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Building blocks for a cognitive science-led epistemology of arithmetic.Stefan Buijsman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1777-1794.details
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Como o estruturalismo pode resolver o problema do ‘acesso’.Otávio Bueno - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (1):180-192.details
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Platonic explanation: Or, what abstract entities can do for you.James Robert Brown - 1988 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):51 – 67.details
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Debunking Debunking: Explanationism, Probabilistic Sensitivity, and Why There is No Specifically Metacognitive Debunking Principle.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:25-52.details
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Systems of substitutional semantics.Daniel Bonevac - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):631-656.details
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Freedom and truth in mathematics.Daniel Bonevac - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (1):93 - 102.details
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Later Wittgenstein on ‘Truth’ and Realism in Mathematics.Philip Bold - 2024 - Philosophy 99 (1):27-51.details
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Quantifier Variance, Mathematicians’ Freedom and the Revenge of Quinean Indispensability Worries.Sharon Berry - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2201-2218.details
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Default Reasonableness and the Mathoids.Sharon Berry - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3695-3713.details
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Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687-701.details
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Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon E. Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687 - 701.details
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Σ01 soundness isn’t enough: Number theoretic indeterminacy’s unsavory physical commitments.Sharon Berry - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (2):469-484.details
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The Benacerraf Problem as a Challenge for Ontic Structural Realism.Majid Davoody Beni - 2020 - Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):35-59.details
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Facets and Levels of Mathematical Abstraction.Hourya Benis-Sinaceur - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18:81-112.details
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Explanation and description: Wittgenstein on convention.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 1998 - Synthese 115 (1):99-130.details
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A Noetic Theory of Understanding and Intuition as Sense-Maker.John Bengson - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):633-668.details
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Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option.Delia Belleri - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):348-362.details
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Numbers, numerosities, and new directions.Jacob Beck & Sam Clarke - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:1-20.details
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From full blooded platonism to really full blooded platonism.Jc Beall - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):322-325.details
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Truth, Correspondence, and Gender.Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):621-638.details
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Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):662-689.details
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Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.details
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Non-naturalistic moral explanation.Samuel Baron, Mark Colyvan, Kristie Miller & Michael Rubin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4273-4294.details
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Neo-Expressivism: (Self-)Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth.Dorit Bar-On - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:11-34.details
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How can necessary facts call for explanation.Dan Baras - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11607-11624.details
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Groundless Truth.Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):175-195.details
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Estructuralismo, ficcionalismo, y la aplicabilidad de las matemáticas en ciencia.Manuel Barrantes - 2019 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 31 (1):7-34.details
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Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?Sam Baron - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):153-173.details
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Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?Sam Baron - 2014 - Theoria 80 (2):153-173.details
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A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument.Sam Baron - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.details
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A reliability challenge to theistic Platonism.Dan Baras - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):479-487.details
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Absence perception and the philosophy of zero.Neil Barton - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3823-3850.details
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Indispensability, causation and explanation.Sorin Bangu - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (2):219-232.details
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Realistic rationalism [1998]: Can we know that platonism is true?Mark Balaguer - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):459–476.details
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Non-uniqueness as a non-problem.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84.details
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Can we know that platonism is true?Mark Balaguer - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3):459-475.details
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Alethic Pluralism and the Role of Reference in the Metaphysics of Truth.Brian Ball - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):116-135.details
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A platonist epistemology.Mark Balaguer - 1995 - Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.details
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Against (maddian) naturalized platonism.Mark Balaguer - 1994 - Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):97-108.details
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A fictionalist account of the indispensable applications of mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (3):291 - 314.details
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Popper’s Theory of World 3 and the Evolution of the Internet.Peter Backes - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):265-287.details
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Why deflationary nominalists shouldn’t be agnostics.Jody Azzouni - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1143-1161.details
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