Political Conservatism

This is my reply essay (1000 words) to Travis Timmerman's "A Case for Removing Confederate Monuments" in Bob Fisher's _Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us_ volume (2020). In it, I explain why I think the mere harm from the racial offense a monument may cause does not justify removing it.

Catholic integralism is a tradition of thought which insists upon the ideal nature of political arrangements on which the Church can mandate the State to advance the supernatural good of the baptized. Thomas Pink, one of the foremost defenders, has proposed controversially that these arrangements are ideal because the Church possesses rights to civil coercive authority. But I argue this fact would not entail – by itself – the ideal nature of those arrangements. To the contrary, I argue that integralism (...) is unjust, even assuming Pink’s claims are true. The integralist ideal necessarily involves violating moral duties toward unbaptized citizens. Integralism does so in imposing differential civic burdens upon baptized/unbaptized citizens and in implying that non-Catholics might be rightly excluded from power merely on account of religious beliefs, both without just cause. I conclude by showing that readings of the relevant Catholic teaching can be given which are non-integralist. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to pin down the essence of conservative political theory. I then show that no-one really believes this theory, because all of us embrace progressive values and principles under the right circumstances. This doesn't mean that there aren't such things as conservative political reasons, and I offer an account of such reasons here. But in my view no-one really thinks that such reasons are the sole or even the primary political reasons.

Engels explained his admiration for Balzac by pointing to an apparent discrepancy between Balzac’s literature and his politics. Despite his sympathies for the French nobility, Balzac’s realism “compelled” him to portray this class in unflattering terms. In this article, I challenge Engels’s reading, arguing that Marx’s scattered remarks on Balzac take us in a different direction. Specifically, I argue that in his remark on Balzac’s The Peasants Marx pinpointed the author’s preoccupation with the spread of bourgeois ideology into the nobility. (...) Building on this remark, I analyze several of Balzac’s works showing that insofar as Balzac lambasted the nobles, his critique was primarily directed towards nobles who had adopted bourgeois ways. In this light, and against Engels’s observation, Balzac’s critique of the nobles appears to stem from his sympathy to aristocratic values rather than conflicting with them. In showing that affinities between Balzac, Marx and Engels did not depend on Balzac expressing anti-noble sentiment, I argue that the admiration the fathers of communism had for the monarchist’s prose exemplifies a partial, yet typical convergence between socialists and conservatives in their critique of modern bourgeois society. (shrink)

Epistemic Courage is a timely and thought-provoking exploration of the ethics of belief, which shows why epistemology is no mere academic abstraction - the question of what to believe couldn't be more urgent. Jonathan Ichikawa argues that a skeptical, negative bias about belief is connected to a conservative bias that reinforces the status quo.

În ciuda faptului că nu contribuie la ordonarea cunoașterii actuale despre fascism, ci dimpotrivă, creează confuzie, lucrarea Madeleinei Albright are unele merite incontestabile. Primul dintre ele este capacitatea de a simplifica, într-o naraţiune scurtă, ușor de parcurs, ideile și faptele liderilor fasciști interbelici. Începând cu capitolul al doilea și până la cel de-al cincilea, istorisirea ar putea să fie folosită ca un foarte accesibil, viu și instructiv rezumat istoric pentru studenţi. Cu certitudine, experienţa profesorală a autoarei în învăţământul politic american (...) a ajutat-o să ajungă la acest nivel excepţional de persuasiune didactică. În al doilea rând, focalizându-și descrierile asupra personalităţii liderilor mai mult decât asupra fenomenelor social-economice, efectul imediat al lecturii este acela de a te face să reflectezi la cât de mult contează orgoliul și ambiţiile personale în alegerea drumului spre fascism. Portretele pe care cartea le schiţează sugerează că nu politician fascist modest și delăsător pur și simplu nu poate exista, așadar transmite cititorilor o intuiţie interesantă în sine. De asemenea, deși face destul de multe afirmaţii îndoielnice, Albright nu se abţine să enunţe unele adevăruri pe care politicienii de obicei le ocolesc. De exemplu, admiraţia lui Winston Churchill faţă de membrii cuplului fascist italo-german este ilustrată cu citate atât în capitolul despre ascensiunea lui Mussolini (p. 25), cât și în cel despre dobândirea puterii de către Hitler (p. 52). Este descris destul de clar și felul în care anticomunismul elitei liberale și conservatoare a contribuit decisiv la succesul politic al celor doi. În fine, cartea arată indirect cât de diferită este încercarea de a defini un fascist de aceea de a defini fascismul și că fascismul este mai mult decât suma credinţelor și acţiunilor adepţilor lui. (shrink)

The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked affinities with the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period have in recent years been emphasized by an emerging radical-conservative “right-Heideggerian” orientation. I first discuss the later Heidegger's “being-historical” narrative of the culmination and end of the metaphysical foundations of Western modernity in the contemporary Nietzschean era of nihilism and (...) of an emerging postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, focused on historical and cultural relativism and particularism. In Heidegger's work of the 1930s and 1940s, we find attempts to apply this historical narrative to interpreting contemporary geopolitical and ideological phenomena in ways that connect Heidegger to certain central ideas and concerns of the conservative revolutionaries, especially Carl Schmitt's geopolitical particularism. De Benoist, the key name of the French Nouvelle Droite and a founding figure of contemporary Identitarianism, is particularly inspired by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the culmination of the “metaphysics of subjectivity” dominating Western modernity. For de Benoist, this modern metaphysics is the root of the “ideology of the Same” underlying the liberal universalism and individualism that he opposes in the name of a cultural ethnopluralism. De Benoist's Russian disciple Dugin bases the pluralistic geopolitics of his radical-conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the conservative revolution, the key intellectual model of which Dugin discovers in Heidegger's notion of the “other beginning”. (shrink)

Puhuttaessa Ukrainan sotaan kärjistyneen Venäjän geopoliittisen ja ideologisen ajattelun filosofis-teoreettisista taustavoimista nousee toistuvasti esiin ”putinismin pääideologiksi” ja ”maailman vaarallisimmaksi filosofiksi” maalaillun Aleksandr Duginin nimi. Kuka Dugin on, millaista on hänen vaarallinen ajattelunsa ja mikä on sen yhteys suurvallan aggressioon ja hyökkäyssotaan? Seuraavassa luodaan tiivis yleiskatsaus Duginin ajattelun kahteen keskeisimpään ideologiseen elementtiin: geopoliittiseen Euraasia-ideologiaan ja Duginin radikaalikonservatiiviseen ”neljänteen poliittiseen teoriaan”. Vaikka Duginin suora vaikutusvalta on rajallinen, hänen ajattelunsa heijastelee Venäjän poliittisen eliitin ajatusmaailmaa laajemminkin.

The following article provides a descriptive approach to the Latin American neoconservative movement led by Argentinian political scientist Agustín Laje. This group has become a new reactionary movement in the region and has brought together different intellectuals around a discourse against to the political left and progressivism. The article is divided into 4 sections: the first dedicated to its classification, the second to its origins, composition and activities, the third to its narrative and the fourth is an approach to its (...) discursive strategies. It is concluded that the movement does not fit exactly into an existing right-wing classification, has a unified discourse, is constantly active and it is suggested that uses communicational strategies of a great populist and intuitive nature. (shrink)

American sociologist Robert Nisbet once described conservatives and libertarians as “uneasy cousins.” The description is apt. While sharing a family resemblance and many of the same political rivals, conservatism and libertarianism are fundamentally at odds. This paper explains why this is so from the conservative perspective. It surveys the starting points and major themes of conservatism and libertarianism. It identifies what conservatives and libertarians agree about. It concludes by showing what conservatives have against libertarianism.

A rejoinder to Harri Mäcklin, "A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art".

Introduction to the Spanish translation of "Green Philosophy", by Roger Scruton.

Social and political concepts are indispensable yet historically and culturally variable in a way that poses a challenge: how can we reconcile confident commitment to them with awareness of their contingency? In this article, we argue that available responses to this problem—Foundationalism, Ironism, and Right Wittgensteinianism—are unsatisfactory. Instead, we draw on the work of Bernard Williams to tease out and develop a Left Wittgensteinian response. In present-day pluralistic and historically self-conscious societies, mere confidence in our concepts is not enough. For (...) modern individuals who are ineluctably aware of conceptual change, engaged concept-use requires reasonable confidence, and in the absence of rational foundations, the possibility of reasonable confidence is tied to the possibility of critically discriminating between conceptual practices worth endorsing and those worth rejecting. We show that Left Wittgensteinianism offers such a basis for critical discrimination through point-based explanations of conceptual practices which relate them to the needs of concept-users. We end by considering how Left Wittgensteinianism guides our understanding of how conceptual practices can be revised in the face of new needs. (shrink)

[Updated 2/23/21: complete chapter scan] In this chapter I sketch a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. I begin by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. I then suggest a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments (...) or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and other “irrational” offenses more than to “objective” historical or philosophical critiques. (shrink)

America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 3 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity (...) will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. The idea of human rights is an evil fantasy promoted by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world motherhood. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there. The attempt to do this is bankrupting America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. (shrink)

The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s (b. 1962) challenge to the Western liberal order. Even though Dugin’s project is in many ways a theoretical epitome of Russia’s contemporary attempt to profile itself as a regional great power with a political and cultural identity distinct from the liberal West, Dugin can also be read in a wider context as one of the currently most prominent representatives of the culturally and intellectually oriented international New Right. The chapter introduces Dugin’s role (...) on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent “fourth political theory” as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to liberalism as well as the two other main twentieth-century ideologies, communism and fascism. Dugin’s fourth ideology, essentially meant as an alternative to a unipolar post–Cold War global hegemony of victorious liberalism, draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt’s pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin’s eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism. (shrink)

This essay articulates a kind of conservatism that it argues is the most fundamental and important kind of conservatism, viz. existential conservatism, which involves an affirmative and appreciative stance towards the given world. While this form of conservatism can be connected to political conservatism, as seen with Roger Scruton, it need not be, as seen with G. A. Cohen. It is argued that existential conservatism should be embraced whether or not one embraces political conservatism, though it is also shown that (...) existential conservatism imposes constraints on our political thinking. In particular, it is argued that Cohen's ‘luck egalitarianism’ stands at odds with his existential conservatism and that one should be a sufficientarian rather than an egalitarian with regard to economic justice. (shrink)

The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism’s problematic relationship with relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical conservatism’s ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, (...) stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements – such as seeing irrational decisions or the demands of “life” as the basis of politics – to discredit notions of universal political morality and law, thereby underpinning their authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist. (shrink)

Estados Unidos y el mundo están en el proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayoría de ella para el siglo pasado, y ahora todo ello, debido a la 3ª gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4 mil millones más CA. 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su suelo vegetal cada año, por lo (...) que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos se habrá ido. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es segura. En Estados Unidos, esto está siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinada con los abusos hechos posible por la democracia. La naturaleza humana depravada convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de delincuencia y pobreza. China seguirá abrumar a América y al mundo, siempre y cuando mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo. La causa raíz del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a las personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. La idea de los derechos humanos es una fantasía malvada promovida por los izquierdistas para atraer la atención de la destrucción despiadada de la tierra por una maternidad sin restricciones del tercer mundo. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una persona a lastimar a alguien más, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y, una por una, todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para levantar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacer esto es la quiebra de Estados Unidos y la destrucción del mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, de lejos el mayor enemigo de los pobres es el de otros pobres y no los ricos. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanzas de evitar el colapso de América, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. (shrink)

Is there a political philosophy of conservatism? A history of the phenomenon written along sceptical lines casts doubt on the existence of a transhistorical doctrine, or even an enduring conservative outlook. The main typologies of conservatism uniformly trace its origins to opposition to the French Revolution. Accordingly, Edmund Burke is standardly singled out as the ‘father’ of this style of politics. Yet Burke was de facto an opposition Whig who devoted his career to assorted programmes of reform. In restoring Burke (...) to his original milieu, the argument presented here takes issue with 20th-century accounts of conservative ideology developed by such figures as Karl Mannheim, Klaus Epstein and Samuel Huntington. It argues that the idea of a conservative tradition is best seen as a belated construction, and that the notion of a univocal philosophy of conservatism is basically misconceived. (shrink)

A brief primer contrasting conservativism from progressivism, and outlining the major schools of conservative thought.

“Bioconservatives” in the human enhancement debate endorse the conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance natural human capacities. However, they often ground their objections to enhancement with contestable claims about human nature that are also in tension with other common tenets of conservatism. We argue that bioconservatives could raise a more plausible objection to enhancement by invoking a strain of conservative thought developed by G.A. Cohen. Although Cohen’s conservatism is not sufficient to fully revive the (...) bioconservative objection, we argue that it can be supplemented by an account of reasonable partiality for humanity in a way that provides further support to the bioconservative position in a manner congruous with broader conservatism. We propose that the idea of partiality to humanity can buttress the bioconservative objection into its strongest possible form. However, we conclude by arguing that, even in this form, the objection cannot do all the work that bioconservatives expect of it. (shrink)

The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows political gridlock in a more positive light.

The aim of this essay is to clarify the meaning and extent of Kant's liberalism by contrasting some of his key ideas to those of Burke, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Nozick, Rawls, and Schmitt. My claim is that Kant's political philosophy navigates the path between the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, just as his theoretical philosophy tries to navigate between dogmatism and skepticism, and that current liberal claim on Kant has important limitations in Kant's letter, as well as in spirit.

Comic book superheroes tend to be conservative and their opponents progressive. Here I explore the reasons for heroic conservatism, review recent disruptions to the trend, and consider what superhuman politics can tell us about our own transhuman and science fictional conditions.

This paper discusses some political implications of humor, using as a point of departure the mechanisms that explain the sources of the comical. First, I briefly present the main explanations offered for why we laugh. I then focus on the cognitive view proposed Hurley, Dennett and Adams, according to which humor carries out the epistemic function of eliminating the errors that covertly entered a mental space. In the second section of the paper, I present two accounts of how liberalism continues (...) to extend the scope of individual liberties. I use these views on liberalism as a background for my analysis of the political implications of humor, advancing the claim that, as a result of its epistemic function, humor has a strong conservative bias. (shrink)

This paper examines the conservative point of view about distributive justice. The first section explains the methodology used to develop this point of view. The second section describes one conservative point of view and briefly provides empirical evidence that it reflects the viewpoint of many ordinary conservatives. The third section explains how this conservative view can ground objections to social safety net programs, using as examples the recent health reform legislation and more extensive proposals for a true national health system. (...) The fourth section sketches ways that non-conservative philosophers might try to refute those objections. Examining a conservative point of view leads to several important conclusions. One is that the conservative point of view is not properly represented in contemporary philosophical discussions. Another is that the conservative point of view cannot be refuted by appealing to existing egalitarian writings. A third is that if progressive philosophers such as myself want to address the conservative point of view, we must expand the range of issues that we discuss in contemporary political philosophy. Doing so is a vital task, because otherwise we ignore the political views held by as much as half the American population. (shrink)

In a time when conservatives believe that the traditional family is under increasing fire, some think an appeal to Darwinian science may be the answer. I argue that these conservatives are wrong to maintain that Darwinian theory can serve as the intellectual foundation for the traditional conception of the family. Contra Larry Arnhart and James Q. Wilson, a Darwinian philosophy of nature simply lacks the stability the traditional family requires; it cannot support the traditional conception of human nature and the (...) normativity it was thought to contain. If conservatives are to maintain these traditional ideas, the theoretical foundation must lie elsewhere. (shrink)

Of increasing influence in the Australian Catholic Church is the kind of orthodoxy associated with American conservatism in which the defence of life and family against the depredations of cultural liberalism is tied to the defence of the free market and the promotion of economic liberalism. The clearest example of this thinking being the magazine First Things, a magazine with great influence both in American and in Australia. The argument of this paper is that there is an organic and determinative (...) link between economy and culture such that economic liberalism will inevitably give rise to, and promote, cultural liberalism. In short, that if the Church identifies herself with the promotion of economic liberalism she will find herself promoting that which she rightly opposes, namely what John Paul II referred to as the culture of death. (shrink)

Im politischen Denken des Wilhelm von Humboldt findet eine konservative Wende statt: Von den radikalen Freiheitsansprüchen der Frühschriften bleibt in den Denkschriften des späten Staatsmannes kaum noch etwas erhalten. In diesem Band wird Humboldts konservative Wende textimmanent freigelegt, historisch situiert und systematisch ergründet. Insbesondere wird Humboldts Konservatismus auf seine zunehmende Angst vor der Demokratie zurückgeführt, was nach seinem Verständnis das schädliche Ergebnis der neuzeitlichen Vernunftrechts- und Vertragslehre darstellt. Aus diesem Grund wird Humboldts konservative Wende letzthin durch seine bereits in der (...) Frühproduktion anzutreffende zweifache Kritik an Rationalismus und Kontraktualismus beleuchtet. (shrink)

How can intellectuals who oppose the illegitimate war in Iraq come to similar terms with the U.S. neoconservatives, and their unrepentant British collaborators, who have stranded us in it? In the Tempest, Shakespeare’s most political play, comedy though it is meant to be, intellectuals are warned not to consider themselves guiltless. But how can those who marched against the war, or who tried to speak truth to power in other ways, be guilty of its misuses? Surely this is too harsh (...) a view of the role of the public intellectual. What choice did Prospero really have? He was exiled, hapless, stranded. What choice do intellectuals who are against the war have? We, too, are powerless. Aren’t we? (shrink)

This article was originally published in January 2007 on the online version of the journal “Rivista della scuola superiore dell'economia e delle finanze”. Since the journal’s webpage does not exist anymore, I have uploaded a PDF of the article as it was published in January 2007. In questo articolo esamino l'idea humboldtiana di progresso. Più precisamente, ricostruisco come Wilhelm von Humboldt teorizzi il progresso del singolo individuo, del cittadino e del genere umano. Secondo la mia ricostruzione, l’idea humboldtiana di progresso (...) presenta un intreccio di motivi illuministi, storicisti e antirazionalisti, ed esige una riforma dello stato in senso liberale. La mia tesi è che, tuttavia, il pensiero politico di Humboldt sfoci in un conservatorismo non liberale che in quanto tale spalanca uno iato tra il sistema istituzionale auspicato e la possibilità di progresso. (shrink)

Hans Kelsens Critique of Eric Voegelins "New Science of Politics" has for a long time been very difficult to access, because Kelsen has published only parts of it in his life time and left other parts unpublished. This allowed Voegelin to spread the myth that Kelsen had refrained from publishing his criticism, because he had understood that he was wrong. This is nonsense. The reasons why Kelsen left part of his criticism unpublished are mostly accidental. At the same time Kelsens (...) criticism itself is a very sound rejection of Voegelin's hopelessly flawed theory of modernity as an age of Gnosticism. In this Nachwort to the Edition of Kelsen's Voegelin-criticism I summarize and comment the most important points of Kelsens criticism: 1. Kelsen's take on Voegelin's criticism of positivism. 2. Kelsen's rejection of Voegelin's "theory of representation" which is in fact a rejection of democratic representation in favor of an authoritarian and theocratic model of politics and 3. Kelsen's refuation of Voegelin's explanation of political disorder in the 20th century as a result of Gnostic heresy. My conclusion is that Kelen's criticism is successful (with only very minor qualifications) in all of these points and that thus it is an important contribution to the discussion of Voegelin's scholarship which has until recently been almost entirely apologetic. (shrink)

Review of John Kekes' *A Case for Conservatism*.

A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.