- What do our impressions say? The Stoic theory of perceptual content and belief formation.Simon Shogry - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (1):29-63.details
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Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael K. Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.details
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Why do we need perceptual content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.details
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The generality and particularity of perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):235-247.details
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Reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency.Robert Schroer - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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On the content of experience.Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590–611.details
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Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Environmental representationalists on afterimages and phosphenes: Putting our best foot forward.Robert Schroer - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.details
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The hybrid contents of memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1263-1290.details
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Episodic Memory as a Propositional Attitude: A Critical Perspective.André Sant'Anna - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination.André Sant'Anna - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:73-93.details
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Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.details
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy.David Rosenthal - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):541-548.details
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Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.details
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Moral Perception as Imaginative Apprehension.Yanni Ratajczyk - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-20.details
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Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese:1-26.details
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Phenomenology without Representation.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1209-1237.details
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Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.details
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Phenomenology without Representation.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):1209-1237.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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Why Does Time Seem to Pass?Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):92-116.details
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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.details
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Passage and Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):69-84.details
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Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):475-513.details
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Perceptual content is indexed to attention.Adrienne Prettyman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4039-4054.details
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Afterimages and Sensation.Ian Phillips - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.details
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Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):273–288.details
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Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties.Frederic Peters - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1113-1135.details
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Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.details
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The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):93-114.details
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The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling.Denis Perrin, Kourken Michaelian & André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: from intentionalism to metacognition.Denis Perrin & André Sant’Anna - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-26.details
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Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):145-182.details
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Intentionalism and perceptual presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.details
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Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.details
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Of the perfect and the ordinary: Indistinguishability and hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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The Bodily Theory of Pain.Erlend Winderen Finke Owesen - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1329-1347.details
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Consciousness and Time: A Representationalist Approach.Koji Ota & Takeshi Sakon - 2011 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 39 (1):1-11.details
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Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem.John W. O’dea - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.details
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A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia.John O'dea - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):81-93.details
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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An account of color without a subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.details
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Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How not to be Inseparatists.Miklós Márton - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):127-147.details
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Mental Strength: A Theory of Experience Intensity.Jorge Morales - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):1-21.details
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