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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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A priority as an evaluative notion.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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1. the concept of apriority.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 117.details
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Recent Debates about the A Priori.Hartry Field - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Anti-expertise, instability, and rational choice.Roy Sorensen - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):301 – 315.details
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Ideal rationality and hand waving.Reed Richter - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.details
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Rationality and epistemic paradox.Frederick Kroon - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408.details
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Rationality and Paradox: A Reply to Conee.Fred Kroon - 1983 - Analysis 43 (3):156 - 160.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.Andy Egan & Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.details
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Utilitarianism And Rationality.Earl Conee - 1982 - Analysis 42 (January):55-59.details
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Evident, but rationally unacceptable.Earl Conee - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.details
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Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise.Nicolas Bommarito - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):413-419.details
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Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Recent Debates about the A Priori.Harty Field - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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