Philosophy of Sexual Orientation

The sex/gender distinction is a staple of feminist philosophy. In slogan form: sex is “natural,” while gender is the “social meaning” of sex. Considering the importance of the sex/gender distinction—which, here, I neither endorse nor reject—it’s interesting to ask if philosophers working on the metaphysics of sexuality might make use of an analogous distinction. In this paper, I argue that we ought to endorse the sexual orientation/identity distinction. In particular, I argue that the orientation/identity distinction is indispensable to normative explanations (...) regarding LGBTQ+ oppression and resistance. As a case study, I consider the oppression involved in the gentrification of historic queer neighborhoods. (shrink)

The sex/gender distinction is a staple of feminist philosophy. In slogan form: sex is “natural,” while gender is the “social meaning” of sex. Considering the importance of the sex/gender distinction—which, here, I neither endorse nor reject—it’s interesting to ask if philosophers working on the metaphysics of sexuality might make use of an analogous distinction. In this paper, I argue that we ought to endorse the sexual orientation/identity distinction. In particular, I argue that the orientation/identity distinction is indispensable to normative explanations (...) regarding LGBTQ+ oppression and resistance. As a case study, I consider the oppression involved in the gentrification of historic queer neighborhoods. (shrink)

Reviews of studies on sexual orientation reveal that researchers have not developed a clear conceptual definition of sexual orientation and that most researchers have failed to provide a theoretical framework for their studies. While some scholars recognize the conceptual confusion that has plagued the development of a theory of sexual orientation, most researchers study sexual orientation as if it were an immutable, essential nature of an individual without questioning how social context influences categorization. The problem with this approach is that (...) components have been hypothesized to be part of the construct, but there has been no systematic study of how to judge the accuracy of the construct. The present study suggests that, because categories of sexual orientation are socially constructed, the study of sexual orientation would benefit from an understanding of how the ordinary language community defines and categorizes sexual orientation. The purpose of the present study was to test the semantics of various category labels of sexual orientation used in ordinary language. Three hypothesized components of sexual orientation , involving either same-sex or opposite-sex oriented behavior, along with a fourth stimulus condition were manipulated in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. Subjects were 371 college students who completed a questionnaire in which they were asked to give a one-word description in response to written statements about hypothetical individuals described as male or female who engage in various same- or opposite-sex behavior. Contrary to what was hypothesized, results demonstrate that there were some necessary and sufficient conditions for categorizing sexual orientation. Also contrary to a proto-behavioral hypothesis, the results of the relative strength of the three components in predicting category label indicate that sexual attraction was the strongest predictor, followed by overt sexual behavior, and sexual fantasy, respectively. The most impressive finding was the overwhelming support for the impurity hypothesis in which descriptions with any same-sex oriented behavior appeared to be judged to contaminate the individual's sexual orientation resulting in greater frequencies of responses of "homosexual" compared to other category labels. Finally, as predicted, overt sexual behavior was least predictive of the sexual orientation of females with sexual fantasy being the most predictive. For descriptions of males, sexual attraction was the most important predictor. Provided in the discussion are possible explanations for the current findings, a description of the limitations and implications of the study, and recommendations for future research. (shrink)

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. : “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa : “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument (...) for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved. (shrink)

Argues that choice, as a form of interpretation, is completely intertwined with the development of both sexual orientation and sexual identity. Sexual orientation is not simply a given, or determined aspect of personality.

Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant’s view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights (...) and that making Kant’s account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments results in a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation. (shrink)

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. : “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa : “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument (...) for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved. (shrink)

Diskriminierung und Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegenüber LSBTI-Personen werden heute international thematisiert und angeprangert – ein vergleichsweise neues Phänomen. Dennoch tragen die herrschenden Normen von Zweigeschlechtlichkeit und Heterosexualität weiterhin zur Diskriminierung bei: So sind gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften in fast allen Staaten schlechter gestellt als heterosexuelle. Transgeschlechtliche Menschen erfahren Gewalt, weil ihr Verhalten und Äußeres nicht geltenden Normen entsprechen.

Was hat der Staat mit sexueller Orientierung zu tun? Eine ganze Menge, meint Gundula Ludwig, denn durch staatliche Macht in Form von „heteronormativer Hegemonie“ würden wir zu Subjekten gemacht – und zwar ‚normalerweise‘ zu männlichen bzw. weiblichen und heterosexuellen. Dabei betont Ludwig die Gegenseitigkeit des Verhältnisses von Staat und Geschlecht: Nicht nur wirke staatliche Macht konstitutiv und vergeschlechtlichend auf Subjekte, sondern der Staat selbst werde im „Prozess der vergeschlechtlichen Subjektkonstitution erst hervorgebracht“. Deshalb seien weder der Staat noch Heterosexualität natürlich gegeben, (...) sondern ihre Konstruktion sei eine Regierungstechnologie, und nicht zu trennen vom ökonomischen (Neo-)Liberalismus. Mit ihrem Buch möchte die Autorin eine Leerstelle in der Forschung füllen: Einerseits sei die Staatstheorie geschlechtsblind, andererseits ließen queer-feministische Arbeiten zur Konstruktion von Geschlecht den Staat aus. Ludwig verspricht eine poststrukturalistisch antiessentialistische Theorie, die beides beobachten kann und so den Zusammenhang von Staat und Geschlecht erklärt. (shrink)

This paper argues that participating exclusively or predominantly in heterosexual romantic or sexual relationships is prima facie morally impermissible. It holds that this conclusion follows from three premises: (1) gender norms are on-balance harmful; (2) conforming to harmful social norms is prima facie morally impermissible; and (3) participating exclusively or predominantly in heterosexual romantic or sexual relationships is a way of conforming to gender norms.

the author analyzes the origin and meaning of the expression ‘Ethics of Sexual Difference’ (ESD), contextualising it in the paradigm ‘thought of Sexual Difference’, in which the potentiality and aporias arising from the debate within the feminist movement are highlighted. Possible interpretations of these ethics, developed in the Italian philosophical context, are illustrated and evaluated. the author proposes a critical comparison with other models, for example, the queer theories, and attempts to show how the ‘thought of Sexual Difference’ (TSD) opens (...) itself to destabilization produced by the emergence of new subjects (gay and lesbian, transgender, intersex) and their corresponding scientific knowledge. the author therefore proposes an update to the plural, ‘Ethics of Sexual Difference’ (ESDs), listing the possible methodological and content assumptions (including the development of a relational model in all scientific disciplines) and the disciplinary implications (also in the psychoanalytic field) of an ethics so defined. A reference is made to the discussion of socalled gender ideology, in which the protagonists have often showed a certain difficulty in implementing an ethics of differences. (shrink)

PrEP (Präexpositionsprophylaxe) ist ein relativ neues Mittel zur Prävention von HIV-Infektionen. HIV-negative Menschen nehmen antivirale Medikamente ein, die verhindern, dass der Kontakt mit dem Virus zu einer Infektion führt. Im Gegensatz zum Kondomgebrauch basiert dieses Präventionsverfahren auf Medikamenten und nicht auf einer Verhaltensänderung. Aus der Perspektive der Biopolitik fügt sie sich in einen größeren Trend in Richtung Medikalisierung, des Anstiegs der Macht der Pharmaindustrie und der Reglementierung des Risikos ein. Sexuelles Verhalten ist das Ergebnis der Subjektivierung, des Prozesses, durch den (...) soziale Normen Subjekte und ihre Wünsche bilden. Die Medikalisierung von schwulem Sex durch PrEP verändert die sexuelle Subjektivierung und geht daher mit einer Veränderung der Praktiken von schwulem Sex einher. Nach einer kurzen Erläuterung der medizinischen Besonderheiten und der Geschichte von PrEP (1) vereint dieser Artikel eine Rekonstruktion zeitgenössischer theoretischer Ansätze zur Biopolitik im Zusammenhang mit PrEP (2) mit einer Darstellung aktueller politischer Debatten um PrEP (3). Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass sich Gouvernementalitätsstudien und die Italienische Theorie auf repressive Machtverhältnisse konzentrieren und daher die Komplexität der Debatte nicht berücksichtigen können, die sich aus der Subjektivität und Handlungsfähigkeit verschiedener beteiligter Akteure, insbesondere schwuler PrEP-Aktivisten, ergibt. Dennoch werden Interpretationen von PrEP als repressiver Macht auch von einigen Akteuren in der politischen Debatte um PrEP genutzt, meist ohne ausdrücklichen Bezug zur biopolitischen Theorie. Nikolas Roses und Paul Rabinows differenziertes Konzept der Biopolitik bietet einige Ansätze wie diejenigen der biopolitischen Bürgerschaft und der somatischen Ethik, um die Debatte um PrEP und die damit verbundenen komplexen Verhandlungen über Sexualität zu beschreiben. Ausgehend von diesen Ideen entwickle ich ein neues Konzept der ‚demokratischen Biopolitik‘ von PrEP, die eine weitere Demokratisierung der Sexualität im biopolitischen Zeitalter ermöglicht. (shrink)

Die Einführung der HIV-Prophylaxe PrEP ist ein Beispiel für demokratische Biopolitik und macht Hoffnung auf eine Beendigung von Sexnegativität und Stigmatisierung, findet Dr. Karsten Schubert.

Wir - als Queers - sollten uns schämen. Denn Scham ist, so verspricht „Gay Shame“, ein Weg zu einer neuen Radikalisierung von queerer Kritik. Gay Shame ist der wörtliche Gegensatz zu Gay Pride und kritisiert, dass der stolze Mainstream der LGBT-Community in den letzten Jahren immer angepasster, bürgerlicher, kapitalistischer und homonormativer geworden ist. Stolz ist man vor allem darauf, endlich dazuzugehören und mitheiraten oder mitkämpfen zu dürfen. Was Scham ist und welche queerpolitische Bedeutung sie hat wird in dem Sammelband von (...) Akademiker_innen, Aktivist_innen und Künstler_innen diskutiert. Sie öffnen den Blick für „beschämende“ Aspekte des queeren Lebens, die in der LSBT-Forschung weitgehend verdrängt wurden, um bestehende homophobe Ideen und Klischees nicht noch zu bestärken. Im Mittelpunkt steht der Versuch, neue und auf Scham basierende queere Gruppenidentitäten zu denken, die nicht-normalisierend wirken, also nicht Menschen bestimmte moralische Konzepte und Ideen aufdrängen und diejenigen ausschließen, die davon abweichen. (shrink)

Was hat der Staat mit sexueller Orientierung zu tun? Eine ganze Menge, meint Gundula Ludwig, denn durch staatliche Macht in Form von „heteronormativer Hegemonie“ würden wir zu Subjekten gemacht – und zwar ‚normalerweise‘ zu männlichen bzw. weiblichen und heterosexuellen. Dabei betont Ludwig die Gegenseitigkeit des Verhältnisses von Staat und Geschlecht: Nicht nur wirke staatliche Macht konstitutiv und vergeschlechtlichend auf Subjekte, sondern der Staat selbst werde im „Prozess der vergeschlechtlichen Subjektkonstitution erst hervorgebracht“. Deshalb seien weder der Staat noch Heterosexualität natürlich gegeben, (...) sondern ihre Konstruktion sei eine Regierungstechnologie, und nicht zu trennen vom ökonomischen (Neo-)Liberalismus. Mit ihrem Buch möchte die Autorin eine Leerstelle in der Forschung füllen: Einerseits sei die Staatstheorie geschlechtsblind, andererseits ließen queer-feministische Arbeiten zur Konstruktion von Geschlecht den Staat aus. Ludwig verspricht eine poststrukturalistisch antiessentialistische Theorie, die beides beobachten kann und so den Zusammenhang von Staat und Geschlecht erklärt. (shrink)

Diskriminierung und Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegenüber LSBTI-Personen werden heute international thematisiert und angeprangert – ein vergleichsweise neues Phänomen. Dennoch tragen die herrschenden Normen von Zweigeschlechtlichkeit und Heterosexualität weiterhin zur Diskriminierung bei: So sind gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften in fast allen Staaten schlechter gestellt als heterosexuelle. Transgeschlechtliche Menschen erfahren Gewalt, weil ihr Verhalten und Äußeres nicht geltenden Normen entsprechen.

My paper is a reaction to polemic of Tomasz Sieczkowski "Discrimination nonetheless. A reply to Krzysztof Saja” [ICF "Diametros" (36) 2013] that he wrote against my paper "Discrimination against same-sex couples" [ICF “Diametros" (34) 2012]. The purpose of the paper is to refute Sieczkowski’s objections that rely on wrong interpretation of the structure of my main argument. I will describe the proper course of the reasoning that I have expressed in the first article and undermine the Sieczkowski’s proposal to justify (...) gay marriages by referring to values such as dignity, freedom and equality. (shrink)

: A pronatalist perspective on maternal bodies renders the adoptive maternal body queer. In this essay, I argue that the queerness of the adoptive maternal body makes it a useful epistemic standpoint from which to critique dominant views of mothering. In particular, exploring motherhood through the lens of adoption reveals the discursive mediation and social regulation of all maternal bodies, as well as the normalizing assumptions of heteronormativity, "reprosexuality," and family homogeneity that frame a traditional view of the biological family. (...) As participants in motherhood who resist "repro-narrativity," " reprosexuality," and essentialism, adoptive maternal bodies have the potential to both queer our notions of normal mothering and normalize our notions of queer mothering. (shrink)

How ought we to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? In this paper, I argue that the normatively important aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements provide reason to endorse a categorization scheme that (i) includes the categories 'heterosexual', 'homosexual', 'bisexual', 'asexual', and 'queer', (ii) distinguishes between attractions to sex features and attractions to gender features, and (iii) allows an element of interpretation, such that individuals have authority over which of their attractions (related to sex and/or gender features) matter to their (...) orientation. (shrink)

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. : “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa : “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument (...) for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved. (shrink)

The author discusses natural law reasoning, from the 1960s in the context of Pope Paul VI’s Humanae vitae, to recent cultural and intellectual currents and their influence on the tradition. The challenges that have skewed acceptance of a common human nature and the existence of natural law are addressed. The author shows how the debate on contraception initiated this challenge against natural law reasoning and led to a more evolutive concept of human nature. Attention is drawn to a need for (...) natural law theorists trained in both modern science and Thomistic philosophy to engage the different scientific fields to clarify, adapt, rethink, and even modify the natural law language in accord with the latest discoveries compatitible with evolutionary findings. (shrink)

Responding to an article in a previous issue from Matthew B. O’Brien on the impermissibility of same-sex marriage, this reply corrects a misinterpretation of Rawls’s understanding of political liberalism and a misdirected complaint against the jurisprudence of the U.S. federal courts on civil marriage and other matters. In correcting these interpretations, I seek to demonstrate that a publicly reasonable case for same-sex civil marriage is conceivable in line with political liberalism. I conclude the article by arguing that, although the same-sex (...) civil marriage issue is likely to be a matter of controversy for some time in western societies, a proper understanding of the theoretical issues at stake may contribute to a partial de-escalation of the ‘culture wars’ currently surrounding the issue. (shrink)

My analysis on the category of signs of times (SoT) shows how it can help to explain a few aspects of synodality. I will explain how synodality and SoT support each other and why Synods should teach a correct judgment of SoT. It is a way to educate God's people to their theology. We may also wonder if in the anti-gender campaign the church was unable to implenaent the theological vision implied in the SoT. This campaign has highlighted the Church (...) weakness in accepting the world-church relations implied in SoT theology. This weakness due to a lack in education must be corrected re-launching the Synods' tasks and processes. (shrink)

Le titre de cette étude suggère de traiter trois termes, à premier vue, sans aucun lien. En effet, quel peut être le lien entre l’homosexualité et la Bible? Ou celui entre l’homosexualité et les sciences cognitives? Et finalement, quel lien peut-il y avoir entre ces trois termes à première vue juxtaposés? Il y a une réponse à chacune de ces trois questions et nous proposons d’explorer ces réponses dans le cadre de cette étude. Notre thèse consiste à défendre que les (...) sciences et plus précisément les sciences cognitives peuvent contribuer à la discussion sur l’homosexualité dans un cadre théologique (et/ou ecclésial). (shrink)

In this article, I will challenge the idea that Islam allows no place for homosexuality, and further explore the educational implications of this.

This essay aims to clarify the debate over same-sex unions by comparing it to the fourth-century conflict concerning the nature of Jesus Christ. Although some suppose that the council of Nicaea reiterated what Christians had always believed, the Nicene theology championed by Athanasius was a dramatic innovation that only won out through protracted struggle. Similarly, despite the widespread assumption that Christian tradition univocally condemns homosexuality, the concept of sexuality is a nineteenth-century invention with no exact analogue in the ancient world. (...) Neither heterosexuality nor homosexuality is addressed directly in Christian tradition; for this reason, the significance of older authorities for the modern debate is necessarily indirect. The dichotomy between progressive and conservative positions is therefore misguided: it is necessary neither to abandon tradition for the sake of progress nor to oppose innovation for the sake of fidelity. (shrink)

The Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans (FCA), whose leaders govern well over half of the 80 million Anglicans worldwide, have put forward ‘a contemporary rule,’ called The Jerusalem Declaration, to guide the Anglican realignment movement. The FCA and its affiliates, e.g. the newly-formed Anglican Church in North America, require assent to the Declaration. To date, there has been little serious appraisal of the Declaration and the status accorded to it. I aim to correct that omission. Unlike ap-praisals in the social media, (...) however, mine grants the FCA’s conservative stand on same-sex unions and homosexual practice. Nevertheless, I argue, the Declaration mischaracterizes the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, binds Anglicans to falsehoods and dubieties in the Thirty-Nine Articles, and adds to the gospel. Two things follow. First, no one—especially no Anglican who identifies herself as con-servative, traditional, orthodox, evangelical, Anglo-catholic or simply concerned with the truth—should assent to the Jerusalem Declaration. Second, since the FCA and its affiliates know that these defects ex-ist in the Declaration, they should fess up to these shortcomings and retract the Declaration’s status as ‘a contemporary rule’ and they should stop requiring assent to it. Anything less constitutes intellectual dis-honesty of a most egregious sort. (shrink)

Hume maintains that the boundaries of morality are widely drawn in everyday life. We routinely blame characters for traits that we find disgusting, on this account, as well as those which we perceive as being harmful. Contemporary moral psychology provides further evidence that human beings have a natural tendency to moralize traits that produce feelings of repugnance. But recent work also demonstrates a significant amount of individual variation in our sensitivities to disgust. We have sufficient reason to bracket this emotion, (...) therefore, when adopting the general point of view: if we allow idiosyncratic affective responses to shape our fully considered moral judgments, we could no longer reasonably expect spectators with different sensitivities to agree with us. (shrink)

Le titre de cette étude suggère de traiter trois termes, à premier vue, sans aucun lien. En effet, quel peut être le lien entre l’homosexualité et la Bible? Ou celui entre l’homosexualité et les sciences cognitives? Et finalement, quel lien peut-il y avoir entre ces trois termes à première vue juxtaposés? Il y a une réponse à chacune de ces trois questions et nous proposons d’explorer ces réponses dans le cadre de cette étude. Notre thèse consiste à défendre que les (...) sciences et plus précisément les sciences cognitives peuvent contribuer à la discussion sur l’homosexualité dans un cadre théologique (et/ou ecclésial). (shrink)

Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant’s view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights (...) and that making Kant’s account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments results in a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation. (shrink)

This paper makes an ethical and a conceptual case against any purported duty to come out of the closet. While there are recognizable goods associated with coming out, namely, leading an authentic life and resisting oppression, these goods generate a set of imperfect duties that are defeasible in a wide range of circumstances, and are only sometimes fulfilled by coming out. Second, practices of coming out depend on a ‘lump’ picture of sexuality and on an insufficiently subtle account of responsible (...) disclosure. We value and promote the goods of out best when we leave the framework of the closet, and not merely the closet door, behind. (shrink)

We take up questions of passing/outing as they arise for those with queer femme identities. We argue that for persons with female-identified bodies and queer, feminine (‘femme’) gender identities, the possibilities above may not exist as distinct options: for example, what it means to ‘pass’ or ‘cover’ is not always distinguishable – conceptually or in practice – from living authentically and resisting heteronormative identification: i.e. the conditions of being ‘out’. In some ways, these conflations privilege queer femmes; in others, femmes (...) find themselves implicated in a political double bind. We contend that this example problematizes the very concepts of passing and outing, and the political and ethical demands that are taken to arise from them. We conclude by exploring what it means to live queer femme identity responsibly and what this means for the ethics of sexual identity more generally. (shrink)

In his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill presents the famous harm principle in the following manner: “[…] the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. […] The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. […] Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” Hence, there is a (...) distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts, and only the latter are subject to moral criticism. However, while all acts are in some way selfregarding, it is not clear if there are any which are exclusively so. There are two additional difficulties. First, the “individual” may not be an individual person; self-determining communities, at least when they have the ability to decide for themselves, are also “individuals” in this sense. Second, it is claimed that groups of acts (activities and practices) have a different kind of justification from single acts. So what are the limits which “others” have in order to protect themselves from what “individuals” (personal or not) do, and what are their rights to do and to protect? If, in the final analysis, protection or defense is a source of justification, what should or must be protected, and why? Where does the demarcation line between self-regarding and other-regarding acts lie? In our age, as in Mill’s, we encounter many situations where such a line is needed, yet is hard to determine or establish. One such example, the case of same-sex marriages, is further explored in this paper. (shrink)