- Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor.Bjørn G. Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.details
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Moderate Epistemic Akrasia.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):69-97.details
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The Transmission of Understanding.Adam Green - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (1):43-61.details
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The Right Side of History and Higher-Order Evidence.Adam Green - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):1-15.details
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Iteration Principles in Epistemology II: Arguments Against.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):765-771.details
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Dubious pleasures.Javier González de Prado - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):217-234.details
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Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
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The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Sanford Goldberg & Jonathan Matheson - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):829-840.details
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The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.Georgi Gardiner - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):83-95.details
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Meta-Research Evidence for Evaluating Therapies.Jonathan Fuller - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):767-780.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. ix + 217. [REVIEW]Claire Field - 2021 - Mind 130.details
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel.Claire Field - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):724-733.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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An optimality-argument for equal weighting.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1543-1563.details
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Conservative Treatment of Evidence.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):568-583.details
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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.details
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Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
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Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements.Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6143-6158.details
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
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Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):22-31.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Why are Epistemic Reasons Normative?Laura Frances Callahan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Moral uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.details
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Disagreement, the Independence Thesis, and the Value of Repeated Reasoning.Ethan Brauer - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):494-510.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account.Anna Boncompagni - 2021 - Episteme 1 (Early view):1-18.details
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The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company.Joshua Blanchard - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):529-541.details
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Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument.Bálint Békefi - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):199-213.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account.Endre Begby - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Resolving Turri's Puzzle about Withholding.Sebastian Becker - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):229-243.details
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Discussion of James Pryor's “The Merits of Incoherence”.Ori Beck, Anil Gupta, Adrian Haddock, James Pryor & Declan Smithies - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):142-148.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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Genealogical Defeat and Ontological Sparsity.Jonathan Barker - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:1-23.details
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