Time Travel

{June 2018 UPDATE: This work has been greatly surpassed by "Utilizing Future-Viewing Instruments" which will appear in the July 2018 issue of Progress in Physics. It can now be downloaded in PDF form from their website.} -/- The introduction of new scientific instruments has always played a vital role in the advancement of science and society. All scientific instruments to date have only been able to gain information pertaining to events of our immediate and distant past. Concerning our attempts to (...) gain information about future events, thus far our sciences have been limited to prediction. However, what if we could develop instruments that would enable us, in a wide range of circumstances, to achieve direct empirical access to future states of our world? It is clear that any kind of future-viewing machine would have enormous impacts upon science and society, but what kinds of impacts? Questions as to whether such machines are physically possible and might ever be feasible from an engineering perspective will not be addressed; this work is devoted to exploring the logic of such machines and deducing some of the possibilities of their utilization. (shrink)

My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but they are (...) not new problems. They are old problems transposed into a new key. Nonetheless, decisions made with foreknowledge teach us important lessons about the instrumental value of our choices. Once we've appreciated these lessons, we are left with a version of CDT which faces no novel threats from foreknowledge. (shrink)

Călătoria în timp implică deplasarea într-un timp diferit de cel prezent, în trecut sau în viitor, în principiu fără o deplasare în spațiu cu referire la un sistem de coordonate local. Călătoria în timp poate fi făcută de un corp material care poate fi sau nu o ființă vie, și pentru care se folosește de obicei un dispozitiv special denumit mașina timpului. Călătoria în timp este un concept recunoscut în filosofie și știință, dar a cărui posibilitatea este foarte disputată, dând (...) naștere la numeroase paradoxuri atât în filosofie cât și în știință. Călătoria în timp este considerată de unii acceptată atât de relativitatea generală cât și de mecanica cuantică, dar există un consens unanim că nu este fezabilă cu tehnologia actuală. Problemele ridicate sunt diferite pentru călătoria în timp în trecu față de călătoria în timp în viitor. (shrink)

Newton supported the idea of absolute time, unlike Leibniz, for which time is only a relation between events and cannot be expressed independently, a statement in concordance with the relativity of space-time. Eternalism claims that the past and the future exist in a real sense, going to the idea that time is a dimension similar to spatial dimensions, that future and past events are "present" on the axis of time, but this view is challenged. On four-dimensional vision, the universe is (...) an existing space-time topology, containing everything that has happened, everything that happens and everything that's going to happen. It follows that there is no singular moment to be considered as insignificant as present. Time travel is possible if the four-dimensional vision including the time is correct, but it is not possible if presentism is true. William Godfrey-Smith says that "the metaphysical image underlying the discussion of time travel is that of the universe block, in which the world is conceived as extended in time as it is in space." DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18575.64163. (shrink)

Newton a susținut ideea timpului absolut, spre deosebire de Leibniz pentru care timpul este doar o relație între evenimente și nu poate fi exprimat în mod independent, afirmație în concordanță ci relativitatea spațiu-timpului. Eternismul susține că trecutul și viitorul există într-un sens real, mergându-se până la ideea că timpul este o dimensiune similară cu dimensiunile spațiale, că evenimentele viitoare și trecute sunt "prezente" pe axa timpului, dar această opinie este contestată. Cel mai cunoscut exemplu de imposibilitate a călătoriei în timp (...) este paradoxul bunicului sau argumentul auto-infanticidului: o persoană care călătorește în trecut și își ucide propriul bunic, împiedicând astfel existența unuia din părinți, și deci propria sa existență. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12629.47843. (shrink)

Time travel is a recognized concept in philosophy and science, but whose scope is highly disputed, giving rise to numerous paradoxes in both philosophy and science. Time travel is considered by some accepted both in general relativity and quantum mechanics, but there is a unanimous consensus that it is not feasible with current technology. (Hawkins 2010) The raised issues are different for the time travel in the past compared to the time travel in the future.

The most well-known example of the impossibility of traveling in time is the grandfather paradox or self-infanticide argument: a person who travels in the past and kills his own grandfather, thus preventing the existence of one of his parents and thus his own existence. A philosophical response to this paradox would be the impossibility of changing the past, like Novikov self-consistency principle (if an event exists that would cause a paradox or any "change" to the past whatsoever, then the probability (...) of that event is zero, thus it would be impossible to create time paradoxes). DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31279.79521. (shrink)

Une autre définition du voyage dans le temps (Arntzenius 2006) (Smeenk and Wüthrich 2011) l'assimile à l'existence des courbes temporelles fermées, une variété lorentzienne d'une particule matérielle dans l'espace-temps qui revient à son point de départ. Certains auteurs acceptent l’existence de deux dimensions temporelles et d’autres envisagent des scénarios comportant plusieurs univers « parallèles », chacun ayant son propre espace-temps à quatre dimensions.Mais la question est de savoir si un voyage dans une autre dimension temporelle ou dans un autre univers (...) parallèle est en fait un voyage dans le temps ou virtuel. Examiner la possibilité de revenir dans le temps dans un univers hypothétique décrit par une métrique de Gödel a amené Kurt Gödel à affirmer que le temps pouvait être une sorte d’illusion, une autre dimension de l’espace, donnant lieu à un « bloc à 4 dimensions. ». (shrink)

Certains scientifiques et philosophes sont d’avis que toute théorie permettant un voyage dans le temps introduirait des problèmes de causalité. Ces types de paradoxes temporels peuvent être évités grâce au principe de cohérence de Novikov ou à une variation de l'interprétation des mondes multiples avec des mondes en interaction. L'argument classique contre la causalité rétrograde est l'argument du contournement. La causalité implique un avenir ontologiquement fermé - une position métaphysique sur le temps communément appelée l'éternalisme, une forme spécifique de non-présentisme. (...) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28823.93605 . (shrink)

À propos de la possibilité de voyager dans le temps sur la base de plusieurs ouvrages spécialisés, notamment ceux de Nicholas J. J. Smith (« Time Travel »), William Grey (« Troubles with Time Travel »), Ulrich Meyer (« Explaining causal loops »), Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (« Presentists should believe in time-travel »), Frank Arntzenius and Tim Maudlin (« Time Travel and Modern Physics »), et David Lewis (« The Paradoxes of Time Travel »). L'article commence par une (...) Introduction dans laquelle je fais une brève présentation du voyage dans le temps et poursuit par une Histoire du concept de voyage dans le temps, les principaux aspects physiques du voyage dans le temps, y compris les voyages dans le temps dans le passé dans la relativité générale et la physique quantique , et les voyages dans le temps dans le futur, puis une présentation du Paradoxe du grand-père abordé dans presque toutes les œuvres spécialisées, suivie d’une section consacrée à la Philosophie du voyage dans le temps et d’une section dans laquelle j’analyse les Boucles causales pour le voyage dans le temps. Je termine mon travail avec Conclusions, dans laquelle je maintiens mes opinions personnelles sur le voyage dans le temps et la Bibliographie sur laquelle repose le travail. -/- TABLE: -/- Abstract Introducere Istoria conceptului de călătorie în timp Paradoxul bunicului Filosofía călătoriei în timp Buclele cauzale Concluzii Note Bibliografie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27116.51841. (shrink)

L'éternalisme soutient que le passé et le futur existent réellement, en partant de l’idée que le temps est une dimension similaire aux dimensions spatiales, que les événements passés et futurs sont « présents » sur l’axe du temps, mais cette opinion est contestée. Dans la vision à quatre dimensions, l'univers est une topologie espace-temps existante, contenant tout ce qui s'est passé, tout ce qui se passe et tout ce qui va se passer. Il en résulte qu'il n'y a aucun moment (...) singulier à considérer non-essentiel comme présent. Les voyages dans le temps sont possibles si la vision à quatre dimensions du temps est correcte, mais ce n'est pas possible si le présentisme est vrai. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31019.18724. (shrink)

În această lucrare analizez posibilitatea călătoriei în timp pe baza mai multor lucrări de specialitate, printre care cele ale lui Nicholas J.J. Smith ("Time Travel", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”), William Grey (”Troubles with Time Travel”), Ulrich Meyer (”Explaining causal loops”), Simon Keller și Michael Nelson (”Presentists should believe in time-travel”), Frank Arntzenius și Tim Maudlin ("Time Travel and Modern Physics") și David Lewis (“The Paradoxes of Time Travel”). Lucrarea începe cu o Introducere în care fac o scurtă prezentare a (...) călătoriei în timp, și continuă cu o Istoria conceptului de călătorie în timp, prezentarea principalelor Aspecte fizice ale călătoriei în timp, inclusiv călătoria în timp în trecut în relativitatea generală și în fizica cuantică și călătoria în timp în viitor, apoi o prezentare a Paradoxul bunicului care este abordat în aproape toate lucrările de specialitate, urmat de o secțiune dedicată Filosofiei călătoriei în timp, și o secțiune în care analizez Buclele cauzale pentru călătoria în timp. Finalizez lucrarea cu Concluzii, în care expun opiniile personale privind călătoria în timp, și Bibliografia pe care se bazează lucrarea. (shrink)

Orice teorie care ar permite călătoria în timp ar introduce probleme de cauzalitate. Aceste tipuri de paradoxuri temporale pot fi evitate prin principiul de consecvență Novikov sau printr-o variație a interpretării multor lumi cu lumi care interacționează. Argumentul clasic împotriva cauzalității înapoi este argumentul bilking, Dacă un eveniment A provoacă un eveniment anterior B, bilking recomandă o încercare de a decorela A și B, adică de a aduce A în cazurile în care B nu a avut loc și de a (...) preveni A în cazurile în care a avut loc B. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.13245.41448. (shrink)

About the possibility of time traveling based on several specialized works, including those of Nicholas J. J. Smith ("Time Travel"), William Grey (”Troubles with Time Travel”), Ulrich Meyer (”Explaining causal loops”), Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (”Presentists should believe in time-travel”), Frank Arntzenius and Tim Maudlin ("Time Travel and Modern Physics"), and David Lewis (“The Paradoxes of Time Travel”). The article begins with an Introduction in which I make a short presentation of the time travel, and continues with a History (...) of the concept of time travel, main physical aspects of time travel, including backward time travel in the past in general relativity and quantum physics, and time travel in the future, then a presentation of the Grandfather paradox that is approached in almost all specialized works, followed by a section dedicated to the Philosophy of time travel, and a section in which I analyze Causal loops for time travel. I finish my work with Conclusions, in which I sustain my personal opinions on the time travel, and the Bibliography on which the work is based. (shrink)

L'exemple le plus connu de l'impossibilité de voyager dans le temps est le paradoxe du grand-père ou l'argument de l'auto-infanticide: une personne qui voyage dans le passé et tue son propre grand-père, empêchant ainsi l'existence d'un de ses parents et donc sa propre existence. Une réponse philosophique à ce paradoxe serait l'impossibilité de changer le passé, (à l'instar du principe de cohérence de Novikov. Le paradoxe du grand-père implique toute action qui change le passé. Il se présente sous de nombreuses (...) variantes. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.14587.26409. (shrink)

The long unbearable sufferings in the past and agonies experienced in some future timelines in which a malevolent AI could torture people for some idiosyncratic reasons (s-risks) is a significant moral problem. Such events either already happened or will happen in causally disconnected regions of the multiverse and thus it seems unlikely that we can do anything about it. However, at least one pure theoretic way to cure past sufferings exists. If we assume that there is no stable substrate of (...) personal identity and thus a copy equals original, then by creating many copies of the next observer-moment of a person in pain in which he stops suffer, we could create indexical uncertainty in her future location and thus effectively steal her consciousness from her initial location and immediately relieve her sufferings. However, to accomplish this for people who have already died, we need to perform this operation for all possible people thus requiring enormous amounts of computations. Such computation could be performed by the future benevolent AI of Galactic scale. Many such AIs could cooperate acausally by distributing parts of the work between them via quantum randomness. To ensure their success, they need to outnumber all possible evil AIs by orders of magnitude, and thus they need to convert most of the available matter into computronium in all universes where they exist and cooperate acausally across the whole multiverse. Another option for curing past suffering is the use of wormhole time-travel to send a nanobot in the past which will, after a period of secret replication, collect the data about people and secretly upload them when their suffering becomes unbearable. (shrink)

This paper presents the proof of the apparent nature of relative simultaneity originally derived from Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (STR). The proof does not challenge the validity of the STR but uncovers fundamental and widespread error in understanding of practical implications of Lorentz transformations. It is demonstrated that more than a century long debates generally miss the point. This results in counterintuitive claims of coexisting multiple time realities by mere equivalence of equal clock indications and simultaneity. Such claims have (...) little empirical significance but they are substantial in education and philosophy which has become utterly confused after universal acceptance of the STR and rejections of Henri Bergson’s challenge. There is nothing more to “relative simultaneity” other than the effect of identical clocks being shifted by an offset which depends on synchronisation method. (shrink)

This paper explores mutable futurism, the view according to which the future can literally change—that is, it can happen that a future time t changes from containing an event E to lacking it. Mutable futurism has received little attention so far, and the details and implications of the view are underexplored in the literature. For instance, it currently lacks a precise metaphysical model and a formal semantics. Although we do not endorse mutable futurism, our goal here is to strengthen the (...) case for mutable futurism and help establish it as a worthy contender in the debate on the philosophy of time. To attain this goal, we try to make mutable futurism, along with its metaphysical and inferential commitments, as clear as possible, by providing it with a coherent metaphysical model and a plausible semantics, and we show that it can be backed by theoretical reasons. (shrink)

This paper brings two fresh perspectives on Lewis’s theory of time travel. First: many key aspects and theoretical desiderata of Lewis’s theory can be captured in a framework that does not commit to eternalism about time. Second: implementing aspects of Lewisian time travel in a non-eternalist framework provides theoretical resources for a better treatment of time travel to the future. While time travel to the past has been extensively analyzed, time travel to the future has been comparatively underexplored. I make (...) progress on this topic. Along the way, I discuss Lewis’s lesser-known time travel oeuvre, especially his volume of correspondence and lectures on the topic collected in Beebee and Fisher (2020) and Janssen-Lauret & MacBride (forthcoming). Lewis’s body of unpublished work on time travel yields fruitful insights into his broader thinking on the subject. (shrink)

I criticize Lockwood’s solution to the “paradoxes” of time travel, thus endorsing Lewis’s more conservative position. Lockwood argues that only in the context of a 5D space-time-actuality manifold is the possibility of time travel compatible with the Autonomy Principle. I argue that shifting from 4D space-time to 5D space-time-actuality does not change the situation with respect to the Autonomy Principle, since the shift does not allow us to have a coincidence-free local dynamical theory.

Future-biased individuals systematically prefer positively valenced events to be in the future (positive future-bias) and negatively valenced events to be in the past (negative future-bias). The most extreme form of future-bias is absolute future-bias, whereby we completely discount the value of past events when forming our preferences. Various authors have thought that we are absolutely future-biased (Sullivan (2018:58); Parfit (1984:173) and that future-bias (absolute or otherwise) is at least rationally permissible (Prior (1959), Hare (2007; 2008), Kauppinen (2018), Heathwood (2008)). The (...) permissibility of future-bias is often held to be grounded in the structure of the temporal dimension. In this paper I consider several proposals for grounding the permissibility of such preferences and evaluate these in the light of the preferences we would have, and judge that we should have, in various time-travel scenarios. I argue that what we learn by considering these scenarios is that these preferences really have nothing to do with temporal structure. So if something grounds their permissibility, it is not temporal structure. (shrink)

The future is different from the past. What is past is fixed and set in stone. The future, on the other hand, is open insofar as it holds numerous possibilities. Branching-tree models of time account for this asymmetry by positing an ontological difference between the past and the future. Given a time t, a unique unified past lies behind t, whereas multiple alternative existing futures lie ahead of t. My goal in this paper is to show that there is an (...) incompatibility between the way branching-tree models account for the open future and the possibility of time travel. That is, I argue that once time travel enters the picture, branching time fails to model the openness of the future by means of alternative future branches. I show how this holds independently of whether branching-time models are cashed out in A-theoretic or B-theoretic terms. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to defend the general tenet that time travelers cannot change the past within B-theoretical models of time, independently of how many temporal dimensions there are. Baron Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98, 129–147 offered a strong argument intended to reach this general conclusion. However, his argument does not cover a peculiar case, i.e. a B-theoretical one-dimensional model of time that allows for the presence of internal times. Loss Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96, 1–11 used the latter model (...) to argue that time travelers can change the past within such model. We show a way to debunk Loss’s argument, so that the general tenet about the impossibility of changing the past within B-theoretical models is maintained. (shrink)

Tim travels back in time and tries to kill his grandfather before his father was born. Tim fails. But why? Lewis's response was to cite "coincidences": Tim is the unlucky subject of gun jammings, banana peels, sudden changes of heart, and so on. A number of challenges have been raised against Lewis's response. The latest of these focuses on explanation. This paper diagnoses the source of this new disgruntlement and offers an alternative explanation for Tim's failure, one that Lewis would (...) not have liked. The explanation is an obvious one but controversial, so it is defended against all the objections that can be mustered. (shrink)

Some philosophers defend the possibility of synchronic multilocation, and have even used it to defend other substantive metaphysical theses. But just how strong is the case for the possibility of synchronic multilocation? The answer to this question depends in part on whether synchronic multilocation is wedded to other controversial metaphysical notions. In this paper, I consider whether the possibility of synchronic multilocation depends on the possibility of time travel, and I conclude that the answer hinges on the nature of time (...) and persistence. (shrink)

Book review of Wasserman, R. (2017), Paradoxes of Time Travel, OUP.

This paper argues for the following disjunction: either we do not live in a world with a branching temporal structure, or backwards time travel is nomologically impossible, given the initial state of the universe, or backwards time travel to our space-time location is impossible given large-scale facts about space and time. A fortiori, if backwards time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe.

In "Changing the Past" (2010), Peter van Inwagen argues that a time traveler can change the past without paradox in a growing block universe. After erasing the portion of past existence that generates paradox, a new, non-paradox-generating block can be "grown" after the temporal relocation of the time traveler. -/- I articulate and explore the underlying mechanism of Van Inwagen's model: the time traveler's control over the location of the objective present. Van Inwagen's model is aimed at preventing paradox by (...) changing the past, but it achieves something broader than paradox avoidance: it gives tools for a new model of time travel. I use van Inwagen's tools to develop a new kind of time travel in which in which the location of the objective present is shifted by the time traveler. I call this type of time travel Movable Objective Present, or MOP. After defining MOP, I argue that it is compatible with any theory of time that accepts hypertime, including presentism and moving spotlight theory. (shrink)

That we find the idea of travelling in time, and in particular travelling backwards in time, fascinating, is evidenced by the plethora of new science fictions shows depicting time travel that hit our TV screens in 2016. I love time travel shows, and I can hardly keep up. In almost all cases these shows depict what philosophers call inconsistent time travel stories: stories that commit what my colleague Nick Smith (The University of Sydney) calls the second time around fallacy. These (...) stories depict individuals travelling back in time (or in some cases sending a signal back in time) in order to change some past event (or, in some cases, to try and mitigate the changes brought about by some other time travellers). -/- It’s easy to see why these storylines are captivating. They ask us to imaginatively entertain questions about the robustness of the present. We are asked to ponder to what extent the way things are now is the product of fluky events, so that had the past been ever so slightly different, the present would be very different indeed. These questions are intriguing because we all wonder to what extent our present selves are the result of choices we made, where we could so easily have made others, and to what extent who we are is most robust, resilient under small changes in our past decisions. (shrink)

It has been suggested that there is something worrisome, puzzling, or incomprehensible about the sorts of causal loops sometimes involved in backwards time travel. This paper disentangles two distinct puzzles and evaluates whether they provide us reason to find backwards time travel incomprehensible, inexplicable, or otherwise worrisome. The paper argues that they provide no such reason.

Personal time, as opposed to external time, has a certain role to play in the correct account of death and immortality. But saying exactly what that role is, and what role remains for external time, is not straightforward. I formulate and defend accounts of death and immortality that specify these roles precisely.

The first section of this article focuses on the treatment of “time travel” in science-fiction literature and film as presented in the secondary literature in that field. The first anthology I will consider has a metaphysical focus, including (a) relating the time travel of science fiction to the banal time travel of all living beings, as we move inexorably toward the future; and (b) arguing for the filmstrip as the ultimate metaphor for time. The second anthology I will consider has (...) a more political focus, arguing that the “special effects” form of science-fiction films, rather than the visual or narrative content of science-fiction-films, is truly imaginative and futural. The second section of this article ties together a variety of concepts and insights between time-travel cinema and Deleuze’s Cinema 1, suggesting (among other things) that (c) time-traveling characters in cinema function as a redoubled phenomenon of the “mobile sections” of Bergsonian duration (in reference to Henri Bergson), and (d) time-travel cinema vividly illustrates the imagistic nature of the entire world. (shrink)

Time travel and superluminal travel are two of mankind's dreams. They inspire our imagination and provide material for bizarre stories. -/- A work on the subject of time travel and superluminal travel forces us to re-examine our concept of "time". The complexity and the contradictory nature this subject makes it difficult to be more precise about "time". On its deepest subjective side, time is a means of perception, a biological rhythm, a social phenomenon in terms of our collective understanding of (...) time. But it is also a physical parameter. -/- Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity revolutionised our idea of space and time by freeing us from the Newtonian concept of absolute space and absolute time. The "problem of time travel", a subject that Herbert George Wells wrote about just ten years before as mere fiction, was now a discussion worthy of physics. Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (1905), by predicting the effects of time dilation, allowed for "travels into the future" and Albert Einstein's Theory of Gravity used closed time-like lines for solutions to calculations about time travel (for example, the Gödel Universe and the Anti-de Sitter Universe). However, a trip to a time warp would immediately involve a whole set of paradoxes (for example, the grandfather paradox and the information paradox) and semantic inconsistencies. -/- Surprisingly, the fundamental laws of physics (apart from extremely rare and non-emergent macroscopic quantum mechanical effects) are not violated by the concept of time reversal. Yet, in nature, there still seems to be a fundamental prohibition against time travel to the past. Physicist Dieter Zeh, whose position is more closely presented in the final chapter of this work, supports the view that science fiction literature on the subject of "time travel" is overwhelmingly based on simple conceptual errors. The processes used in this literature, which are based on the General Theory of Relativity, at best, are just as "theoretically possible" as a gas which gathers itself into the corner of a container. -/- This work discusses approaches for "time machines" and superluminal travel which are consistent with modern physics. Some of the discussions that will be presented are the tachyon hypothesis, Frank J. Tipler's rotating cylinder, the Gödel Universe, the Anti-de Sitter Universe, so-called "wormholes" and the Alcubierre-metric. At the same time, approaches will be presented (for example, Eternalism, the Many-Worlds Interpretation and the Consistent Histories Approach) that will provide attempts to find a solution for paradoxes regarding time travel to the past. -/- Questions about time travel to the past and superluminal travel are like the questions asked on Radio Yerevan. The answer is always, "In principle yes, but…" But the fascination about time travel will continue to provide material for "fiction". (shrink)

In this chapter I articulate the threat that time travel to the past allegedly poses to the free will of the time traveler, and I argue that on the traditional way of thinking about free will, the incompatibilist about time travel and free will wins the day. However, a residual worry about the incompatibilist view points the way toward a novel way of thinking about free will, one that I tentatively explore toward the end of the chapter.

This paper suggests that time travelling scenarios commonly depicted in science fiction introduce problems and dangers for the time traveller. If time travel takes time, then time travellers risk collision with past objects, relocation to distant parts of the universe, and time travel-specific injuries. I propose several models of time travel that avoid the dangers and risks of time travel taking time, and that introduce new questions about the relationship between time travel and spatial location.

The possibility of changing the past by means of time-travel appears to depend on the possibility of distinguishing the past as it is ‘before’ and ‘after’ the time-travel. So far, all the metaphysical models that have been proposed to account for the possibility of past-changing time-travels operate this distinction by conceiving of time as multi-dimensional, and thus by significantly inflating our metaphysics of time. The aim of this article is to argue that there is an intuitive sense in which past-changing (...) time-travels are metaphysically possible also in one-dimensional time. (shrink)

We argue that there is an interesting modal analogue of temporal persistence, namely modal persistence, and an interesting modal analogue of time travel, namely modal travel. We explicate each of these notions and then argue that there are plausible conditions under which some ordinary objects modally persist. We go on to consider whether it is plausible that any modally persistent objects also modally travel.

This article aims to bring some work in contemporary analytic metaphysics to discussions of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. I will show that some unusual claims of the Real Presence doctrine exactly parallel what would be happening in the world if objects were to time-travel in certain ways. Such time-travel would make ordinary objects multiply located, and in the relevantly analogous respects. If it is conceptually coherent that objects behave in this way, we have a model for (...) the behaviour of the Eucharist which shows the doctrine to be coherent, at least with respect to the issues discussed. (shrink)

I argue that the theory of moral responsibility defended by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of time travel.

Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...) for the endurantist. (shrink)

{June 2018 UPDATE: This work has been greatly surpassed by "Utilizing Future-Viewing Instruments" which will appear in the July 2018 issue of Progress in Physics. It can now be downloaded in PDF form from their website.} This is the full text of the paper that was published as a Kindle book on April 6th, 2014. In most respects, it has since been surpassed by "Potentials of Future-Viewing Machines," which is available here in this repository. Nevertheless, this earlier work addresses minutia (...) and interesting considerations that do not appear elsewhere, and it has a large bibliography, so it remains very useful for research purposes. (shrink)

Una breve discussione di due problemi concernenti la metafisica della prescienza.

Thinking about time travel is an entertaining way to explore how to understand time and its location in the broad conceptual landscape that includes causation, fate, action, possibility, experience, and reality. It is uncontroversial that time travel towards the future exists, and time travel to the past is generally recognized as permitted by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, though no one knows yet whether nature truly allows it. Coherent time travel stories have added flair to traditional debates over the metaphysical (...) status of the past, the reality of temporal passage, and the existence of free will. Moreover, plausible models of time travel and time machines can be used to investigate the subtle relation between space-time structure and causality. -/- It surveys some philosophical issues concerning time travel and should serves as a quick introduction. It includes a new and improved way to define a time machine. (shrink)

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities is the intuitive idea that someone is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt has famously presented putative counterexamples to this intuitive principle. In this paper, I formulate a simple version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a course-grained notion of actions. After warming up with a Frankfurt-Style Counterexample to this principle, I introduce a new kind of counterexample based on the possibility of time travel. At (...) the end of the paper, I formulate a more sophisticated version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a certain fine grained notion of actions. I then explain how this new kind of counterexample can be augmented to show that even the more sophisticated principle is false. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to an idea to be found in popularizations of time travel, one cannot more easily multiply oneself by taking younger versions of oneself back in time than by travelling back in time on one’s own. The reason is that the suggested multiplication of the traveller is, from a global perspective, only apparent.

Here I defend the compatibility of presentism and time travel against a few objections. Keller and Nelson argue that, if presentism is at all plausible, presentism and time travel are as compatible as eternalism and time travel. But Miller and Sider are not convinced. I reply that for their concerns to have merit, Miller and Sider must assume presentists are committed to positions they need not be; I explain why presentists are not so committed and, in the process, defend Keller (...) and Nelson’s position that there is no roadblock to presentist time travel that does not also apply to eternalist time travel. (shrink)

David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self-locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. In this paper, I raise a problem for centered worlds and discuss the costs and benefits of different solutions. My investigation into the nature of centered worlds brings out potentially problematic implicit commitments of the theories that employ (...) them. In addition, my investigation shows that the conception of centered worlds widely attributed to David Lewis is not only problematic, but in fact not his. (shrink)

Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.