- “Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2341-2364.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):841-866.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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The epistemology of evolutionary debunking.Justis Koon - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12155-12176.details
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Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
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Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict.Verena Wagner - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-76.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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E-Cigarettes and the Multiple Responsibilities of the FDA.Larisa Svirsky, Dana Howard & Micah L. Berman - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (10):5-14.details
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(1 other version)Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. ix + 217. [REVIEW]Claire Field - 2021 - Mind 130.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Reasons Against Belief: A Theory of Epistemic Defeat.Tim Loughrist - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska - Lincolndetails
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Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Being pessimistic about the objective present.Derek Lam - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-16.details
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The Unity of Evidence and Coherence.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic Function of Higher-Order Evidence.Declan Smithies - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-120.details
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Epistemic Self-Doubt.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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A Genealogy of Emancipatory Values.Nick Smyth - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.details
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Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist.Dominik Balg - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):51-78.details
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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An optimality-argument for equal weighting.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1543-1563.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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(1 other version)The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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(1 other version)The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming.Neil Levy - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):487-502.details
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Modesty and Humility.Nicolas Bommarito - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements.Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6143-6158.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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