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  1. added 2019-02-23
    Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century-- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 217-235.
    Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work (...)
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  2. added 2018-07-08
    Gödel’s Disjunction: The Scope and Limits of Mathematical Knowledge. [REVIEW]Panu Raatikainen - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (4):401-403.
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  3. added 2017-08-07
    Turing Machines and Semantic Symbol Processing: Why Real Computers Don’T Mind Chinese Emperors.Richard Yee - 1993 - Lyceum 5 (1):37-59.
    Philosophical questions about minds and computation need to focus squarely on the mathematical theory of Turing machines (TM's). Surrogate TM's such as computers or formal systems lack abilities that make Turing machines promising candidates for possessors of minds. Computers are only universal Turing machines (UTM's)—a conspicuous but unrepresentative subclass of TM. Formal systems are only static TM's, which do not receive inputs from external sources. The theory of TM computation clearly exposes the failings of two prominent critiques, Searle's Chinese room (...)
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  4. added 2017-01-26
    Roger Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. [REVIEW]B. Josephson - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):271-273.
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  5. added 2014-03-24
    McCall's Gödelian Argument is Invalid.Panu Raatikainen - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (1):167-69.
    Storrs McCall continues the tradition of Lucas and Penrose in an attempt to refute mechanism by appealing to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. That is, McCall argues that Gödel’s theorem “reveals a sharp dividing line between human and machine thinking”. According to McCall, “[h]uman beings are familiar with the distinction between truth and theoremhood, but Turing machines cannot look beyond their own output”. However, although McCall’s argumentation is slightly more sophisticated than the earlier Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments, in the end it fails badly, (...)
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  6. added 2014-03-06
    Truth and Provability: A Comment on Redhead.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):611-613.
    Michael Redhead's recent argument aiming to show that humanly certifiable truth outruns provability is critically evaluated. It is argued that the argument is at odds with logical facts and fails.
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  7. added 2013-08-31
    This Sentence Does Not Contain the Symbol X.Samuel Alexander - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (9):108.
    A suprise may occur if we use a similar strategy to the Liar's paradox to mathematically formalize "This sentence does not contain the symbol X".
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  8. added 2013-05-28
    A Machine That Knows Its Own Code.Samuel A. Alexander - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.
    We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
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  9. added 2008-12-31
    Truth and Provability Again.Jeffrey Ketland & Panu Raatikainen - manuscript
    Lucas and Redhead ([2007]) announce that they will defend the views of Redhead ([2004]) against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). They certainly re-state the main claims of Redhead ([2004]), but they do not give any real arguments in their favour, and do not provide anything that would save Redhead’s argument from the serious problems pointed out in (Raatikainen [2005]). Instead, Lucas and Redhead make a number of seemingly irrelevant points, perhaps indicating a failure to understand the logico-mathematical points at (...)
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  10. added 2008-12-31
    On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
    A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results.
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