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  1. added 2020-05-06
    Well-Being Coherentism.Gil Hersch - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize wellbeing and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.
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  2. added 2020-03-13
    Measuring Utility: From the Marginal Revolution to Behavioral Economics.Lukas Beck & Anna Alexandrova - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 26 (4):380-384.
    Volume 26, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 380-384.
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  3. added 2020-01-21
    The World Without Money: Economic and Socio-Cultural Transformations of the Value Equivalent.Alex V. Halapsis - 2018 - Scientific Knowledge: Methodology and Technology 40 (1):126-135.
    The notion of “worth” and “value” throughout human history was only partly dependent on economic reasons. Arrangements about what is considered an equivalent value/measure of wealth are the result of complex interdependencies of economic, social and cultural factors. For thousands of years people have used precious metals as universal equivalent and main measure of wealth; full-value metal money was, in fact, only reinforced by the authority of state (ruler) evidence of presence certain amount of precious metal. The rejection of valuable (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-21
    Choice-Based Cardinal Utility. A Tribute to Patrick Suppes.Jean Baccelli & Philippe Mongin - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):268-288.
    We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes's contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and dis- tinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes's doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions (...)
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  5. added 2019-07-01
    No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.
    Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...)
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  6. added 2018-07-05
    Which Values Should Be Built Into Economic Measures?S. Andrew Schroeder - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):521-536.
    Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. This implies that, despite disagreement (...)
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  7. added 2017-04-05
    The Architect and the Ditch Digger.Cruz Cora - manuscript
    “You have an architect and a ditch-digger working together on a construction project. Who gets paid more, and why?” Does a tendency toward abstraction and quantification, a pretense of objectivity, obscure the character, situation and bias from which all economic and political theorems stem? Following the principle that arguments neither arise nor persist in a vacuum, that they live and die by their context and character, we can describe two sorts of response corresponding to two rather timeless worldviews, along with (...)
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  8. added 2017-03-11
    The Moral Justification of Benefit/Cost Analysis: Donald C. Hubin.Donald C. Hubin - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):169-194.
    Benefit/cost analysis is a technique for evaluating programs, procedures, and actions; it is not a moral theory. There is significant controversy over the moral justification of benefit/cost analysis. When a procedure for evaluating social policy is challenged on moral grounds, defenders frequently seek a justification by construing the procedure as the practical embodiment of a correct moral theory. This has the apparent advantage of avoiding difficult empirical questions concerning such matters as the consequences of using the procedure. So, for example, (...)
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  9. added 2016-02-29
    Can an Evidential Account Justify Relying on Preferences for Well-Being Policy?Gil Hersch - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (3):280-291.
    Policy-makers sometimes aim to improve well-being as a policy goal, but to do this they need some way to measure well-being. Instead of relying on potentially problematic theories of well-being to justify their choice of well-being measure, Daniel Hausman proposes that policy-makers can sometimes rely on preference-based measures as evidence for well-being. I claim that Hausman’s evidential account does not justify the use of any one measure more than it justifies the use of any other measure. This leaves us at (...)
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  10. added 2014-09-25
    Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Ruth Chang (Ed.), Harvard University Press, 1998, 303 Pages. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):147-174.
    review of Ruth Chang's collection in which I argue that the apparent agreements between the authors disguise underlying important differences.
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  11. added 2014-09-25
    Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, Jon Elster and John E. Roemer . Cambridge University Press, 1991, X + 400 Pages and The Quality of Life, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen . Oxford University Press, 1993, Xi + 453 Pages. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):101.
    review of two similar collections on well-being.
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