- Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast.Jeroen de Ridder - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):185-199.details
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Design discourse and the cognitive science of design.Jeroen de Ridder - 2014 - Philosophia Reformata 79 (1):37-53.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat.Jan Constantin - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3437-3457.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.details
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Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese:1-20.details
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On behalf of controversial view agnosticism.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1358-1370.details
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Externalist justification without reliability.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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The significance of unpossessed evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.details
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Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):367-395.details
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Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.details
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Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency.Avery Archer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Knowledge and conviction.David James Anderson - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):377-392.details
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“Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2341-2364.details
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Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.details
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Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat.David Alexander - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.details
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Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.details
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When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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How should we ascribe the third stance?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Alexandra Zinke & Verena Wagner (eds.), Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. Routledge.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Neo-Pyrrhonism.Markus Lammenranta - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 565-580.details
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On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.details
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Doubt.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Movin' on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.details
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Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 217-232.details
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On Metaepistemological Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem.Harmen Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.details
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Philosophical Individualism.John A. Keller - 2017 - In Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-20.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Agnosticism as settled indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.details
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An Epistemic Defeater for Islamic Belief? A Reply to Baldwin and McNabb.Jamie Benjamin Turner - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):123-142.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.details
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The defeater version of Benacerraf’s problem for a priori knowledge.Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1587-1603.details
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Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion.Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):77-98.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.details
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Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.details
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Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments.Emily Slome - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Etiological information and diminishing justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.details
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