Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Problem of Punishment

Cambridge University Press (2008)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts.Nathan Hanna - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):109-127.
    Many philosophers think that, when someone deserves something, it’s intrinsically good that she get it or there’s a non-instrumental reason to give it to her. Retributivists who try to justify punishment by appealing to claims about what people deserve typically assume this view or views that entail it. In this paper, I present evidence that many people have intuitions that are inconsistent with this view. And I argue that this poses a serious challenge to retributivist arguments that appeal to desert.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Rights Forfeiture and Liability to Harm.Massimo Renzo - 2017 - Journal of Political Philosophy 25 (3):324-342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Why Punitive Intent Matters.Nathan Hanna - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):426-435.
    Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Retributivism Revisited.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends to non-retributive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Facing the Consequences.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):589-604.
    According to deterrence justifications of legal punishment, legal punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on important empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can't deter or that it can't deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for these justifications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Punishment: Consequentialism.David Wood - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (6):455-469.
    Punishment involves deliberating harming individuals. How, then, if at all, is it to be justified? This, the first of three papers on the philosophy of punishment (see also 'Punishment: Nonconsequentialism' and 'Punishment: The Future'), examines attempts to justify the practice or institution according to its consequences. One claim is that punishment reduces crime, and hence the resulting harms. Another is that punishment functions to rehabilitate offenders. A third claim is that punishment (or some forms of punishment) can serve to make (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Gossip and Social Punishment.Linda Radzik - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):185-204.
    Is gossip ever appropriate as a response to other people’s misdeeds or character flaws? Gossip is arguably the most common means through which communities hold people responsible for their vices and transgressions. Yet, gossiping itself is traditionally considered wrong. This essay develops an account of social punishment in order to ask whether gossip can serve as a legitimate means of enforcing moral norms. In the end, however, I argue that gossip is most likely to be permissible where it resembles punishment (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Consent Solution to Punishment and the Explicit Denial Objection.Miroslav Imbrisevic - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (2):211-224.
    Recently, David Boonin has put forward several objections to Carlos S. Nino's 'Consensual Theory of Punishment'. In this paper I will defend Nino against the 'explicit denial objection'. I will discuss whether Boonin's interpretation of Nino as a tacit consent theorist is right. I will argue that the offender's consent is neither tacit nor express, but a special category of implicit consent. Further, for Nino the legal-normative consequences of an act (of crime) are 'irrevocable', i.e. one cannot (expressly and successfully) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Collective Agents and Communicative Theories of Punishment.Bill Wringe - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (4):436-456.
    This paper considers the applicability of expressive theories of punishment to the punishment of corporate entities. The author argues that although arguments which suggest that the denunciatory account is superior to a communicative account in paradigmatic cases of punishment cannot be transferred straightforwardly to cover this kind of case, there are other reasons, connected with the different attitudes we have to regret and remorse in individual and collective cases, for preferring a communicative to a denunciatory account here.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Punishing the Oppressed and the Standing to Blame.Andy Engen - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (2):271-295.
    Philosophers have highlighted a dilemma for the criminal law. Unjust, racist policies in the United States have produced conditions in which the dispossessed are more likely to commit crime. This complicity undermines the standing of the state to blame their offenses. Nevertheless, the state has reason to punish those crimes in order to deter future offenses. Tommie Shelby proposes a way out of this dilemma. He separates the state’s right to condemn from its right to punish. I raise doubts about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe.Nathan Hanna - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):969-976.
    Many philosophers think that an agent punishes a subject only if the agent aims to harm the subject. Bill Wringe has recently argued against this claim. I show that his arguments fail.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Odera Oruka on Culture Philosophy and its Role in the S.M. Otieno Burial Trial.Gail Presbey - 2018 - In Reginald M. J. Oduor, Oriare Nyarwath & Francis E. A. Owakah (eds.), Odera Oruka in the Twenty-first Century. Washington, DC, USA: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 99-118.
    This paper focuses on evaluating Odera Oruka’s role as an expert witness in customary law for the Luo community during the Nairobi, Kenya-based trial in 1987 to decide on the place of the burial of S.M. Otieno. During that trial, an understanding of Luo burial and widow guardianship (ter) practices was essential. Odera Oruka described the practices carefully and defended them against misunderstanding and stereotype. He revisited related topics in several delivered papers, published articles, and even interviews and columns in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mitä merkitystä rangaistuksella on?Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Rikoksen ja rangaistuksen filosofia.
    On varsin yleisesti hyväksyttyä, että rangaistuksen ilmaisullinen tehtävä - eli se, että se ilmaisee yhteisön paheksuntaa - on yksi sen ominaispiirre. Viime aikoina on kuitenkin esitetty myös kunnianhimoisempia väitteitä siitä, että rangaistuksen voisi oikeuttaa sen ilmaisullisella tehtävällä. Nämä näkemykset ovat myös saaneet runsaasti kritiikkiä. Tässä esseessä kehittelen aiemmin muotoilemaani versiota ekspressiivisestä rangaistusteoriasta, jonka mukaan asenteiden toiminnallinen ilmaisu rankaisemalla on oikeutettua siksi, että muuten rikoksen uhrilla ei ole hänelle kuuluvaa oikeudenhaltijan statusta. Jos ihmisen oikeuksia voi loukata rangaistuksetta, ne jäävät moraaliseksi ihanteeksi (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? A Critical Examination of Vargas’s Agency Cultivation Model of Responsibility.Harry Harland - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (4):401-425.
    This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral influence theory of responsibility with his ‘agency cultivation model’. By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinctive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Vargas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual test is (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Teleological Account of Proportional Surveillance.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2020 - Res Publica (3):1-29.
    This article analyses proportionality as a potential element of a theory of morally justified surveillance, and sets out a teleological account. It draws on conceptions in criminal justice ethics and just war theory, defines teleological proportionality in the context of surveillance, and sketches some of the central values likely to go into the consideration. It then explores some of the ways in which deontologists might want to modify the account and illustrates the difficulties of doing so. Having set out the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes.Derk Pereboom - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):439-454.
    In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros argues that wrongdoers acquire special duties to those they’ve wronged, and from there he generates wrongdoers’ duties to contribute to general deterrence by being punished. In support, he contends that my manipulation argument against compatibilism fails to show that causal determination is incompatible with the proposed duties wrongdoers owe to those they’ve wronged. I respond that I did not intend my manipulation argument to rule out a sense of moral responsibility that features such duties, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence.Derk Pereboom - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):87-97.
    The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributive justification for punishment; does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Felon Disenfranchisement and the Argument From Democratic Self-Determination.William Bülow - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):759-774.
    This paper discusses an argument in defense of felon disenfranchisement originally proposed by Andrew Altman, which states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, members of a legitimate democratic community have a collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons. Although this argument—which is here referred to as the argument from democratic self-determination—is held to justify policies that are significantly broader in scope than many critics of existing disenfranchisement practices would allow for, it has received little attention from philosophers and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment.Zachary Hoskins - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):53-71.
    This paper attempts to establish that, and explain why, the practice of punishing offenders is in principle morally permissible. My account is a nonstandard version of the fair play view, according to which punishment 's permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender gains relative to law-abiding members of the community. Such views (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Punishment as Fair Play.Richard Dagger - 2008 - Res Publica 14 (4):259-275.
    This article defends the fair-play theory of legal punishment against three objections. The first, the irrelevance objection, is the long-standing complaint that fair play fails to capture what it is about crimes that makes criminals deserving of punishment ; the others are the recently raised false-equivalence and lacks-integration objections. In response, I sketch an account of fair-play theory that is grounded in a conception of the political order as a meta- cooperative practice—a conception that falls somewhere between contractual and communitarian (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Practice-Dependence and Epistemic Uncertainty.Eva Erman - 2017 - Journal of Global Ethics 13 (2):187-205.
    A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the practice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recent contributions to this debate, the condition of epistemic uncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying a practice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role of epistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach. We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing this justificatory role. What we call ‘normative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Collateral Legal Consequences of Criminal Convictions in a Society of Equals.Jeffrey M. Brown - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):181-205.
    This paper concerns what if any obligations a “society of equals” has to criminal offenders after legal punishment ends. In the United States, when people leave prisons, they are confronted with a wide range of federal, state, and local laws that burden their ability to secure welfare benefits, public housing, employment opportunities, and student loans. Since the 1980s, these legal consequences of criminal convictions have steadily increased in their number, severity, and scope. The central question I want to ask is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Was Ellen Wronged?Stephen P. Garvey - 2013 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):185-216.
    Imagine a citizen (call her Ellen) engages in conduct the state says is a crime, for example, money laundering. Imagine too that the state of which Ellen is a citizen has decided to make money laundering a crime. Does the state wrong Ellen when it punishes her for money laundering? It depends on what you think about the authority of the criminal law. Most criminal law scholars would probably say that the criminal law as such has no authority. Whatever authority (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why Moral Paradoxes Matter? “Teflon Immorality” and the Perversity of Life.Saul Smilansky - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):229-243.
    “Teflon immorality’’ (or TI) is immorality that goes on unchecked—the wrongdoing is not stopped and its perpetrators, beyond the reach of punishment or other sanction, often persist in their immoral ways. The idea that the immoral prosper has been recognized as morally (and legally) disturbing presumably for as long as humanity has been reflective, and can be found already in the Bible. The reasons behind a great deal of successful immorality are important practically, but uninteresting philosophically. Sometimes, however, we face (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Punitive Intent.Nathan Hanna - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Most punishment theorists seem to accept the following claim: punishment is intended to harm the punishee. A significant minority of punishment theorists reject the claim, though. I defend the claim from objections, focusing mostly on recent objections that haven’t gotten much attention. My objective is to reinforce the already strong case for the intentions claim. I first clarify what advocates of the intentions claim mean by it and state the standard argument for it. Then I critically discuss a wide variety (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Buddhism, Free Will, and Punishment: Taking Buddhist Ethics Seriously.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):474-496.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Punishment, Jesters and Judges: A Response to Nathan Hanna.Bill Wringe - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):3-12.
    Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not in fact counterexamples to any view I hold, produce an example which shows that, if we accept a number of Hanna’s own assumptions, punishment does not require (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Punishment, Consent and Value.David Alm - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):903-914.
    In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Crime Victims and the Right to Punishment.David Alm - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):63-81.
    In this paper, I consider the question of whether crime victims can be said to have a moral right to see their victimizers punished that could explain why they often feel wronged or cheated when the state fails to punish offenders. In the first part, I explain what I mean by a “right to punishment” and what it is for such a right to “explain” the frustrated crime victim’s reaction. In the second part, I distinguish such a right from a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):13-28.
    Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A New Societal Self-Defense Theory of Punishment—The Rights-Protection Theory.Hsin-Wen Lee - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):337-353.
    In this paper, I propose a new self-defense theory of punishment, the rights-protection theory. By appealing to the interest theory of right, I show that what we call “the right of self-defense” is actually composed of the right to protect our basic rights. The right of self-defense is not a single, self-standing right but a group of derivative rights justified by their contribution to the protection of the core, basic rights. Thus, these rights of self-defense are both justified and constrained (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Puzzle About Proportionality.David Alm - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (2):133-149.
    The paper addresses a puzzle about the proportionality requirement on self-defense due to L. Alexander. Indirectly the puzzle is also relevant to the proportionality requirement on punishment, insofar as the right to punish is derived from the right to self-defense. Alexander argues that there is no proportionality requirement on either self-defense or punishment, as long as the aggressor/offender has been forewarned of the risk of a disproportional response. To support his position Alexander appeals to some puzzle cases, challenging us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Regaining Traction on the Problem of Punishment: A Critique of David Boonin’s Use of the Entailment Test.Alex Howe - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (2):261-272.
    Boonin examines more than a dozen theories of punishment and offers perhaps the most systematic argument that the legal practice of punishment is probably unjustified. This provocative claim comes at a time when US prisons face unsustainable population growth and high recidivism rates. In place of punishment, Boonin offers an account of ‘compulsory victim restitution’. Responses to Boonin have focused on the merits of his theory of restitution or have defended a single particular theory of punishment from his objections. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rethinking Expressive Theories of Punishment: Why Denunciation is a Better Bet Than Communication or Pure Expression.Bill Wringe - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):681-708.
    Many philosophers hold that punishment has an expressive dimension. Advocates of expressive theories have different views about what makes punishment expressive, what kinds of mental states and what kinds of claims are, or legitimately can be expressed in punishment, and to what kind of audience or recipients, if any, punishment might express whatever it expresses. I shall argue that in order to assess the plausibility of an expressivist approach to justifying punishment we need to pay careful attention to whether the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Retributivism and Public Opinion: On the Context Sensitivity of Desert.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):125-142.
    Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, here called ‘popular retributivism,’ deserved punishments are constituted by the penal conventions of the community. This paper makes two claims against this view. First, the intuitive appeal of popular retributivism is undermined once we distinguish between context sensitivity and convention sensitivity about desert. Retributivism in general can freely accept context sensitivity without being committed to the stronger notion of convention (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Can Medical Interventions Serve as ‘Criminal Rehabilitation’?Gulzaar Barn - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (1):85-96.
    ‘Moral bioenhancement’ refers to the use of pharmaceuticals and other direct brain interventions to enhance ‘moral’ traits such as ‘empathy,’ and alter any ‘morally problematic’ dispositions, such as ‘aggression.’ This is believed to result in improved moral responses. In a recent paper, Tom Douglas considers whether medical interventions of this sort could be “provided as part of the criminal justice system’s response to the commission of crime, and for the purposes of facilitating rehabilitation : 101–122, 2014).” He suggests that they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):299–309.
    We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the retribution gap. This gap arises (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and the Emotions.Peter Königs - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1029-1047.
    This paper provides a discussion of the role that emotions may play in the justification of punishment. On the expressivist account of punishment, punishment has the purpose of expressing appropriate emotional reactions to wrongdoing, such as indignation, resentment or guilt. I will argue that this expressivist approach fails as these emotions can be expressed other than through the infliction of punishment. Another argument for hard treatment put forward by expressivists states that punitive sanctions are necessary in order for the law (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Punishing and Atoning: A New Critique of Penal Substitution.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (2):201-218.
    The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one must at least believe the recipient is responsible for an offense. But God surely did not believe the innocent Christ was responsible for an offense, let alone the offense of human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Must Punishment Be Intended to Cause Suffering?Bill Wringe - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):863-877.
    It has recently been suggested that the fact that punishment involves an intention to cause suffering undermines expressive justifications of punishment. I argue that while punishment must involve harsh treatment, harsh treatment need not involve an intention to cause suffering. Expressivists should adopt this conception of harsh treatment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Perp Walks as Punishment.Bill Wringe - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):615-629.
    When Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then head of the IMF, was arrested on charges of sexual assault arising from events that were alleged to have occurred during his stay in an up-market hotel in New York, a sizeable portion of French public opinion was outraged - not by the possibility that a well-connected and widely-admired politician had assaulted an immigrant hotel worker, but by the way in which the accused had been treated by the American authorities. I shall argue that in one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Considering Capital Punishment as a Human Interaction.Christopher Bennett - 2013 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):367-382.
    This paper contributes to the normative debate over capital punishment by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. The answer to the latter question turns on the kind of justification the agent can give for what she does in carrying out the role. So our inquiry concerns whether the justifications available to an executioner could provide him with the kind of justification necessary for him to take pride in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Harms Beyond Imprisonment: Do We Have Special Moral Obligations Towards the Families and Children of Prisoners?William Bülow - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):775-789.
    This paper discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the close family members and children of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two competing perspectives in moral philosophy are then applied in order to assess whether the harms are permissible. The first is consequentialist and the second is deontological. It is argued (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Limits of the Rights to Free Thought and Expression.Barrett Emerick - 2021 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 31 (2):133-152.
    It is often held that people have a moral right to believe and say whatever they want. For instance, one might claim that they have a right to believe racist things as long as they keep those thoughts to themselves. Or, one might claim that they have a right to pursue any philosophical question they want as long as they do so with a civil tone. In this paper I object to those claims and argue that no one has such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Possibility and Permissibility of Interpersonal Punishment.Laura Gillespie - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In the dissertation, I consider the permissibility of a familiar set of responses to wrongdoing in our interpersonal relationships—those responses that constitute the imposition of some cost upon the wrongdoer. Some of these responses are, I argue, properly considered punishing, and some of these instances of punishing are in turn permissible. Punishment as I understand it is a broad phenomenon, common in and to all human relationships, and not exclusively or even primarily the domain of the state. Personal interactions expressive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.
    This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe.Nathan Hanna - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):89-100.
    This paper continues a debate about the following claim: an agent punishes someone only if she aims to harm him. In a series of papers, Bill Wringe argues that this claim is false, I criticize his arguments, and he replies. Here, I argue that his reply fails.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Punishment and Forgiveness.Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - In Jonathan Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics. Routledge. pp. 203-216.
    In this paper we explore the relationship between forgiving and punishment. We set out a number of arguments for the claim that if one forgives a wrongdoer, one should not punish her. We then argue that none of these arguments is persuasive. We conclude by reflecting on the possibility of institutional forgiveness in the criminal justice setting and on the differences between forgiveness and acts of mercy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
    Skepticism about moral responsibility, or what is more commonly referred to as moral responsibility skepticism, refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise. Some moral responsibility skeptics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Punishment.Zachary Hoskins - 2016 - Analysis:anw022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation