- Reasoning About Collectively Accepted Group Beliefs.Raul Hakli & Sara Negri - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):531-555.details
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Rethinking Religious Epistemology.Amber L. Griffioen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):21-47.details
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The importance of belief in argumentation: belief, commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion.David M. Godden - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):397-414.details
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Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing Epistemic Risk.David Godden - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):485-511.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.details
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Ersatz Belief and Real Belief.Jerome Gellman - 2019 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):39-53.details
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Liberalismo político y reciprocidad: justificación epistémica de creencias versus justificación moral de acciones.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2012 - Isegoría 46:279-294.details
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Deliberación moral, creencia y aceptación.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):5-32.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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Do the self-deceived get what they want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.details
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The cognitive attitude of rational trust.Karen Frost-Arnold - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability. [REVIEW]James B. Freeman - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (4):453-460.details
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Dual systems and dual attitudes.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.details
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Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.details
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Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
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Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.details
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Conscious thinking, acceptance, and self-deception.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):20-21.details
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A matter of opinion.Keith Frankish - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.details
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Adaptive misbelief or judicious pragmatic acceptance?Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):520.details
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A pragmatic, existentialist approach to the scientific realism debate.Curtis Forbes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3327-3346.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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Can Fictionalists Have Faith?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):215-232.details
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Collective Scientific Knowledge.Melinda Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831.details
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El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Ángeles Eraña & Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:9-36.details
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Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.details
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La logique peut-elle mouvoir l'esprit?Pascal Engel - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):35-54.details
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Is epistemic agency possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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De modalibus non disputat asinus.Pascal Engel - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):157-.details
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True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.details
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Replies.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1577-1597.details
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Disagreement in philosophy.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-16.details
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Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.details
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Non-factive Understanding: A Statement and Defense.Yannick Doyle, Spencer Egan, Noah Graham & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (3):345-365.details
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Laura Goodship on Priest's principle R.Andrew Doherty - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):480 – 490.details
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Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.details
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Inquiry Tickets: Values, Pursuit, and Underdetermination.Marina DiMarco & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):1016-1028.details
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Understanding without Justification or Belief.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):239-254.details
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The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
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Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56 (C):72-83.details
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Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):451-459.details
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Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.details
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-24.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability.Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2475-2494.details
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Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):487-497.details
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Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions.David M. Godden & Nicholas Griffin - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.details
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Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs?Thomas J. Coleman Iii, Jonathan Jong & Valerie van Mulukom - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (3):279-283.details
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