” – dwanaście różnych pojęć godności, zatem i dwanaście jej typów. Połowa z nich to znaczenia (pojęcia), które ujmują godność jako coś przynależnego człowiekowi jako podmiotowi i tym znaczeniom (i odpowiadającym im typom godności) poświęcone jest niniejsze opracowanie. W tej grupie znaczeń odróżnione zostają trzy pojęcia godności, które ujmują godność jako coś konstytutywnego dla bycia osobą – (1) przyrodzoną i niezbywalną godność osobową, (2) godność opartą na obserwowalnych i zmiennych cechach specyficznych dla istoty rozumnej i (3) godność opartą na historycznie ukształtowanym statusie społecznym przypisanym wszystkim ludziom. Jedynie pierwsze z tych pojęć jest adekwatne do interpretacji preambuły i art. 30 Konstytucji RP. W drugiej grupie znaczeń ujmujących godność jako coś przysługującego człowiekowi są pojęcia ujmujące godność jako cechę osoby – (4) godność osobistą (cześć i dobre imię), (5) godność osobowościową (poziom moralny) oraz (6) godność jako dyspozycja do stosownego sposobu bycia. Druga połowa znaczeń ujmuje godność jako coś przynależnego czemuś lub jako coś o charakterze konwencjonalnym, instytucjonalnym. Te znaczenia będą omawiane w kolejnym opracowaniu Godność jako cecha podmiotów zbiorowych lub cecha ugruntowana instytucjonalnie. Typy godności – Propozycja systematyzacji – Część 2. Konstytucja RP mówi o (1) godności Narodu, (2) godności urzędu lub funkcji, oraz o (3) godności publicznej (godnościach publicznych. Wyrażenie „godność” jako desygnujące coś przynależnego czemuś może także desygnować (4) godność statusu społecznego opartego na przynależności do jakiejś grupy społecznej, (5) godność zawodu oraz – co specyficzne dla języka polskiego – (6) godność jako nazwisko. Autor argumentuje, że niedopuszczalne jest przypisywanie wyrażeniu „dignity” występującym w danym przepisie prawnym, różnych pojęć godności. (shrink)

One central objection to philosophical defences of liberal neutrality is that many neutrally justified laws and policies are nonetheless discriminatory as they unilaterally impose costs or confer unearned privileges on the bearers of a particular conception of the good. Call this the false neutrality objection. While liberal neutralists seldom consider this objection to be a serious allegation, and often claim that it rests on a misunderstanding, I argue that it is a serious challenge for proponents of justificatory neutrality. Indeed, a (...) careful examination of recent French and Canadian laws which impede the members of cultural minorities from freely practising their religion reveals that the state can hide its discriminatory aims by cloaking the policies it enacts in neutral language. In order to avoid the problem of false neutrality, I contend, liberal neutralists should defend a combination of neutrality of justification and neutrality of aim and operationalize neutrality of aim through a practical test that has been a defining feature of American jurisprudence on religious freedom in the last thirty years: the general applicability requirement. (shrink)

Artykuł, choć traktuje głównie o statusie jednostki w realiach i myśli politycznej monarchii absolutnej doby Bodinusa i Pufendorfa, odnosi się – toutes proportions gardées – do następującej kwestii: Czy członków państw niedemokratycznych, pozbawionych pełni praw i wolności politycznych, można określać mianem obywateli? Krzysztof Trzciński, Odwrócenie perspektywy: poddany jako obywatel w monarchii absolutnej, czyli o wieloznaczności pojęć lub ich różnym rozumieniu, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 3/2004, s. 93-106.

Why does institutional police brutality continue so brazenly? Criminologists and other social scientists typically theorize about the causes of such violence, but less attention is given to normative questions regarding the demands of justice. Some philosophers have taken a teleological approach, arguing that social institutions such as the police exist to realize collective ends and goods based upon the idea of collective moral responsibility. Others have approached normative questions in policing from a more explicit social-contract perspective, suggesting that legitimacy is (...) derived by adhering to (limited) authority. This article examines methodologies within political philosophy for analyzing police injustice. The methodological inquiry leads to an account of how justice constrains the police through both special (or positional) moral requirements that officers assume voluntarily, as well as general moral requirements in virtue of a polity’s commitment to moral, political and legal values beyond law enforcement and crime reduction. The upshot is a conception of a police role that is constrained by justice from multiple foundational stances. (shrink)

Поскольку до сих пор нет никакого судебного решения в отношении правомерности совершённых в прошлом и совершаемых в настоящем деяний, квалифицируемых как подлог и предательство, правовая оценка перестройки адресуется как юристам, так и всем прочим гражданам.

The debate on the argumentative turn in Public Policy and Administration (PPA), as reflective of the influence of politico-legal theory on the discipline, is reviewed with a thorough and indepth engagement with the Argumentation Theory (AT) literature. The focus in this article is in fact of a methodological nature since we argue that critical scholars - who have contributed to the general and specialized (i.e. political discourse analysis and critical contextualism) literature of AT as well as politico-legal theory - pave (...) the way to a novel methodology which will be exemplified through the analysis of the transparency concept. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich am Beispiel des deutschen "Kopftuchstreits" mit der rechtlich-politischen Auseinandersetzung um subjektive Rechte innerhalb des liberalen Rechtsstaats. Wie Christoph Menke in seiner Deutung der für den politischen Liberalismus wesentlichen politischen Konflikte gezeigt hat, bezieht sich diese Auseinandersetzung vorrangig auf zwei Fragen: Wer sollte Anspruch darauf genießen, ein politisches Subjekt zu sein, das heißt, als Gleiche oder Gleicher berücksichtigt zu werden? Welche Ansprüche politischer Subjekte könneen als schützenswerte Verwirklichung subjektiver Rechte gelten? Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich vorwiegend mit (...) der Frage, wie die politischen Konflikte des letztgenannten Typs auf die rechtliche Auseinandersetzung um Grundrechte abfärben. Damit wende ich mich gegen ein Verständnis der Grundrechte, das diese als Garant der ethischen Neutralität eines liberalen Gemeinwesens ansieht. Ich möchte zeigen, dass der Sinn subjektiver Rechte in der liberalen Demokratie zwar unter anderem genau darin besteht, dass sie partikulare ethische Wertvorstellungen neutralisieren und die Bürgerinnen und Bürger innerhalb eines vernünftigen Rahmens vor Unterdrückung schützen. Wie eine Analyse der Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) zum "Kopftuchstreit" zeigt, wird diese Funktion aber stets zugleich durch die partikulare Interpretation gleicher Rechte unterminiert. Dies bezeichne ich als die Dekonstruktion der Neutralität, die sich im Recht vollzieht. (shrink)

L'America e il mondo sono in procinto di collassare a causa di una crescita eccessiva della popolazione, la maggior parte per il secolo scorso e ora tutto a causa di persone del terzo mondo. Il consumo di risorse e l'aggiunta di uno o due miliardi in più di 2100 crolleranno la civiltà industriale e porterà alla fame, alle malattie, alla violenza e alla guerra su scala impressionante. Miliardi moriranno e la guerra nucleare è tutt'altro che certa. In America questo è (...) stato enormemente accelerato dalla massiccia immigrazione e dalla riproduzione degli immigrati, unite ad abusi resi possibili dalla democrazia. La natura umana depravata trasforma inesorabilmente il sogno della democrazia e della diversità in un incubo di criminalità e povertà. La causa principale del collasso è l'incapacità della nostra psicologia innata di adattarsi al mondo moderno, che porta le persone a trattare le persone non correlate come se avessero interessi comuni. Questo, oltre all'ignoranza della biologia e della psicologia di base, porta alle illusioni di ingegneria sociale dei parzialmente istruiti che controllano le società democratiche. Pochi capiscono che se aiuti una persona che fai del male a qualcun altro, non c'è pranzo gratuito e ogni singolo oggetto che qualcuno consuma distrugge la terra in modo irreparabile. Di conseguenza, le politiche sociali ovunque sono insostenibili e una dopo l'altra tutte le società senza rigorosi controlli sull'egoismo crolleranno nell'anarchia o nella dittatura. Senza cambiamenti drammatici e immediati, non c'è speranza di prevenire il crollo dell'America, o di qualsiasi paese che segua un sistema democratico. Da qui il mio saggio "Suicide by Democracy". È anche ormai chiaro che i sette sociopatici che governano la Cina stanno vincendo la terza guerra mondiale, e quindi il mio saggio conclusivo su di loro. L'unica minaccia più grande è l'Intelligenza Artificiale che commento brevemente. La chiave di tutto ciò che ci riguarda è la biologia, ed è l'ignarietà che porta milioni di persone intelligenti istruite come Obama, Chomsky,Clinton, il Partito Democratico e il Papa a sposare ideali utopici suicidi che portano inesorabilmente direttamente all'Inferno sulla Terra. Come W ha notato, è ciò che è sempre davanti ai nostri occhi che è il più difficile da vedere. Viviamo nel mondo del sistema linguistico deliberativo cosciente 2, ma è inconscio, automatico sistema riflessivo 1 che governa. Questa è la fonte della cecità universale descritta da The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI) di Searle, Pinker's Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides' Standard Social Science Model. Il primo gruppo di articoli cerca di dare un'idea di come ci comportiamo che è ragionevolmente privo di illusioni teoriche. Nei prossimi tre gruppi commento tre delle principali illusioni che impediscono un mondo sostenibile: tecnologia, religione e politica (gruppi cooperativi). La gente crede che la società possa essere salvata da loro, quindi fornisco alcuni suggerimenti nel resto del libro sul perché questo è improbabile attraverso brevi articoli e recensioni di libri recenti di scrittori ben noti. Un'altra sezione descrive l'illusione religiosa – che c'è qualche super potere che ci salverà. La sezione successiva descrive le illusioni digitali, che confondono i giochi linguistici del System 2 con gli automatismi del Sistema uno, e quindi non possono distinguere le macchine biologiche (cioè le persone) da altri tipi di macchine (cioè i computer). Altri illusioni digitali sono che saremo salvati dal male puro (egoismo) del Sistema 1 da computer/AI/robotica/nanotecnologia/ingegneria genetica creata dal System 2. Il principale Nessun pranzo libero ci dice che ci saranno conseguenze gravi e forse fatali. L'ultima sezione descrive The One Big Happy Family Delusion, cioè che siamo selezionati per la cooperazione con tutti, e che gli ideali euforici di Democrazia, Diversità e Uguaglianza ci condurranno all'utopia, se ne gestiamo le cose correttamente (la possibilità della politica). Ancora una volta, il No Free Lunch Principle dovrebbe avvertirci che non può essere vero, e vediamo nel corso della storia e in tutto il mondo contemporaneo, che senza controlli rigorosi,egoismo e stupidità guadagnano il sopravvento e presto distruggono qualsiasi nazione che abbracci queste illusioni. Inoltre, la mente scimmia sconti ripida il futuro, e così collaboriamo nel vendere il patrimonio del nostro discendente per comfort temporanei, esacerbando notevolmente i problemi. (shrink)

Od końca XX wieku w Europie rozwija się instytucja ponadpaństwowego obywatelstwa europejskiego, które obecnie pozostaje komplementarne wobec członkostwa jednostki w strukturze państwa. Obywatelstwo związane jest głównie z państwem, zarówno genetycznie, jak i funkcjonalnie, zaś proces kształtowania się idei obywatelstwa i jej prawnego urzeczywistniania leży w cywilizacji europejskiej głęboko u początków państwowości. Podkreślić należy przy tym, iż to wydarzenia końca XVIII wieku we Francji bezsprzecznie dodały rozwojowi idei obywatelstwa nowej dynamiki, prowadząc do jej nowożytnej instytucjonalizacji. Przez stulecia porządek prawny panujący w (...) państwach europejskich determinował bowiem posiadanie przez jednostkę praw, które wynikały z jej przynależności do danej grupy społecznej (kręgu wolno urodzonych, grona zamożnych, czy danego stanu). Dopiero akty prawne doby Rewolucji Francuskiej wprowadziły kategorię praw podmiotowych jednostki. Słusznie przyjęło się uważać, iż Rewolucja Francuska stworzyła „nowego człowieka” − obywatela. Nieczęsto jednak zwraca się uwagę na fakt, iż burzliwe wydarzenia końca XVIII wieku we Francji doprowadziły do powstania różnych wzorców obywatela, zaś wszystkie one razem stały się podstawą dla prawnego urzeczywistnienia obywatelstwa państwowego w Europie. Podstawy ideologiczne gruntownych przemian dawała twórczość wielkich myślicieli Oświecenia, zwłaszcza zaś poglądy wyrażane przez Monteskiusza i Jana Jakuba Rousseau. Nie bez znaczenia pozostawały również społeczno-polityczne oraz gospodarcze koncepcje przedstawicieli szkoły fizjokratów i encyklopedystów (czy nawet utopijnych komunistów). Intelektualiści epoki proponowali kierunki zmian często zasadniczo od siebie odmienne, ale zawsze – teoretycznie przynajmniej – lepsze od stanu rzeczywistego. Przelewane na papier wizje uznanych pisarzy podsycały ogólny klimat niezadowolenia i przyspieszały dojrzewanie rozwiązań radykalnych. Intelektualna krytyka istniejącego status quo prowadziła wprost do przełomu, który miał uzbroić człowieka w więcej praw, poszerzyć horyzonty jego wolności i przekształcić poddanego w obywatela. (shrink)

This article develops a liberal theory of cultural rights that must be guaranteed by just legal and political institutions. People form their own individual conceptions of the good in the cultural space constructed by the political societies they inhabit. This article argues that only rarely do individuals develop views of what is valuable that diverge more than slightly from the conceptions of the good widely circulating in their societies. In order for everyone to have an equal opportunity to autonomously form (...) their own independent conception of the good, rather than merely following others, culture must be democratically controlled. Equal respect for members of a liberal democracy requires that all citizens have roughly equal opportunities to do things like make movies, publish novels, and exhibit paintings. This article contends that the contemporary American legal order fails to guarantee that all cititizens have roughly equal opportunities to shape and influence their shared culture. Guaranteeing the liberty to do so would require reforms to many areas of law, including applying anti-discrimination law more broadly to the conduct of cultural organizations, expanding fair use protections in copyright law, limiting the ability of businesses to arbitrarily refuse service to customers, and restricting private control of capital in order to democratize the means of cultural production. (shrink)

Abstract: The New Latin-American Constitutionalism (NCL) is a new theory represented by the last-two decades constitutions of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. These constitutional texts share special characteristics in their originality and their comprehension of the features of their societies, which have originated new mechanism and institutions in constitutional theory, in order to advance the development of their nations. This paper analyzes the aspects of democracy, economic regulation, and peace building, as fundamental elements of NCL, in order to prove the (...) advance in social development of those States. -/- Resumen: El Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano (NCL) es una teoría que enmarca las cartas políticas surgidas en las últimas décadas en Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador y Bolivia. Estas constituciones comparten características especiales respecto a la originalidad y apropiación de los elementos particulares de sus sociedades, dando paso a nuevos mecanismos y figuras innovadoras en la teoría constitucional, buscando un avance en el desarrollo de sus naciones. El artículo analiza los postulados en la democracia, la regulación económica y la construcción de paz, como elementos fundamentales del NCL, buscando evidenciar el avance presentado por los Estados en su desarrollo social. (shrink)

In discussions of state surveillance, the values of privacy and security are often set against one another, and people often ask whether privacy is more important than national security.2 I will argue that in one sense privacy is more important than national security. Just what more important means is its own question, though, so I will be more precise. I will argue that national security rationales cannot by themselves justify some kinds of encroachments on individual privacy (including some kinds that (...) the United States has conducted). Specifically, I turn my attention to a recent, well publicized, and recently amended statute (section 215 of the USA Patriot Act3), a surveillance program based on that statute (the National Security Agency’s bulk metadata collection program), and a recent change to that statute that addresses some of the public controversy surrounding the surveillance program (the USA Freedom Act).4 That process (a statute enabling surveillance, a program abiding by that statute, a public controversy, and a change in the law) looks like a paradigm case of law working as it should; but I am not so sure. While the program was plausibly legal, I will argue that it was morally and legally unjustifiable. Specifically, I will argue that the interpretations of section 215 that supported the program violate what Jeremy Waldron calls “legal archetypes,”5 and that changes to the law illustrate one of the central features of legal archetypes and violation of legal archetypes. The paper proceeds as follows: I begin in Part 1 by setting out what I call the “basic argument” in favor of surveillance programs. This is strictly a moral argument about the conditions under which surveillance in the service of national security can be justified. In Part 2, I turn to section 215 and the bulk metadata surveillance program based on that section. I will argue that the program was plausibly legal, though based on an aggressive, envelope-pushing interpretation of the statute. I conclude Part 2 by describing the USA Freedom Act, which amends section 215 in important ways. In Part 3, I change tack. Rather than offering an argument for the conditions under which surveillance is justified (as in Part 1), I use the discussion of the legal interpretations underlying the metadata program to describe a key ambiguity in the basic argument, and to explain a distinct concern in the program. Specifically that it undermines a legal archetype. Moreover, while the USA Freedom Act does not violate legal archetypes, and hence meets a condition for justifiability, it helps illustrate why the bulk metadata program did violate archetypes. (shrink)

A xurisprudencia constitucional española (STC 37/2011, de 28 de marzo, entre outras) ten establecido como fundamento do consentimento informado o dereito á integridade física e moral (art. 15 CE). O Tribunal Constitucional configura o consentimento informado como un deber de abstención do profesional sanitario, é dicir, como unha negación da competencia do profesional sanitario na terminoloxía de Hohfeld. Así pois, o consentimento informado queda conformado como un dereito negativo ou de defensa, polo que concibilo como liberdade xurídica ou facultade de (...) autodeterminación positiva esixiría a revisión do seu fundamento constitucional. O presente artigo pretende precisamente revisar a natureza iusfundamental do consentimento informado a partir da obra de W.N. Hohfeld e Robert Alexy. (shrink)

My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is the (...) theory of “Constitutional Textualism”—or just plain “Textualism”—which says that the meaning of the Constitution lies entirely within the “four corners” of the document. Second is the theory of “Originalism,” which says that this meaning was fixed at the time of ratification. (Likewise, the meanings of the amendments were fixed at the time of their ratification.) -/- While Justice Scalia helped to inspire a Textualist/Originalist (and anti-substantive-due-process) movement, his Originalism has received far more attention than his Textualism. Since Judge Robert Bork first introduced Originalism to the general public during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987, this theory has ignited passions on all sides and effectively re-framed the entire debate about how to interpret the Constitution. Constitutional scholars, left and right, now define themselves as either for or against Originalism. Meanwhile, Textualism has merely retreated into the background. -/- Part of the reason for this disparate treatment is that many who reject Originalism still consider themselves to be Textualists. They agree with Justice Scalia (and Judge Bork) that the text is all-important. They disagree, however, that its meaning was fixed for eternity at ratification. Instead, they maintain that either the meaning of the text or applications of this meaning to new cases can change as society changes. -/- In this Article, I bring Textualism out of Originalism’s shadow and into broad daylight. I argue that once we dig just a little deeper into the proposition that all of the meaning in the Constitution inheres in its words, we find that this theory simply cannot work. In order to interpret the nation’s foundational document, we must resort to assumptions that it does not explicitly state. (Indeed, even Textualism itself is a theory that the Constitution does not explicitly endorse.) And the notion that “extra-textual” assumptions necessarily inform our interpretations of the Constitution poses a direct and insurmountable threat to Textualism. -/- The Constitution actually requires each judge, when faced with a case concerning the right to privacy, not merely to consider the text but also to anticipate and evaluate the moral, social, and political consequences of both possible decisions before choosing between them. While this position may initially sound counterintuitive, it turns out to be a much more realistic theory of constitutional interpretation than Textualism (and Originalism). -/- I ultimately conclude that, contrary to Justice Scalia, the Constitution most certainly does protect a right to privacy. For what it’s worth, the Obergefell majority agree with me (and oppose Justice Scalia). I aim to show exactly why they are correct. (shrink)

In an article previously published in this Journal, Anthony Oyowe critically engages with my attempt to demonstrate how the human rights characteristic of South Africa’s Constitution can be grounded on a certain interpretation of Afro-communitarian values that are often associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’. Drawing on recurrent themes of human dignity and communal relationships in the sub-Saharan tradition, I have advanced a moral-philosophical principle that I argue entails and plausibly explains a wide array of individual rights to civil liberties, political (...) power, criminal procedures and economic resources. Oyowe’s most important criticism of my theory is in effect that it is caught in a dilemma: either the principle I articulate can account for human rights, in which case it does not count as communitarian, or it does count as the latter, but cannot account for the former. In this article, I reply to Oyowe, contending that he misinterprets key facets of my theory to the point of not yet engaging with its core strategy for deriving human rights from salient elements of ubuntu. I conclude that Oyowe is unjustified in claiming that there are ‘theoretical lapses’ that ‘cast enormous doubts’ on my project of deriving human rights from a basic moral principle with a recognizably sub-Saharan and communitarian pedigree. (shrink)

Two-step proportionality-balancing [TSPB] has become the standard method for human and constitutional rights decision-making. The first step consists in determining whether a rights-provision has been infringed/limited; if the answer to that first question is positive, the second step consists in determining whether the infringement/limit is reasonable or justified according to a proportionality analysis. TSPB has regularly been the target of some criticism. Critiques have argued that both its ‘two-step’ and ‘proportionality’ elements distort reality by promoting a false picture of rights (...) and constitutional decision-making. This would cause negative moral consequences. This article seeks to defend TSPB against these criticisms and to depict it in a more appropriate and favourable light. First, it is argued that both aspects of TSPB do not have the dire moral consequences that opponents suggest they have. Second, it is argued that TSPB, deploying notions such as burdens, presumptions and prima facie/defeasible propositions, constitutes a valuable framework for public argumentation and authoritative decision-making. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the current crisis of the global industrial civilization as a coincidence of external and internal reasons, mainly as a coincidence of economic and environmental crises tendencies. The analysis is based on Habermas´ distinction between four types of social formation, and according to their internal organizational principles and an extent of their social and system integration, also types of crises that can occur in the given type of the social formation. The paper shows that the common reason of (...) economic and environmental crises which are a part of system crisis of industrial civilization is an imperative of growth. This imperative, as Habermas points out, is the immanent principle of institutions and systems of capitalism. Economic and demographic growth of industrial civilization based on capitalism principles has reached its limits. However, all types of social formation, institutions and civilizations are also determined by the imperative of sustainability. The current crisis is then characterized as a display of antagonism between the imperative of growth and imperative of sustainability. This antagonism creates a new category of transformation for sustainable societies or revolution conflicts in states that break environmental and economic limits of growth. These conflicts result from food and water shortages and could bring a growing instability into the world or lead into the collapse of the industrial civilization. (shrink)

Artykuł, choć traktuje głównie o statusie jednostki w realiach i myśli politycznej monarchii absolutnej doby Bodinusa i Pufendorfa, odnosi się – toutes proportions gardées – do następującej kwestii: Czy członków państw niedemokratycznych, pozbawionych pełni praw i wolności politycznych, można określać mianem obywateli? Krzysztof Trzciński, Odwrócenie perspektywy: poddany jako obywatel w monarchii absolutnej, czyli o wieloznaczności pojęć lub ich różnym rozumieniu, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 3/2004, s. 93-106.

Poprzez wieki ewolucji idei i instytucji obywatelstwa w Europie, płeć (obok wolności osobistej, wieku, pochodzenia, miejsca urodzenia, domicylu czy majętności ) należała do głównych kryteriów posiadania pełnoprawnego statusu obywatelskiego w państwie. Obywatelstwo aż do XX wieku miało charakter patriarchalny, jednak jego współczesna definicja implikuje równouprawnienie obu płci. Egalitaryzacja dostępu do pełnego obywatelstwa w nowożytnej Europie następowała wieloetapowo. Proces ten wiązał się ze zmianami mentalności społecznej i stopniowym znoszeniem prawnego upośledzenia kobiet w różnych dziedzinach życia.