"Este livro apresenta a você, profissional ou estudante, a mais completa visão do papel da Ética nas Ciências Contábeis e sua contribuição para o correto desempenho social da atividade contábil. Totalmente revitalizada, esta nova edição baseia-se na promulgação mais recente do Código de Ética Profissional do Contador (CEPC) pelo Plenário do Conselho Federal de Contabilidade (CFC). Traz, também, as atualizações decorrentes da legislação profissional e da organização dos Conselhos de Contabilidade, procedidas pelo Conselho Federal de Contabilidade (CFC). Neste livro você (...) encontra os principais aspectos filosóficos da Ética, sua história, as diferentes correntes de pensamento, os princípios e as normas éticas e morais. E, ainda, a legislação profissional e a organização dos Conselhos de Contabilidade, discorrendo sobre as habilidades requeridas para o exercício da profissão, as particularidades desse mercado de trabalho e informações contábeis, inclusive aspectos relacionados à auditoria ¿ uma das mais importantes funções exercidas pelo profissional da Contabilidade. Para compreender as melhores e mais adequadas práticas relativas ao exercício de suas atividades profissionais (segundo a entidade de classe), os autores apresentam o CEPC na íntegra acompanhado de uma valiosa exposição analítica. Ao final de cada capítulo, há uma bateria de questões cuidadosamente elaboradas para auxiliar você a fixar os assuntos tratados no livro. Além disso, uma sequência de testes composta por questões que já foram objeto de provas de Exame de Sufi ciência, cuja resolução constitui um treinamento que permite ao estudante avaliar o grau de seus conhecimentos e se familiarizar com o perfil das provas do CFC. Você tem em mãos um verdadeiro manual para estudo, reflexão e fixação dos princípios e da legislação que regem a profissão do contador, imprescindível para a formação do pensamento crítico e para o bom exercício da cidadania, da justiça e dos valores. APLICAÇÃO: este livro é indicado para profissionais e estudantes do curso de Ciências Contábeis, nas disciplinas de Ética Geral e Profissional e História do Pensamento Econômico.". (shrink)

In ethics, the good is the final cause of every action. All other causes are what they are relatively to the final cause, but the final cause is not relative to something else, except as means and efficient cause of an ulterior motive, whereby the supreme end, whose possession brings happiness, is the absolute in ethics. In physics, the same thing: the living being tends to the fullness of its eidos and all matter is moved towards that end. But the (...) notion of happiness is a kind of empty truism and the correspondent good will also remain empty until determined by relation to some substantive content, and in that determination we will fatally see the polyphony and the antilogy break out. In the realm of nature, as long as the good is thought from a philosophy of form and as what is useful and advantageous, that strengthens, brings health and preserves life, we will then have a total relativization of its absolute sense, because one form needs to snatch the matter from the other to survive, and the good of one, therefore, will be the evil of another. How to determine the good from the point of view of a philosophy of matter? (shrink)

I discuss the argument Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23-32. I discuss (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it as eristic and inconclusive and (i) the solution (lusis) Aristotle proposes against it.

This is a translation, made by myself, of the paper to be published in Portuguese in the journal Discurso, 2020, in honour of the late professor Oswaldo Porchat. I discuss what Aristotle was trying to encode when he said that the object of scientific knowledge is necessary, or that what we know (scientifically) cannot be otherwise etc. The paper is meant as a continuation of previous papers—orientated towards a book on the Posterior Analytics—and thus does not discuss in much detail (...) key passages, as the very definition of scientific knowledge in APo I.2, or passages from APo I.4 and I.6 (for these, I refer to my previous papers). This paper is mainly focused on Aristotle’s references to his notion of scientific knowledge both in other passages from the APo and in other treatises. I intend to show that there is a progressive, intrinsic relation between the two requirements by which scientific knowledge is defined. It is not true that each of these requirements stems from a different source. The Causal-Explanatory requirements gives Aristotle the general heading. Then, the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation between explanans and explanandum and thereby specifies what sort of cause is sctricly required for having scientific knowledge of a given explanandum. Now, Aristotle was also concerned with the necessary truth of the elemental predications that constitute a demonstration. My claim that the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation does not ignore that concern, and does not deny it. My claim is that Aristotle’s main focus, and main concern, consists in stressing that the explanatory factor to be captured in scientific knowledge of a given explanandum is such that cannot be otherwise. (shrink)

The paper examines Posterior Analytics II 11, 94a20-36 and makes three points. (1) The confusing formula ‘given what things, is it necessary for this to be’ [τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾿ εἶναι] at a21-22 introduces material cause, not syllogistic necessity. (2) When biological material necessitation is the only causal factor, Aristotle is reluctant to formalize it in syllogistic terms, and this helps to explain why, in II 11, he turns to geometry in order to illustrate a kind of material cause that (...) can be expressed as the middle term of an explanatory syllogism. (3) If geometrical proof is viewed as a complex construction built on simpler constructions, it can in effect be described as a case of purely material constitution. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the possibilities of relating scientific knowledge, practical and theoretical, with normative accounts. Firstly, we investigate how the particularized aspect of political science guarantees a degree of normative appropriateness between laws according to habit and the activity of phrónesis as a form of political intelligence. Secondly, we investigate how the universal aspect attributed to theoretical science and written laws could identify a criterion of epistemological validity that expresses normativity. In this sense, the reader will find in this essay (...) a study about methodological questions in Aristotelian philosophy, mainly in the direction in which the texts of practical philosophy establish a methodological relation with the texts of theoretical philosophy. The possibility of inferring normative aspects in Aristotle’s political philosophy depends on the direct results of this kind of methodological connection. (shrink)

In this book Timothy Clarke examines Aristotle's response to Eleatic monism, the theory of Parmenides of Elea and his followers that reality is 'one'. Clarke argues that Aristotle interprets the Eleatics as thoroughgoing monists, for whom the pluralistic, changing world of the senses is a mere illusion. Understood in this way, the Eleatic theory constitutes a radical challenge to the possibility of natural philosophy. Aristotle discusses the Eleatics in several works, including De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the Metaphysics. (...) But his most extensive treatment of their monism comes at the beginning of the Physics, where he criticizes them for overlooking the fact that 'being is said in many ways' – in other words, that there are many ways of being. Through a careful analysis of this and other criticisms, Clarke explains how Aristotle's engagement with the Eleatics prepares the ground for his own theory of the principles of nature. Aristotle is commonly thought to be an unreliable interpreter of his Presocratic predecessors; in contrast, this book argues that his critique can shed valuable light on the motivation of the Eleatic theory and its influence on the later philosophical tradition. (shrink)

This dissertation is about the construction of the concept of alchemy in the text named Compound of alchimy, written by English alchemist George Ripley (c.1415-c.1490). Manuscript history and circulation dates the text back to 1471. The route taken by the researcher serves two immediate purposes: the analyses of the document to verify the basis of the concept’s construction and the critique of an established historiography through a different methodological approach. The document serves as the axis of a perspective about aspects (...) of orality and scripture (from the French conception of écriture), whose intention is to open questions and bring light to unexplored points of the historiography of alchemy. (shrink)