- Internalismo e justificação epistêmica não inferencial.Kátia Etcheverry - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):527-547.details
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Varieties of externalism.J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.details
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Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-95.details
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The origins of perceptual knowledge.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):311-328.details
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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Global Evolutionary Arguments: Self-Defeat, Circularity, and Skepticism about Reason.Diego E. Machuca - 2023 - In Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 333–359.details
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Responding to How Things Seem: Bergmann on Scepticism and Intuition.Jennifer Nagel - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):697-707.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast.Jeroen de Ridder - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):185-199.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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What is Understanding? An Overview of Recent Debates in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.Christoph Baumberger, Claus Beisbart & Georg Brun - 2016 - In Stephen Grimm Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemolgy and Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 1-34.details
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Cognitive Penetrability.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition.Paul Silva - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.details
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Ought to believe vs. ought to reflect.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Why There is No Justified Belief at Demon Worlds.Thomas D. Senor - manuscriptdetails
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Skepticism and Memory.Andrew Moon - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 335-347.details
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Internalism and Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 283-295.details
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Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix.I. Dream Skepticism - 2015 - In John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fisher (eds.), Introduction to philosophy: classical and contemporary readings. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 195.details
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Debunking Debunked? : Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat.Conrad Bakka - 2023 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape.John M. DePoe - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Delusion, Proper Function, and Justification.Parker Crutchfield - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):113-124.details
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A dilemma for internalism?Thomas M. Crisp - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):355-366.details
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
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Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat.Jan Constantin - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3437-3457.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness.E. J. Coffman - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):119-135.details
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A Church–Fitch proof for the universality of causation.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2749-2772.details
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Pollock and Sturgeon on defeaters.Albert Casullo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2897-2906.details
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Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):702-718.details
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Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.details
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Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.details
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Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong.Stefan Buijsman & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (4):541-562.details
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Reflective luck and belief ownership.Daniel Breyer - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):133-154.details
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Ownership, Agency, and Defeat.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):253-256.details
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Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):503-528.details
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Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility.Leandro de Brasi - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):113-140.details
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In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.details
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Deontology in ethics and epistemology.Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):530-545.details
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Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure.Patrick Bondy - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):335-348.details
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Deeply Disagreeing with Myself: Synchronic Intrapersonal Deep Disagreements.Patrick Bondy - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):1225-1236.details
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The Socratic method, defeasibility, and doxastic responsibility.Peter Boghossian & James Lindsay - 2018 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (3):244-253.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Moral intuitionism and disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.details
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