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Realization, determination, and mechanisms.Matthew C. Haug - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330.details
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Exploratory concept formation and tool development in neuroscience.Philipp Haueis - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (2):354 - 375.details
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Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function.Philipp Haueis - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5373-5402.details
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A refinement to the general mechanistic account.Eric Nelson Hatleback & Jonathan M. Spring - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):19.details
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Two faces of representation: on the neuroscience of folk psychology.Daniel F. Hartner - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):523-539.details
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Mutual manipulability and causal inbetweenness.Totte Harinen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):35-54.details
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Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation.Jens Harbecke - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):363-385.details
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Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation.Stephan Hartmann & Matteo Colombo - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).details
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Explanatory Integration Challenges in Evolutionary Systems Biology.Sara Green, Melinda Fagan & Johannes Jaeger - 2015 - Biological Theory 10 (1):18-35.details
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Moving beyond the subset model of realization: The problem of qualitative distinctness in the metaphysics of science.Carl Gillett - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.details
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Taking the Russo-Williamson thesis seriously in the social sciences.Virginia Ghiara - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6).details
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The Covering Law Model Applied to Dynamical Cognitive Science: A Comment on Joel Walmsley.Raoul Gervais & Erik Weber - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):33-39.details
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Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models.Raoul Gervais & Erik Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):139-152.details
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Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the ‘mere description’ worry.Raoul Gervais - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):43-66.details
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Junk or functional DNA? ENCODE and the function controversy.Pierre-Luc Germain, Emanuele Ratti & Federico Boem - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (6):807-831.details
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Understanding the development and use of tools in neuroscience: the case of the tungsten micro-electrode.Juan Manuel Garrido Wainer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-22.details
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The Extended Mind: State of the Question.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):421-447.details
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Replies to Barrett, Corris and Chemero, and Hutto.Shaun Gallagher - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):839-851.details
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Economic Reasoning and Interaction in Socially Extended Market Institutions.Shaun Gallagher, Antonio Mastrogiorgio & Enrico Petracca - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 40 (1):63-90.details
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Mono-Causal and Multi-Causal Theories of Disease: How to Think Virally and Socially about the Aetiology of AIDS.Katherine Furman - 2020 - Journal of Medical Humanities 41 (2):107-121.details
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Preventive and curative medical interventions.Jonathan Fuller - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Idealizations and Partitions: A Defense of Robustness Analysis.Gareth P. Fuller & Armin W. Schulz - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (4):1-15.details
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A mechanistic framework for Darwinism or why Fodor’s objection fails.Fermín Fulda - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):163-183.details
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Can parts cause their wholes?Toby Friend - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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Can parts cause their wholes?Toby Friend - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5061-5082.details
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Unificatory Understanding and Explanatory Proofs.Joachim Frans - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1105-1127.details
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High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):553-577.details
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Modulation : an alternative to instructions and forces.Martin Flament Fultot - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):887-916.details
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Neuroscience and the multiple realization of cognitive functions.Carrie Figdor - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):419-456.details
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Mechanisms meet structural explanation.Laura Felline - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):99-114.details
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Construct validity in psychological tests – the case of implicit social cognition.Uljana Feest - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.details
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Flat mechanisms: a reductionist approach to levels in mechanistic explanations.Peter Fazekas - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2303-2321.details
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Are Higher Mechanistic Levels Causally Autonomous?Peter Fazekas & Gergely Kertesz - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):847-857.details
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Causation at different levels: tracking the commitments of mechanistic explanations.Peter Fazekas & Gergely Kertész - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (3):365-383.details
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The dynamical renaissance in neuroscience.Luis H. Favela - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2103-2127.details
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Toward Mechanism 2.1: A Dynamic Causal Approach.Wei Fang - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):796-809.details
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Design principles and mechanistic explanation.Wei Fang - 2022 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 44 (4):1-23.details
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An Inferential Account of Model Explanation.Wei Fang - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):99-116.details
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Waddington redux: models and explanation in stem cell and systems biology.Melinda Bonnie Fagan - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (2):179-213.details
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Stem cells and systems models: clashing views of explanation.Melinda Bonnie Fagan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):873-907.details
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Philosophy of Stem Cell Biology – an Introduction.Melinda Bonnie Fagan - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1147-1158.details
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Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution.Marco Facchin - 2023 - Synthese 203 (1):1-42.details
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Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.details
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Reductionist Challenges to Explanatory Pluralism: Comment on McCauley.Markus I. Eronen - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):637-646.details
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Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.details
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Levels of organization: a deflationary account.Markus I. Eronen - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):39-58.details
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What can polysemy tell us about theories of explanation?Maria Şerban - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):41-56.details
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What is Interpretability?Adrian Erasmus, Tyler D. P. Brunet & Eyal Fisher - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34:833–862.details
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