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Aspects of Psychologism

Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (2014)

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  1. Review of Matthew MacKenzie Buddhist philosophy and the Embodied Mind: a constructive engagement, London: Roman & Littlefield, 2022. [REVIEW]Odysseus Stone - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
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  • In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Psychological and philosophical studies have extended J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordances. Affordances are possibilities for bodily action presented to us by the objects of our perception. Recent work has argued that we should extend the actions afforded by perception to mental action. I argue that we can extend the notion of affordance itself. What I call ‘Introspective Affordances’ are possibilities for mental action presented to us by introspectively accessible states. While there are some prima facie worries concerning the non-perceptual (...)
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  • The Paradox of Empathy.L. A. Paul - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):347-366.
    A commitment to truth requires that you are open to receiving new evidence, even if that evidence contradicts your current beliefs. You should be open to changing your mind. However, this truism gives rise to the paradox of empathy. The paradox arises with the possibility of mental corruption through transformative change, and has consequences for how we should understand tolerance, disagreement, and the ability to have an open mind. I close with a discussion of how understanding this paradox provides a (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The Boundaries of the Mind.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 256-279.
    The subject of mental processes or mental states is usually assumed to be an individual, and hence the boundaries of mental features – in a strict or metaphorical sense – are naturally regarded as reaching no further than the boundaries of the individual. This chapter addresses various philosophical developments in the 20th and 21st century that questioned this natural assumption. I will frame this discussion by fi rst presenting a historically infl uential commitment to the individualistic nature of the mental (...)
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  • How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists.Adam Pautz - 2018 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press.
    In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes, because these would (...)
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  • A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.
    In this paper, I develop and defend a new adverbial theory of perception. I first present a semantics for direct-object perceptual reports that treats their object positions as supplying adverbial modifiers, and I show how this semantics definitively solves the many-property problem for adverbialism. My solution is distinctive in that it articulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic framework and ties adverbialism to a plausible semantics for perceptual reports in English. I then go on to present adverbialism as a (...)
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  • Skeptizismus und negative Theologie.Rico Gutschmidt - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (1):23-41.
    Scepticism and negative theology are best understood not as theoretical positions, but rather as forms of philosophical practice that performatively undermine our knowledge claims or our seeming understanding of God. In particular, I am arguing that both scepticism and negative theology invoke the failure of the attempt to understand the absolute, be it God or the notion of absolute objectivity. However, with reference to L. A. Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience, I am arguing that we still understand something about (...)
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  • 'Explicating ways of consensus-making: Distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus.Laszlo Kosolosky & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Martini Carlo (ed.), Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Springer. pp. 71-92.
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  • Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.
    This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In (...)
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  • XIV—Existence ‘in’ the Mind.Umrao Sethi - 2024 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 124 (3):299-322.
    We often speak of an entity existing only in the mind, but what exactly do we mean when we speak this way? In this paper, I look at different accounts of what it is for something to exist in the mind. I argue that none of these accounts do justice to a specific set of cases involving sensory phenomena like after-images, phosphenes and hallucinations. When a subject experiences a green after-image, we may say that the greenness that the subject sees (...)
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  • Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.
    Brentano’s suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality. What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane, some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane replies that the concept of (...)
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  • Mind and Object. An Essay on Intentionality.Patrik Engisch - 2017 - Dissertation, Université de Fribourg
    Provides a certain conception of the target of a theory of intentionality in terms of five properties (aboutness, non-existence, aspectuality, generality, and semantic normativity) and provides a guided tour of how different styles of theories of intentionality can meet up these requirements.
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  • Distinguishing Representations as Origin and Representations as Input: Roles for Individual Neurons.Jonathan C. W. Edwards - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • The problem of higher-order misrepresentation.Graham Peebles - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (6):842-861.
    The problem of higher-order misrepresentation poses a dilemma for the higher-order theory of consciousness. The two ways of conceiving of the theory each run into a different difficulty raised by the problem of misrepresentation. If the theory is conceived relationally, i.e., conceived so as the higher-order state causes or makes a first-order state conscious, then the theory faces a problem raised by Block concerning the implausibility of non-existent conscious states. If conceived non-relationally, i.e., conceived in such a way as it (...)
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  • Much Ado About Nothing: Toward a Structural Realist Theory of Intentionality.Majid Davoody Beni - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (3):293-308.
    Building upon Brentano’s Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge, London, [1874] Brentano 1995) reintroduction of the concept of intentionality to the contemporary philosophy, Tim Crane has famously presented the intentionality as the mark of the mental. Accordingly, the problem of “intentional existence” has resurfaced in Crane’s revival of the Brentanoian theme. Here, I revise Crane’s construal of Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence and reinterpret it in terms of a moderate version of relationalism. My relationalist theory of intentionality is inspired by (...)
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  • Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?Peter V. Forrest - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):403-424.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number of philosophers (...)
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  • What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?Stina Bäckström - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):358-375.
    In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti-psychologism’ and ‘non-psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti-psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non-psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought (...)
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  • Communicating your point of view.Paul Faulkner - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):661-675.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 661-675, June 2022.
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  • How Do Mental Processes Preserve Truth? Husserl’s Discovery of the Computational Theory of Mind.Jesse Daniel Lopes - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (1):25-45.
    Hubert Dreyfus once noted that it would be difficult to ascertain whether Edmund Husserl had a computational theory of mind. I provide evidence that he had one. Both Steven Pinker and Steven Horst think that the computational theory of mind must have two components: a representational-symbolic component and a causal component. Bearing this in mind, we proceed to a close-reading of the sections of “On the Logic of Signs” wherein Husserl presents, if I’m correct, his computational theory of mind embedded (...)
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  • Can We Hear Silence?Daniela Šterbáková - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):33-53.
    We can hear silence because silence, an absence of sound, causes our hearing of it. Advocating this position, Roy Sorensen puts to use his own theory of the direct perception of absences. Sorensen’s theory, which relies on two theories of perception, certainly has its appeal. However, it also has its problematic aspects. On my reading, a weak point of his theory is that it does not provide a criterion for the identification of what exactly we hear. By elaborating this objection (...)
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  • Maria van der Schaar, G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Consuelo Preti - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (3).
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  • On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):453-462.
    The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane’s psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the relationality of intentionality.
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